Kinney v. Whiton. we have considered above, as falling in with their general views, and contend specially for such an extension of the principle of estoppel as will make it applicable to cases where the party making the representation misled some other party than the one whose action he designed to influence. But we are not able to concur in the results at which the court arrived in the three cases we have been considering. It seems to us to be an unsafe doctrine to adopt, that a person who gets at second hand a declaration not intended for the public and not intended for him, may act upon it as safely as the person to whom the declaration was addressed and for whom alone it was intended. Where the declaration was intended only for the person to whom it was addressed, the party making it has assumed no obligation to any other person. A bystander who casually overhears a conversation has no right to appropriate to himself, without further inquiry, what was intended for another. If he desires to act in the matter he can make direct inquiry for himself. It would be dangerous to adopt any other rule. The conversation overheard may have been really a fragment of a negotiation extending through several conversations, and may be materially qualified by what had been said before or might be said afterward. Indeed, in any case, the person making the declaration may upon further reflection have modified his statement the next day, or retracted it altogether; and where a person finds that he has inadvertently or inconsiderately committed himself upon some point and wishes to withdraw or correct his statement, he has done his whole duty when he looks up the person to whom he made the statement, and sets himself right with him, and is under no obligation to hunt up the bystanders and make the correction to them. The bystanders, if they wish to estop him, must look him up and get a statement for themselves. In Mayenborg v. Haynes, 50 N. Y. 675, the Court of Appeals of that State, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court, held that a declaration made to A and by him communicated to and acted upon by B, would not constitute an estoppel in B's favor, where it was no part of the original intention that it should thus be communicated to him and influence his action. There is no substantial difference between that case and that of a bystander who overhears a declaration not intended for him. We think there is manifest error in the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, and it is reversed. Judgment reversed. Seymour v. Continental Life Insurance Co. SEYMOUR V. CONTINENTAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. (44 Conn. 300.) Interest-how affected by modification of usury law. A promissory note, intended to run for several years, was executed, payable on demand with interest semi-annually at the legal rate of eight per cent. Subsequently the rate of interest was by law limited to seven per cent. When the note was made there was a statute that demand notes were to be considered as due in four months from date. In an action by the payee against the makers, after several years, held, that the statute relating to demand notes did not apply to the original parties, but only to third parties, and that the original rate of interest attached until payment of the note.* EBT for the recovery of usurious interest alleged to have been paid by plaintiffs to defendant, upon a note made by the plaintiffs, Sept. 21, 1872, to the order of the defendant, for $12,000, payable on demand, with interest at the rate of eight per cent, semi-annually, and secured by a mortgage by the plaintiffs, and accompanied by the agreement of the husband plaintiff to pay two per cent for default of interest until paid. The whole amount of the note and the agreed interest had been paid to defendant. Other facts appear in the opinion. The defendant had judg ment. R. S. Welles, for plaintiffs, cited Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 550, 553; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 id. 314, 317; Gen. Stat., 1866, p. 600, § 2; Gen. Stat., 1875, p. 343, § 2; Rhodes v. Seymour, 36 Conn. 1, 6; Fisher v. Bidwell, 27 id. 363; Brewster v. Wakefield, 22 How. 118; Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 W. & S. 51; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 Ill. 331, 342; Barlow v. Gregory, 31 Conn. 265; Suffield Ec. Soc. v. Loomis, 42 id. 570; Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank, 92 U.S. 625, 630; Bullock v. Boyd, Hoff. Ch. 294, 300; Savings Bank v. Bates, 8 Conn. 505. H. B. Freeman, for defendant. CARPENTER, J. In Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 524; S. C., 19 Am. Rep. 564, a note was made payable in one year after date, *See Cecil v. Hicks, ante, p. 391. Seymour v. Continental Life Insurance Co. with interest after due at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum. The contract when made was legal; when the note fell due the law forbade the taking of a greater rate of interest than seven per cent. This court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover fifteen per cent interest after due. In Suffield Eccl. Society v. Loomis, 42 Conn. 570, the note was payable in three years after date, with no contract for interest after maturity. The contract rate of interest was above the legal rate after the note fell due. This court held that the plaintiff could recover, after maturity, only the statutory rate of interest. In both these cases the court enforced the contract according to the intention of the parties. In the present case the contract of the parties, as understood and intended by them, if legal, will be sustained. The note now under consideration was on demand, and was outstanding several years. The rate of interest expressed in the note was eight per cent, which was a legal rate at the time the note was given. Before the principal was paid the law forbade the taking of more than seven per cent. The