'He addressed vows to Priam as a hero or demigod; with the purpose, Arrian says, was restored, of averting the anger of the everliving spirit of the king of antient Troy from the progeny of Achilles of whom, though his mother, he was reckoned to be.'-p. 123.

'But the passage of the Granicus with or without conquest effected, had Memnon's advice only been so far followed that the satraps with their overbearing cavalry bad attended Alexander's march though destroying nothing, but compelling only the removal of supplies removable, that he might possibly have reached Sardis, perhaps the retreat of the Cyreians may show to have been possible; but it would have been slowly, with difficulty, and not without loss.'—p. 181.

These passages (and such are found in almost every page) outrage, it will be seen, not only harmony but even the most common principles of composition. They are absolutely a disgrace to a person of such talents and acquirements as the author of the work before us.

for

Mr. Mitford has applied to this (as well as to his preceding volumes) the title of the History of Greece: he should have denominated it. a Narrative of Alexander's Conquests in Asia; very little is said of the country whose name it bears. He has not presented us with a view of the actual state of opinion, of literature, of manners and of philosophy, during that brilliant period of ancient genius; but merely recounted the distant campaigns of a warrior, the sovereign of a people with whom the pure blood of Hellas disdained confraternity. As well might we call a detail of Buonaparte's battles in Russia a History of France. We must assign a very undue latitude to the meaning of terms, we must expand to an unwarrantable extent the measure of our indulgence if we can allow a partial transaction, a mere episode, to be dignified with the comprehensive title of the History of Greece. Did Greece only exist in Alexander and his thirty thousand followers? Was the whole of its mind and energy and achievements transferred from the banks of the Ilissus to those of the Tigris, during the time of the Macedonian enterprize? We should imagine from Mr. Mitford's narrative that such had been the case; we should never have suspected from his history that the period which it embraces was illustrated by the names of Aristotle, of Menander, of Lysippus and of Apelles; of men who, in philosophy and art, were extending the intellectual boundary of our horizon. Surely the mental conquests of such men were as innocent, and have proved fully as important as the victories of that chief on whom Mr. Mitford has lavished all his attention and all his applause. The labours, the conversation, the example of such men must, beyond a doubt, have influenced, in a very sensible degree, the general tone of the society with which they lived and by which they were admired. A philosophic historian would

un

unquestionably feel it to be not only a duty but a pleasure to examine, by every collateral inquiry within his reach, the sphere of that influence and the effect of that example. Mr. Mitford has passed by all these most interesting topics of investigation without the slightest notice, and has contented himself with repeating the oft-told tale of war and murder, of invasion and conquest.

It must indeed be allowed that, in pursuing this path, Mr. Mitford has only followed the footsteps of many of his historical predecessors. He is not singular in his opinion that history ought to be merely a narrative of actions: but surely it is time to assert for her the high prerogative of being the interpreter of the thoughts as well as the reciter of the deeds of eminent men. The spirit of philosophy is pouring a flood of light upon this as well as upon most other subjects of human investigation; it has guided the researches of several able and excellent writers, and it is preparing the way for greater and more important improvements in this department of knowledge. The student is disgusted with the trite tale of wars and state-intrigues, and he desires to meet, in his historical researches, with personages more interesting and intellectual than commanders of armies and leaders of cabinets.

History conducted on the enlarged and enlightened principle to which we have alluded will go far towards correcting those erroneous opinions which have been transmitted from age to age without examination. It will exalt our ideas of human nature by a picture of its beauties instead of lowering them by an exposition of its deformities. It will give a place in its annals to those most worthy of commemoration, but who have hitherto been rarely introduced, or, if ever admitted, have been dismissed with haste and impatience in order to make way for personages of more splendour and pretension. It will carry us to the closet of the philosopher, and there exhibit him to our view engaged in speculations for the improvement of his fellow-creatures. It will discover the first conception of heroic and virtuous sentiment in the feelings and expressions of the poet, and trace it through the obscurity of ages, until its truth and efficacy are proved by the actions of the patriot. This is no doubt a very difficult task, but it is a necessary one if we would investigate the causes of things and give the meed of commendation to those who deserve it. Why should we perpetuate misrepresentation in history by attributing to the last agent what is due to the prime mover? The firm resolve, the daring valour which win the battle are engendered and nourished by the civil and literary institutions of a country as much as by the mind of the commander. It is the elo

quence

quence of those who, from the fulness of their intellectual stores, pour forth exhortations to virtue and reprehensions of vice, that really restrains the bulk of mankind from crime, and not the warrant of the magistrate. It is the intercourse of original and creative minds that prepares the public disposition for improvement and guarantees the success of change, and not the formal decree of a minister. Public men do little more than take off the impression and perpetuate the traces which have been marked by preceding and superior minds. In short, if, instead of wasting much laborious investigation in tracing political events to their causes, when ninety-nine times out of a hundred it is manifest that the events have depended upon causes beyond all human calculation and control, historians were to follow the first thoughts of reflecting and philosophic understandings through their varying processes and evolutions, and ascertain the degrees of influence which they exerted on different periods and societies till, matured by time, they expanded into the vigour of positive law and active benevolence to coerce and ameliorate mankind; if they were to watch the first feeble efforts of imagination, slowly unfolding its faculties from its embryo state to its perfect development, and estimate the gradual change in public sentiment and feeling, and consequently in action, which such a transmutation would produce, their works would be infinitely more instructive, and the palm would be assigned to those who really deserved it. It would then appear that many of those who have hitherto usurped the first places on the roll of history are in fact not entitled to that preeminence; it would be shown that they have acted only a subordinate part in promoting the advancement of their species; and the great civilizers, the real benefactors of mankind, would be found amongst that class which the historian in general passes by unnoticed, that class which, in silence and solitude maturing the fruits of its speculations, prepares, by its writings, the community for the reception of those truths which confirm its improvement and advance its happiness.

