joined in marriage with one C. K., without the consent and approbation and against the wish and will of the said D. N., and in violation of his lawful and parental rights and authority. And the jurors aforesaid, on their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do further present, that the said J. M., R. C. H., and D. H. C., with the said other persons unknown, in pursuance and furtherance of and according to the said conspiracy, combination, confederacy, and agreement, between them the said J., R., and D. as aforesaid had, did, on the night between the tenth and eleventh days of June, in the year aforesaid, and about the hour of one o'clock, at Shippensbury, in said county, and within the jurisdiction of this court, wickedly, falsely, maliciously, unlawfully, and injuriously entice, persuade, cause, procure, aid, and assist the said J. M. N. to elope, escape, and depart from her said father's house, family, care, guardianship, protection, control, and authority, in the company and along with the said C. K., and secretly and without the knowledge, approbation, and consent, and against the will of the said D. N., with the view, purpose, and intent that she the said J. M. N. should be joined in marriage with the said C. K., without the consent and against the will of her said father; and with the same intent and purpose, and in furtherance and according to the said conspiracy, combination, confederacy, and agreement, the said J. M., R. C. H., and D. H. C., and other persons unknown, then and there did aid, assist, abet, and co-operate with the said J. M. N. and C. K., secretly and covertly to carry away and remove a large quantity of clothing, goods, and chattels of the said D., and to place the said J. M. N. and the said goods, chattels, and clothing within and upon a certain railroad car then and there passing, so that the said J. might be swiftly and secretly conveyed and carried away and transported beyond the pursuit and protection of her said father, with the intent, view, and purpose aforesaid; to the great damage of the said D. N., to the evil example, &c., and against, &c. (Conclude as in book 1, chap. 3.)

(653) Conspiracy to inveigle a daughter from the custody of her parents, for the purpose of marrying her (in substance).(j)

That C. S. was an infant of thirteen years of age (her father P. S. being dead, and S. her mother married to C. G.), and under the guardianship of M. S. and A. S. both as to person and estate, and that the same C. was entitled to a large property under her father's will, to wit, one thousand pounds, and resided with the said C. and S., with the consent of her said guardians, and that the said M. H. et al., well knowing the premises, on, &c., did conspire together to deprive the said C. and S. of the service of the said C. and to seduce her from their house, and to inveigle her into a marriage with the said M. H., and under divers false pretences did seduce and inveigle the said C. for the purposes aforesaid, against the will of the said C. and S. and of the said M. and A., and in pursuance of the said conspiracy did supply the said C. with wine and other strong liquors, and she the said C. being intoxicated, did procure the ceremony of marriage to be recited between the said M. H. and C. S., to the great damage and disgrace of the said C., to the evil example, &c., and against, &c. (Conclude as in book 1, chap. 3.)

(654) For a conspiracy to procure the defilement of a female.(jj)

That Mary Ann Mears, late of B. in the County of S., single woman, and Amelia Chalk, late of the same place, laborer, on the first day of June in

(j) Resp. v. Hevice, 2 Yeates 114. This is the mere skeleton of the indictment employed in this case. I have been unable to discover the record.

(j) This count was held to sufficiently charge an indictable offence at common law, in R. v. Mears, 1 Temple & Mew, C. C. 414; 2 Denison, C. C. 79; 4 Cox, C. C. 423; 1 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 581.

the year of our Lord with force and arms, at B. aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, did between themselves conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together wickedly, knowingly, and designedly to procure, by false pretences, false representations, and other fraudulent means, one Johanna Carroll, then being a poor child under the age of twenty-one years, to wit, of the age of fifteen years, to have illicit carnal connection with a man, to wit, a certain man whose name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown; against the peace, etc.

(655) For a conspiracy to incite J. N. to lay wagers, &c; overt act, actually cheating.(k)

That R. S., late of, &c., yeoman, together with a certain other person, to the inquest aforesaid unknown, being persons of evil name and fame and not caring to get their livelihood by honest labor, but by fraud and covin maintaining their idle and disorderly course of life (on the year and day, the place and jurisdiction), unlawfully and wickedly did combine and conspire and agree together, to cheat and defraud the liege citizens of this commonwealth, and particularly a certain J. N. of their money, goods and chattels, by art, fraud, practice and deceit, and then and there unlawfully and wickedly did combine, conspire and agree together, that he the said R. S. should provoke and incite the said liege subjects of this commonwealth, but particularly the said J. N. aforesaid, to bet and lay wagers with the said unknown person, with an intent in the said betting and wagering, to deceive and impose on and cheat the said liege subjects of this commonwealth, and particularly the said J. N., and them the said liege citizens of this commonwealth and particularly J. N. aforesaid, of money, goods and chattels, by false tricks and deceit in and about the betting and wagering aforesaid, deceive and defraud, to the great damage of the said liege subjects of this commonwealth and particularly to the said J. N., to the evil example, &c., and against, &c.

