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vate land, which was entered and located in pursuance of law more than thirty years ago, and held in quiet and peaceable possession under title adverse to the Government for all that period. But a few years ago the Government laid claim to all the land on which the town is located, and contiguous territory to the amount of four sections; and the question of title being carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, that tribunal decided in favor of the Government, and by that act disseized 5,000 people of the homes they had paid for, and improved and beautified with the toil of years. But Congress, in consideration of the circumstances, enacted a law on March 3, 1877, providing for the appointment of three Commissioners, whose duty it should be to survey and lay off in convenient tracts, parcels, and lots all the land embraced in said four sections, having due regard to the boundaries of existing claims; and, after laying aside as a special reservation all the lands covering the Hot Springs, to adjudicate the possessory or preemption rights of rival claimants to each individual tract, parcel, or lot so surveyed and laid out by the Commissioners, who were then to fix a price on each tract or lot, which the party adjudged the preemption right by the Commissioners might purchase. The term of the Commissioners' office was limited to one year.

On April 28, 1877, the Commissioners organized by the election of Hon. Aaron Cragin as chairman of the Board. John Anderson was appointed stenographer and clerk. They examined the reserve to be laid off into lots, blocks, squares, streets, and alleys, and determined to retain control of all the medicinal wators for the general public, and directed that all the thermal springs should be reserved from sale. For the purpose of properly performing the work, the engineer was authorized to make a thorough topographical survey of the entire reservation. Claimants were allowed six months in which to file their claims, the majority of whom filed them within the last month allotted to them. Rules were made to assist the claimants in filing their claims, and the of fice was kept open until 12 o'clock on the night of the 27th of October, 1877, being the last hour that could be allowed the claimants for filing petitions. During the six months 950 petitions were filed. The Hot Springs Mountain, embracing the thermal springs, have been laid off and reserved from sale. The boundary line follows the base of the mountains, and is laid out as a carriage-drive, inclosing an area of 245 acres in the reserve. The Commissioners are of the opinion, from the nature and character of the country, and the great importance of this place as a health and pleasure resort, that a much larger tract should be reserved from sale. The thermal springs all make their appearance on the west side of the Hot Springs Mountain, and west of the springs across the valley is Whippoorwill Mountain, the area of which is about 500 acres. It is un

available for building-lots, but is covered with evergreen and other trees of beautiful foliage. At the north end of the valley is the Novaculate Mountain, containing 200 acres, unavailable for building-lots. In their first report the Commissioners recommended to the Government the reservation of all these mountains as general parks, and the donation of four lots for public-school houses. The Commissioners asked that their time for finishing up the work be continued until June 30, 1879. By act of Congress, April 20, 1832, Congress reserved from.entry the Hot Springs, together with four sections of land. At that time the surveys were not complete, nor for six years thereafter. Several settlers attempted to enter the lands by preemption prior to Congress surveying them. Litigation continued among the claimants for thirty years. In 1870 Congress authorized the claimants to institute suits in the Court of Claims to settle the titles. The decisions were adverse to them. They then appealed to the Supreme Court, April 26, 1877, which also decided against the claimants. A receiver was then appointed to take charge of the property and collect rents, and he paid to the Government $5,000 in a few months.

The Commissioners continued at work taking testimony in respect to claims, etc., until their term of office expired, when they suspended operations. A few months more would have been sufficient to complete the whole business. At once petitions, signed by nearly every man and woman in the place, were sent to Congress, beseeching it to pass a supplemental act extending the time of the Commission long enough to enable it to complete the work assigned to it by the original bill. The Senate responded to their appeals by passing the necessary act, but the House of Representatives neglected it. Finally, in the sundry civil appropriation bill, an amendment was made which provided for the continuance of the Commission. This passed both Houses of Congress; but in the enrollment of the bill, the section was left out in some unexplained manner. It did not appear in the bill as signed by the President, and became a failure. Immediately on the commencement of the subsequent session of Congress in December, 1878, a committee was appointed in the Senate to investigate the change in the bill abovo mentioned. A new bill was also introduced to provide for the same object as mentioned in the defective bill.

