event may arise, and if it should, it is probable it will produce an armed mediation, the consequences of which would be, that the allies must accept of the terms proposed by the mediator, or continue the war under the disadvantage of having the forces of the mediator united with those of their enemies. That in such event it is possible the terms proposed will be such as Spain offered and Britain rejected in the last proposed mediation.

That, though the Powers who may be under such engagements by treaty to Great Britain, from their friendly disposition towards his Most Christian Majesty, may be very unwilling to give assistance to his enemies, yet they may find it indispensably necessary in compliance with their engagements; but it is not improbable that their reluctance, or the distance of their dominions may delay such assistance, if granted at all, so as to be too late for the next campaign. That should the enemy be in possession of any part of the United States at the close of the next campaign, it will be extremely difficult to bring Great Britain to acknowledge their independence; and if a mediator should be offered while the enemy is in possession of any part, an impartial mediator could not easily refute the arguments which might be used for its retaining such possessions. And, probably, a mediator well disposed towards Great Britain might insist on her holding them; and if not agreed to, the hostility of such a mediator would be the necessary consequence. That should Great Britain form such alliances, or procure such aids as are the objects of her present negociations, there will be every reason to fear a long and an obstinate war, whereof the final event may be doubtful.

That this view of affairs plainly points out the necessity for the greatest possible vigor in the operations of the next campaign, in order to dispossess the enemy of every part of the United States, and to put them in condition to treat of peace, and accept of a mediation with the greatest advantage; and the preparations for it ought to be as speedy and as effectual as possible. That France and Spain are prepared to make a very powerful diversion, and will exert themselves most strenuously for preserving and improving their naval superiority, and for employing the powers of the enemy in Europe and the West Indies. The Minister declared, as from himself, that he doubted not his Most Christian Majesty will spare some ships to the United States, if it can be done without endangering his superiVOL. V.-43

ority at sea; and that an application made to the Minister informally is more eligible than to the King, because it would give his Majesty great pain to refuse the request, though he might be in no condition to grant it. That at all events, supplies should be prepared on a supposition that the ships will be granted; and such supplies should be put into the hands of the Agent for the Marine of France, and considered as the King's property.

He desires to be informed, as far as Congress may deem proper. what force the United States can bring into the field next campaign? On what resources they rely for their maintenance and necessary appointments? And what shall be the general plan of the campaign, on supposition either of having, or not having the aid of ships-ofwar? He gives it as his opinion, that an application for clothing may be made to his Most Christian Majesty with prospect of success; and although measures have been taken for sending arms and warlike stores to America, yet it would be prudent in Congress not to neglect any other means for procuring those supplies, or supplies of clothing.

ANSWER OF CONGRESS TO THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE FRENCH

MINISTER.

In Congress, January 31st, 1780.

Congress, taking into consideration the communications of the French Minister, as reported by the Committee on the 28th instant, Resolved, That the following answer be given to the communications of the honorable the Minister Plenipotentiary of France:

That Congress entertain the most grateful sense of the unremitting attention given to the interests of the United States by their illustrious ally; and consider the communications made to them by his Minister under his Majesty's special command as equally wise and interesting. That the confidence which they repose in his Majesty, in consequence of his so generously interesting himself in the affairs of these United States, and the wisdom and magnanimity of his councils, determine them to give the most perfect information in their power of their resources, their views, and their expectations.

That to this end they state as follows: That the United States have expectations, on which they can rely with confidence, of

bringing into the field an army of twenty-five thousand effective men, exclusive of commissioned officers. That this army can be reinforced by militia, so as to be in force sufficient for any enterprises against the posts occupied by the enemy within the United States. That supplies of provisions for the army in its greatest number can certainly be obtained within the United States; and the Congress, with the coöperation of the several States, can take effectual measures for procuring them in such manner as that no operation will be impeded. That provisions, also, for such of the forces of his Most Christian Majesty as may be employed in conjunction or cooperation with those of the United States, can be procured under the direction of Congress; and such provisions shall be laid up in magazines, agreeably to such instructions as his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary shall give; and the magazines shall be put under the direction of the Agent of the Marine of France.