And that the said R. S., together with the said other person to the inquest aforesaid unknown, in pursuance of such their conspiracy aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, at the city aforesaid and within the jurisdiction aforesaid, did wickedly and fraudulently provoke and incite the said J. N. to lay wagers with the unknown person aforesaid, and that the said R. S. together with the person to the inquest aforesaid unknown as aforesaid, by betting and laying wagers with the said J. N., then and there did get into their possession, unlawfully and wickedly, the sum of fifteen shillings, lawful money of Pennsylvania, of the goods and chattels of the said. J. N., and him the said J. N. of the said sum of fifteen shillings aforesaid, lawful money as aforesaid, by false acts and tricks then and there did deceive and defraud and cheat.

And so the inquest aforesaid on their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do say, that the said R. S., together with the said other person to the inquest aforesaid unknown, according to the conspiracy, combination and agreement. aforesaid, the aforesaid J. N. of the sum of fifteen shillings, lawful money aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid fraudulently and wickedly did deceive, cheat and defraud, contrary, &c., to the great damage, &c., and against, &c. (Conclude as in book 1, chap. 3.)

(656) Conspiracy at common law, among workmen, to raise their wages and lessen the time of labor.(1)

That A. B., &c. (setting out their names and additions), on, &c., at, &c.,

(k) Drawn by Mr. Bradford.

(1) Starkie's C. P. 471; see Wh. C. L. § 2322, &c.

What degree of particularity is required in indictments of this class, is examined by Shaw C. J. in Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 125.

"The first count," he said, "set forth that the defendants, with divers others un

being workmen and journeymen in the art, mystery and manual occupation of a wheelwright, and not being content to work and labor in that art and mys

known, on the day and at the place named, being workmen and journeymen in the art and occupation of bootmakers, unlawfully, perniciously and deceitfully designing and intending to continue, keep up, form and unite themselves into an unlawful club, society and combination, and make unlawful by-laws, rules and orders among themselves, and thereby govern themselves and other workmen in the said art, and unlawfully and unjustly to extort great sums of money by means thereof, did unlawfully assemble and meet together, and being so assembled, did unjustly and corruptly conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, that none of them should thereafter, and that none of them would work for any master or person whatsoever in the said art, mystery and occupation, who should employ any workman or journeyman or other person in the said art, who was not a member of said club, society or combination, after notice given to him to discharge such workman from the employ of such master; to the great damage and oppression, &c.

"Now it is to be considered that the preamble and introductory matter in the indictment-such as unlawfully and deceitfully designing and intending unjustly to extort great sums, &c.—is mere recital, and not traversable, and therefore cannot aid an imperfect averment of the facts constituting the description of the offence. The same may be said of the concluding matter which follows the averment, as to the great damage and oppression, not only of their said masters employing them in the said art and occupation, but also of divers other workmen in the same art, mystery and occupation, to the evil example, &c. If the facts averred constitute the crime, they are properly stated as the legal inferences to be drawn from them. If they do not constitute the charge of such an offence, they cannot be aided by these alleged consequences.

"Stripped then of these introductory recital and alleged injurious consequences, and of the qualifying epithets attached to the facts, the averment is this, that the defendants and others formed themselves into a society, and agreed not to work for any person who should employ any journeyman or other person, not a member of such society, after notice given him to discharge such workman.

"The manifest intent of the association, is to induce all those engaged in the same occupation to become members of it. Such a purpose is not unlawful. It would give them a power which might be exerted for useful and honorable purposes, or for dangerous and pernicious ones. If the latter were the real and actual object, and susceptible of proof, it should have been specially charged. Such an association might be used to afford each other assistance in times of poverty, sickness and distress; or to raise their intellectual, moral and social condition; or to make improvement in their art; or for other purposes; or the association might be designed for purposes of oppression and injustice. But in order to charge all those who become members of an association, with the guilt of a criminal conspiracy, it must be averred and proved that the actual, if not the avowed object of the association, was criminal. An association may be formed, the declared objects of which are innocent and laudable, and yet they may have secret articles, or an agreement communicated only to the members, by which they are banded together for purposes injurious to the peace of society or the rights of its members. Such would undoubtedly be a criminal conspiracy on proof of the fact, however meritorious and praiseworthy the declared objects might be. The law is not to be hoodwinked by colorable pretences. It looks at truth and reality, through whatever disguise it may assume. But to make such an association, ostensibly innocent, the subject of prosecution as a criminal conspiracy, the secret agreement which makes it so, is to be averred and proved as the gist of the offence. But when an association is formed for purposes actually innocent, and afterwards its powers are abused by those who have the control and management of it, to purposes of oppression and injustice, it will be criminal in those who thus misuse it, or give consent thereto, but not in the other members of the association. In this case no such secret agreement, varying the objects of the association from those avowed, is set forth in this count of the indictment.

