reservist with six or eight children and have another reservist who is a single man and who has the same qualifications, not being called. That did not strike me as right, and that is what we have tried to correct in H. R. 5426.

I did not ever want to see the time again when marine reservists would be called with only 3 days' notice or something like that, and without regard to their family ties or their local or financial or domestic obligations. That seemed to me to be rather brutal and I thought there should be some method in the calling of the Reserves. Now, we have attempted to correct these inequities. We have attempted to write into this bill corrections so that we would organize the Reserves so that you would have your Ready and your Standby Reserves, and each one would know his obligation in the service of our country, and when his time ran out in one category he would be placed in a different category.

That, in my judgment, corrects a great many of the difficulties. It permits the Defense Department to keep up with the location and the occupation and the qualifications of the reservist and the guardsman and it permits a better supervision all around.

Now, there might be some details of the bill at this late date that might be open to some question, but generally speaking we feel it accomplishes its purpose.

We have got to have a Reserve bill if we are going to have a Reserve, because this bill does not call into the Reserve a single individual that is not already in there, nor is the over-all obligation of the reservist increased one bit by this bill.

The guardsmen, for instance, have mentioned to me the fact that the Reserves would be in for 8 years. This bill does not establish the law that the reservist shall serve 8 years in the Reserve. That is set by Public Law 51 and not by this bill.

But this bill does attempt to establish, as to the reservists in the organization, to establish his rights, to establish his duties and his responsibilities and a proper method of handling his obligations.

I want to thank the chairman for letting me say these few words, and I want to say again that we are obligated to the country to pass some kind of legislation to insure that never again shall the Reserves be recalled into active service in the hodgepodge and helter-skelter manner that they were called in at Korea, and if we establish that one obligation by an act such as this, we will have done a great deal for the Reserves of the United States.

Thank you.

Senator LONG. Thank you very much, Congressman Brooks, for your statement in connection with this legislation. We certainly would like to invite you to sit in and hear the remainder of our witnesses if you care to.

We have as our first witness listed this evening Brig. Gen. E. A. Evans, representing the Reserve Officers' Association of the United States. He is the executive director of that association. Will you proceed with your statement, General Evans?

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. E. A. EVANS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

General EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a prepared statement which is somewhat detailed and I will not burden you with the formal reading of this statement, but would ask that it be placed in its entirety in the record at this moment. Senator LONG. That will be done.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. E. A. EVANS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RESERVE FORCES

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, a brief history of the Reserve forces and their development since World War I constitutes the best possible introduction to my statement. This preliminary discussion will also provide answers to the question which you may have in your minds concerning the reason why the reservists of this country are so vitally interested in the passage of H. R. 5426-a bill relating to the Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States.

In 1925 the First Naval Reserve units, as such, were organized. These units consisted of both officers and enlisted men. The Naval Militia had existed for many years prior to this time but it was not until the middle twenties that Federal units came into existence and pay, facilities, equipment, and administrative and training assistance were provided by the Federal Government. It became evident after about 10 years of operation that a revised law was necessary to increase the effectiveness of the Naval Reserve; consequently in 1938 the Naval Reserve Act was passed by Congress.

Following the close of World War II, a board of officiers, both Regular and Reserve, was convened for the purpose of reviewing the 1938 act and recommending any changes that might be needed to meet the situation for the future. This board became known as the Roper board-Admiral Roper being the chairman. This board, after long and arduous deliberations, submitted recommendations which were subsequently introduced in Congress in the form of revised legislation.

No action was taken by Congress on the Roper bill because of the unification program. It was apparent that revisions were likewise necessary to the laws relating to the Army and Air Force and it was decided that a combined bill for all services would be introduced for consideration.

In the meantime, two things had taken place which vitally affected any such proposed legislation. A board was created by the Secretary of Defense originally known as the Civilian Components Policy Board but now known as the Reserve Forces Policy Board. This board, consisting of both Regulars and Reserves of all services, was to act in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of Defense on all Reserve problems. The second happening was the advent of the Korean war. Reservists were called to extended active duty who had just recently served in World War II and who had jointed the Reserves with the tacit understanding that they would not be called unless an all-out emergency existed. Officers and men were called to extended active duty who had received relatively little training and who were not being paid for drills, while in many cases members of organized units were not called to duty. It soon became apparent that if we were to expect to have civilians remain in the Reserve in future years some plan would have to be developed which would protect them from being returned to active duty any time Joe Stalin caused a fire to break out. These reservists felt-and rightly so that their civil vocations could not be continuously jeopardized by partial mobilizations, but on the other hand they would be willing to remain in the Reserves for use in a major emergency when everyone was needed.

Let us turn for a moment to the situation which had existed in the Army and Air Force Reserves since the close of World War I. The Army Reserve system. (the Air Corps then being a part thereof) came into being with the National Defense Act, originally passed in 1916 and revised in 1920. During the period between the two World Wars, the Army Reserve was organized almost entirely

as an officer corps. The officers were assigned to units which trained periodically throughout the year and 2 weeks' active-duty camps were available once every 2 or 3 years.