plaintiffs having paid eight per cent, bring this action to recover the penalty for taking usurious interest. They claim that the note was due by force of the statute at the expiration of four months, and that after that time the defendants could legally take but seven per cent. The statute is as follows: "Any negotiable promissory note payable on demand, which remains unpaid four months from its date, shall be considered as overdue and dishonored after that time." Gen. Stat., p. 343, § 2. This statute was not designed to change the real contract between the parties. Its object was to make certain that which before was indefinite and uncertain, and it relates to the rights and liabilities of third parties who may become interested in such notes as indorsers, guarantors or purchasers. In respect to them such notes are not ordinarily dishonored until the expiration of four months. After that time they are dishonored. Their rights and liabilities materially depend upon that fact, while the rights and liabilities of the immediate parties to the note are unaffected by it. Hence the statute may well affect the former and not the latter. The payee may sue and collect, and the maker may pay, the note at any time within four months as well as after. A third party purchasing the note at any time within four months takes it free from Tyler v. Hammersley. equities; after that time he takes it subject to them. The payee or holder, in order to retain the security of an indorser or guarantor, must take certain steps at the end of four months. The payee, as between himself and the maker, holds it at all times subject to equities, and the liability of the maker is the same whether dishonored or not, and irrespective of demand and notice or suit at maturity. It is manifest that the parties intended this transaction as a loan to continue for a term of years. The contract between William H. Seymour and the defendants, which the court found was a part of the transaction, tends to show this, and was admissible for that purpose. The rate of interest as fixed by the note was expected and intended by the parties to be paid so long as the loan should continue. That being a legal rate when the note was made, it continued such until it was paid. This interpretation gives effect to the intention of the parties and does the plaintiffs no injustice. If they regarded the rate of interest as exorbitant they might at any time have terminated the contract by paying the principal. So long as they paid interest they paid it pursuant to their contract, and now have no cause of complaint. There is no error in the judgment of the Superior Court. Judgment affirmed. TYLER V. HAMMERSLEY. (44 Conn. 393.) Contempt writ of error to review adjudication for. In proceedings for contempt in refusing to obey a peremptory mandamus, the defendant answered that a writ of error had been taken and served upon the judgment for mandamus, and that the same operated as a supersedeas. To this answer the moving party demurred, and on a trial of that issue of law the moving party had judgment; upon this judgment the defendant brought a writ of error. Held, (1) that although an adjudication of con. tempt, under the common-law practice, is not reviewable by a court of error, yet where the moving party tenders an issue of law upon which the question of contempt is tried, a writ of error will lie upon the adjudication thereon; but (2) the writ of error upon the original judgment for peremp Tyler v. Hammersley. tory mandamus does not operate as a supersedeas, especially where the assigned errors have already been passed upon by the court upon a case reserved for advice, as in this case.* WRI RIT of error from a judgment of contempt and imprisonment. The petition was made by William Hammersley, attorney for the State for Hartford county; the defendant answered; the moving party demurred, and on that issue of law there was judg ment for the moving party, upon which the defendant brought this writ of error. The other facts appear in the opinion. G. H. Watrous and C. E. Perkins, for plaintiffs in error, cited upon the point of supersedeas, 2 Bac. Abr. 448; Bishop of Ossory's case, Cro. Jac. 534; Jacques v. Nixon, 1 T. R. 279; Somerville v White, 5 East, 145; Meriton v. Stevens, Willes, 272; Phelps v. Landon, 2 Day, 370; Dutton v. Tracy, 4 Conn. 365; Arnold v. Fuller's Heirs, 1 Ohio, 463; Beatty's Adm'rs v. Chapline, 2 Har. & Johns. 7; Blanchard v. Myers, 9 Johns. 66; McDonald v. Gifford, 1 Brewst. 280; Board of Com❜rs v. Gorman, 19 Wall. 661; U. S. v. Dashiel, 3 id. 701; State v. N. H. & N. Co., 41 Conn. 134; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 97; Gilman v. Bassett, 33 Conn. 305; Herman on Executions, 2; Jacob's Law Dict., Execution; Bla. Com. 412; Burrill's Law Dict., Execution; U. S. v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 28; U. S. v. Cal. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 266; s. c., 7 Wheat. 534; U. S. v. Kendall, 5 Cranch, 278; s. c., 12 Pet. 524; Dutton v. Tracy, 4 Conn. 365. W. Hammersley, State's attorney, and J. R. Buck, for defendant in error, cited as to whether the writ of error would lie, Androscoggin & Kennebec R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin R. R. Co., 49 Me. 401; Lord Mayor of London's case, 3 Wils. 188; Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 406; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Crook v. People, 16 Ill. 534; In re Hummel, 9 Watts, 416, 431; Passmore Williamson's case, 26 Penn. St. 9; Vilas v. Burton, 27 Vt. 56. HOVEY, J. This writ of error is founded upon an adjudication of a contempt in refusing obedience to a peremptory writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus was awarded and issued by the Superior Court sitting at Hartford, in accordance with advice given by this court, after a full hearing and argument, upon a reserva * See Shattuck v. State (51 Miss. 50), 24 Am. Rep. 624 and note; Robb v. McDonald 29 Iowa, 330), 4 Ain. Rep. 211. |