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except for those with critical specialties needed for military duty, they could be released "upon completion of seventeen or more months of active duty since June 25, 1950..." (Public Law 51, 82d Cong.). Calls upon Selective Service for increasing numbers of men occurred throughout 1950 and 1951. On April 6, 1951, the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall, signed the Department of Defense policies relating to the Reserve Forces. This publication, intended for the information of reservists and the general public, defined the nature and purpose of Reserve Forces and explained the general policies to be followed by the Department. The Reserve Forces were defined as the National Guard of the United States, the Air National Guard of the United States, the United States Army Reserve, the United States Naval Reserve, the United States Marine Corps Reserve, the United States Air Force Reserve and the United States Coast Guard Reserve. These Reserve Forces were to be divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. With regard to the priority of recall to active Federal service, the policy was stated as follows:

Whenever it becomes necessary to order to active Federal service, involuntarily, any portion of the Ready Reserve each service shall, so far as possible, determine the priority of order to active service of the remaining units and individuals of the Ready Reserve, and shall publish such priority to the widest extent consistent with security considerations. In the event of a declaration of war, or the declaration of a national emergency by the Congress, the priority of order to involuntary active Federal service of the Standby and Retired Reserve shall be similarly determined and published. Insofar as military conditions permit, a reservist ordered to active Federal service will be allowed at least 30 days between the date he is alerted and the date on which he must report for active duty."

XII. LEGISLATIVE PROVISION FOR RAISING ARMED FORCES DURING AND SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

Two major laws on military manpower were passed by the 82d Congress, and significant amendments were later made by the 84th Congress. The military policies set forth in these acts covered the Reserve as well as the Regular Armed Forces.

1. The Universal Military Training and Service Act (65 Stat. 75), which amended the Selective Service Act of 1948, was enacted on June 19, 1951. Passed during the Korean war, the purpose of this act was

first to raise immediately the manpower necessary to build and maintain an armed force of the size determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be our minimum security requirement, and, secondly, to provide for the maintenance of an adequate force of trained Reserves for the future security of the United States.

The active-duty personnel strength of the Armed Forces was set at 837,000 for the Army; 666,882 for the Navy, including the Marine Corps; and 502,000 for the Air Force. This personnel strength limitation of 2,005,882 was suspended so that the Armed Forces could be built up to 5 million persons, and the peak military strength reached during the Korean war was 3,685,054 on April 30, 1952.

47 Department of Defense Policies Relating to the Reserve Forces. Approved April 6, 1951. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 8-9. 48 U. S. Senate Armed Services Committee. S. Rept. No. 117, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 1.

In brief, the act provided that every man between 18 and 26 years of age should register for military service; that those between 181⁄2 and 26 years were liable for training and service in the Armed Forces; that they must meet minimum standards of physical and mental fitness; that each man should be given full and adequate military training for no less than 4 months; and that no man should be assigned to duty outside the United States, its Territories, and possessions, until he had been given the equivalent of at least 4 months of basic training. Furthermore, the law provided with regard to periods of service that everyone inducted, enlisted, or appointed in the Armed Forces (or the proposed National Security Training Corps), prior to his becoming 26 years of age, should be required to serve on active training and service and in a Reserve component for a total period of 8 yearsunless sooner discharged because of personal hardship. Each man inducted after June 19, 1951, was required to serve for 24 months in the Armed Forces, and upon his discharge, for 6 years in a Reserve component.

No person was to be inducted for training and service in the Armed Forces after July 1, 1955, except certain deferred persons whose liability continued after this date.

All men physically and mentally qualified were, upon their release from active training and service in the Armed Forces, to be transferred to one of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. Unless there was personal hardship, it was the duty of the person, "to enlist, enroll, or accept appointment in, or accept assignment to [an] organized unit or officers' training program and to serve satisfactorily therein."

