We may here note, that, even at this early period, arose the germ of that cause of dissention between the States and the general government, which have produced, at several subsequent eras, controversies, questions and parties, that have inflamed the minds of the people, and endangered the peace and permanency of the Union. In Washington, his advocacy of consolidated power in the union was a prejudice of the purest patriotism, combined with a military love of energetic power, which had its origin not less in his desire to vanquish, by a single blow, the enemies of his country, than the thirst of acquiring glory by brilliant feats of arms, or decisive victories, or trophies of valour, skill and patriotism. Still, however, it had so much influence, as indeed all his opinions had, whether founded in reason or engendered by prejudice and habit, as to prove the foundation of a party, which embraced nearly all the wealth, talent and intelligence, arrayed on the side of the whig population: for, such was the confidence reposed in him such the idolatrous affection cherished for his virtues, his talents and his patriotism, that reason itself shrunk from the task of testing the soundness of his opinions; while justice always took it for granted, that what Washington decreed could not be wrong, and that what he uttered was alike sanctioned by truth, and confirmed by honesty. With such a moral weight of popular power attached to his name, it was natural that all who partook of the same military ardour, the same love of energetic authority, and the same desire to behold the American army a colossal engine of stupendous power, should coincide in views which aimed to concentrate all the energies of the States in the grand focus of the general government, presenting the magnificent spectacle of a consolidated empire, compensating by its vigour and effect for the absence of that freedom, which, while it relapses, enfeebles; and while it protects, often leads to momentary distraction, or casual licentiousness.

It was natural, however, that the principal advocates for this consolidated power in the union, should be found among the officers of the army, or those invested with authority under the confederacy; for the States, and the people of the States generally, do not appear to have implicitly adopted the sentiments of Washington upon this question. Marshall, who had embraced the views of Washington in their widest extent, has the following passage, which shows

that even in that crisis of unexampled danger to the liberty and independence of the country, the States were decidedly opposed to the plan of consolidation. He says, the solicitude of the State governments to retain within their respective limits, and for partial objects, a part of the force raised for the general defence, was not the only interference with the plan formed by the commander in chief for the conduct of the ensuing campaign.' The other interference to which Marshall alludes, was a resolution of Congress of the 10th of April, 1777, that a camp be immediately formed on the western side of the Delaware, to which the continental troops in Philadelphia, and on their march from the southward and westward, should be ordered to repair with all expedition.'

The plan of the campaign formed by Washington, was to take possession of Middlebrook, on the high grounds to the north of Brunswick, as a point from which he might with facility move to the highlands on the Hudson; anticipating that the enemy would move in that direction, which induced him to request Congress that the camp on the west of the Delaware might be composed of militia.

In May, he broke up his winter camp at Morristown; and on the 28th of that month took post on the heights of Brunswick, with an army amounting to 8000 men, 2000 of whom were on the sick list, and a large proportion raw recruits, foreigners, and servants, in whom the General does not seem to have reposed confidence. General Arnold, who was at that time in Philadelphia, was invested with the command of the camp on the west bank of the Dela

ware.

The object of the campaign, on the part of the British commander, was the acquisition of Philadelphia, having first subdued New Jersey, then crossing the Delaware on a portable bridge, and proceeding on to the city; hoping that, by this measure, the American army could be brought to a general action on equal ground, when, by its signal defeat, the war would be brought to a close.

Washington now occupied his strongly fortified camp at Middlebrook, to attack which was full of danger; and yet to pass on to the Delaware, and leave the American army in his rear, was not in accordance with the prudent temper of General Howe; he, therefore, determined to try the effect of manoeuvre, in enticing Washington out of his

encampment; but Washington penetrating the object of the enemy, remained immovable in his camp; and Howe, not inclined to give his adversary any advantage, retired suddenly to Amboy; whence, after several manœuvres and some skirmishing, Howe crossed his army to Staten Island on the 30th of June, preparatory to embarking his forces for the Delaware, or Chesapeake. Uncertain, however, as to the final destination of the British army, Washington made his dispositions for any contingency that might occur; and advised Congress to make every preparation to ward off the expected blow from Philadelphia.

Whilst Washington moved towards the Delaware to meet Howe, who had embarked his army for that destination, he despatched Major Generals Arnold and Lincoln, to the east, to hold Burgoyne at bay; for which purpose he weakened his own army, in the hope of defeating the plans of Burgoyne.

On the 30th of July, the British fleet was discovered off the Capes of Delaware; when Washington immediately commenced his march in person for the neighbourhood of Philadelphia.

Howe, deterred from entering the Delaware by the supposed difficulties of its navigation, again put to sea and steered for the Chesapeake, which he did not reach till the 16th of August.