"Nor can we perceive that the objects of this association, whatever they may have been, were to be attained by criminal means. The means which they propose to employ, as averred in this count, and which, as we are now to presume, were established by the proof, were, that they would not work for a person, who, after due notice, should employ a journeyman not a member of their society. Supposing the object of the association to be laudable and lawful, or at least not unlawful, are these means criminal? The case supposes that these persons are not bound by contract, but free to work for whom they please, or not to work if they so prefer. In this state of things, we cannot perceive that it is criminal for men to agree together to exercise

tery by the usual number of hours in each day, and at the usual rates and prices for which they and other workmen and journeymen were wont and

their own acknowledged rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their own interests. One way to test this is, to consider the effect of such an agreement, where the object of the association is acknowledged on all hands to be a laudable one. Suppose a class of workmen, impressed with the manifold evils of intemperance, should agree with each other not to work in a shop in which ardent spirit was furnished, or not to work in a shop with any one who used it, or not to work for an employer who should, after notice, employ a journeyman who habitually used it. The consequences might be the same. A workman who should still persist in the use of ardent spirit, would find it more difficult to get employment; a master employing such an one might, at times, experience inconvenience in his work, in losing the services of a skilful but intemperate workman. Still it seems to us, that as the object would be lawful, and the means not unlawful, such an agreement could not be called a criminal conspiracy.

"From this count in the indictment, we do not understand that the agreement was, that the defendants would refuse to work for an employer to whom they were bound by contract for a certain time, in violation of that contract; nor that they would insist that an employer should discharge a workman engaged by contract for a certain time, in violation of such contract. It is perfectly consistent with everything stated in this count, that the effect of the agreement was, that when they were free to act, they would not engage with an employer, or continue in his employment, if such employer when free to act, should engage with a workman, or continue a workman in his employment, not a member of the association. If a large number of men, engaged for a certain time, should combine together to violate their contract, and quit their employment together, it would present a very different question. Suppose a farmer employing a large number of men engaged for the year at a fair monthly wages, and suppose that just at the moment that his crops were ready to harvest, they should all combine to quit his service, unless he would advance their wages, at a time when other laborers could not be obtained; it would surely be a conspiracy to do an unlawful act, though of such a character, that if done by an individual, it would lay the foundation of a civil action only, and not of a criminal prosecution. It would be a case very different from that stated in this count.

"The second count, omitting the recital of unlawful intent and evil dispositions, and omitting the direct averment of an unlawful club or society, alleges that the defendants with others unknown, did assemble, conspire, confederate and agree together, not to work for any master or person who should employ any workman not being a member of a certain club, society or combination, called the Boston Journeymen Bootmaker's Society, or who should break any of their by-laws, unless such workmen should pay to said club, such sum as should be agreed upon as a penalty for the breach of such unlawful rules, &c., and that by means of said conspiracy they did compel one J. B. W., a master cordwainer, to turn out of his employ one T. H., a journeyman bootmaker, &c., in evil example, &c. So far as the averment of a conspiracy is concerned, all the remarks made in referenee to the first count are equally applica ble to this. It is simply an averment of an agreement amongst themselves not to work for a person, who should employ any person not a member of a certain association. It sets forth no illegal or criminal purpose to be accomplished, nor any illegal or criminal means to be adopted for the accomplishment of any purpose. It was an agreement, as to the manner in which they would exercise an acknowledged right to contract with others for their labor. It does not aver a conspiracy or even an intention to raise their wages; and it appears by the bill of exceptions, that the case was put upon the footing of a conspiracy to raise their wages. Such an agreement, as set forth in this count, would be perfectly justifiable under the recent English statute, by which this subject is regulated; St. 6 Geo. IV. c. 129; see Roscoe's Crim. Ev. (2d Am. ed.), 368, 369.

