without having to depend upon each separate State militia organization to carry on a war. The function of planning has been given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And the liability of all male citizens for military duty, an obligation deriving from earliest Anglo-Saxon and Colonial days, has been recognized and accepted. In general, these improvements pertain to the organization, administration, and training of men after they have been called for military service. The problem of trained reserves from which armies may be quickly mobilized for modern warfare is still in the process of study and evolution. Historically, we have rejected the idea of maintaining a large standing army with its professional soldiers dominating the issues of war and peace, with its economic burden to the people, and the undemocratic tendencies implicit in such a military organization. Instead, we have held to the idea of a small standing army which, in time of need, can be reinforced by citizen-soldiers who are able to make a contribution to all levels of military affairs. The small army augmented by citizen reserves is a tradition of American military and political affairs, but this "well-regulated militia" recommended by George Washington must mean, in its modern context a "well-trained" citizen reserve capable of functioning immediately and effectively in the event of nuclear warfare. The answer to the question of what is a "small" standing army in terms of the present international situation and of the capacity of our economic system to maintain it, is approximately 2.9 million for activeduty forces and 2.9 million for Reserve strength. Actual size is, of course, relative to the threat of war, the firepower of modern weapons, the number of men in the military manpower pool, and the state of the economy. Military strength statistics may change somewhat from time to time; but the concept of a minimum hard core of regular forces which can be augmented in times of stress by trained reserves is still valid as a working military manpower policy. The test of a Reserve system is the speed with which men and machines can be mobilized for effective combat if war comes. Selective Service is not the entire answer to this question because it takes time to raise and train men, and the nub of the issue is whether or not the Reserve Forces will be composed of trained men. Our present answer to the question of who is to constitute the Reserves, and how they are to be trained and organized, lies largely in the provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, and the amendments to both these laws made by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. The concept of training for the Reserves alone has been extended, and the choices of military service for those who have an obligation have been increased. The law is explicit with regard to the fact that a man discharged from active duty is required to participate in Reserve training, and implements this obligation with a penalty which is deemed to be administratively practicable. By providing a combination of incentives and compliance features, it is hoped that the operation of the law will result in strengthening the Reserve Forces. The legislative task of dealing with the complicated problems of military manpower is always difficult. There are several reasons why difficulties may be expected when legislation is being formulated on this subject. There are many variables in the operating situation at any one time, and these are in the nature of social and economic changes which cannot be precisely controlled and to which adjustments must therefore be made. The international situation may become more tense or it may clear up to the point where some steps may be taken to reduce armaments. The employment level in the United States may go up or down with consequent effects upon enlistment rates in the active forces. Success in promoting career benefits in the Armed Forces may cause an increase in the reenlistment rate, thus affecting the forecasts of the numbers of trained men available in the military services; on the other hand, a decrease in the reenlistment rate can result in larger monthly induction notices by the Selective Service. System. The relationship between the numbers of men needed for defense production and those who are needed for combat training must always be kept in balance. Deferment and exemption policies may change with the size of the manpower pool, and the pool itself is subject to increasing or decreasing with the rise or fall in the birthrate. The existence of all these variables helps to explain why, in the field of military manpower, it cannot be expected that one answer can be given one problem for an indefinite period of time. Sudden or unusual changes in any of these factors, or in a combination of them, produce both administrative and legislative repercussions. The changing nature of warfare affects calculations with regard to the numbers of men necessary for the active and reserve forces. Assumptions based upon fighting a war with nuclear or conventional weapons, fighting overseas or on our homeland following a sudden attack, and the length of time such a war might last-all such assumptions underlie decisions on the necessary size of the active forces and the desired size of the Ready Reserve. New weapons, planes, ships, and missiles may call for more or fewer numbers of men, and may change the ratio between the active and reserve forces. The main purpose of having a Ready Reserve is to have additional strength to defend the Nation in time of war, and the legislative authorization for strength, equipment, and facilities must constantly be correlated with the kinds of military action that may be called for. Such operations must be calculated on the basis of the probable nature of a nuclear war the kind of war that has never been fought but for which men must be trained and equipped. The different Reserve requirements of the military services result not in one but in several Reserve "problems." The differences themselves stem from the need to be prepared for sudden, nuclear warfare and the timing with which the forces-in-being and the Reserves of each service are to be used. Interservice differences as to Reserve requirements do not arise because of psychological conflicts, but are inherent in the fact that each service has a stated function and a definite concept of the requirements essential to the performance of its role and mission. This situation presents a complication for the lawmakers. If strengthening the Reserve forces is defined as one problem, then the proposed law must be permissive enough to permit variations among the service Reserve programs, specific details being worked out in regulations made by the three service Secretaries. The problem involved in such a situation is the difficulty of achieving uniformity in the impact upon the individual if the regulatons are very