In the mean time, Washington inspected the defensible points of Philadelphia, and recommended Red Bank and Mud Island, as positions from which to defend the river, should the British menace that quarter. In the interval of Howe's passage to the Chesapeake, a variety of rumours and conjectures distracted the American army, as to his final destination; but Washington, with his usual perspicacity, remained firm in the conviction, that the acquisition of Philadelphia was the real object of the enemy.

On the 24th of August, Washington marched through Philadelphia, on his way to meet the enemy, who the next day landed eighteen thousand men at Elk river ferry, consisting of the flower of the British army, in excellent spirits, sound health, and among the best disciplined troops in Europe.

The American army, including the militia, which had been carefully summoned, did not exceed eleven thousand men, and took a position in the rear of Red-Clay Creek,

having its left at Newport, on the Christiana, and on the main road to Philadelphia, from the camp of General Howe. At this post, Washington resolved to dispute the possession of Philadelphia with the British General; but, upon a closer insight into his plans, he thought it prudent to change his position, and take up his post behind the Brandywine, on the height extending from Chadd's ford.

On the 11th of September, Howe, at the head of the British, attacked and defeated the forces under Washington, on the Brandywine, compelling the Americans to retreat to Chester, and on the next day to Philadelphia. Many of the troops of Washington displayed the coolness and courage of veterans; whilst others fled ignominiously upon the first approach of the enemy. The Americans suffered a loss of three hundred killed and six hundred wounded; whilst that of the British was not more than one-third.

From Chester he retired to a camp near Germantown, where, having reposed his troops, he recrossed the Schuylkill, and advanced on the Lancaster road, in the expectation of meeting the enemy, with whom he was desirous of trying the fate of another battle.

On the 15th of September, Washington reached the Warren tavern, and on the 16th Sir William Howe advanced to meet him, when an action commenced; but a heavy rain coming on, separated the combatants, and the Americans were forced to retreat, their ammunition having been rendered totally unfit for use. Washington now retreated to Warwick Furnace, on French Creek, there to renew his munitions, and replace the arms that had been injured by the rains, the severity of which had prevented the enemy from making any immediate pursuit; but the weather having mended, Howe continued to advance upon the American general, who, prudently declining an action, although public opinion would have urged him to the peril, Howe crossed the Schuylkill, and advanced towards the city; but Washington, after the most mature deliberation, came to the conclusion not to risk a general engagement; a decision which, no doubt, led to the ultimate salvation and triumph of the cause of American Independence. A council of war confirmed him in the wisdom, policy, and patriotism of this course; for his troops were badly clothed, worse armed, harassed, fatigued, and weakened by absent detachments and recent losses.

On the 26th of September, Lord Cornwallis took possession of Philadelphia without opposition.

Criticism and censure, on the part of British writers, have been lavishly heaped upon Washington, and extravagant praise bestowed upon General Howe, on the occasion of the victorious approaches of the latter to the capital of the United States. But, on the part of Washington, his army is known to have been so inferior in force, as well as equipment, to the English general, as to furnish ample excuse for his failure to arrest the progress of the enemy towards Philadelphia. If he was out-generalled' at the battle of Brandywine, it was not so much owing to superior military genius in Sir William Howe, as to his having command of superior numbers, superior facilities, troops who were disciplined, and well provided, and officers who were experienced, well trained, and exuberantly supplied with every appliance and means to secure victory by force, or effect it by stratagem. On the part of Washington, the patriot drops the tear of mortification over the lamentable deficiencies, wants, and inconveniences, that obstructed his motions, baffled his manœuvres, defeated his plans, and circumvented his genius; but there was one thing which all his wants and disadvantages could not subtract from, or impair-a mind endowed with invincible courage, sublime fortitude, exhaustless resources, and indomitable patriotism.

The next event of importance which marked the life of this illustrious man, was the Battle of GERMANTOWN, in the arrangement of which that consummate skill of generalship was displayed, of which his English detractors had attempted to strip him at the battle of Brandywine, and which will ever remain as a memorable instance of that happy faculty of surprising an enemy, which formed in Washington so prominent a feature of his military character. That it miscarried, as it respected the splendid results anticipated, is solely to be ascribed to that want of experience, discipline, and training, that constituted so vital a defect of the continental army, assisted by those natural disadvantages which arose from the heavy fog of the atmosphere, and the difficulties of the ground, upon which the troops were destined to operate. Yet the 4th October will ever remain a memorable day in the life of the father of his country.

In this battle, the British lost five hundred in killed and wounded; the Americans sustained a loss of two hundred killed, and six hundred wounded.