either to or from it, are totally extinguished by its dissolution; so that the members thereof cannot recover, or be charged with them, in their natural capacities; (m) 20 agreeable to that maxim of the civil law, (n)" si quid uni"versitati debetur, singulis non debetur; nec, quod debet universitas, singuli debent."

A corporation may be dissolved, 1. By act of parliament, which [485] is boundless in its operations. a 2. By the natural death of all its members, in case of an aggregate corporation. 23 3. By surrender of its franchises into the hands of the king, which is a kind of suicide. 23 4. By forfeiture of its charter, through negligence or abuse of its franchises; in which case the law judges that the body politic has broken the condition upon which it was incorporated, and thereupon the incorporation is void. 24 And the regular course is to bring an information in nature of a writ of quo warranto, to inquire by what warrant the members now exercise their corporate power, having forfeited it by such and such proceedings. The exertion of this act of law, for the purposes of the state in the reigns of king Charles and king James the Second, particularly by seizing the charter of the city of London, gave great and just offence; though perhaps, in strictness of law, the proceedings in most of them were sufficiently regular: but the judgment against that of London was reversed by act of parliament (9) after the Revolution; and by the same statute it is enacted, that the franchises of the city of London shall never more be forfeited for any cause whatsoever. And, because by the common law corporations were dissolved, in case the mayor or head officer was not duly elected on the day appointed in the charter or established by prescription, it is now provided, (p) that for the future no corporation shall be dissolved upon that account; and ample directions are given for appointing a new officer, in case there be no election, or a void one, made upon the prescriptive or charter day.

m 1 Lev. 237.

n Ff. 3.4.7. o Stat. 2 W. & M. c. 8.

p Stat. 11 Geo. I. c. 4.

(20) But a debt due to a corporation still remains, though their name is changed by a new charter. 3 Lev. 238.

(21) The king cannot by his prerogative destroy a corporation. Rex v. Amley, & Term. R. 582.

(22) But if the king makes a corporation consisting of twelve men to continue always in succession, and when any of them die the others may choose another in his place, it may be so continued. Roll. 524. Bac. Ab. tit. Corp. G. But where a corporation consists of several distinct integral parts, if one of these parts become extinct, whether by the death of the persons of whom it is composed, or by any other means, the whole corporation is dissolved. 3 Burr. 1866. When an integral part of a corporation is gone, and the corporation has no power to restore it or to do any corporate act, the corporation is so far dissolved that the crown may grant a new charter. 3 T. R. 199. And where the major part of an integral part of a corporation, whose attendance is required at the election of officers, being gone, it operates as a dissolution of the whole corporation, which has thereby lost the power of holding corporate assemblies for the purpose of filling up vacancies and continuing itself. 3 East, 213. And where the election of mayor was to be made by the majority of an assembly composed of several integral definite parts of a corporation and other burgesses and inhabitants for the time being, it was held that one of such definite integral parts, being reduced below its majority of a proper number, could no longer be repre sented in such corporate assembly, and the whole corporation was thereby dissolved, being no longer capable of continuing itself. 4 East, 17. Chitty.

(23) The surrender of a charter is void if not inrolled. 4 East, 327. See also 1 Salk. 191. (24) Refusing or neglecting to choose such officers as they are obliged to do by their charter, is a ground of forfeiture. Carth. 483. scd vid. 11 Geo. I. c. 4. For a forfeiture a corporation not dissolved without a judgment in a court of law to enforce it, and this is attained by scire facias or quo warranto. Bac. Ab. Corp. G. As to the effect of this judgment, see 2 T. R. 515. 4 T. R. 122. 2 Kyd. 496. Bac. Ab. Corp. G.

COMMENTARIES

ON THE

LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK II.

OF THE RIGHTS OF THINGS.

CHAPTER I.

OF PROPERTY IN GENERAL.

THE former book of these Commentaries having treated at large of the jura personarum, or such rights and duties as are annexed to the persons of men, the objects of our inquiry in this second book will be the jura rerum, or those rights which a man may acquire in and to such external things as are unconnected with his person. These are what the writers on natural law style the rights of dominion, or property, concerning the nature and original of which I shall first premise a few observations, before I proceed to distribute and consider its several objects.

There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and [2] engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. And yet there are very few that will give themselves the trouble to consider the original and foundation of this right. Pleased as we are with the possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; or at best we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in our favour, without examining the reason or authority upon which those laws have been built. We think it enough that our title is derived by the grant of the former proprietor, by descent from our ancestors, or by the last will and testament of the dying owner; not caring to reflect that (accurately and strictly speaking) there is no foundation in nature or in natural law, why a set of words upon parchment should convey the dominion of land; why the son should have a right to exclude his fellow-creatures from a determinate spot of ground, because his father had done so before him: or where the occupier of a particular field or of a jewel, when lying on his death-bed, and no longer able to maintain possession, should be entitled to tell the rest of the world which of them should enjoy it after him. These inquiries, it must be owned, would be useless and even troublesome in common life. It is well if the mass of mankind will obey the laws when made, without scrutinizing too nicely into

the reasons for making them. But, when law is to be considered not only as a matter of practice, but also as a rational science, it cannot be improper or useless to examine more deeply the rudiments and grounds of these positive constitutions of society.