This is the high ground which, in our opinion, History should vindicate to herself; but Mr. Mitford has not chosen such a commanding elevation for his operations, and we must therefore attend him on his own level. We shall not, however, intrude our attendance upon the whole course of his narrative; we shall content ourselves with occasionally commenting upon what appears most obnoxious to criticism. With respect to the narrative in general, we must remark that it presents many obscurities and contradictions, not indeed arising from Mr. Mitford's want of attention or acuteness, but from the character of the writers on

whom

whom he is obliged to depend for his authorities; writers, whose national pride was too nearly interested in the statements they have left us, to make us feel satisfied of their impartiality. When the accounts of the same transactions by Persian historians (if such accounts exist) shall be revealed to us by the labours of our Eastern scholars, then, and not till then, shall we be able to form a sound and unbiassed judgment of the talents and weaknesses, the achievements and failures of the Macedonian hero.

Mr. Mitford commences the volume now before us with some account of the Macedonian government. It is meagre and unsatis-. factory, but as good, we believe, as the scantiness of the facts we possess will allow us to expect. On this subject very little information can be obtained from the writer from whom it would naturally have been expected, Aristotle. That philosopher's usual acuteness seems indeed to desert him when he treats of political matters. According to his theory all states should be small republics. He maintains that slavery is reasonable and necessary and natural, and enacts, by the laws of that constitution which he offers as approaching nearest to perfection, that a few freemen should be served by slaves. As well might it be proposed,' observes Mr. Mitford, in modern times that Geneva, Lucca or Ragusa should defy surrounding nations with their own force, as his republic; yet alliance and confederacy seem to have been out of his contemplation. It might indeed be supposed that, intent on physics and metaphysics, he had neglected observation of politics, and wrote [written] on from fancy, did not his work show that he had been diligent in using his large opportunities for collecting facts among the transactions of the various states around him on which to ground them.'-p. 8.

The writings of Aristotle are deficient in an account of the contemporary governments, but these must have been in a very low and degraded state if we may judge from the amendments. which he proposes to engraft on their constitution. The first. philosopher of his age, the friend and preceptor of the two princes. most considerable for power and talents at the time when he wrote, the sage whose dicta were received as oracles, seriously proposes, not as a mere experimental alteration, but as a clear, unequivocal improvement of all the governments with which he was acquainted, a form of polity by the laws of which (as we have just seen) freemen were to be served by slaves. If such was to be the amended form, what must have been the original structure? Aristotle's general opinions upon government seem indeed to have been singularly crude and unsettled. He considers the existence of an absolute monarchy as quite ideal. Why? Because an individual cannot rule multitudes without the consent

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of some amongst them, on whom, therefore, he is in effect dependent, and consequently not absolute. It is evident that, if this reasoning be allowed, we may prove that no man has the absolute control over his own actions, for he cannot accomplish the most trivial one without the direct or indirect co-operation of his fellows. Allegiance, according to the same philosopher, may be withdrawn from a king: monarchical authority is not to be supported by force; but, for the maintenance of a republic, violence is admissible. Why this distinction? Is it consistent with his former sentiments? We should, on the contrary, have expected that the advocate for the right of freemen to be served by slaves would have provided for the security of individual power and have left the many unprotected.

Aristotle does not afford us any information on the constitution of the Macedonian government, and Arrian only occasionally touches upon the subject. We collect, however, from his writings that it was a limited monarchy. The Macedonians were a military people, and their military character was supported by popular institutions similar to those of a republic.'-p. 25. Their armed force consisted of national troops without any admixture of foreign soldiers. Such an institution was of rare occurrence amongst the Greeks. Diodorus and Curtius also mention popular assemblies as a part of the civil polity. To the people was confided the decision upon life and death; and for the execution of the king's decree the sanction of the law was necessary. 'Hardly,' says Mr. Mitford, have we equal proof that equal security for individuals was provided by law in any republic of Greece.'-p. 28. 6 Altogether,' he observes, the Macedonian constitution appears to have borne a very near resemblance to that of the modern European kingdoms in early times; when the combined civil and military powers were divided among lordships, similar in essence though various in denomination, dukedoms, marches, earldoms, baronies, all of limited monarchal character, intermingled among which the corporate towns had constitutions truly republican.'-pp. 32-34. The Macedonian monarchs derived their revenue from very extensive landed possessions, and no other source is indicated except taxes on importation and exportation.

A few particulars are given on the composition of Philip's court. The native Macedonians were in manners rude and unpolished, and it was the object of that sovereign to civilize them by intermixture with the more refined classes of southern Greece. He invited to his court philosophers and men of letters who had been formed in the schools of the polished republics, and a chosen number of these (amongst whom we find the name of Æschines) was associated under the title of the king's companions. It ap

pears