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actual force, nevertheless entertain the expectation that they may, perhaps, be brought back to their allegiance by the effect of internal dissentions; and that it is principally upon that account, that they consider it impolitic to treat with them as sovereign powers. This expectation is no better founded, according to the views of the government of the United States, than would be that of conquering them by actual war. It is believed that there is no greater probability of the occurrence of intestine troubles in these states, than in other established and organized bodies politic; and that, should they occur, they could not, by any possibility, be turned in future to the profit of Spain.

Every community which changes its form of government violently and suddenly, is visited almost of necessity by a period of anarchy and civil war. This was an evil which the Spanish colonies, in separating from the mother country, had reason to expect that they should be obliged to encounter; and from which the have, in fact, suffered, in a greater or less degree. Serious divisions occurred in most, if not all, of them, soon after the declaration of their independence, and for a time threatened their existence as sovereign powers. In Mexico, an adventurer usurped the government by military force, and assumed the title of emperor. In Colombia, the state of affairs was long unsettled, and there seems to have been, at one moment, considerable danger of insurbordination among the blacks. In Peru and Chili, the leading public characters were frequently at variance; and Buenos Ayres was, for awhile, the theatre of actual civil war. It was necessary that these troubles should

terminate in one of two ways, either by bringing back the colonies to their allegiance, or by subsiding and disappearing under the influ ence of the new independent governments. The latter part of the alternative has in fact been realized. The difficulties to which I have alluded, and which accompanied so naturally the first attempts of the colonies to establish their national existence, are now at an end, and the fate of those persons who were engaged in them has not been such as to hold out much encouragement to future imitators. The disturbers of the established order have met, in almost every remarkable in. stance, with signal defeat and exemplary punishment. Iturbide, in Mexico, general Piar, in Columbia, the Carreras, in Chili, were publicly executed as common traitors. Saint Martin, who deserted his post at the head of the govern. ment of Peru, at a critical period, lost his influence, sunk into insignificance, and is said to be now li. ving unknown at Brussels. Pueyr. redon, who appears to have been gained by the agents of his majesty, while occupying the post of su preme director of the republic of the United Provinces of La Plata, could not carry with him a single man, was obliged to quit his post and his country, and has since, it is understood, died somewhere, in obscurity, of a broken heart. Such have been the fortunes of the prin. cipal authors of internal dissentions in America; and they are evident. ly not of a kind to encourage new attempts. In fact, since the disap. pearance of these first troubles, the reign of good order and of consoli. dated political institutions seems to have taken place every where, and is apparently established. Five of the six principal states that have

been formed out of his majesty's colonial dominions, not including Paraguay, of which the internal condition is but little known to foreign. ers, present as tranquil an appearance as any part of Europe or the world. Peru is, in some degree, unsettled, but the tranquillity of that country is secured by the battle of Ayacucho; and the final arrangement of its political institutions will not probably be long delayed. Having thus organized their respective governments at home, these states are already beginning to extend their views abroad, and are, at this moment, assembled by their ministers in a congress at Panama, for the purpose of forming among themselves some concerted schemes of action. This great event may be considered as indicating distinctly the consolidation of their several political institutions, and the disap. pearance of all pre-existing internal dissentions.

The troubles which naturally accompanied the first establishment of these new states having thus sub. sided, they cannot, in the natural course of events, be expected to return. They were incident to a particular period in the history of the colonies; and this period having passed away, the dangers incident to it have naturally passed away with it. The various epochs in the progress of communities, like the different ages in the life of man, are subject to particular disorders; but, in both cases, those that belong to one period can never be encountered at another. Troubles may doubtless occur in the nations that have been formed out of the Span. ish colonies, as in all others; but they will not be hereafter of the same kind with those which were occasioned by the separation from the mother country, and the attempt

