Senator LONG. Eighty percent go ahead and 20 percent do not. Admiral BUBOSE. In each grade. From lieutenant, junior grade, to lieutenant it is 80 percent. Eighty percent of those go to lieutenant commander. Eighty percent of those go to commander. Mr. WHITEHAIR. Those are Regular officers.

Admiral DUBOSE. The Reserve is proportionately the same.

METHOD OF RECALLING RESERVES OF NAVY AND MARINES

Mr. WHITEHAIR. If I may refer to some statements contained in previous testimony to the effect that the recall of Reserves, insofar as the Navy and Marine Corps were concerned, was a hit-and-miss system, that is about as far from the facts as anything can possibly be.

I wish to emphasize to you, Senator, that careful consideration has been given to hardship cases as well as to essential industry occupations. Right on that point, for example, we will enter into a contract with General Electric for certain types of electronic equipment and along with that, in that contract, we provide for the training of an adequate number of our military or civilian personnel, or both, to handle that type of new equipment as it comes out.

I can understand industry's problems as well, but again and again we have lost on the civilian side-and I have that responsibility, toomany of our graded employees to private industry. We haven't come up here quarreling about it. We are doing the very best we can.

There is a dearth of certain types of highly specialized people. That is readily admitted. Industry is having its problems as well as the military.

In handling these hardship cases we have deferment boards. In the case of enlisted men and officers they have labored long and diligently, that I know of, in considering each case presented to them on the basis of its individual merits, with the following criteria in mind: To meet the immediate requirements of the Navy and at the same time to be fair both to the individual and to the civilian economy. It was inevitable that in all cases the decision could not be favorable to the individual or his employers, and this was undoubtedly the reason for much of the correspondence received by the Congress and we received a considerable amount, too. Actually the Navy's selective recall was a scientific process, as I see it, based on the best utilization of the talents and skills that were available in the Reserve and necessary to fill the complements of the ships and Marine Corps units in order to meet the critical situation of Korea.

And I know of no better demonstration I can possibly give of the necessity to preserve this thing called the Reserve than after Korea, when the Commanding General of the Pacific, then MacArthur, who was backed up against the Sea of Japan in the lower part of that peninsula, ordered an amphibious landing at Inchon. It was the most difficult one that has ever been performed. The Navy got the vessels and the 30,000 marines who landed there, over 50 percent of them were Reserves and had been in civilian clothes about 2 months prior.

NAVY OPPOSES RECALL OF RESERVISTS THROUGH SELECTIVE SERVICE

I also have been informed that it has been recommended in previous testimony that future recall of reservists be screened and adminis

tered by Selective Service. The Department of the Navy is unalterably opposed to this concept. It has been contended that the large pool of manpower and skills which will result from the 8-year obligation under Public Law 51 will be subject to the whim of the military is not lacking in adequate civilian control and supervision. If It must be apparent to anyone familiar with the defense organization and the structure of our Government as now constituted that the military is not lacking in adequate civilian control and supervision. If anything, they are quite aware of that control every hour they work.

The military are responsible to their civilian heads, who in turn are responsible to civilian Secretary of Defense, who is in turn responsible to the Commander in Chief, the President, and to the Congress. It is unbelievable to me that the Navy should be charged with missions vital to the national security and then be denied the tools necessary to its successful accomplishment. In other words, the Navy is charged with training the Reserve in time of peace but then denied the use of the Reserve in the number of skills that would be needed to meet an emergency, except at the discretion of an outside agency not at all responsible to the Navy's mission. Furthermore, such a system would be an administrative nightmare because it would involve the duplication of millions of records, and heavy additional cost to all we people who pay taxes without corresponding benefit that I can see, to the country and its defense.