A conflict of authority between the Federal and State courts became very important during the year. Subsequent to the war many counties of the State issued bonds or scrip for internal purposes. These have been bought up by citizens of other States at nominal prices, and the holders brought suits in the Federal courts for their face value. More than thirty counties were thus sued. In such cases the Federal Court, after judgment for the plaintiff, issued a mandamus ordering the taxes to be levied and collected for the payment of the

judgment. The grounds of the decision of the Federal Court are set forth by Judge Dillon of the U. S. Circuit Court, Hewitt & Cooper vs. Judge and Justices of Jefferson County. In re Silverman, Judge of said County, Hewitt recovered judgment in the Federal Court against Jefferson County. The county did not appeal from that judgment. Hewitt assigned part of the judgment to Cooper. The Court awarded a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the county authorities to levy a tax to pay the judgment. The tax was levied and

afterward set aside. A rule was issued by the Court against the County Judge of Jefferson County, Frank Silverman, to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in not obeying the writ of mandamus directed to him by the Court. He set up in defense that he obeyed certain orders of the State Court. Judge Dillon said:

The county officers on the alternative writ which issued had full opportunity to be heard against the demands that were made against them. No sufficient reason was shown by the county or its officers why the peremptory writ of mandamus should not issue, and the Court adjudged that it ought to be awarded. The peremptory writ was directed to Frank Silverman, County Judge, and Craig and others, Justices of the Peace, composing the County Court of Jefferson County. It commanded them "to meet and convene together at the courthouse in the town of Pine Bluff, in said county, upon the day fixed by law for levying taxes for county purposes for the year 1877, then and there to organize, open, and hold a County Court of said connty, and to levy the tax of five mills upon the dollar of all the taxable property of said county, provided for by the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, for the payment of indebtedness contracted and created before and existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution, payable only in United States currency, and cause the same to be collected at the same time and in the same manner that other county taxes are directed by law to be collected, and to cause the proceeds of the said tax, as soon as collected, to be paid into the registry of our said Circuit Court for the payment and satisfaction of the said judgment, interest, and

costs."

It appears that this writ was duly served, and that in pursuance of this command they did meet, and levied the tax which the writ commanded them to cause to be levied. Afterward, at the instance of certain tax-payers of that county, a proceeding upon certiorari was instituted to have the order of the County Court made in obedience to this writ reviewed by the Circuit Court of the county; and that proceeding was begun and carried on in the local court without any notice being given to the relators or parties interested in the judgment; and in that proceeding the State Circuit Court undertook to annul the order of the County Court, made in obedience to the commands of this Court, and certified its action to the County Court in that regard. When that action was certified to the County Court commanding that Court to enter an order annulling its prior levy of taxes, the County Court obeyed and caused that order to be made. The tax had been extended on the tax-books of the county, and the warrant for collection was in the hands of the sheriff, who by the statutes of this State is ex officio collector. When it was known in the community that the Circuit Court of the county had made such order, the collector made return (in obedience to a rule issued upon him) that, although he demanded the tax, he was unable to collect it; that the tax-payers refused to pay it, and so practi

cably the commands contained in the writ we issued have been of no avail.

In the State of Iowa, some years since, we had an important conflict between the State and Federal judicial tribunals concerning the validity of bonds issued by municipalities to aid in the construction of railroads. The Supreme Court of that State held that those bonds were unconstitutional, having, howfirst decision a large number of such bonds had been ever, previously decided otherwise; and under the issued. The State Supreme Court afterward changed their judgment, and held the bonds to be invalid, and proceedings were begun by tax-payers in the courts of that State to enjoin the counties from levying any tax to pay judgments rendered in the Federal Courts on municipal bonds. The leading case in the Supreme Court of the United States upon this subject, which is well known to the profession, is the case of Riggs vs. Johnson County, 6 Wallace Reports. The case is a stronger one than the cause now at the bar, because in that case the injunction from the State Court against the officers of Johnson County was issued before the writ of mandamus was issued by the Federal Court. Here is a very correct synopsis of the point ruled in that case:

"After a return unsatisfied of an execution on a judgment in a Circuit Court of the United States against a county for interest on railroad bonds, issued under a State statute in force prior to the issue of the bonds, and which made the levy of a tax to pay such interest obligatory on the county, a mandamus from the Circuit Court of the United States will lie against the county officers to levy a tax, even although prior to the application for the mandamus a State Court has perpetually enjoined the same officers against making such levy; the mandamus, when so issued, being to be regarded as a writ necessary to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court which had previously attached, and to enforce its judgments, and the State Court, therefore, not being regarded as in prior possession of the case."

Now the State officers in the State of Iowa were between two fires. First, the State Court enjoined them from levying the tax, and a subsequent mandamus from the Federal Court con:manded them to levy precisely the same tax which the writ of the State Court forbade. If they obeyed the mandamus of the Federal Court, and levied the tax, the State Court would, they said, arrest them for contempt of its writ and punish them. If they disregarded the command of the writ of mandamus the Federal Court would attach them for contempt and punish them. Now, what was to be done? It was this dilemma the County Judge, in the case at bar, said he supposed he was in: "I am subject to two commands; the Federal Court commands the levying of this tax, and the Circuit Court for the county has commanded me to annul the levy." He obeyed the orders of the local court, and in so doing he simply obeyed the wrong tribunal.

The subject is very fully considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the above-mentioned case of Riggs vs. Johnson County. It would consume too much time to repeat it at length; but the effect of it is, that in judgments rendered in this class of cases the writ of mandamus is a writ necessary to enforce the judgment, and that judgment can no more be interfered with by the State Courts than they can undertake to interfere with an ordinary writ of execution in the hands of the Marshal of this Court; nor can the State Court any more interfere than the Federal Court could interfere with their judgments or process. It is a rule that one Court shall not interfere with the processes of the other; and when this rule is observed harmony exists in both, and there can be no conflict.

In the case first cited the Supreme Court of the United States uses this language: "State Courts are exempt from all interference by the Federal tribunals, but they are destitute of all power to restrain

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either the process or proceeding in the national Courts. Circuit Courts of the United States and State Courts act separately and independently of each other, and in their respective spheres of action the process issued by the one is as far beyond the reach of the other as if the line of division between them' was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye.' Appellate relations exist in a class of cases between the State Courts and this Court, but there are no such relations between the State Courts and the Circuit Courts of the United States. Tested by these considerations, our conclusion is," says the United States Supreme Court, "that the propositions of the defendants can not be sustained, and that the Circuit Courts of the United States in the several States may issue the writ of mandamus in a proper case, where it is necessary to the exercise of their respective jurisdio tions, agreeably to the principles and usages of law. Where such exigencies arise they may issue it, but when so employed it is neither a prerogative writ nor a new suit in the jurisdictional sense. On the contrary, it is a proceeding ancillary to the judgment which gives the jurisdiction; and, when issued, becomes a substitute for the ordinary process of execution to enforce the payment of the same, as provided in the contract.

"The next suggestion of the defendants is," continues the United States Supreme Court, "that if the writ is issued and they should obey its commands, they may be exposed to a suit for damages or to attachment for contempt, aud imprisonment by the State Courts. No such apprehensions are entertained by this Court, as all experience shows that the State Courts at all times have readily acquiesced in the judginents of this Court, in all cases confided to its determination under the Constitution and laws of Congress. Guided by the experience of the past, our just expectations of the future are that the same just views will prevail. Should it be otherwise, however, the defendants will find the most ample means of protection at hand. The proper course for them to pursue in case they are sued for damages is to plead the commands of the writ in bar of the suit; and if their defense is overruled and judgment is rendered against them, a writ of error from their Court will lie to the judgment under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act. The remedy in case of imprisonment is a very plain one, under the seventh section of the act of the second day of March, 1833, entitled 'An act further to provide for the collection of the duties on imports.' Prisoners in jail or confinement for any net done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree of any Judge or Court thereof, may apply to either of the Justices of the Supreme, or any Judge of any District Court of the United States, for the writ of habeas corpus, and they are severally author ized to grant, in addition to the authority otherwise conferred by law."

