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THE DUKE OF

t.

THE KING OF

HANOVER,

from a prince or chief against whom you have no ordinary means of enforcing it. It may be refused; acquiescence in the refusal is BRUNSWICK the abandonment of justice, and pressure after refusal implies an imputation, and gives rise to discussions and irritations which may again prove incentives to war. Justice can be peaceably and effectually administered there only where there is recognised authority and adequate power. What is to be done in cases where there is no power to enforce it ?

It must be admitted, that the subject is replete with difficulties. These difficulties and the importance of maintaining the legal inviolability of sovereign princes, can scarcely be shown more strongly, than by adverting to the opinions which have been expressed by eminent jurists, that offences committed by sovereign princes in foreign States ought rather to be treated as causes of war, than as violations of the law of the country where they are committed, and ought rather to be checked by vengeance, and making war on the offender, than by any attempt to obtain justice through lawful means.

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After giving to the subject the best consideration in my power, it appearing to me that all the reasons upon which the immunities. of ambassadors are founded do not apply to the case of sovereigns, but that there are reasons for the immunities of sovereign princes, at least as strong, if not much stronger, than any which have been advanced for the immunities of ambassadors; that suits against sovereign princes of foreign countries must, in all ordinary cases in which orders or declarations of right may be made, end in requests for justice, which might be made without any suit at all; that even the failure of justice, in some particular cases, would be less prejudicial than attempts to obtain it by violating immunities thought necessary to the independence of princes and nations, I think that, on the whole, it ought to be considered as a general rule, in accordance with the law of nations, that a sovereign prince, resident in the dominions of another, is exempt from the jurisdiction of the Courts there.

It is true, as was argued for the plaintiff, that the common interest of mankind requires that justice should every where be done, and that, for the attainment of justice, all persons should be amenable to the Courts of justice in the country where they are. Such is the general rule; but in cases where either party has no superior by whom obedience can be compelled, where the execution

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of justice is not provided for by treaty, and cannot be enforced by the authority of the Judge; and where an attempt to enforce it by the authority of the State may probably become a cause of war; the same common interest, which is the foundation of the rule, requires that some exception should be made to it, and that exception is the general rule with respect to sovereign princes.

The question then arises, whether the exception in favour of sovereign princes, and the exemption from suit thereby allowed, is to be entire and universal, or subject to any and what limitations.

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The first and most general rule is, that all persons should be amenable to Courts of justice, and should be liable to be sued. A consideration of the policy of the law creates an exception in the case of sovereign princes. May not a further consideration of the policy of the law create a modification or limitation of the exception in the case of sovereign princes who are subjects?

There are in Europe other sovereign princes who, if not now, have been subjects of the country of their origin or adoption. Upon such a question as this, *I cannot disregard those cases, but they may have their specialties, of which I am not aware.

I cannot venture to say, that a subject acquiring the character of a sovereign prince in another country, and being recognised as a sovereign prince by the sovereign of the country of his origin, may not, by the act of recognition, in ordinary circumstances and by the laws of some countries, be altogether released from the allegiance and legal subjection which he previously owed; but the case now before me must depend on its own circumstances; and I am of opinion, that it is not contrary to any principle and not unreasonable to consider, that in the contemplation of the Courts of this country, the inviolability which belongs to his Majesty the King of Hanover as a sovereign prince, ought to be, and is modified by his character and duties as a subject of the Queen of England.

Previously to his becoming King of Hanover, he always lived in allegiance to the Crown of England, and in subjection to the laws of England. His accession to the Throne was contemporaneous with the accession of the Queen to the Throne of this kingdom; and since he became King of Hanover, he has been so far from renouncing or from showing any desire to renounce, his allegiance to the Crown or his subjection to the laws of England, he has been so far from admitting it to be questionable, whether his

THE DUKE OF

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sovereignty, and the recognition of it by the Queen, has absolved his allegiance or his subjection to the laws of England, that he has BRUNSWICK renewed his oath of allegiance, and taken his seat in the English Legislature, and has claimed and exercised the political rights of an English subject and an English peer.

If he came here as King of Hanover only, the same inviolability and privileges which are deemed to belong to all sovereign princes would have been his, and, save in peculiar cases, such as I have before referred to, he would have been exempt from all suits and legal process. But coming here, not as King of Hanover only, but as a subject, as a peer of the realm, and as a member of her Majesty's Privy Council, can it be reasonably said, that he is exempt from all jurisdiction, or, in other words, from all responsibility for his conduct in any of those characters?

The law of England admits the legal inviolability of the sovereign, requiring, at the same time, the legal responsibility of those who advise the sovereign. Can the law of England, in any individual case, admit the strange anomaly of an inviolable adviser of an inviolable sovereign, of a legal subjection without any legal superiority? Can any peer or privy councillor, whatever station he may occupy elsewhere, be permitted to give advice, for which any other peer, or any other member of the Privy Council, might be justly impeached, and yet hold himself exempt from the jurisdiction of the highest tribunal in the realm? May he enter into a contract which any other subject would be compelled to perform, and yet refuse to answer any claim whatever, either for specific performance or for damages?

