the Capital. From farms and shops, 4,400 men gathered to repel the invasion; but the green troops, led by untrained officers, ran when the redcoats opened fire. The small defending marine force was trained but greatly outnumbered. The cabinet officers who rode out to give advice on the battle were of little help. The British marched on Washington, burning the White House and public buildings. At no time did the enemy have more than 30,000 men in the war, while the United States engaged almost 527,000, but with a peak strength of 158,500. The British could not conquer a continent with such a small number of troops, while the Americans could not win an early decisive victory because of scattered war efforts and lack of planning. The war dragged on for 3 years.

One of the issues, however, which had arisen during this war when State governors refused to furnish militia quotas, was later decided, in 1827, in favor of the Federal Government. In Martin v. Mott (12 Wheaton 28), the Supreme Court declared:

We are all of the opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons. We think that this construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself, and from the manifest object contemplated by the act of Congress.

V. THE MEXICAN WAR, 1846-48

On May 11, 1846, President Polk sent a war message to Congress that "After reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil." At that time the paper strength of the Army was 8,613 men, the actual strength 5,300. Furthermore, the troops were scattered in a hundred posts throughout the country. The Nation had not had such a small military force since 1808, although the population had doubled in the intervening years. There were, however, 2 assets in the manpower situation: some of the Regulars were more effective because of their training and service on frontier posts, and there were 500 West Point graduates available to serve as officers. The war was fought on foreign soil, and therefore it was not possible to call up the militia which claimed constitutional immunity against being used as an invading force. The miltia clause of the Constitution was not used; rather, the Federal Government asked the States for volunteers under its power to raise and support armies. The men, of course, were largely drawn from the militia and had little or no training.

The war was fought with Regulars and Volunteers. The Regulars had to enlist for 5 years, whereas the 50,000 Volunteers which the President was authorized to recruit, had to serve only 12 months. The law of May 13, 1846, stated that Volunteers could be called "to serve 12 months after they shall have arrived at the place of rendezvous, or to the end of the war unless sooner discharged, according to the time for which they shall have been mustered into service." Although it would appear that the President had discretion to call for enlistments

Morison, Samuel Eliot, and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic. New York, Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 592.

Palmer, John McAuley, America in Arms; the experience of the United States with military organization. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1941, p. 90.

"to the end of the war," this clause was interpreted by the War Department to mean that the individual had discretion in the matter. The short term enlistment was naturally more attractive than "the end of the war" or the 5-year period, and it became difficult to fill the ranks with Regulars. Meanwhile, the Volunteers could hardly be trained before it was time for them to go home, and once more it was proved that short term enlistments are expensive and have the effect of lengthening the war.

The Volunteers experienced their own difficulties in the Mexican campaign, being required to furnish their own clothes, horses, and horse equipment, for the use of which they received 40 cents a day additional pay. It was not until the end of the war that it was decided to furnish uniforms for Volunteers as well as for the Regulars. though the Volunteers were offered $12 bounty if they would reenlist in Mexico for the duration of the war, many of them preferred to go home.

Al

When halfway to Mexico City, Gen. Winfield Scott, had to send home 4,000 men whose terms of enlistment had expired. His force falling from 10,000 to less than 6,000, General Scott had to wait for 3 months before reenforcements arrived, thus allowing time for the Mexicans to build up their forces. General Scott was expected to live off the land, to capture ammunition with which to fight, to contend with insubordinate volunteer officers, and to wage a campaign with half the men he thought necessary for the purpose. In spite of these difficulties, however, his tattered troops finally reached Mexico City.

The only plan for defense in the ensuing years was to call up Volunteers to expand the standing army. This "expansible standing army" idea first appeared in December 1820 when Secretary of War John C. Calhoun sent to Congress a plan whereby the peacetime regular army would be enlarged during an emergency by volunteers who would double the battalions. George Washington's criticisms of the ill-regulated militia were quoted in support of this idea, but his peace establishment plan for a small standing army to be reinforced by trained reserves was not quoted because it was lost in the archives for 147 years. It was not until 1930 that Washington's "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," was found in the Library of Congress by Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer, and published in his book "Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen."

The Mexican War, won by an Army of Regulars and Volunteers, gave weight to the policy of the "expansible standing army," espoused by so many military thinkers in subsequent years. That enlistments should be for the duration of a war is a lesson that might have been learned, but 13 years later the country became involved in the Civil War and began with enlistments of only 3 months. So little military planning had been done that Lincoln was hampered by some of the same problems with which Washington had to contend during the Revolution.