As an officers corps this group of reservists, numbering around 100,00 active individuals, maintained their efficiency remarkably well under most adverse training conditions, and when they were called to duty in World War II they not only proved themselves professionally but also provided a Reserve of officer strength that was essential to our mobilization in 1940 and 1941.

In 1944 a group of Reserve officers (including National Guard) and Regular officers were convened by the War Department to develop plans for the postwar Army Reserves. This group known as the General Staff Committee on Reserve and National Guard Policies, and commonly known today as the Section V Committee, developed plans for the Army Reserve which differed from the previous concept of the Reserve Corps in two principal features; namely, that there would be not just an officer corps but a Reserve Corps consisting of units made up of both officers and men equipped and trained to meet a future emergency. The second difference was in the concept of the size of the future Reserve. This General Staff Committee on Reserve Policies recognized that there would undoubtedly be a real need in the future for not only an effective Reserve but also a Reserve of a size which had heretofore never been contemplated.

When World War II was over and the wartime Army was disbanded, officers were offered commissions in the Reserve and enlisted men were urged to enlist in the Reserve. Between the Army and the Air many hundreds of thousands of officers and men agreed to become a part of the new Reserve forces. A few years after the close of World War II, the Air Force became autonomous and all of the Army Air Corps reservists became members of the Air Force Reserve. During the years between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, a great deal of dissatisfaction existed among the reservists. They had accepted a commission or enlisted in the Reserves because they felt that it was their patriotic duty to do so. They also felt that if they were to become part of an effective Reserve force they should be organized into units, which units would be furnished with proper facilities and equipment, and that they should receive adequate and practical training. For reasons which are much too lengthy and involved to explain in this statement, the Army and the Air Force failed to produce either a sufficient number of units or methods and means whereby officers and men might be adequately' trained, and, as a result, interest in the Army and Air Force Reserve programs suffered tremendously. The morale of officers became extremely low, and many, thoroughly disgusted with the whole program, failed to maintain their interest, and enlisted men by the tens of thousands failed to renew their enlistments which ran out at the end of 3 years.

In October of 1948, the President of the United States, recognizing the inadequacy of the Army and the Air Force reserve programs, issued an Executive order directing the Secretary of Defense to take steps to correct the situation. Steps were taken to develop new programs for both the Army and the Air Force. After a period of time, these came into being; the Air program in 1949 and the Army program was sent to the field just a few months before the outbreak of the Korean war. Both of these programs were a marked improvement over anything that had been previously developed, and if accomplishing nothing more they at least set forth a firm plan which the reservist might feel would eliminate the consistent changing of programs which had previously existed.

The Korean war brought about a changed situation because it was obvious that reservists in fairly large numbers would be needed on extended active duty, and furthermore, the new conflict pointed up one problem which had heretofore not been contempplated; namely, the possible use of the reserves in a partial mobilization.

THE DRAFTING OF H. R. 5426

We now reach a point where during the first session of the Eighty-second Congress, hearings were held on the revision of the 1948 Selective Service Act, and during the course of those hearings, before both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the Office of Secretary of Defense promised to submit to the Congress an over-all plan for the reserves of all the services. The problem was presented to the Reserve Forces Policy Board and after much deliberation this Board recommended to the Secretary of Defense a number of general policies affecting the reserves. These policies were approved by Secretary of Defense Marshall, and under date of April 6, 1951, these policies were published for the information of all concerned. It was these approved policies that formed the

basis of the Armed Forces Reserve bill which you now have before you for consideration.

The Armed Forces Reserve bill as originally submitted to Congress was entirely rewritten in the Brooks subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. A somewhat unusual procedure was followed by that subcommittee in asking that representatives of the reserve associations sit in with them in the rewriting of the bill. Some 70 days, including a number of evenings, were consumed in rewriting this bill. But when it was completed and put into the form as you now see it, it had the approval of not only the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air, but also had the approval of the reserve associations who were so vitally interested in its passage.

Just what does this Armed Forces Reserve bill provide? And why is it that it has so often been called the "Magna Carta" for the citizen soldier? It is a long bill and contains many items, but I should like, Mr. Chairman, to recite the principal provisions contained therein.

PROVISIONS OF THE BILL

The legislation furnishes clarification of many terms affecting the Reserves, such as active duty, active-duty training, inactive-duty training, partial mobilization, etc. In addition, it gives a clear definition of the mission of the Reserve components and provides that within each Armed Force there shall be a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve.

This bill provides that each member of the Reserve components shall be in an active, inactive, or retired status. Everyone in the Ready Reserve will be in an active status. The Standby Reserve is divided between the active reserve and inactive reserve inasmuch as there exists in the Standby Reserve an inactive status list, and all members of the Reserve components who are on the inactive status list are in the Inactive Reserve, while all other members of the Standby Reserve are in the Active Reserve. Members of the Retired Reserve shall be in a retired status.

