of course, the militia may be nationalized and federalized, as we call it, and in that event, of course, the Congress would have control. But to that extent, according to the interpretation of Houston v. Moore (5 Wheat., pp. 1 to 6), an early case-of course, I guess there are a whole lot of Supreme Court rulings, but under that the Court said: Congress has the power for organizing, arming, and disciplining them, and this power being unlimited except in two particulars of officering and training them, according to the discipline to be prescribed by Congress, it may be exercised to any extent as may be deemed necessary by Congress. The power of the State governments to legislate on the same subjects having existed prior to the formation of the Constitution and not having been prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the States, subordinate nevertheless to the paramount law of the General Government operating on the same subject. Now that is substantially the comments on it. I thought that ought to go in the record, so somewhere we would know just what the constitutional provision is. Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, may I observe on that? I agree with your position on it, but I still say that in order to have Federal recognition of these individual officers, then they must come up to certain standards. And that was the point I was making. Mr. BROOKS. I understand the point the gentleman is making. Just how far we can constitutionally go toward controlling the guard by saying we will deny Federal recognition if they don't come up to a certain point, I don't know. That will be a court decision. But I would gather, from reading that constitutional provision, that the States will control the officering of the guard, whether it be promotion or otherwise. Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Chairman, would you mean by that that State standards for officers of the National Guard will supersede Federal standards? Mr. BROOKS. I mean that the Constitution gives the States the authority to nominate to appoint the officers. Now what we can do toward taking that away from the States, I don't know. Mr. OSMERS. I don't know as we want to take it away from the State. We have a responsibility here, as I see it, which gets pretty far away from some of the things that are said in a discussion of this subject. We have a responsibility to provide for an adequate national defense and also to see that no American is put on a battlefield without adequate training or supervision. I think it is on that basis. that we would have to approach any suggestion with regard to the personnel of the officers of the National Guard. Mr. BROOKS. I think thus far we have done this. The States have come along voluntarily with us in naming the standards, and we have then said, "If you don't accept the standards of the officers and the personnel of the guard we will deny the money that we give to that. training purpose to the State." Now that is the way we have done. And so the States have found it convenient and advisable to go along with us. Mr. DEVEREUX. Can we have any Kentucky colonels? Mr. DUCANDER. I think that is the answer to it. Mr. BROOKS. Anyway, I think that ought to be in the record. Now, gentlemen, what is it you want to give us in executive session, Mr. Secretary? Secretary MILTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to show three charts which I think brings the Army problem into very sharp focus. Initially, in the deliberations of this committee, and I go back several years now, our attention was concentrated upon numbers. We are beginning to grow and grow rather rapidly, and we feel that the time has come when we ought to put a qualitative as well as a quantitative requirement upon our Reserve components in order that they can best meet the needs of national defense. I want to show you just 3 charts in quick succession, 2 of which are confidential and the last one is secret. Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Secretary, you have screened everybody here? Secretary MILTON. I am told that has been done. Mr. BROOKS. All right. Secretary MILTON. The last one in particular, if it became public information, could lend aid and comfort to a potential enemy and that is the reason why I just had to ask you if you would see these in executive session. I am going to ask General Abrams if he will speak to the charts, and I am going to ask him to shorten any discussion on the second one because it is a rather complex one and in detail that I don't think the committee is particularly interested in. However, if you are, please don't hesitate to interrupt us. General ABRAMS. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to speak off the record, because the substance is classified? Mr. BROOKS. All right, general, go right ahead. When you don't want Sam to take down the comment you just say so. Otherwise, he will go ahead and reduce your comments to writing. But it won't be publicized, it won't be given out without the permission of the Secretary or yourself. General ABRAMS. All right, may I speak off the record. (Remarks off the record.) (The reporter was excused at 4: 30 p.m.) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE No. 1, Washington, D. C., Thursday, February 7, 1957. The subcommittee reconvened at 10 a. m., Hon. Overton Brooks, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. Mr. BROOKS. The subcommittee will please come to order. I promised a good friend and colleague, Congressman Rogers, from Colorado, that we would recognize him the first thing this morning. You have a short statement? Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman? Mr. ROGERS. For the record, my name is Byron G. Rogers, Representative from the First District of Colorado. I have a letter and a statement from Maj. Gen. Irving O. Schaefer, the adjutant general of the State of Colorado, that I would desire to place in the record at this time, that is at this point. Mr. BROOKS. If there is no objection, the statement will be inserted in the record. Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. Mr. BROOKS. We will see that the members of the committee have the statement, Mr. Rogers. We are certainly glad to have it and commend you and your district for diligence in your actions, in coming before this subcommittee and giving us your views. Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. (The letter and statement is as follows:) STATE OF COLORADO, Denver, Colo., January 31, 1957. ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, COLORADO NATIONAL GUARD, Hon. BYRON G. ROGERS, House Office Building, Washington, D. C. DEAR BYRON: I am writing in reference to the remark made by Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson that during the Korean episode National Guard men were draft dodgers. For your information, in 1950, and 1951, 60 percent of all the Colorado Army and Air National Guard units were called to active duty; the total aggregate of officers and men called was 2,242 Colorado Army and Air National Guard men. None of our Colorado units was sent to Korea, but a very high percentage of our personnel were sent there as replacements. Several of our draft dodgers met their deaths in Korea. In October of 1950, I attended an adjutants general session in Washington, D. C., and we were addressed by Generals Omar Bradley and John Lawton Collins. The adjutants general informed both of these general officers that we desired that they call all of the National Guard and not make it a piecemeal call. I distinctly remember General John Lawton Collins addressing us and stating that the Army did not need all of the National Guard and furthermore, some of the National Guard should be left in the United States as a Continental Army Reserve. Mr. Wilson has also stated to the press that 84 percent of National Guard men were untrained. In making a hasty check of personnel figures of the Colorado National Guard, I find that 50 percent of the Army Guard has had some type of active duty and about 70 percent of our Air Guard has had some type of active duty. All our units are also subject to an annual armory inspection. These inspections are not under control of the State but are inspections ordered by the Army commander. A Regular Army officer is assigned to make these inspections. Below are ratings of our annual army inspections for 1955 and 1956. It should be observed that there were more units concerned in 1956 than in 1955. This was due to the conversion of our State to Artillery. Ratings are given as follows: superior, excellent, satisfactory and unsatisfactory. It will be noted that for 1956, 83 percent of our units received either excellent or superior; 17 percent received satisfactory and there were no unsatisfactory ratings. If Mr. Wilson's remarks are true, then there must be something wrong with Fifth Army in our annual ratings. Of course, my personal opinion is that Mr. Wilson is receiving some very bad information in the Pentagon. In a previous letter to you on January 15, I informed you that the adjutants general are opposed to mandatory 6 months basic training and in this letter I stated that in 1956 we recruited about 1,000 young men for the Army and Air National Guard, and yet we were only able to get 30 of these men to volunteer for 6 months' basic training. I should like to refer you to enclosure 1, which shows the number of National Guard recruits that have volunteered for 6 months' basic training from August 1955 to December 1956. In the entire National Guard we have only been able to get approximately 9,000 young men to take the 6 months' basic training program. Bear in mind, as I stated in my previous letter to you, in 1956 we recruited 144,000 young men for the entire National Guard. I should like to now refer you to enclosure 2, which shows the number of basic training from July 1956 through December 1956-in other words, a 6 months' period. It should be noted that in Colorado, we were able to get 7 to volunteer. the Army Reserve were able to obtain 133. However, in this same period of time, we recruited about 275 young men for the Colorado Army National Guard. It is very evident that even if we should get all of the Army Reserve input, we would still suffer a loss in strength. We are not opposed in the National Guard to basic training and basic training that will be given in vacation period in June, July and August. We in the Guard are training to be realistic. We know what we can do and the Pentagon does not know. I personally feel that the office of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army are either bullheaded or trying to destroy the National Guard. The point I am trying to make is that the 6 months' basic training program is not attractive to young men or the parents of these men. If the Army Reserve were able to get a mass of recruits out of this program, then I would say we in the guard are falling down, but the Reserve is not having any luck with their program. I should like to refer you now to enclosure 3, which is a basic training program that we have recommended to the Secretary of the Army. This program was unanimously adopted by the Adjutants General on Wednesday, January 23. In the program we are endorsing a mandatory 11-week basic training program for all our prospective recruits. If you will be so good as to inform the House Armed Services Committee of how I personally feel on the 6 months' basic training program, I should be most appreciative to you. I believe hearings have been directed by Chairman Vinson to start on Monday, February 4. Sincerely, IRVING O. SCHAEFER, Major General, Colorado National Guard, Number of National Guard recruits volunteering for 6 months' training, Number of National Guard and Army Reserve units volunteering for 6 months" training July 1956 through December 1956 PROGRAM ENDORSED BY THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL On Wednesday, January 23, in a special session in Washington, D. C., the adjutants general unanimously adopted the minority report of the National Guard officers of the section 5 policy committee. This is our plan for basic training. We all feel that if a 6-month basic training program is forced upon us, it will eventually destroy the National Guard. Here is our proposal: 1. That all men age 182 to 25 years now in (as members before April 1, 1957) be permitted to take 6 months' active duty for training on a voluntary basis, provided they have not already had active duty for training. 2. All men age 18 to 25 years who are enlisted on or after April 1, 1957, be required to take 6 months' active duty for training as a mandatory condition to their enlistment. 3. All men age 17 to 18 years who are enlisted on or after April 1, 1957, be required to take 11 weeks of active-duty for training as a mandatory condition to their enlistment. These men may volunteer for 6 months active-duty training. 4. All men age 17 to 181⁄2 years now in (as members before April 1, 1957) be permitted to choose either 11 weeks' active-duty training or 6 months' activeduty training, on a voluntary basis. Mr. BROOKS. Now this morning, gentlemen of the subcommittee, we have Maj. Gen. Edgar C. Erickson, Chief of the National Guard Bureau. He is the first witness this morning. Do you have pictures you want to show us, General? Are you going to use that screen? General ERICKSON. Yes, sir. Mr. BROOKS. Fine. Do you have a prepared statement? You do, because we have a copy of it here. General ERICKSON. That is right. Mr. BROOKS. Will you proceed, sir, with your prepared statement? General ERICKSON. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, it is a privilege for me to appear before this committee to report on the efforts of the National Guard Bureau to support the recruiting efforts |