"As to the latter part of this count, which avers that by means of said conspiracy, the defendants did compel one W. to turn out of his employ one J. H., we remark, in the first place, that as the acts done in pursuance of a conspiracy, as we have before seen, are stated by way of aggravation, and not a substantive charge, if no criminal or unlawful conspiracy is stated, it cannot be aided and made good by mere matter of aggravation. If the principal charge falls, the aggravation falls with it; State v. Rickey, 4 Halst. 293.

"But further; if this is to be considered as a substantive charge, it would depend altogether upon the force of the word 'compel,' which may be used in the sense of coercion, or duress, by force or fraud. It would therefore depend upon the context and the connection with other words, to determine the sense in which it was used in the

accustomed to work, but falsely and fraudulently conspiring and combining, unjustly and oppressively to increase and augment the wages of themselves

indictment. If, for instance, the indictment had averred a conspiracy, by the defendants, to compel W. to turn H. out of his employment, and to accomplish that object by the use of force or fraud, it would have been a very different case; especially if it might be fairly construed, as perhaps in that case it might have been, that W. was under obligation, by contract, for an unexpired term of time, to employ and pay H. As before remarked, it would have been a conspiracy to do an unlawful, though not a criminal act, to induce W. to violate his engagement, to the actual injury of H. To mark the difference between the case of a journeyman or a servant and master, mutually bound by contract, and the same parties when free to engage anew, I should have before cited the case of Boston Glass Co. v. Binney, 4 Pick. 425. In that case, it was held actionable to entice another person's hired servant to quit his employment, during the time for which he was engaged; but not actionable to treat with such hired servant, whilst actually hired and employed by another, to leave his service, and engage in the employment of the person making the proposal, when the term for which he is engaged shall expire. It acknowledges the established principle, that every free man, whether skilled laborer, mechanic, farmer or domestic servant, may work or not work, or work or refuse to work with any company or individual, at his own option, except so far as he is bound by contract. But whatever might be the force of the word 'compel,' unexplained by its connection, it is disarmed and rendered harmless by the precise statement of the means, by which such compulsion was to be effected. It was the agreement not to work for him, by which they compelled W. to decline employing H. longer. On both of these grounds, we are of opinion that the statement made in this second count, that the unlawful agreement was carried into execution, makes no essential difference between this and the first count.

"The third count, reciting a wicked and unlawful intent to impoverish one J. H., and hinder him from following his trade as a bootmaker, charges the defendants, with others unknown, with an unlawful conspiracy, by wrongful and indirect means, to impoverish said H., and to deprive and hinder him from his said art and trade and getting his support thereby, and that, in pursuance of said unlawful combination, they did unlawfully and indirectly hinder and prevent, &c., and greatly impoverish him.

"If the fact of depriving J. H. of the profits of his business, by whatever means it might be done, would be unlawful and criminal, a combination to compass that object would be an unlawful conspiracy, and it would be unnecessary to state the means. Such seems to have been the view of the court in the King v. Eccles, Dougl. 337, though the case is so briefly reported, that the reasons on which it rests are not very obvious. The case seems to have gone on the ground, that the means were matter of evidence, and not of averment; and that after verdict, it was to be presumed, that the means contemplated and used were such as to render the combination unlawful and constitute a conspiracy.

"Suppose a baker in a small village had the exclusive custom of his neighborhood, and was making large profits by the sale of his bread. Supposing a number of those neighbors, believing the price of his bread too high, should propose to him to reduce his prices, or if he did not, that they would introduce another baker; and on his refusal, such other baker should, under their encouragement, set up a rival establishment, and sell his bread at lower prices; the effect would be to diminish the profit of the former baker, and to the same extent to impoverish him. And it might be said and proved, that the purpose of the associates was to diminish his profits, and thus impoverish him, though the ultimate and laudable object of the combination was to reduce the cost of bread to themselves and their neighbors. The same thing may be said of all competition in every branch of trade and industry; and yet it is through that competition, that the best interests of trade and industry are promoted. It is scarcely necessary to allude to the familiar instances of opposition lines of conveyance, rival hotels, and the thousand other instances, where each strives to gain custom to himself, by ingenious improvements, by increased industry, and by all the means by which he may lessen the price of commodities, and thereby diminish the profits of others.

"We think, therefore, that associations may be entered into, the object of which is to adopt measures that may have a tendency to impoverish another, that is, to diminish his gains and profits, and yet so far from being criminal or unlawful, the object may be highly meritorious and public spirited. The legality of such an association will therefore depend upon the means to be used for its accomplishment. If it is to be carried into effect by fair or honorable and lawful means, it is, to say the least, innocent; if by falsehood or force, it may be stamped with the character of conspiracy. It follows as a necessary consequence, that if criminal and indictable, it is so by reason