VI. THE CIVIL WAR, 1861-65

Of the War Between the States, Senator James M. Mason of Virginia, said: "I look upon it then, sir, as a war of sentiment and opinion by one form of society against another form of society."7

7 Morison, op. cit., p. 652.

There was the possibility that the issue could have been settled by nonmilitary means had a sufficient military force existed as a deterrent to war. Had the Federal Government been operating according to a planned military policy, a situation would have existed whereby the organized regiments of the North and South would have been in the ratio of 9 to 1, considering the greater population of the Northern States. At the time the issue of slavery became crucial, however, the Union Army numbered 16,367 men in 198 companies, 183 of which were scattered on the frontiers. This weakness made secession seem militarily feasible. War was chosen as the method of resolving the issue, and in the absence of a sound military manpower policy, it was 2 years after the war started before trained armies began to fight decisive battles. The result was costly in terms of the length of the war, the number of casualties, and the loss in resources and money. Soven States had seceded when Lincoln became President. Twelve days after his inauguration, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, called out 100,000 volunteers for 12 months. By April 1861, a third of these troops were equipped and partially trained, serving under West Point graduates who had returned to the South at the time of the great decision.

Lincoln called 10 companies of District of Columbia militia, but these troops could not be sent outside the Federal District. Not having an adequate regular army, it became necessary to call upon the States to furnish 75,000 militia, but by law they could not be kept in the Federal service for more than 3 months. This hastily called and untrained "Reserve force" could hardly be put in readiness for battle before the enlistments expired. Those who served in the Shenandoah Valley refused to stay longer, and in the Manassas area, they marched away in the midst of battle when their time was up.

On July 22, 1861, Congress authorized the President to accept 500,000 volunteers to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, enforce law, and protect public property. These volunteers were to serve not less than 6 months nor more than 3 years, and were to be disbanded at the end of the war. Officers were elected by the men in their companies. This practice led to the political reward of untrained officers. A man who could raise and equip a regiment naturally became an officer, while trained Regular officers were often passed over. On the Confederate side, however, United States Army officers were allowed to keep their rank and rise in the service, a practice which proved its value to the South.

On July 25, 1861, after only 2 more days of debate, the President was authorized to accept volunteers for 500,000 men who were to be mustered into the service "during the war." By July 29 another statute authorized the President to call forth the militia but provided "that such continuance in service shall not extend beyond 60 days after the commencement of the next regular session of Congress.

Within the following year, it became apparent that voluntary recruiting had failed as a method of raising armies, and on July 17, 1862, the Congress authorized the President to call forth the militia of the States for 9 months, defining the militia as "all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five." Every soldier was to receive his first month's pay and a bounty of $25, but those who

s Palmer, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

volunteered for 12 months were to receive a bounty of $50. This made it possible for the President to draft 300,000 militia, but the 9-month provision made it difficult thereafter to recruit volunteers for "3 years or the war." This "Reserve force" of militia did not have sufficient training to be used during the summer and fall, nor could the men be used effectively during the winter months; by spring their 9-month enlistment term had expired. It was apparent that the responsibility for national defense could not be met by dependence upon the State militia system. It became necessary to introduce the draft.

On March 3, 1863, Congress passed "An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces" which were defined as "all able-bodied male citizens *** between the ages of 20 and 45 years." Those drafted were to serve "during the present rebellion," but not to exceed 3 years. But the law also provided that the draftee could furnish a substitute to take his place or could pay $300 for a substitute and thus be "discharged from further liability under that draft." A bounty of $50 was also provided for volunteer reenlistments.

There was great opposition to conscription throughout the North and in New York City a draft riot broke out on July 11, 1863. Ten thousand troops were required to put down the riot which resulted in a thousand casualties." Troops were even sent from Gettysburg. Finally, however, there was acceptance of the principle that the Federal Government has power to call forth citizens to defend their country.