I know General Hershey and I have great admiration for the accomplishments of the Selective Service System, but I do not consider that it should be interposed between two integral parts of the Navy, namely, the regular Naval Establishment and its Reserve components. I apologize for so much of my testimony being repetitious and cumulative. I do feel this very, very deeply, Senator, and I trust you and your committee will find it necessary to go forward in a favorable way with the enactment of this proposed legislation and at a very early date in a very, very critical insecure period of our history. Thank you. Senator LONG. Do you have any further statement to make in connection with the statement of Under Secretary Whitehair, Admiral? Admiral DuBOSE. I have a statement here which will take about 8 or 10 minutes. It is somewhat repetitious. If you wish to hear it, I will proceed.

Senator LONG. You can either read the entire statement or else we will include the entire statement in the record, and you might comment on those portions that you care to.

USE OF SELECTIVE SERVICE WOULD INTERFERE WITH EFFECTIVE RESERVE

MOBILIZATION

Admiral DuBOSE. My position is that of Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Therefore I am the one responsible for procuring the personnel for the Navy and I am also the one responsible to look after their discharges and releases. So that one thing which concerns me vitally is, of course, the suggestion that we turn over the recall to the Selective Service System.

That concept may appear attractive on the surface but it will not stand up under critical examination and it is totally unacceptable to the Department of Defense, for reasons which I hope to make clear.

Section 201 (a) of the bill that you are considering sets forth the purpose of the Reserve components as follows:

The Congress hereby declares that the Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States are maintained for the purpose of providing trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to meet the requirement of the Armed Forces of the United States in excess of those of the Regular components thereof, during and after the period needed for procurement and training of additional trained units and qualified individuals to achieve the planned mobilization.

It is obvious that a reservist who is not available for active duty, as stated in the declaration of this bill, is of no potential value to the military services and should not be a member of their Reserve components. We must not be misled by our experiences of the past 2 years of limited recalls, when the problem has been one of selectivity rather than ultimate availability. Partial mobilization is a guns and butter problem, and is much more difficult to administer than either guns or butter alone. It requires making distinctions between the relative availabilities of individuals, taking into account both personal and professional circumstances. I fear that earlier witnesses have left with you an implication that no consideration was given to these features in recalling reservists, and that by and large, no selectivity was exercised. This is exactly opposite to the true picture of what has happened.

SELECTIVITY IN RESERVE RECALL

The Secretary has told you about our boards.

Of all the officers whom we have recalled involuntarily, 62 percent have requested deferment, and 62 percent of these requests have been granted in some degree. For enlisted personnel, the similar statistics ar 33 percent and 60 percent. However, I wish to emphasize the fact that under a full mobilization there will be no question of selectivity; we will need all our trained officers and men. Full mobilization is the real purpose for which the Reserve components exist, and it is inconceivable that a military man should not be unquestionably available; that he should have to be screened and certified by a civilian agency. During a partial mobilization, when distinctions are permissible, I firmly believe that the services are in the best position to weigh the military needs versus the individual circumstances. And despite the criticism that has been leveled against us, I believe that we have done a respectable job. Please do not overlook the fact that we had urgent commitments that had to be met.

This brings me to other allegations that have been made before this committee that the services called up veterans and family men while many young men without prior service and without domestic responsibilities stayed home. These veterans are our trained men for whom there is no substitute. No service can double or treble its strength overnight and fight a war with untrained men. This takes time which the reservists provide. In the Navy, approximately 60 percent of the enlisted billets call for petty officers, whom it takes on an average of 2 years to train for the lowest grade. It is very difficult to convince one veteran that his place could not have been taken by one recruit. But it is not hard to understand that 100,000

recruits could not replace the 100,000 trained men that have taken the Navy's ships out of mothballs and into combat. I would like also to assure this committee that these recalls were made on a most austere basis-not what we would have liked to call, but the bare minimum with which we figured we could get by.

POINT SYSTEM FOR RECALL OF RESERVISTS

There has been mentioned a "point system" for priority of recall. This scheme would result in the best-trained men-those most needed— being the least available. This proposition is utterly untenable and vicious, it defeats the very purpose of maintaining the reserve components, and I recommend that this committee dismiss any further. consideration of such a plan.