The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard) were authorized to provide that persons who volunteer for and are accepted into organized units of the National Guard and the Air National Guard and other Reserve components could be released from training and service in the Armed Forces before they served 24 months. Any such reservist, however, could be called to active duty.

The law provided that if the National Security Training Corps program were started, the trainees who served for 6 months should be obligated thereafter to serve in a Reserve component for 711⁄2 years. The proposal for a National Security Training Corps, designed to insure the flow of trainees instead of prior servicemen into the Reserve Forces, failed of passage when it was considered by the 82d Congress, 2d session (H. R. 5904 and S. 2441).

Deferments could be authorized by the President for persons in any category of industry, agriculture, or other occupation or employment, or whose continued service in an office under the United States or any State, Territory, or possession or the District of Columbia, or whose activity in study, research, medical, dental, scientific, and some additional endeavors was found to be "necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest ***." The President could not, however, defer all persons in any particular category; deferments had to be made on the basis of individual status. Even so, a person who was deferred for any reason remained liable for induction until 35 years of age.

Deferments could also be made for other persons, such as those with dependents, those who were deficient or defective, high-school students until the time of their graduation, and college students who could be deferred until the end of an academic year or until they ceased to pursue their studies in a satisfactory manner. Young men who joined National Guard units before they were 18 years old could be deferred as long as they participated in training. Deferment was also extended to those in officer-training programs such as the senior division of the Reserve Officers Training Corps.

Exemptions from induction applied to members of certain specialized groups, among which were members of the Armed Forces on active duty, cadets and midshipmen of the various service Academies, students enrolled in officer-procurement programs at military colleges, reservists while on active duty, foreign diplomatic representatives,. ministers and students of the ministry, and sole surviving sons. Certain members of organized National Guard units were also exempt from induction.

2. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (66 Stat. 481).—Approved on July 9, 1952, the purpose of Public Law 476 (82d Cong.) was to provide trained units and qualified individuals who could be called to active duty in time of war or during a national emergency declared by the Congress or proclaimed by the President, or when otherwise authorized by law. The Reserve Forces are to augment the Regular Forces when additional trained men are required for the defense of the Nation. The act codified many existing statutes which relate to Reserves, and provided various benefits and equalization measures for reservists.

Provision was made for each of the Armed Forces to maintain a Ready Reserve, a Standby Reserve, and a Retired Reserve, the total strength being limited to 1,500,000 persons.

Seven Reserve components were established.

1. The National Guard of the United States.

2. The Army Reserve.

3. The Naval Reserve.

4. The Marine Corps Reserve.

5. The Air National Guard of the United States.

6. The Air Force Reserve.

7. The Coast Guard Reserve.

Men who completed their active duty under the Universal Military Training and Service Act were placed in the Ready Reserve unless they qualified for the Standby.

The three different categories of Reserves-Ready, Standby, and Retired were subject to different degrees of vulnerability for recall to active duty, and a limitation was placed on the recall of Korean veterans to insure a fair "sharing of hazardous exposure."

(1) The Ready Reserve was liable for a 24-month, involuntary call during a war or in a national emergency declared by the Congress or proclaimed by the President, or when otherwise authorized by law. In a national emergency proclaimed by the President, Congress was to determine the number of men to be called from the Ready Reserve. (2) The Standby Reserve was liable for active duty only during a war or a national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law; and except in time of war or under congressional

authorization, was not to be ordered to active duty unless adequate and qualified Ready Reserves were not available.

(3) The Retired Reserve could be ordered to active duty only in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress, or when authorized by law.

Although a legislative pattern for the development of the Reserve Forces had been provided, in large part, by the two basic laws which have just been described, it soon became apparent that there were serious weaknesses in the Reserve program. During 1953 and 1954, major studies and reports were made by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the National Security Training Commission, and the Office of Defense Mobilization.

