it out of the power of the departments or bureaus to distribute it unequally, by publishing oftener in the one than in the other. It is certain that equality was aimed at. If the claim before me is maintained, and it be clear, as I think it is, that the purpose was the selection of the same papers to do all the printing, is it not manifest that the proviso will be disregarded? The advertisements to be made oftener than once a week cannot appear in that way in a weekly paper at all; and if they do appear in it but once a week, as they must, if they appear at all, and papers of a daily publication are also selected, in which they appear according to their direction, then, as between the papers, the "publications" are not made in each equally as to frequency." 'This would, of course, be in direct conflict with the very terms of the proviso.

I am, therefore, of the opinion, that the claim of the proprietor of the National Era cannot be sustained.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, REVERDY JOHNSON.

Hon. Mr. COLLAMER,

Postmaster General.

CLAIM FOR COUNTY LANDS UNDER ACT OF 1847.

A soldier who enlisted into the army in 1846, for the term of five years, and served until April, 1849, when, in consequence of the reduction of the army after the termination of the war with Mexico, he was honorably discharged, against his own wishes, is entitled to the bounty land provided by the 9th section of the act of 4th February, 1847.

The 9th section of that act embraces those of the regular army enlisted for twelve months or for a longer period; volunteers regularly mustered into a volunteer company, who served during the war, and have been honorably discharged; those killed, or who died of wounds received or by sickness incurred in the course of their service; and those who were discharged before the expiration of their term of service, in consequence of wounds received or sickness incurred in the course of their service.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

July 27, 1849.

SIR: The claim of John Hasson, late a sergeant in the general recruiting service, to the benefit of the bounty land provided by the 9th section of the act of the 4th February, 1847, (Session acts, p. 14,) submitted by you to this office, I have carefully considered.

It rests altogether upon what is the proper construction of that section. The facts are these: The claimant was enlisted on the 29th January, 1846, and on the 14th April, 1849, honorably discharged. The discharge was made against his wish, and in consequence of the reduction of the army after the termination of the Mexican war. The term of his enlist

ment was five years.

The Pension Office thinks the claim unfounded, and has so decided. Its interpretation of the section is, that it embraces only those who served out their full term, or were prevented in consequence of wounds, disabilities, or death.

I construe it differently. In my opinion, it embraces three classes: 1st Those of the regular army enlisted for twelve months or for a longer period; volunteers regularly mustered into a volunteer company, "who have served, or may serve, during" the war with Mexico, and are then, at the end of the war, honorably discharged.

2d. Those killed, or dying of wounds received or sickness incurred,

"in the course of such service.'

3d. Those who are discharged before the expiration of their term of service, "in consequence of wounds received or sickness incurred in the course of such service."

The first class need only to serve during the war, and to be honorably discharged at its termination, to entitle them to bounty. It is not necessary to show service in the army for the whole period of the enlistment. The second: death from wounds or sickness received or incurred during service in the war, and not during the term of enlistment, when that extends beyond the close of the war. Third: those who, by reason of wounds or sickness occurring in the war, are discharged before the close the war.

The view taken by the Pension Office is, that the express provision for this latter class shows that the terms "and who shall receive an honorable discharge," applicable to the first class, were not meant to embrace any other such discharge than one granted after the full period of enlistment had been served out.

This construction evidently renders it necessary to add to that part of the section these words: "at the expiration of his term of service." The terms actually used neither imply nor justify such an addition. They are, in themselves, perfectly clear. A non-commissioned officer, &c., enlisted in the regular army, or such a volunteer as is described mustering in a volunteer company, and serving during the war, not during the period of enlistment, and then honorably discharged, is to receive the bounty. The words necessary to be superadded by the construction in question manifestly changes the entire sense of the language used; nor is such an interpretation called for by the object of the provision. That evidently was to hold out an incentive to faithful and gallant service during the war. It did not look to service during a state of peace. The increased peril of a war service, and the increased occasion it furnished for skill and daring, gave rise to the bounty. This being so, it would seem strange that the soldier who so served during the very exigency, and that ceasing, was honorably discharged, should not be entitled to the very benefit designed to meet it. The express provision for the third class, upon which the other view rests, is susceptible, I think, of a meaning perfectly consistent with the one I give to the provision for the first class. It is this: That it includes those who are discharged before the end of the war, and the termination of the enlistment, in consequence of wounds or sickness happening during the war.

In my opinion, the words "in course of such service," applying to the second and third classes, are equivalent with the words applicable to the first class, "who has served, or may serve, during the present war." The service meant is not a service commensurate with the term of enlistment, but with the continuance of the war, wholly irrespective of the term of enlistment. The words relied upon by the Pension Office for its deci sion, in my opinion, therefore, mean this: A discharge during the war, prior to the expiration of enlistment, in consequence of wounds or sickness occurring during the war. So far from qualifying, by limiting, the antecedent provision for the first class, they embrace another which would not have been otherwise provided for. Under the first, an honorable discharge at the end of the war is required. Under this, a discharge

during the war, and before its end, in consequence of wounds, &c., is sufficient.