That Congress rely on the contributions of the States by taxes, and on moneys to be raised by internal loans, for the pay of the army. That supplies of clothing, of tents, of arms, and warlike stores, must be principally obtained from foreign nations; and the United States must rely chiefly on the assistance of their ally for them; but every other means for procuring them are already taken, and will be prosecuted with the greatest diligence.

That the United States, with the assistance of a competent naval force, would willingly, during the next campaign, carry on the most vigorous offensive operations against the enemy in all the posts occupied by them within the United States. That without such naval force, little more can be attempted by them than straitening the quarters of the enemy, and covering the interior parts of the country. That their forces must be disposed in such manner as to oppose the enemy with the greatest effect, wheresoever their most considerable operations may be directed.

That at present the southern States seem to be their principal object, and their design to establish themselves in one or more of them; but their superiority at sea over the United States enables them to change their objects and operations with great facility, while those of the United States are rendered difficult by the great extent of country they have to defend.

That Congress are happy to find that his Most Christian Majesty gives no credit to the suggestions of the British Cabinet relative to

the dispositions of the United States, or any of them, to enter into treaties of accommodation with Great Britain; and wish his Majesty, and all the Powers of Europe, to be assured that such suggestions are insidious and without foundation.

That it will appear by the constitutions and other public acts of the several States, that the citizens of the United States, possessed of arms, possessed of freedom, possessed of political power to create and direct their magistrates as they think proper, are united in their determinations to secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of liberty, by supporting the independence of their governments, and observing their treaties and public engagements with immovable firmness and fidelity. And the Congress assure his Majesty that, should any individual in America be found base enough to show the least disposition for persuading the people to the contrary, such individual would instantly lose all power of effecting his purpose, by forfeiting the esteem and confidence of the people.

COMMUNICATIONS OF THE FRENCH MINISTER TO A COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS AT A SECOND CONFERENCE.

In Congress, February 2d, 1780.

The Committee report that, in a second conference with the honorable the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, he communicated to them

That his Most Christian Majesty, being uninformed of the appointment of a Minister Plenipotentiary to treat of an alliance between the United States and his Catholic Majesty, has signified to his Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States that he wishes most earnestly for such an alliance; and in order to make the way thereto more easy, has commanded him to communicate to the Congress certain articles which his Catholic Majesty deems of great importance to the interests of his Crown, and on which it is highly necessary that the United States explain themselves with precision, and with such moderation as may consist with their essential rights.

That the articles are,

1st. A precise and invariable western boundary to the United States.

2dly. The exclusive navigation of the river Mississippi.

3dly. The possession of the Floridas; and

4thly. The lands on the left or eastern side of the river Mississippi. That, on the first article, it is the idea of the Cabinet of Madrid, that the United States extend to the westward no farther than settlements were permitted by the royal proclamation bearing date the day of 1763.

On the second, that the United States do not consider themselves as having any right to navigate the river Mississippi, no territory belonging to them being situated thereon.

On the third, that it is probable that the King of Spain will conquer the Floridas during the course of the present war; and in such event every cause of dispute relative thereto between Spain and these United States ought to be removed.

On the fourth, that the lands lying on the east side of the Mississippi, whereon the settlements were prohibited by the aforesaid proclamation, are possessions of the Crown of Great Britain, and proper objects against which the arms of Spain may be employed for the purpose of making a permanent conquest for the Spanish Crown. That such conquest may probably be made during the present war. That, therefore, it would be advisable to restrain the southern States from making any settlements or conquests in those territories. That the Council of Madrid consider the United States as having no claims to those territories, either as not having had possession of them before the present war, or not having any foundation for a claim in the right of the sovereignty of Great Britain, whose dominion they have abjured.

That his Most Christian Majesty, united to the Catholic King by blood and by the strictest alliances, and united with these States in treaties of alliance, and feeling towards them dispositions of the most perfect friendship, is exceedingly desirous of conciliating between his Catholic Majesty and these United States the most happy and lasting friendship.

That the United States may repose the utmost confidence in his good will to their interests, and in the justice and liberality of his Catholic Majesty; and that he cannot deem the revolution which has set up the independence of these United States as past all danger of unfavorable events until his Catholic Majesty and the United States shall be established on those terms of confidence and amity which are the objects of his Most Christian Majesty's very earnest wishes.