The Senate Committee on Armed Services issued two reports on the Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the armed services. Senator Saltonstall reported the following conclusions of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness to the full committee on January 29,

1954:

1. The paramount problem facing the defense effort is the acute shortage of personnel needed to meet manpower requirements in the Reserve Forces.

2. The tremendous annual turnover of personnel hampers adequate and efficient training and keeps the readiness state of the units at a low level.

3. There is an imbalance between the ranks which must be corrected. 4. There is a definite shortage of young pilots and other skilled technicians.

5. It is apparent that the Army Reserve program has not been realistically organized to conform to the potential manpower available to it.

6. The responsibilities and opportunities of individual reservists should be defined and fixed with some degree of permanency.

7. Better acceptance and support by the general public, civic groups, and industry should be secured for Reserve training.

8. The subcommittee feels that notwithstanding personnel and training difficulties which the Reserve components face, the problem of creating a strong and available Reserve can never be effectively solved until a plan for creating a continuous rotating Reserve is formulated. This is not a new conclusion. The Committee on Armed Services reported favorably on legislation for the establishment of a program of universal military training which it was believed would augment the flow of new personnel into both the Regular Forces and the Reserve program as well. On three occasions the committee pointed out during its deliberations on that legislation the serious inequities which are basically inherent in our Reserve structure. This inequity was demonstrated during the Korean conflict when the services were required to recall reservists-veterans of World War II-for the second time, while there were available in the communities of the United States thousands of men who had never served in either the military forces or the Reserves. This lack of equity in the sharing of the military obligation essential to our national defense is a basic weakness in our Reserve structure and has far-reaching effects in practically all types of Reserve activities.49

49 Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the Armed Services. Reports of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate. January 1954. Committee print, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15-16.

The same subcommittee reported again on December 28, 1954, with regard to the shortage of enlisted personnel in the various Reserve programs, and concluded that "any proposed legislation by the executive branch should inquire into the following":

1. Means by which an active program can be made more attractive to the young men of the Nation and the American public can be stimulated to encourage participation in the Reserves.

2. Whether some form of compulsory Reserve training program is not essential.

3. Whether the mobilization manpower requirements, as set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Reserve program, are realistic.

4. A clear-cut delineation of how the Reserve Forces will be integrated into the Regular Establishment in the event of an emergency. 5. What is the plan for providing armories, training sites, and for supplying equipment to conduct the Reserve training program, and the extent of joint utilization by the services? How much will it

cost? 50

Meanwhile the executive branch of the Government was continuing its study of the problem of military manpower. Two reports that were published before proposals were made for the new Reserve program of 1955 are of special significance: 20th Century Minutemen, a report to the President on a Reserve Forces training program by the National Security Training Commission on December 1, 1953; and Manpower Resources for National Security, a report to the President by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization on January 6, 1954.

The National Security Training Commission concluded in its report 20th Century Minutemen that "our present Reserve system is unsatisfactory. The Commission findings were that

1. All should share equally the obligation to serve the Nation. 2. Our present Reserve system is unfair *** [a policy that] has been not only morally wrong, it has also been socially and financially costly.

3. Our present Reserve is inadequate. About three-fourths of our reservists are veterans of Korea, World War II, or both, and the nonveteran reservists are relatively untrained. Only 30 percent of our reservists are participating in Reserve units. Units are seriously under strength. ****

4. At least 1 million men are available for a national security training program between now and 1960. ***

5. Inductions for training and service can and should operate concurrently. ***

6. Present rejection standards for military service are not realistic in light of the nature of 20th century warfare.

7. Our defense posture must be well adapted to the long-term Soviet danger.51

The Commission went on to recommend that a national security training program should start with trainees who would be given 6 months' basic training and thereafter be obligated to serve in a

50 Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the Armed Services. Second Report of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate. December 1954. Committee print, p. 12.

51 20th Century Minutemen. A report to the President on the Reserve Forces training program. National Security Training Commission. December 1, 1953. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1954, pp. 123-130.

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