Such is the law of the land, as declared by the highest tribunal of the country, and all Courts, Federal and Stato, must accopt it and yield obedience to it. The effect of this is, that the action of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County and the action of the County Court in pursuance hereof were nullities. The County Judge has been examined on oath, and he disclaims any intention to disregard the mandate of this Court; but he has made a mistake which may result to the prejudice of the relator's interests. We will reserve any further action against the County Judge, in order to see whether his action shall in the end result injuriously to the parties.

It is now ordered that the said rule against said Silverman be reserved for the further action of the Court, and that John M. Clayton, sheriff and ex officio collector of said county, do proceed to collect the taxes levied to pay the relator's judgment, the same as if the said certiorari proceedings had not

been had, and the judgment orders of the Circuit Court and, of the County Court setting aside said levy had not been made.

Against Pulaski County a judgment was rendered for a very large amount, and an order issued commanding the County Court to levy a tax in United States currency sufficient to pay it. The County Court answered that the State Constitution, which it was sworn to obey, allowed only a certain amount of tax to be levied; and if it levied the amount the Federal Court required, it would exceed the limit and violate the Constitution of the State. The Judge and Justices were then summoned before the Federal Court and commanded peremptorily to levy the tax, under penalties of contempt of Court. Being powerless and unwilling to encounter fines and imprisonment, they obeyed. The tax was levied and collected, despite the State Constitution.

Subsequently in June, in the case of Graham vs. Purham, Chief Justice English of the State Supreme Court delivered an opinion in which the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is reviewed, and many questions in connection with their powers are discussed. The opinion is a dignified protest against encroachments of the Federal judiciary upon the reserved rights of the States; and, though conceding to the Federal Courts the right to entertain suits against counties, and to enforce their judgments by mandamus compelling the proper officials to levy and collect taxes to satisfy such judgments, yet maintains that this jurisdiction can be exercised only in pursuance of and accordance with the Constitution and laws of the State; and that the Supreme Court of the State is the proper tribunal to interpret the Constitution and expound the laws marking and limiting the boundaries in which the Federal as well as State Courts shall exercise their jurisdiction.

In respect to the right of the Federal Courts to entertain suits against counties, the Supreme Court say that this right is derived solely (in connection with their constitutional jurisdiction) from the statutes of the State, which give the counties the right "to sue and be sued": and that without such a law a county could not be sued at all in either the Federal or State Courts.

In respect to the powers of the Federal Courts to compel by mandamus County Courts to levy taxes to pay their judgments, the Supreme Court say that this jurisdiction has been claimed by virtue of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, although the Court was divided on the question; but affirms that no case can be found in which the Supreme Court has decided that a United States. Circuit or District Court can compel by mandamus a County Court to levy a tax, or do any other act which it is not empowered by the Constitution and laws of the State to do.

In respect to the constitutional provision that no county shall levy a tax to exceed one

half of one per cent. for all purposes, but may levy an additional tax of one half of one per cent. to pay existing indebtedness at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the Court uses this strong and emphatic language:

This section furnishes the measure and limitation upon the taxing power of the counties, and neither the Legislature, nor the State Courts, nor the Federal Courts can direct or force a county to make a valid levy in excess of these limitations.