In the beginning of the world, we are informed by holy writ, the all-bountiful Creator gave to man "dominion over all the earth; and over the fish "of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that

"moveth upon the earth." (a) This is the only true and solid founda[3]tion of man's dominion over external things, whatever airy metaphysi

cal notions may have been started by fanciful writers upon this subject. The earth, therefore, and all things therein, are the general property of all mankind, exclusive of other beings, from the immediate gift of the Creator. And, while the earth continued bare of inhabitants, it is reasonable to suppose that all was in common among them, and that every one took from the public stock to his own use such things as his immediate necessities required.

These general notions of property were then sufficient to answer all the purposes of human life; and might perhaps still have answered them had it been possible for mankind to have remained in a state of primeval simplicity as may be collected from the manners of many American nations when first discovered by the Europeans; and from the ancient method of living among the first Europeans themselves, if we may credit either the memorials of them preserved in the golden age of the poets, or the uniform accounts given by historians of these times, wherein " erant omnia communia "et indivisa omnibus, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset.” (b) Not that this communion of goods seems ever to have been applicable, even in the earliest stages, to ought but the substance of the thing; nor could it be extended to the use of it. For, by the law of nature and reason, he, who first began to use it, acquired therein a kind of transient property, that lasted so long as he was using it, and no longer: (c) or, to speak with greater precision, the right of possession continued for the same time only that the act of possession lasted. Thus the ground was in common, and no part of it was the permanent property of any man in particular; yet whoever was in the occupation of any determined spot of it, for rest, for shade, or the like, acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have been unjust, and contrary to the law of nature, to have driven him by force:

but the instant that he quitted the use or occupation of it, another might [4] seize it, without injustice. Thus also a vine or other tree might be

said to be in common, as all men were equally entitled to its produce; and yet any private individual might gain the sole property of the fruit, which he had gathered for his own repast. A doctrine well illustrated by Cicero, who compares the world to a great theatre, which is common to the public, and yet the place which any man has taken is for the time his own. (d)

But when mankind increased in number, craft, and ambition, it became nceessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion; and to appropriate to individuals not the immediate use only, but the very substance of the thing to be used. Otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the world be continually broken and disturbed, while a variety of persons were striving who should get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it. As human life also grew more and more refined, abundance of conveniences were devised

b Justin. 1. 13. c. 1.

a Gen 1.28. c Barbeyr. Puff. 1. 4. c. 4. Quemadmodum theatrum, eun comiziune ent, recte tamen dici potest, ejus erst ein locum quem quisque serti -4-9. De Pos 1. Sve 201

to render it more easy, commodious, and agreeable; as, habitations for shelter and safety, and raiment for warmth and decency. But no man would be at the trouble to provide either, so long as he had only an usufructuary property in them, which was to cease the instant that he quitted possession;-if, as soon as he walked out of his tent, or pulled off his garment, the next stranger who came by would have a right to inhabit the one, and to wear the other. In the case of habitations in particular, it was natural to observe, that even the brute creation, to whom every thing else was in common, maintained a kind of permanent property in their dwellings, especially for the protection of their young; that the birds of the air had nests, and the beasts of the field had caverns, the invasion of which they esteemed a very flagrant injustice, and would sacrifice their lives to preserve them. Hence a property was soon established in every man's house and home-stall; which seem to have been originally mere temporary huts or moveable cabins, suited to the design of Providence for more speedily [ 5 ] peopling the earth, and suited to the wandering life of their owners, before any extensive property in the soil or ground was established. And there can be no doubt, but that moveables of every kind became sooner appropriated than the permanent substantial soil: partly because they were more susceptible of a long occupancy, which might be continued for months together without any sensible interruption, and at length by usage ripen into an established right; but principally because few of them could be fit for use, till improved and meliorated by the bodily labour of the occupant, which bodily labour, bestowed upon any subject which before lay in common to all men, is universally allowed to give the fairest and most reasonable title to an exclusive property therein.

The article of food was a more immediate call, and therefore a more early consideration. Such as were not contented with the spontaneous product of the earth, sought a more solid refreshment in the flesh of beasts, which they obtained by hunting. But the frequent disappointments incident to that method of provision, induced them to gather together such animals as were of a more tame and sequacious nature; and to establish a permanent property in their flocks and herds in order to sustain themselves in a less precarious manner, partly by the milk of the dams, and partly by the flesh of the young. The support of these their cattle made the article of water also a very important point. And therefore the book of Genesis (the most venerable monument of antiquity, considered merely with a view to history) will furnish us with frequent instances of violent contentions concerning wells; the exclusive property of which appears to have been established in the first digger or occupant, even in such places where the ground and herbage remained yet in common. Thus we find Abraham, who was but a sojourner, asserting his right to a well in the country of Abimelech, and exacting an oath for his security, "because he had digged that well." (e) And Isaac, about ninety years afterwards, reclaimed this his father's property; and after much contention with the Philistines, [ 6 ] was suffered to enjoy it in peace. (ƒ)

All this while the soil and pasture of the earth remained still in common as before, and open to every occupant: except perhaps in the neighbourhood of towns, where the necessity of a sole and exclusive property in lands (for the sake of agriculture) was earlier felt, and therefore more readily complied with. Otherwise, when the multitude of men and cattle had consumed every convenience on one spot of ground, it was deemed a natural

Gen.xxi. 30.

í Gen. xxvi. 15, 18. &c.