different as between the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. If, on the other hand, the strengthening of the Reserves is defined as several problems, the legislative task is to devise a series of laws which will dovetail into one integrated pattern. If any one of the proposals fails of passage, there may be a missing link in the total chain of projected legislative development. In the military manpower field, this difficulty is usually inherent because there are so many related factors which must necessarily be incorporated in separate laws―career compensation, fringe benefits, and military construction, to mention only a few. Another inherent difficulty is the problem of achieving equity in the application of a law to an individual or a group, for the conditions under which rules and regulations operate may change so that what appears to be equitable in one situation may not turn out to be so in another. If the size of the manpower pool is much greater than the numbers of men actually needed in the Armed Forces in time of peace, then some men will be called while others who are equally qualified may not receive notices to report for induction. If, on the other hand, a proposal is made that all men in a specified age group are to receive equal minimum training, objections are raised by those who oppose universal military training as well as by the services which want fewer men trained in highly specialized skills. Sometimes equity is thought of as "equal exposure to hazardous duty," but the hazards do not exist everywhere simultaneously, and in a nuclear war it would be quite possible for the inhabitants of a city to be bombed while some military personnel were "safe" in a nuclear submarine or on a base that was not attacked by the enemy. In a situation characterized by changing and conflicting values, the Constitution provides guidance, directing the Congress "to provide for the common defense"-the main objective of all military manpower legislation. As in other areas with which legislation is concerned, military manpower laws must be supported by what Mr. Justice Holmes called a preponderant public opinion. Such opinion has been in the process of being formulated and of making an adjustment to the continuing threat posed by aggressive communism, and is now much more firm in supporting an adequate and stabilized Military Establishment than it has been throughout the greater part of the Nation's history when the threat of war was intermittent. Even so, a very careful balance must be struck between compulsory and voluntary provisions by which the citizen may discharge his military obligation. The legislative process in this field, as much if not more than in any other, must weigh the testimony of organized groups representing educational, religious, occupational, and military opinions. Special legislation is often requested and the need for adjusting to such problems as school terms, conscientious objectors, skilled workers for industry, and military preparedness, is carefully met during committee hearings on proposed bills. Whatever the difficulties inherent in the problem of formulating legislation on military manpower, the fact remains that legislation alone is not the answer to all the problems. Success depends also upon a combination of leadership and morale, good programs and adequate appropriations, wise departmental regulations and administration, facilities and equipment, and public understanding. Through the oversight of its Committees on Armed Services, Congress is keeping constantly in touch with the implementation of the laws designed to strengthen our Reserve Forces, and is thus exercising its responsibility under the Constitution "To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces" (art. I, sec. 8 (14)). BIBLIOGRAPHY SELECTED REFERENCES ON UNITED STATES MILITARY POLICY ON RESERVE FORCES American Selective Service: a brief account of its historical background and its probable future form. Prepared under the supervision of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee. October 1939. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939. 33 p. Ansell, S. T. (Major and Judge Advocate). Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia. Yale Law Journal (New Haven, Conn.) April 1917. Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 471-480. The Army Almanac, a book of facts concerning the Army of the United States. Compton, Karl T., Chairman. A program for National Security. Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training. May 29, 1947. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947. 448 p. Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 2d session, vol. 59, p. 5391; 81st Congress, 2d session, vol. 96, Part 1. p. A-567. Crowder, E. H. (Major General) The Spirit of Selective Service. New York, Century Co., 1920. 367 p. Department of Defense Policies Relating to the Reserve Forces. Approved April 6, 1951. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. 20 p. Duggan, Joseph C. The Legislative and Statutory Development of the Federal Concept of Conscription for Military Service. Washington, D. C., Catholic Univ. Press, 1946. 178 p. Economics of National Security. Edited by George A. Lincoln, William S. Stone, Thomas H. Harvey. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951. 601 p. Eliot, George Fielding. The Ramparts We Watch: a study of the problems of American national defense. New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1938. 370 p. Ganoe, William Addleman (Major). The History of the United States Army. New York, D. Appleton, 1924. 609 p. Herring, E. Pendleton. The Impact of War. New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1941. 306 p. Huidekoper, Frederic Louis. Is the United States Prepared for War? Introduction by Hon. William Howard Taft. New York, North American Review Publishing Co., May 1907. 47 p. Huidekoper, Frederic Louis. The Military Unpreparedness of the United States: a history of American land forces from colonial times until June 1, 1915. New York, Macmillan, 1915. 735 p. McMaster, John B. History of the People of the United States during Lincoln's administration. New York, D. Appleton, 1927. 693 p. Military Laws of the United States (Army). Prepared in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. Ninth edition, Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949. 1913 p. Morison, Samuel Eliot and Henry Steele Commager. The Growth of The American Republic. New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1942. Vols. 1 and 2. National Guard. Annual reports of the Chief, National Guard Bureau. Issued by fiscal years. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office. National Guard. Title 10 and title 32, United States Code. An act to revise, codify, and enact into law, title 10 of the United States Code, entitled "Armed Forces" and title 32 of the United States Code, entitled "National Guard." |