SELECTIVE SERVICE AND RESERVE MOBILIZATION

Under the present philosophy governing application of the Selective Service principle in this country, civil authority, i. e., local, State and national boards, administers the individual until he passes from civilian status into that of the military, at which point he becomes subject to military administration. While on inactive duty, an officer or enlisted man of the Reserve forces is a civilian in all respects except that he has assumed an obligation to be available for active military service when needed. It is this obligation that sets the reservist apart from the civilian population at large and makes him subject to the jurisdiction not of Selective Service but of the military service of which he is a part.

For the sake of discussion, let us assume that the Selective Service System were to be empowered to select or to pass judgment on the reservists whom the services were privileged to call to active duty. This brings us to a contemplation of the actual mechanics of operation. Upon mobilization the services require all their reserves as individuals possessing definite military qualifications. Their reporting dates must be firmly set, and their distribution must be in accordance with known billet requirements to meet the particular military situation. To achieve this, it is necessary to maintain extensive records of the reserve personnel. Only the custodian of these records is able to identify individuals and issue their orders. It is conceivable that this custodian could relay orders via Selective Service for screening for availability, but this would be a time-consuming and complicated administrative process, and would produce unacceptable uncertainties in results. It therefore becomes evident that the designation of individuals to be recalled must devolve primarily on the services and can be handled effectively only by a direct process. The bill that this subcommittee is considering was designed to provide uniform internal administration of the Reserve components of the various services. The proposal under discussion goes far beyond this purpose and, in my opinion, has no place in this legislation. The purpose of the Armed Forces Reserve Act is to say how the reservists shall be governed, not who shall serve. This latter problem is properly a matter that should be covered in the Universal Military Training and Service Act. If certain categories of reservists are to be

exempted from military duty, that act should provide for their separation from military status.

DONT TAKE AWAY THE MILITARY'S ABILITY TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY

The military departments are charged with the defense of the country in time of war. The Reserve components are an integral part of the organization that is maintained for this mission. They must be kept at adequate strength, and they must be available to meet the purposes for which constituted. Therefore I believe that we are going far astray in our thinking when we entertain any ideas that an outside agency should step in and otherwise allocate the forces that are trained and earmarked for military operations. It would be an excellent start, in my opinion, toward losing a war. It is incomprehensible to me how any one who has investigated this matter and has given serious thought to it, could fail to see the incongruity of such a situation. They may not realize it but they advocate a course of action that would be disastrous to effective mobilization. In my mind, such a procedure would largely destroy the usefulness of the Reserve components to meet the very situation which is the only justification. for their existence.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much for your statement, Admiral DuBose, and also your presentation here, Mr. Whitehair.

I was under the impression that the Selective Service procedure might be the fairest and the most readily acceptable procedure to bring reservists back to the colors, particularly for the Standby reserve; however, just as did the Army and the Department of Defense, you make a strong case in the armed services for the control by the armed services of the calling up of reservists in the event of a limited or complete emergency.

If you care to make any further statements, I would be pleased to hear it for the record; however, I think your position is clear in this matter.

Admiral PHILLIPS. I have a statement, Mr. Chairman, that I do not need to go into. Some of it is repetitious. However, it might be of some information to the committee on the Naval Reserve program. I would like to turn it over for the record.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much.

(The statement submitted by Admiral Phillips follows:)

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM K. PHILLIPS, UNITED STATES NAVY, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NAVAL RESERVE), ON THE NAVAL RESERVE

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAVAL AND MARINE RESERVE

It is my opinion that the Armed Forces Reserve Act is a most desirable piece of legislation that will, if enacted, contribute materially to the over-all development of the Reserve forces. With its passage, it will be incumbent upon the Military Departments to accord their civilian components the full measure of support which is so essential to their effectiveness. In the interest of the individual reservist, it clearly defines his obligations and duties as well as it spells out his rights and privileges. From the standpoint of morale, this is of the utmost importance.

We feel that the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve have been greatly aided in their growth and development by the fact that sound legislation has been provided by the Congress for this purpose. The Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Acts of 1916, 1925, and 1938 have all been progressive measures, each a refinement of its predecessor. It is in the interest of our taking the next step forward