roll. And besides, here the purchaser is not to be at liberty to question the right of the lords of the manor to grant such copies of Courtroll. The lords of the manor might have made a voluntary admission by the Court-roll of May, 1842, and their title to do so would be immaterial: Doe d. Burgess v. Thompson (1); and the plaintiff is estopped from denying its validity. The only way in which the Court can give effect to these conditions of sale is, by deciding that the purchaser has no right to question the title prior to the last Court-roll. Secondly, the plaintiff has brought his action too soon, for the defendants were not bound to make out their title before the next Court day had elapsed, and it does not appear that that day has passed. In Sansom v. Rhodes (2), it was held, that where no precise time is fixed, within which the vendor is to deduce a good title, it ought to appear that he had been allowed a reasonable time. (LORD ABINGER, C. B.: That point was not taken at the trial.) It was for the plaintiff to show that a reasonable time had elapsed; but he has failed to do this, as he does not show that the next Court day has passed and it is submitted that the defendants are entitled to insist upon this objection, as it is apparent upon the evidence, and the case was reserved generally. Thirdly, no valid objection has been shown to the title. *A contract to sell land consists of two parts—a contract to deduce a good title, and a contract to make a valid conveyance. The former is fulfilled, if the vendor has vested in himself, or in himself and those who are bare trustees for him, the complete legal and equitable interest in the property. The rest is matter of conveyance, the non-fulfilment of which cannot be objected to by the purchaser until the time has arrived at which he is entitled to have the property vested in him, (which in this case was not until the next Court day), nor until he has tendered for execution the necessary documents. In Berkeley v. Dauh (3) it was held, that an outstanding term to attend the inheritance, the trusts being performed, is no objection to the title, though it may be an objection to the conveyance. Here the legal estate being outstanding was no objection to the title, SELLICK บ. TREVOR. [ *728 ] SELLICR ť. TREVOR. [ *729 ] and the defendants would have been ready to complete the title by producing a conveyance of the legal estate. LORD ABINGER, C. B.: The case of Berkeley v. Dauh was a case where a bill had been filed to compel specific performance; and it was held, that the outstanding term, although it might form an objection to the conveyance, was no objection to the title. That case does not govern the present, which is an action for money had and received, and depends upon the question, whether the defendants had a reasonable time after the contract within which to make out their title. The decision in Shepherd v. Keatley is applicable to this case. By the conditions of sale, the defendants are not bound to produce any earlier title-deed than the last copy of Court-roll; that protects them from any other title anterior to that Court-roll; but still the plaintiff is at liberty to show aliunde that the title is void. It is said, however, that the defendants must have a reasonable *time to make out their title; whether they had that reasonable time in this case would be a question of fact for the jury. Now the circumstances are, that the sale took place in July, 1842, and the action was not brought until the January following. It appears to me, therefore, that the defendants had a reasonable time; and it is quite clear that at the present moment the title is insufficient. I am of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. As to the other question, I think that the proviso in the Stamp Act has no application to this case, and that the stamp is sufficient. The rule must therefore be discharged. ROLFE, B.: I am of the same opinion. There can be no doubt that a party has a right to stipulate that a purchaser shall take that interest only which he himself has in the premises; and in this case the vendors have stipulated by the conditions of sale, that they shall not be bound to produce a title anterior to the last copy of the Court-roll. They then go on to stipulate, that they shall not be bound to produce or prove the title of the lords of the manor, the Dean and Chapter; their intention being that the last copy of the Court-roll only shall be produced, and that the title of the Dean and Chapter shall not be ripped up. But here the title which they did produce is defective on the face of it, and it never could have been intended that the purchaser should be precluded from objecting As to to the title which the vendors should produce, if defective. FORMAN v. DAWES AND ANOTHER (1). (11 Meeson & Welsby, 730-734; S. C. 12 L. J. Ex. 437; 1 D. & L. 299.) TRESPASS for seizing the plaintiff's goods, under an execution issued out of the Wolverhampton Court of Requests. Plea, not guilty, by statute. At the trial, the plaintiff completely failed in establishing his case, and the jury found a verdict for the defendants, without any evidence having been adduced on their part. By the 48 Geo. III. c. cx. (local), intituled "An Act for the more easy and speedy recovery of small debts within the township of Wolverhampton, and the several parishes and places therein mentioned," it is enacted, (by s. 52), "that no action shall be brought against any person for anything done in pursuance of this Act, until notice thereof shall have been given &c. at least one calendar month before the suing out and serving of the same &c. ; and the defendant or defendants in such action shall and may plead the general issue, and give this Act and the special matter in evidence, and that the same was done in pursuance and by the authority of this Act; and if the same shall appear to have been so done &c., then the jury shall find for the defendant or defendants; and upon such verdict, or if the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall become nonsuited or discontinue such action, or if, upon a verdict (1) Discussed by ROMER, J., in North Metropolitan Tramways Co. v. London County Council [1898] Ch. 145, 148, 67 L. J. Ch. 449, 450; see R.R.