am unwilling to increase the power of the Judges; but it is because I am afraid there is danger at this time, of bringing down the Judiciary by putting such a weight upon it, and therefore I am opposed to altering the present mode of appointment.

In short, after bestowing all the reflection on the subject I possibly could-after being obliged to acknowledge there are many evils in the present system, which we could desire to avoid---after acknowledging there would arise out of the change proposed the advantages which have been suggested-after considering all these things, I have been unable to bring my mind to the conclusion, that we can adopt any plan less objectionable than the one which is furnished by the existing Constitution: And, particularly, for this reason, sir, that it is a power, the exercise of which the Chief Magistrate of the Commonwealth is able to bear and to execute. If he cannot bear it, let another Governor be elected in his place, who can. If his appointments are bad, it may happen, and has heretofore happened, that they have been satisfactory to the majority; and his appointments, whether good or bad, would be sustained by that majority. Therefore, he is able to bear the burden. I think that the judiciary would perform the duty well, but it could yield nothing to the desire of the majority, however great it might be, without swerving from its duty, without endangering its great virtue of independence which it should never yield. I would never put upon a court, if I could see any other depository with which to lodge it, any extra power, the exercise of which might be calculated to interfere with the fair form of justice-justice according to law, and not according to the will of any man, or any body of men. I should be afraid of introducing bad habits of that sort, and therefore, I am against an accumulation of such power. Sir, there seems to be a great majority in favor of making the offices elective, and if the Constitution is so altered, it must be remembered that it is a very serious matter.

There are objections to the instrument as it now stands. Those objections are weighty and serious, such as every man would be disposed to remove if it were in his power to do so, but he cannot find any other place of deposit for the power, a substitute for the Constitution, which has not equal or greater objections. Well, sir, if we come to that conclusion, is it not better to bear with existing evils, than to support a substitute which is not to be prefered? If I were asked where the best appointments could be made, I should say by the courts. But, if we come to the other question-whether the attributes of a Judge should not be kept as defined and as single as possible, I should say they ought, and I would not put more authority in their hands, because it might have the effect of producing extreme jealousy on the part of the people-it might weaken the judiciary.

Mr. SMYTH, of Centre, said, he had thought, that before this time the Convention would have become convinced of the impropriety of leaving the appointing power in the hands of the Governor. But, it seemed that he was mistaken, for the idea was not abandoned by all. The President of the Convention had alleged, that the Governor possessed better means of judging and ascertaining the qualifications of candidates for office than the people, and observed that the officers would be of the same political complexion as the citizens of the county by whom they were elected, Now, he (Mr. S.) must beg leave to differ from that gentleman, and con,

tend, that the people of the respective counties, who were interested in the proper discharge of the duties of those officers, were much more able to select and to judge of their qualifications than the Governor was. Would gentlemen say that the Governor was not as likely to appoint men of his own politica, as were the people? Undoubtedly he was. In every point of view, then, the better course to adopt was to give the election of the officers to the people. His opinion was, that the people were decidedly in favor of curtailing the patronage of the Governor, and of electing their own officers. He entertained not the least doubt, that the people would make judicious selections of men, well qualified in every respect to fill

the offices.

Mr. SCOTT, of Philadelphia, said, that the amendment offered to the amendment by his colleague, (Mr. MEREDITH) undoubtedly involved a consideration of the general character of the amendment itself, and, therefore, authorized the remarks which had been made on the subject. He confessed, that he desired to explain briefly his views in relation to it, and also on the amendment. The general proposition, stated by the amendment, went so far as to give the people of the Commonwealth the right to elect what were called their county officers; and to it, at least so far as silence could be an interpretation of gentlemen's views, he had given his assent. If, after further argument and examination, he should adhere to that opinion, he would not, at this moment, undertake to say. There were many considerations which had induced him, by silence, to assent to what appeared to be the general opinion of the committee. He thought that it must be admited, that the theory of our Government, on this subject, was beautiful beyond all dispute. What, he would ask, was that theory? The theory was, that the gentleman elected as Governor, by the votes of the majority of all the voters of the Commonwealth was charged with the execution of the laws, and with the general investigation of all its concerns. Being an upright and pure man, he was presumed to possess an accurate knowledge of the wants of each part of the Commonwealth of the character of the population composing it, and of the peculiar qualifications of men to fill the offices, with a proper regard to the interests and welfare of the Commonwealth. The theory goes further, and supposes that, guided by these principles, he will allow only the just application of them, and would appoint no man to office who did not possess those qualifications, which rendered him able to promote the best interests of the people in his own particular sphere. Now, he (Mr. S.) would say, that the theory was, in itself, an exceedingly beautiful one.— But, for the purposes of this argumeut, we were bound to assume, that the practical result of that theory had not comported with the theory itself. He would say, that we were bound to assume it, because we could not otherwise comprehend why it was, that almost every gentleman in this committee should agree in a desire to withdraw the appointing power from the Governor. He accounted for this fact only by presuming, that they conceived this power to have been abused. Nothing short of it could have led gentlemen here to pursue the course they had. How it had been abused, was not necessary for him to enquire; but, we were bound to suppose, that the abuse was not of modern date, but had been of such long continuance, as to justify the conviction in the minds of the committee, that the theory was imperfect. For, he could not believe, that gen