Members of the Ready Reserve are subject to call for extended active duty in time of war or in time of national emergency declared by Congress or proclaimed by the President. Members of the Standby Reserve can only be called to extended active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress. Members of the Retired Reserve may, if qualified, be ordered to active duty only in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress. The bill provides a plan whereby, generally speaking, in the early years of a reservist's life he is required to serve in the Ready Reserve, and following that he may, if he so desires, be transferred to the Standby Reserve.

Each Reserve component shall be divided into training categories and the training categories shall be the same for each Armed Force and shall be the same within the Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve.

Each Department shall establish an adequate and equitable system for promotion of members of the Reserve components which shall conform as nearly as practicable to the system of promotion for the regular members of the Armed Forces. It further provides that as a policy there shall be no discrimination between and among members of the Regular and Reserve components in the administration of laws applicable to both regulars and reserves. Legislation has been prepared by the Department of Defense on both of these items and will undoubtedly be heard before the committees of Congress during the next session. In the future a person who has heretofore not held an appointment as a commissioned officer may not be so appointed in a grade higher than major or lieutenant commander except upon the recommendation of a board of officers. After the effective date of the act, all appointments of Reserve officers shall be for an indefinite term, but further, any officer may decline to have his current appointment continued for an indefinite term, if he so requests.

All members of the reserve components, except members of the Retired Reserve, shall be given physical examinations at least once every 4 years.

Any member of the Active Reserve may be ordered to duty for training purposes without his consent for a period not to exceed 15 days annually.

A member of the Reserve components ordered into the active military service of the United States is to be allowed a reasonable period of time between the date he is alerted and the date when he reports for duty. It further provides that this period shall be at least 30 days, unless military conditions do not permit. The bill provides that during any expansion of the active Armed Forces it shall be the policy to utilize to the greatest practicable extent the services of

the qualified and available officers of the Reserve components in all grades. It further provides that where an expansion requires that units be ordered into military service the members of these units shall be ordered involuntarily only with their units, but this shall not be interpreted as prohibiting the reassignment of personnel of such units after they have been placed on active duty.

Provision is made for members of the reserve components to be ordered to or retained on active duty with their consent. It is provided also that such reservists shall be ordered in the grade and status held by them in the Reserve. Members of the reserve components who voluntarily accept active duty may enter into a standard written agreement for periods of active duty up to 5 years. A provision makes it possible for members of the reserve components to be detailed or assigned to any duty authorized by law for officers or enlisted members of a regular component.

The bill provides that during a period of partial mobilization the various Departments would continue to maintain mobilization forces to insure the continued organization and training of the Reserve components not mobilized.

Except under special conditions, a member of a Reserve component serving on active duty in time of war or national emergency shall not be released from active duty except upon the approved recommendation of a board of officers. Provisions have been made in the bill for uniform allowances for all services which would grant an initial allowance and a small continuing allowance upon the completion of each 4 years of satisfactory Reserve service.

Provision is made that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of each military Department shall designate an Assistant Secretary who shall, in addition to other duties, have the principal responsibility for supervision of all activities of the Reserve components. The bill provides further that the Secretary of each military Department shall designate a general or flag officer who shall be directly responsible for Reserve affairs.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board is established, which Board is to be the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters pertaining to the Reserve components. The legislative establishment of the Reserve Forces Policy Board is not to be construed, however, to limit and modify the functions of the Reserve Policy Committees of the various services.

It is required that in the semiannual report of the Secretary of Defense, as presently required by law for submission to the Congress, a chapter shall be devoted to the status of Reserve programs.

Each Armed Force is required to maintain adequate and current personal. records of each member of its Reserve component.

The Secretary of Defense is directed to require complete and up-to-date dissemination of information of interest to the Reserves to be made to all members of the Reserve components and to the public in general.

The various items which have just been stated are the high lights of the bill and they do not reflect all of the intimate details which affect the Reserves. In writing the bill, every effort was made to eliminate provisions which would be left to the discretion of the Secretaries of the Services or the Secretary of Defense for solution. Every possible effort was made to write such provisions into law. This in itself was a marked accomplishment as the reservists will, under this law, be able to understand most clearly their obligations as well as their rights and privileges.

THE READY RESERVE

We would like to call particular attention to one section of the bill which relates to the call of the Ready Reserve. It will be noted that the Ready Reserve can be called to active duty in time of a national emergency proclaimed by the President. This period cannot exceed 24 months; and furthermore, the Congress shall determine the numbers that can be called. This particular section was discussed at considerable length by the House Armed Services Committee. The original bill would have allowed the President to call out the Ready Reserve, and when this was under consideration we were insisting that a limiting size should be placed on the Ready Reserve. It will be noted that no limitation of the size of the Ready Reserve is provided in the present bill and while we are very much interested in the relative size of the Ready and Standby Reserve, we believe that this ratio will solve itself after a few years of operation.

For the record we should like to give our concept of the Ready Reserve and the active portion of the Standby Reserve. This concept was thoroughly dis