-VOL. LXIII. now 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97 and (as to costs 47 SELLICK] υ. TREVOR. 1843. June 13. Exch. of [ 730] FORMAN v. DAWES. [ 731] or demurrer, judgment shall be given against the plaintiff or plaintiffs, the defendant or defendants shall and may recover treble costs." The Master having, in pursuance of the above Act, taxed treble costs in favour of the defendants in this cause, Godson obtained a rule to show cause why the Master should not review his taxation, and reduce the amount, on the ground that the defendants were not entitled to treble costs, as they had not entered any suggestion on the record, and had not given the Act in evidence at the trial. W. J. Alexander (Talfourd, Serjt., with him) now showed cause: First, a suggestion was not necessary; for the statute does not require it. The statute says, that if, upon a verdict or demurrer, judgment shall be given against the plaintiff or plaintiffs, the defen dant shall recover treble costs. The defendants having succeeded at the trial, the judgment is regular, without any suggestion being entered; and it would not appear from the judgment whether treble costs had been charged or not: Wells v. Ody (1). In that case PARKE, B., says, "There are some cases in which a suggestion must be entered up, as where the defendant seeks to deprive the plaintiff of costs under the Court of Requests Acts; but here the judgment would be regular without such suggestion being entered. If the defendant entered up judgment for treble costs, the Court could not see from the judgment whether he had charged treble costs or not. It was held, in Finlay v. Seaton (2), that neither a certificate from the Judge, nor a suggestion on the roll, is necessary to entitle a defendant to double costs under the 11 Geo. II. c. 19. There the words in the statute are, shall recover double costs.' I do not say whether it is not necessary to enter a suggestion in the present case. If the words had been shall recover treble costs,' it is quite clear, on the authority of that case, that it would not have been necessary to do so." That judgment is expressly in point, and is decisive to show that no suggestion was necessary here. But then it is said, that the defendants, in order to entitle themselves to treble costs, ought to have given some evidence to bring the case within the Act. But it sufficiently appeared that they were proceedings under the Act. Notice of action had been given, and the plea was, not guilty by statute. It was not necessary to produce the warrant to show that the goods were seized under (1) 46 R. R. 358 (2 Cr. M. & R. 184). (2) 53 R. R. 265 (1 Taunt. 210). the execution, as it was clear, from the plaintiff's *own showing, that it was so, and that the seizure was justifiable, and therefore the trespass was not proved. It was not denied before the Master, that this was an action for a matter done in pursuance of the Act. Godson, in support of the rule: : As the warrant was not put in and proved, the Court has no judicial knowledge that the proceedings were for anything done under the Act and the defendants are in the same situation as if this were a simple trespass, and the words "by statute" were not added to the plea of not guilty. The defendants not having given any evidence to show that their defence was under the Act, and no certificate of the Judge having been produced to that effect, the Court has no judicial knowledge that the defendants are entitled to treble costs, and they ought not to be allowed. He referred to the ruling in Forman v. Dawes (1), on the first trial of this cause. LORD ABINGER, C. B.: I am of opinion that this rule ought to be discharged with costs. I think the Court granted the rule without sufficiently considering the merits of the application; for it appears to me, upon consideration, that there was no ground or pretence whatever for it. The words of the Act of Parliament are precise, that if an action is brought for any matter done by virtue of this statute, the plaintiff shall give one month's notice of the action before he brings it, and that he shall be punished, if he be nonsuited, or a verdict pass against him, by the payment of treble costs to the defendant. According to Mr. Godson's interpretation of the Act, if the plaintiff is nonsuited because he fails to give any evidence at all, the party who defends the action never can recover treble costs. Then what is the meaning of the Act of Parliament? The record does not state that the action was brought for a matter done *in pursuance of the Act, and there was no plea that a notice was served to that effect. But suppose there was a plea to that effect, then, according to Mr. Godson, that plea ought to be proved before the defendant can derive any advantage from the Act. But if that be so, what becomes of all the provisions in the statute about a nonsuit? This is precisely a case where a verdict is given against the plaintiff, because he did not prove his notice of action under the statute. But it is said that a suggestion ought to have been entered. It is (1) Car. & M. 127. FORMAN v. DAWES. [ *732 ] [ *733 ] |