tlemen around him would overturn the existing theory, if the abuse had been one of short duration. They must have satisfied themselves that it had not, on the whole, worked well. Well, if we admited that the theory had not worked well, it would become essential to look elsewhere for the exercise of that power which, it was supposed, had been improperly exercised where it now existed. He believed, that that power might be safely commited to the hands of the taxable inhabitants and voters of the Commonwealth. He thought them fully capable of selecting good and competent county officers-men who would discharge the duties of their offices with satisfaction to the public. One reason why the theory had not worked well in modern times, perhaps was, that that which was good for a population of two or three hundred thousand, might not be equally good for a million, and still less for a population of three millions, which, in twenty years, would probably be that of Pennsylvania. It was, perhaps now, and would then certainly be, impossible for a Governor of this Commonwealth to be intimately acquainted with the population of the different counties, so as to be able, by force of his personal knowledge, to select the men best adapted to fill the county offices. His individual and personal knowledge conid not extend beyond the most eminent men, and that eminence would probably be, merely the eminence of the active politician. It was not precisely the desire of the people, that the county of fices should be filled by the most eminent men in a county, as their services, in other capacities, might be of more value to the Commonwealth. At the end of twenty years, then, the probability was, that in point of theory as well as practice, the Governor would not be the best able to select proper officers, because his information in regard to them, must be derived chiefly from others, partizans and partial friends. He had observed, and he presumed that every member of the Convention had, that a nucleus in each county, of party organization, was to be found-of men who were looking for county offices. There, then, originated the party men, who gave to the people of the county a party direction-a party manœuvre. These men looked to a central direction, and from that direction they received a governing indication of conduct. And, once indicated from a central point, they aimed at some particular object. We could not legislate for Pennsylvania, without regarding her as a sister of a great confederacy; and, that which we regarded here as a central point, may, in point of fact, be one subordinate to a more remote and powerful central point. Now, (said Mr. S.) suppose that a powerful, influential, and ambitious chief sits in the Presidential chair, who is willing to wield the immense patronage of the General Government to oppress the people, and to strengthen and perpetuate his power, and the State Executive should favor his views-then the people would have but little chance in resisting the encroachments of a federal Executive, supported by the patronage of both Governments. What more powerful combination could be formed, not only to keep ambitious men in power, but to mould and shape the organization of party public opinion upon measures? This great central power, stretching to the remotest corners of the States, and reaching the extremities of the Union, would control every local election, and destroy the independence of the people. There was once a time, when a party existed in this country, who thought that danger was to be apprehended of a disunion of the States, from the fear of their separate interests being

stronger than that of their general interests. But that day has gone by.The only danger now feared is, of the consolidation of all power in the hands of the Executive of the Union. And, if ever the day comes, when the liberties of this country will be destroyed, it will be in consequence of the use of this concentrated power in the hands of a powerful, artful, and unprincipled chief, to oppress the people, prostrate their interests, and triumph over the Constitution.

By giving the election of these county officers to the people, this central and powerful party organization, extending from the national head to the extremities of the counties, will be destroyed. It will carry the minority principle into its proper sphere of action, by the election of officers of the opposition in the minority counties. It will cut off that dependence which those of the majority feel to the Executive-and thus a concentrated, dependent, and dangerous party combination will be destroyed. The Legislature are so elected, that the minority are represented to watch and counteract the excesses of the majority. It preserves to the minority its rights, and secures the people against acts of party violence.