The Court say, however, that there may be an exceptional case arising under the Constitution of the United States, forbidding any State to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

One of the most important subjects to the State of Arkansas relates to the establishment of a territorial government by Congress over the Indian Territory. The five Indian tribes occupying the Territory west of Arkansas have until recently been almost unanimously opposed to breaking up their tribal relations, and have been bitterly hostile to all measures for their future development. These views have changed among the Choctaws and Chickasaws, whose recently elected rulers were chosen to support a change. Arkansas bas within her limits about fifty thousand square miles. Immediately west of the State lies the Indian Territory, with sixty-five or seventy thousand square miles, which was set apart and ceded by solemn treaty, about fifty years ago, as a country and a future home for the Southern Indians. This cession was made to be perpetual; the lands were granted in fee simple, and the tribes were guaranteed independent self-government and freedom from taxation. But Congress, some ten years ago, without notice or hearing, extended the revenue laws and taxation over all countries lying within "the bounds of the United States." · Treaties with the tribes hitherto had always been held to be sacred, being made with independent and not subject nations; and they had been so recognized always by the political power, and repeatedly by the Supreme Court of the United States. All this has now been reversed. The Congress in effect destroyed all treaties when it destroyed the sovereignty of one of the parties by extending over the Indian country, without its consent, the revenue laws of the United States. In the noted case of E. C. Boudinot vs. the United States, Mr. Boudinot resisted the right of the United States to do this thing, quoting in vain the treaties with the tribes and the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining their inviolability. The Cherokee authorities, in maintaining the rights of the Cherokee Nation, employed counsel to aid them. But the Supreme Court sustained the action of Congress, and Mr. Boudinot was ruined, and with him the cause of his people.

This is regarded as a precedent for the abrogation of all treaties with the Indians by simple legislation, and the time will perhaps be short

when it may be held up as a solemn declaration by Congress and the Supreme Court of the subjugation of all tribes and the nullity of all treaties now or hereafter made; as the establishment by the President, the Congress, and the courts, of a far-reaching principle, on which must follow the policy of settling all Indian questions hereafter. Since the decision of the Supreme Court referred to, it has become a question propounded openly in Congress"whether it is not time that the Government should cease longer to attempt by force of treaties to govern and civilize the Indians."

The Indian appropriation bill passed in May, 1878, contained a clause to remove all the wild Nez Percés tribes into their territory. In the Senate, General Maxey, of Texas, moved to strike out this clause. His motion was rejected. Mr. Edmunds proposed to remove these wild tribes to such part of the Indian Territory as the Government had a right to use, and it was agreed to. Mr. Teller, of Colorado, offered a proviso that the removal should be dependent upon the consent of the civilized tribes, and forthwith his motion was rejected. These indications bring the question home to the five tribes whether they shall at some future day be crowded with all the savage tribes, involved in wars, and driven out at last, or whether Congress shall, after giving each Indian of them a fee simple in land enough to live on, and paying them the price of the balance, open their country to settlement by the whites, and establish a territorial government, giving the Indians equal rights with the whites, and enabling them to live in peace and perfect their civilization.

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. The army on October 15, 1878, consisted of 24,761 enlisted men, which is a reduction of about five thousand since the previous year. The desertions during the year ending June 30, 1878, were 1,678; during the previous year 2,516. In the expenditures for the army there was a reduction over the previous year of $4,323,734.54, which arose in part from the diminution of the force. The appropriation by Congress was $25,712,500.

The only active service of the army during the year was caused by some Indian disturbances which were confined to a comparatively small number of Indians. The discontent among the Bannocks, which led first to acts of violence on the part of some members of the tribe, and finally to the outbreak, appears to have been caused by an insufficiency of food on the reservation, and this insufficency to have been owing to the inadequacy of the appropriations made by Congress to the wants of the Indians at a time when they were prevented from supplying the deficiency by hunting. After an arduous pursuit by the troops of the United States, and several engagements, the hostile Indians were reduced to subjection, and the larger part of them surrendered themselves as prisoners. The other

case of disturbance was that of a band of northern Cheyennes, who suddenly left their reservation in the Indian Territory and marched rapidly through the States of Kansas and Nebraska in the direction of their old huntinggrounds, committing murders and other crimes on their way. From documents accompanying the report of the Secretary of the Interior it appears that this disorderly band was as fully supplied with the necessaries of life as the 4,700 other Indians who remained quietly on the reservation, and that the disturbance was caused by men of a restless and mischievous disposition among the Indians themselves. Almost the whole of this band have surrendered to the military authorities, and when some of them had taken refuge in the camp of the Red Cloud Sioux, with whom they had been in friendly relations, the Sioux held them as prisoners and readily gave them up to the officers of the United States, thus giving new proof of the loyal spirit which they have uniformly shown ever since the wishes they expressed at the council of September, 1877, were complied with.