to establish an independent nation. al existence. Let it be supposed, however, for argument's sake, that internal dissentions should again arise, equally serious with those which have already arisen and subsided; let it be supposed that a second Iturbide shall appear in Mexico, another general Piar in Colombia; that Buenos Ayres or Chili shall again be the theatre of civil war; that a new Pueyrredon should be gained by his majesty's. agents; or, finally, in order to exhaust every supposition, however improbable, let it be imagined that Bolivar and Sucre shall belie their noble characters, disappoint the hopes of the world, and turn out Bonapartes and Cromwells, instead of Washingtons; of what advan. tage would the occurrence of these or similar events be to the royalist cause? Or what additional proba. bility would they furnish of a return of the colonies to their allegiance? If his majesty's government found it impossible to turn to any account the troubles that actually broke out at a time when the state of the colo. nies was yet unsettled, and they had a large military force in the country, would they be able to do it now, when they have not a sol. dier not under close siege from California to Cape Horn, and when the new governments have acquired consistency and vigour? If Iturbide, when he overthrew the Mexican government, while the royalist party was still imposing, and the prospect of success in the establish. ment of independence uncertain, did not think of proclaiming the king, would another Iturbide do it now? If the insurbordination of Piar, under the eyes of general Morillo, could not be made the means of reducing Venezuela, would another black insurgent be likely to prove

a better instrument, with no body present to direct and employ him? If Bolivar or Sucre should attempt to establish a military despotism, would it be in the name of the legitimate king, and under the royal Spanish flag? These suppositions, like that of an actual military con. quest of the country, are obviously not merely improbable, but chimerical, and full of inherent contradictions. The time to take advantage of internal dissentions, if ever, was the time when they might have been expected to occur; when they did in fact occur; and when the king had his armies in the country, ready to back a discontented leader. If nothing could be done under all these favourable circumstances, it is vain to expect a better result at present, when every circumstance is of an adverse character.

Finally, such is the strength of public opinion prevailing throughout the colonies in favour of inde. pendence, that nothing would be really effected, even by successful attempts to create internal divisions, and to gain over the popular leaders. This is evidently shown by the fate of Pueyrredon, to which I have already alluded. Here was a person holding the supreme executive power in one of the new states, enjoying a high reputation, and ap. parently possessing great influence, who consented to employ it in endeavouring to bring about a union of the colony, under his govern ment, with the mother country, in the most plausible way in which it could be done. This colony was precisely the one in which political dissentions had prevailed to the greatest extent, having assumed, for a long period, the shape of ac. tual civil war. The negotiation presented an additional probability of success, from being carried on

under the auspices of one of the most powerful monarchs of Europe in alliance with his Catholic majesty. The king had, at that time, one or two considerable armies in America, ready to lend their aid in promoting the intended object.Here was a case, if ever there was or will be one, in which something might be expected from the effect of internal divisions, and from the adhesion of leading characters. What happened? Did Pueyrredon, under all these favourable circum. stances, succeed in bringing back to its allegiance the colony under his government? I have already stated that he did not carry with him a single man. He could not stay in his country. He was crushed at once to the earth by the execration and contempt of the whole American continent; and, in order to escape an ignominious death, was compelled to hide himself in some obscure corner, where he has since died of chagrin and shame. Such is the history of the only considera. ble apostate that has yet been gained from the cause of independence in America. It proves that whatever may be the merits of the contest, there is a force of public

timent arrayed in support of this cause, too strong to be resisted by any individual, however eminent; that nothing can be hoped by Spain from the effect of internal dissentions in the colonies; and that no means, excepting that of actual physical force, will ever bring them, or any part of them, again under the dominion of his Catholic majesty. The impossibility of em ploying this means with success has already been shown, and is under. stood to be felt by his majesty's government.

It has sometimes been said, how. ever, that Spain might reasonably

be encouraged in the hope of re. covering her ancient colonies, by the great and sudden revolutions that have occurred in Europe in our own time. The late king of France, after being deprived of his hereditary rights and dominions for twenty-five years, finally succeeded in obtaining possession of them. Why may not the king of Spain, in like manner, recover his American pos. sessions, although he should have lost them for an equal length of time? It is understood that this argument from analogy is considered by some persons of great respectability as the principal one that can be urged in favour of the continuance of the war, and it may therefore be proper to give it some attention.

The conquest of the colonies must be effected, if at all, by the aid of means; and the example of the king of France is applicable, in the present instance, only as far as the same means which were em. loyed to place him on the throne, re now at the disposal of the king of Spain for the purpose of recoverng his lost possessions in America. What were these means, and how ar can they probably be employed, t present, by the Spanish govern

nent?