When all returns were in it appeared that 292,441 names were drawn from the wheels and that 39,877 men had failed to report, leaving 252,564 for examination. For one reason and another, 164,394 were exempted, leaving for duty 88,170, of whom 52,288 purchased exemption which yielded the Government $15,686,400, and left but 35,882 men for service. Of these 26,002 were substitutes.10

The result of the Civil War draft on other counts, according to the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee, was "about as bad as it could have been." The committee summarized the mistakes of this draft as follows:

In the first place, the draft was introduced 2 years after war began. Instead of being a popular measure to insure orderly mobilization of the Nation's manpower, it was by now only a means of coercing those who had declined to volunteer. It was not made the sole method of recruitment; on the contrary, voluntary recruiting continued full blast, and the draft was applied only in those districts which failed to fill their quotas with volunteers. Hence public odium quickly attached not only to the drafted man, but to the district where the draft was necessary. It was obvious that a drafted man represented a community which was unwilling to perform its duty.

Second, the machinery set up to conduct the draft was simultaneously assigned the duty of apprehending spies and deserters. The draft registration was conducted by the military, using force when necessary. Men were registered by a house-to-house canvas, and hunted down when they hid. In the public eye, the manhunts for deserters and for registrants were similar enterprises, and the draft was further stigmatized.

Third, the Federal Government alone conducted the draft machinery. The local governments of the States and counties were not made parties, either in action or in responsibility. Draft quotas were allotted from Washington to each congressional district, which was a casual division of the national system

Ganoe, William Addleman, The History of the United States Army, New York, Appleton, 1924, p. 289.

19 McMaster, John B., History of the People of the United States During Lincoln's Administration, 1927, p. 415.

and not an organized unit of local self-government. It was made to seem that the Federal Government was using its Army to drag men away without regard to fundamental democratic processes.

Fourth, the recruiting process was vastly expensive. Since the local communities wished to avoid the stigma of the draft by producing a full quota of volunteers, large cash bounties were offered for recruits. General Crowder reports that the cost of recruiting each man in the Civil War was $228, as against $8 in the World War I. Even if considerable errors were found in either figure, the comparison would still remain staggering.

Fifth, the law fell heavily upon the poor and allowed the rich to escape. After being drafted, a man could either hire a substitute or purchase exemption outright for $300. These provisions favored not only the rich individual but also the rich district. The rich districts filled their quotas from the poor districts by purchasing substitutes and by offering lavish bounties for volunteers. The poor districts, whose men were thus credited to rich districts, still had to fill their own quotas as well. In a saying of the time, it was "the rich man's money and the poor man's blood."

Sixth, the Civil War draft induced corruption on a vast scale. "Substitute brokers" traded in the sale of substitutes. This commerce created "professional substitutes" who, after getting their money, deserted and sold themselves again and again in new localities. "Bounty jumpers" similarly lived well by repeated enlistments and desertions. Corruption also enriched many civilian officials and Army officers concerned with draft administration.

*** In short, the Civil War draft was enforced not by the will of the people but by the weapons of the Army; it was a coercive factor in a vastly expensive recruiting process; its weight fell wholly on the poor; it nourished vicious forms of corruption. It was begun too late, after enthusiasm for the war had died. It aroused bitter hatred and was resisted by riots amounting to serious insurrections. It can perhaps be excused as the measure of a desperate government; but it was about as bad as it could have been."

In the South, also, the Confederate Government had an unhappy experience with conscription. Although the first troops had volunteered for a year, it was necessary thereafter to resort to the draft. This was done at first to keep the volunteers from going home. Wealthy draftees could hire substitutes for wages, and there was a saying, similar to the one in the North, that "It was the rich man's war and the poor man's fight." Many occupational groups were exempted, and those who wished to dodge the draft found safe jobs for themselves.

Of the 2,128,948 men engaged on the side of the North, the draft supplied only 119,000, of whom 73,000 were substitutes. The war had been fought by 2 million volunteers, but the "dribblings of untrained levies" dragged the fighting out for 4 years. When the conflict ended, there were only 295 organized companies, although 448 were authorized. By October 1865, 800,963 men had been demobilized. Short enlistments and bounties depleted the manpower source from which the Regular Army could expect recruits.12 The war and its aftermath followed a familiar pattern; a small armed force was quickly expanded in the face of war; when the danger was past, the armies were cut back by rapid demobilization.

An analysis of the Civil War draft was made by Brig. Gen. James Oakes, the assistance provost marshal general for Illinois. His report of August 9, 1865, not only described the shortcomings of the draft policy, but his suggestions for improvement bore fruit a half-century

11 American Selective Service; a brief account of its historical background and its probable future form. Prepared under the supervision of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee. October 1939. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1939, pp. 9-11. 12 Ganoe, op. cit., p. 302.