Mr. S. remarked, that it was on this ground that he felt disposed to go for an election of these officers, by the people. It had been said, on this floor, that being elected by the people, a man who should be injured by these county officers, would have some difficulty in obtaining redress.He apprehended no such difficulty. The only appropriate place to which a citizen could look for a remedy, in office, or out of office, was not to the Executive, but to the Judiciary. Keep the fountain of justice pure-preserve the Judiciary in a state of independence-preserve it from corruption or from party chicanery, and then a man would always have a place to which he could resort, with a certainty of being protected. It had been urged in favor of Executive appointment, that when injury or wrong was inflicted by the officer, redress would flow from the Executive. He disliked this idea of application for relief to the Executive. The freeman should never go there for redress. Let him look to the Judiciary for his remedies to the aid of a jury of his countrymen-if necessary, to the halls of legislation-but to the Executive authority, never. We had seen, within these last few years, some memorable instances of application for relief, by American citizens to American Chief Magistrates, which had brought the blush of shame on the cheek of freemen. He would not have appeals made to the Executive officer. He would have the freemen of this country, in order to obtain redress against the exercise of arbitrary power, go to the ballot box. That was the freeman's remedy. And, when that failed, he might despair of his country. The general principles of the remarks which he had made, related, in a great measure, to the amendment of his colleague, (Mr. MEREDITH.) With regard to the appointment of Prothonotaries by the courts, it was, perhaps, a little too soon fairly to test that principle. He should hold himself in reserve for it, until he had ascertained what was to be done with the Judiciary. He thought, that the propriety of the amendment would depend much upon the tenure of the judges. If their tenure is to be altered, and they are to hold their offices for a term of years, eligible to re-appointment, then the appointment of these officers, by the court, would be unwise. The judges would be continually looking to the Executive for a re-appointment; and, perhaps, as an inducement to that re-appointment, would be tempted to lend them

selves to the nomination of clerks from the ruling political parties, and from mere political motives. The appointment to the clerkship of the court might settle the question of the re-appointment of the Judge. A Judge should be above all such influences. The temple of justice should be his place of residence; the atmosphere of justice, the only air which he breathes; the interests of justice, the only interests which should occupy his mind. The ermine of justice is polluted by contact with politics. If, however, the tenure of the judicial office shall be retained in its present condition, then the proposed amendment may be wise. He hoped his colleague would not insist upon the vote, until that point shall be settled.

Mr. MERRILL, of Union, expressed his doubts, as to whether it would be safe and salutary, for the courts to be vested with these appointments, because they might have a tendency to bring them into disrepute among the people, and diminish that respect which was now entertained by the community, generally, for the Judiciary. If this should be the case, the appointing power, in the hands of the courts, would be a public misfortune. He thought that the gentleman, under existing circumstances, had better withdraw his amendment, for the present. He would say a word or two, in reference to the argument of the President of the Convention, who had said that the theory of our Constitntion was perfect, and that the Governor of the Commonwealth represented the whole people. He (Mr. M.) thought that it was only necessary that he should state that the Exccutive might be the proper agent of the State, as a whole-as one consolidated and grand community-but the State was divided into separate and distinct communities, each county having separate and local interests. The sphere of the county offices, then, did not stand beyond the county limits. There was the mistake. The Commonwealth, so far as the county officers were concerned, was not one grand community, but divided into distinct and separate ones, and as much so as the several States of the Union. As there was danger of consolidating the powers of the General Government into the hands of the Executive, so there was danger of merging the distinct, separate, and local interests of the several counties into a central power, that would disregard the rights and wants of the people.

Mr. CURLL, of Armstrong, said that he thought every gentleman pre sent must be satisfied there was a decided majority of the committee opposed to the amendment which had been so strongly and urgently pressed upon them. It was perfectly evident that a majority of the committee were, in accordance with the wishes of the people, determined to cut down the patronage of the Governor, and vest in the people the election of a number of their officers, who were now appointed by the Executive. A great many useless speeches had been made, and which were entirely foreign to the subject under consideration, and the object for which they were delivered, was, in his opinion, to exhaust the patience of the committee, and to occasion delay. He trusted that there would be less talking, and more action on this subject. The gentleman from Philadelphia (Mr, SCOTT) expressed his hope that the vote would not now be taken on the question, until the Judiciary article shall have been acted upon. That gentleman, only the other day, voted against taking up that article, and in favor of passing over it. Why did not the gentleman meet the question