Both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior unite in the recommendation

that provision be made by Congress for the organization of a corps of mounted "Indian auxiliaries," to be under the control of the army, and to be used for the purpose of keeping the Indians on their reservations, and preventing or repressing disturbance on their part. It is believed that the organization of such a body of Indian cavalry, receiving a moderate pay from the Government, would considerably weaken the restless element among the Indians by withdrawing from it a number of young men and giving them congenial employment under the Government, it being a matter of experience that Indians in service, almost without exceptions, are faithful in the performance of the duties assigned to them. Such an organization would materially aid the army in the accomplishment of a task for which its numerical strength is sometimes found insufficient. It may be very difficult and require much patient effort to curb the unruly spirit of the savage Indian to the restraints of civilized life, but experience shows that it is not impossible. Many of the tribes which are now quiet and orderly and self-supporting were once as savage as any that at present roam over the plains or in the mountains of the Far West, and were then considered inaccessible to civilizing influences. It may be impossible to raise them fully up to the level of the white population of the United States, but they are aborigines of the country, and called the soil their own on which our people have grown rich, powerful, and hapру.

It is also a well-authenticated fact that Indians are apt to be peaceable and quiet when their children are at school; and there is a steadily increasing desire, even among Indians belonging to comparatively wild tribes, to have their children educated. An experiment has

been recently inaugurated in taking fifty Indian children, boys and girls, from different tribes, to the Hampton Normal Agricultural Institute in Virginia, where they are to receive an elementary English education and training in agriculture and other useful work, to be returned to their tribes, after the completed course, as interpreters, instructors, and examples. It is reported that the officer charged with the selection of those children might have had thousands of young Indians sent with him had it been possible to make provision for them.

In the opinion of the Secretary of War, the policy of the Government toward the Indians should be designed to enforce these two propositions, viz. :

1. Fair and just treatment of the Indians, including the faithful performance on our part of every promise; and

2. The prompt and effectual punishment of all acts of a sufficient military force in the Indian country to of war on their part, and to this end the employment act with vigor and success when occasion requires, and prevent the possibility of the defeat or massacre of small detachments of our troops, by which Indian wars have been so often in the past encouraged and prolonged.

The army appropriation bill passed at the close of the session of Congress in June, 1878, contained a provision for a joint committee to investigate the propriety of a transfer of the care of the Indians from the Interior Department to the War Department. The first meeting of the committee was on December 6th, and the first witness called was the Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz. The following extract from his testimony will show some of the points of the question:

Permit me to state that there are two methods of Indian management possible-either to herd and corral the Indians under the walls or guns of a military force, so to speak, so as to watch them and prevent outbreaks, or to start them at work upon their lands, to educate them and to civilize them.

Now, in the nature of things, the first method would be the only method adopted by the military branch of the Government, for the simple reason that it is their business to keep the peace and prevent troublesome tribes from getting into mischief. The second is the policy which we have followed and carried out, with at least a partial success; a policy certainly the most humane and enlightened, and more in the interest of peace in the long run, without any settled interests or property, we may for as long as the Indians remain roaming tribes, always look for complications. It is also the most economical policy, for the sooner the Indians are civilized the sooner they will be able to provide for themselves. I think also that in the morals and industrial habits of civilized life the military branch of the Government is not the best calculated to instruct them. This question of a transfer has been discussed before, and in a report which has attained is suggested the chief duties of the Bureau will be some celebrity it is stated that under the plan which to educate and instruct in the peaceful arts; in other words, to civilize the Indians. The military arm of the Government is not the most admirably adapted to discharge duties of this character. We are satislike to teach Indian children to read and write or

fied that not one army officer in a thousand would Indian men to sow and reap. These are emphatically civil and not military occupations. The re

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