The revolution in the govern. nent of France, of which the return of Lewis XVIII. was the natural consequence, was accomplished by the military force of other European powers, at a time when the king had not a soldier in the field in his own immediate service. Is it probable that there will be now or ever a similar alliance of these powers, for the purpose of restoring to the king his ancient dominions in America? What was the motive which induced all the sovereigns of Europe to unite in a joint attack

upon the government of Bonaparte? It was no other than the direct interest they had in overthrowing that government, on account of the inconvenience, more or less oppressive, which they all suffered from its continuance. Have they all or any of them any such motive for opposing, at present, the independence of the Spanish colonies? It is evident that their direct interest, as far as they have any in the affair, is on the other side; and that the independence of America, instead of being an inconvenience to them, is rather advantageous than otherwise, as it affords them a greater freedom of intercourse with these vast and wealthy regions than they would enjoy under any colonial system, however liberal. Their interest, therefore, would naturally lead them, considered merely as neutral powers, to take part with the Americans, rather than with the Spanish government. Such of them as possessed extensive and valuable colonies might be supposed, per haps, to sympathize with Spain in this contest, either because these colonies had actually thrown off their allegiance, or might be cx. pected to do so; and these, if any, are the powers which would have an interest in assisting his Catholic Majesty, or in wishing, at least, for his success. What then has been the policy of the powers thus situa. ted? France and Portugal have just acknowledged the indepen. dence of their ancient transatlantic dominions. England and Holland, the only nations now possessing colonies of consequence, have ac knowledged the independence of South America. It so happens, therefore, that the four powers, which have or had colonies, are precisely those which have given the most unequivocal proof, that it is

not their intention to deviate from the line of neutrality, by engaging in the war on the side of Spain. If such be the policy of these nations, which alone had some little indirect interest in common with that of his Catholic Majesty, what can be ex. pected from the rest, which have all a pretty strong interest on the other side? There is evidently no probability that they will enter into a great European alliance for the reduction of America, like that which was employed for the overthrow of Bonaparte; nor is it believed that his majesty's government expect any such co-operation or assistance. It is, therefore, not in their power to take advantage of the same means which were used by the king of France, to obtain possession of his hereditary domi. nions; and his example has, of course, no application to the present circumstances of his Catholic Majesty.

I fear that I may have taxed somewhat too severely the attention of your excellency, by the length to which these considerations have been already drawn out; but it is difficult to touch, however concisely, upon the several leading points of so great a question, with out entering into a pretty extensive course of remarks. If the above statement of the grounds upon which the government of the United States have formed their opinion in regard to this question, be at all correct, it follows conclusively, that there is no chance of recovering the colonies, either by actual military force, by the effect of internal dissentions, or by the aid of foreign powers. The object of the war is, therefore, unattainable. What remains, then, but to escape, as soon as possible, from its inconveniences, and to con

clude peace at once? Peace is, of itself, and in all cases, the greatest of blessings, and an almost indispensable condition of all public and private prosperity. The advan. tages, direct and indirect, that would accrue to Spain from making peace at present with the colonies, are, in the opinion of the government which I have the honour to represent, of even more than ordinary value. I fear that I shall exhaust your excellency's patience; but being charged by my govern. ment with the expression of their convictions and wishes upon a subject of such vast magnitude, I should have reason to reproach myself if the effect of their intercession were diminished, and the war protracted, by the omission of any topic that would be likely to have weight with his Catholic Majesty. Allow me, then, my lord duke, to request your attention a little longer, and to state to you, very concisely, as they ap pear to the government of the United States, the important benefits which would result to Spain from the restoration of peace, and the establishment of friendly relations with her ancient colonies.

The immediate inconveniences suffered by Spain from the continu. ance of the war are far from being inconsiderable, and the cessation of them would constitute, of itself, a very serious advantage. These inconveniences are principally the heavy expense necessary to keep up military and naval establishments adequate to the defence of the West India islands, and the almost entire destruction of the commerce of Spain, by the armed vessels and privateers of the new American states. It is understood that the whole revenue which would accrue from the islands is,

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