Great inconveniences may arise from the exercise of any jurisdiction in such a case. They arise, perhaps, inevitably, from the two characters which his Majesty the King of Hanover unites in his own person, and from the claim which he voluntarily makes to enjoy or exercise, concurrently, in this country, his rights as a sovereign prince, and also his rights as an English subject, peer, and privy councillor. He is a sovereign prince, *and, as such, inviolable in his own dominions, and, I presume, also in the dominions of every other prince to whom he is not a subject. Remaining in his own dominions, or in the dominions of any other prince to whom he is not a subject, he would, as I presume, be exempt from all forensic jurisdiction. But he comes to this country where he is a subject, and claims and exercises his rights as such. As a subject, he owes duties correlative to which, not individuals

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only, but the country at large may have legal rights, which are to be respected, and being legal rights against a subject in respect of his acts and duties as a subject, it seems that they ought, if necessary and practicable, to be vindicated and enforced by the law. Those legal rights would be nugatory, if his inviolability as a sovereign prince would admit of no exception or modification. But any contradiction or inconsistency may be obviated by distinguishing, as in the analogous case of the ambassador, the acts which ought to be attributed to one character or the other; and, it appears to me, that, when necessary, it must be the office and duty of the Courts to make the distinction.

If the distinction can justly be made, why should it not, and why should not the jurisdiction be exercised, so far as the circumstances of the case will allow ?

Admitting it to be the general rule, that sovereign princes are not liable to be sued, and that all sovereign princes may consider themselves interested to maintain the inviolability which each one claims, and that any aggression upon it might, in ordinary circumstances, be a cause of war; yet, observing what is stated to be the law of nations in the case of ambassadors, conceiving that a rule applicable only to the case of sovereigns who are subjects, and think fit actively to exercise their rights as subjects, cannot have any extensive application, *and is not likely to excite any general interest, or any alarm, and having regard to that which is absolutely required to maintain the relation of sovereign and subject in any country, I am of opinion that no complaint can justly or will probably arise, from any legal proceeding, the object of which is to compel, as far as practically may be, a sovereign prince residing in the territory of another prince whose subject he is, to perform the duties of a subject, in relation to his own acts done in the character of subject only.

And admitting that, in ordinary cases, it may happen, that the execution of a decree cannot be enforced against a sovereign prince though a subject of this realm, I do not think that, for that reason, a plaintiff should be deprived of all means of establishing his right in a due course of procedure; I do not think that I ought to presume that a sovereign prince, who deems it to be consistent with his dignity and interest to come here and practically exercise the rights of an English subject, will not also deem it consistent with his dignity and interest to yield willing obedience to the law of England when duly declared.

And for these reasons I am of opinion, that his Majesty the

THE DUKE OF

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THE KING OF HANOVER.

King of Hanover is and ought to be exempt from all liability of BRUNSWICK being sued in the Courts of this country, for any acts done by him as King of Hanover, or in his character of sovereign prince, but that, being a subject of the Queen, he is and ought to be liable to be sued in the Courts of this country, in respect of any acts and transactions done by him, or in which he may have been engaged as such subject.

And in respect of any act done out of this realm, or any act as to which it may be doubtful, whether it ought to be attributed to the character of sovereign or to the character of subject, it appears to me, that it ought to be presumed to be attributable rather to the character of sovereign than to the character of subject.

And it further appears to me, that in a suit in this Court against a sovereign prince, who is also a subject, the bill ought, upon the face of it, to show that the subject-matter of it constitutes a case in which a sovereign prince is liable to be sued as a subject.

I cannot, therefore, consider the present suit as an ordinary suit between subject and subject; it is a suit against a defendant who is prima facie entitled to special immunities, and it ought to appear on the bill, that the case made by it is a case to which the special immunities ought not to be extended.

What is shown is, that the defendant is an English subject, and may therefore not be exempt from suit in some cases. Is it shown

that this is one of the cases in which the defendant is liable to be sued ?

The object of the suit is to obtain an account of property belonging to the plaintiff, alleged to have been possessed by the defendant, under colour of an instrument creating a species of guardianship unknown to the law of England. It is not pretended that any one act was done, or that any one receipt in respect of which the account is asked, was made in this country. Every act alleged as a ground of complaint was done abroad, in Brunswick, in Hanover, or elsewhere in foreign countries. No act alleged as a ground of complaint, was done by the defendant before he became King of Hanover, and from the nature of the transaction, and the recitals in this instrument, there are strong grounds to presume, that it was only by reason of his being King of Hanover, that the defendant was appointed guardian of the plaintiff's fortune and property. It is not pretended that the instrument has been impeached, or attempted to be impeached, in the country where alone it has

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