Senator LONG. I certainly hope that the public is not as fickle as the chairman of this subcommittee has been with his witnesses. In each instance I have agreed with the last witness I have heard. I will have to study and think this over longer. [Laughter.] Lieutenant ST. MARY. I would like to point out this was thrashed out at good length in the subcommittee of the House, and the same objections were made except as to the objections on page 22, which have no foundation in fact and are an inaccurate application of the law. I want to thank you very much for hearing me and letting me come back after my illness to speak before you, Senator. Senator LONG. Well, at least the chairman of this subcommittee has this matter straight in his mind for the moment, at least, he believes; and I am sorry that, because of these other obligations and these long hours and other duties of the Senate, other committee members have not been able to hear the testimony. The subcommittee will stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow. (Whereupon, at 11:30 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 10:30 a. m. Thursday, May 29, 1952.) ARMED FORCES RESERVE ACT THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1952 UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D. C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:40 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building. Present: Senator Long (presiding). Also present: Verne D. Mudge of the committee staff. The committee will resume its consideration of H. R. 5426, the Armed Forces Reserve Act. Our purpose today is to hear the views of the administration witnesses in connection with this very important piece of legislation. We purposely have endeavored to give to all of the various groups and associations outside of the Government full opportunity to lay their opinions before us in public hearings before calling upon the administration to give the views of the official sponsors of the bill. Our first witness is the Secretary of Labor. Two of the Nation's major labor organizations have previously testified on the bill, expressing their grave concern as to who will exercise the selective process as to the size of the Reserves, as they gradually increase with the transfer of hundreds of thousands of enlisted men to the Reserve components upon their completion of active service. This is indeed a question of the utmost importance, and we welcome the Secretary's views on this subject. The Secretary of Labor will be followed by the Director of Selective Service. General Hershey needs no introduction before this committee, as we have repeatedly called upon him in times of stress for his sage counsel and sound advice. Before we call on Secretary Tobin, we will insert in the record a letter from Senator Cordon of Oregon, dated May 28, 1952. (The letter referred to is as follows:) Hon. RUSSELL B. LONG, MAY 28, 1952. Chairman, Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR: I shall be indebted if you will present for consideration for your committee, when H. R. 5426 is before you, the following telegram I have received from Maj. Gen. Thomas E. Rilea, the adjutant general of Oregon : Advise we in Oregon are unalterably opposed to H. R. 5426 in present form and strongly urge that the bill be not reported out by committee. This would have a serious effect upon the National Guard In fact, it appears to be just another attempt to scuttle the National Guard. Sincerely yours, GUY CORDON. Senator LONG. Mr. Tobin, we are very pleased to have you here today, and we look forward to your advice on this matter. STATEMENT OF HON. MAURICE J. TOBIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR Secretary TOBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before this subcommittee to present my views on H. R. 5426, the proposed "Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951." FAVORS OBJECTIVES OF H. R. 5426 I am in accord with the objectives of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951 (H. R. 5426) which are: To provide for the more effective utilization of the Reserve components; to assure the maintenance of a strong and vigorous reserve force; and to place all the reserve components of the United States Armed Forces on an equal basis. The passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (Public Law 51, 82d Cong.) introduced a fundamental change in national policy with regard to the maintenance of a military reserve force, establishing a large reserve in which practically all able-bodied young men are required by law to serve for a period of years. This change in national policy makes it imperative that the objectives sought in the bill under consideration be realized. MILITARY RESERVES AS PART OF NATION'S TOTAL MANPOWER RESOURCES While H. R. 5426 appears to take full account of the military implications of the establishment of a large, involuntary reserve force, it does not take account of the implications of such a reserve force for industrial manpower mobilization. In the interest of national security the bill should be strengthened to bring about the most effective use of military reserves as part of the Nation's total manpower re Sources. With a small voluntary reserve such as existed prior to World War II, no reasonable question could be raised concerning the wisdom of requiring its members to be available for immediate recall to active service. Because of the expanded reserve forces following World War II, however, the recall of reserves has presented a substantially different and more difficult problem. Even the limited recall of reservists since Korea has created manpower problems in industrial and research activities; had there been a large scale call-up of Reserves, many activities directly supporting our military forces would have been confronted with a real crisis. Now that the UMTS Act provides for a large reserve force maintained over an indefinite period of years, it is imperative that reserve legislation establish the basic policy that reservists having critical skills be recalled to active duty only after a determination that the Armed Forces have the greatest relative need for their services. According to estimates of the Department of Defense, about 2 million men will be available for entry into the Reserves in 1953, and there will be a steady increase until 1960 when approximately 412 million men will be available to the Reserve. The total Reserve force will be substantially larger than these figures indicate, however, since there is no statutory maximum on the size of the Reserves, and incentives are offered to induce persons to remain in the Reserves after the 8-year period of obligated service. Eventually a very large percentage of all able-bodied men under 30 years of age and a large number of older men will be members of the Reserve force. It must be borne in mind that members of the military reserves will have dual characteristics; they will have military skills acquired in their military service and they will have, in addition, civilian skills acquired through training and experience. Both types of skills may be urgently needed simultaneously by the Armed Forces and by essential defense-supporting activities. How these requirements are reconciled will vitally affect our national strength at a time in which maximum strength may be essential to our survival. Establishment of this policy would in no way impede the rapid and efficient call-up of reserves for military duty. Less than 10 percent of the reservists will possess technical skills of such importance to defense-supporting activities that their recall should be given special consideration. This relatively small number of reservists, however, will in many cases be of far greater service creating the weapons of war than in using them. Scientists and engineers are vivid examples of individuals whose essential contribution to national security in civilian life is often far greater than it could possibly be in the Armed Forces. While reservists have a particular responsibility for defending the Nation against attack, it would be extremely unwise to insist that the responsibility in every case be discharged as a member of the Armed Forces. A time of national emergency, more than any other time, demands that each individual serve in the capacity in which he can make the greatest contribution to the common security. MANPOWER SELECTIVITY NEEDED IN MODERN WARFARE The National Manpower Mobilization Policy recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President on January 17, 1951, declares that in modern warfare adequate manpower for the Armed Forces, war production and essential civilian activities must be regarded as "integral parts of a balanced program." Otherwise, the military effort may fail through lack of effective industrial support. Decisions as to where men's skills can best serve the Nation in time of peril requires intelligent consideration of both military and industrial requirements. Our national policy has been to follow the principle of selectivity in manpower mobilization; World War II experience proved that service in the Armed Forces is not in every case more essential than service elsewhere. Since our military reserves were very small at the beginning of World War II, and the bulk of our military manpower was inducted directly from civilian life, this principle was given effect through the Selective Service System. With the shift to large military reserves subject to call-up by the armed services, it is important that the principle of selectivity which has served this Nation so well in the past be preserved. It has further been our national policy that the decision as to where each individual can serve most effectively should take full account of the needs of the Armed Forces, defense production and essential civilian activities. Objective consideration of military and industrial |