But there is another ground, in my judgment, sufficient to sustain the claim. The objection is not that the claimant did not serve during the war, and was not afterwards honorably discharged, but that he did not serve out his term of enlistment. The enlistment being on the 29th of January, 1846, was, under the law as it then stood, for a term of five years. But the act of the 13th May, 1846, (Session acts, p. 16,) authorized the President to increase the army by increasing each company to one hundred privates, and the enlistments to be made for the purpose are to be for the term of five years and no longer, unless sooner disbanded by the President." The increase was to be made when the President thought "the exigencies of the public service" required it, and he was to reduce it when such exigencies ceased.

Under this power, when the war ended, the reduction was made; and in making it, as he clearly had the right to do, he caused to be discharged some of those who were enlisted before May, 1846, as well as some who were afterwards enlisted. The claimant was among the former. The power to reduce was thought to be (and I think properly) independent of the character of the enlistment. The effect clearly was, to place those enlisted prior to the act of 1846 and those enlisted under that act upon the same footing as those enlisted after, as far as a discharge before the expiration of the term of enlistment was concerned. The consequence of this clearly was, to make the enlistment of both classes to be for five years "unless sooner disbanded by the President.' The latter qualification was, by the act of 1846, made as much a part of the antecedent enlistments as of those it authorized. This being the case, it is, in my opinion, perfectly clear that the present claimant, having been discharged under the reduction provided for by that act, and such discharge having been an honorable one, is entitled to the benefit of the act of 1847, even conceding the view of the Pension Office to be right, that the terms "and who shall receive an honorable discharge," found in the first part of the 9th section of the act, mean only a discharge at the end of the enlisted term, if he was so discharged. His term of service after the act of 1846 was five years, unless sooner disbanded by the President. If so disbanded, that was the expiration of his term of en. listment. But, in addition to all this, unless the words of the law admitted of no other meaning, would it be just to Congress to give them that interpretation? The nation was then at war, and the purpose was, because of the war, to encourage enlistments and good conduct in the army. This is done by the incentive of the promised bounty. The soldier is told: enlist, serve during the war, and be honorably discharged, and the bounty is yours. The pledge of the public faith is apparently complete. Now, if the construction of the Pension Office is the sound one, is it not clear that this pledge is but a false and deceitful instead of a fair one? Service, says the office, during the entire term of enlistment, is necessary, unless a prior discharge is caused by wounds or sickness. Before the term expires, then, (which may well happen, and in the present instance did happen,) Congress may direct or authorize the disbanding the army. Is it possible, in that event, the soldier having fully complied up to his discharge with his part of the engagement, and been prevented against his will and by the act of the government from

complying throughout, that he is not to be entitled to demand compliance on the part of the government? Every principle of justice and fair dealing is on the side of such a demand, and it cannot be that Congress designed to deny it. Upon the whole, then, I am of opinion that the claim of Hasson should be allowed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, REVERDY JOHNSON.

Hon. THOMAS EWING,

Secretary of the Interior.

PROCEEDS OF SALES OF PUBLIC LOTS IN WASHINGTON.

The act of 1820 pledged the proceeds of sales of public lots in the city of Washington to the payment of certain expenses to be incurred by the corporation in the making of certain improvements; wherefore, the funds in the treasury derived from that source should be applied to reimburse certain advances made by the corporation, notwithstanding the act of May 17, 1848.

It cannot be reasonably supposed to have been the intention of Congress to have made a different disposition of the fund, upon the faith of which improvements had been made.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, September 6, 1849. SIR: I have considered the question submitted to me by your letter of the 5th instant, in relation to the application of the fund now in the treas ury from the sales of public lots in the city of Washington to refund advances made by the corporation for certain improvements made prior to the act of May 17, 1848, amending the charter. I am clear in the opinion that the fund may be so applied. The twelfth section of the act of 1848 in nowise affects the fifteenth section of the original act of May 15, 1820. By the law of 1820, the proceeds of all the public lots sold were to be applied to make good such expenses as have been incurred by the city in the cases like that before me. Congress could not with propriety afterwards, and when the expenditure was made on the faith of such provision, have made a different disposition of the fund; and I am quite certain that they did not intend it by the act of 1848 above referred to. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant, REVERDY JOHNSON.

ACCOUNTS FOR EXTRA COMPENSATION TO VOLUNTEERS IN THE WAR WITH MEXICO.

The accounts of disbursing officers for extra compensation paid under the order of Major General Scott of May 3, 1847, to certain volunteers in the war with Mexico, should be allowed, provided the disbursements shall be adjudged to have been necessary and proper, and there is a sufficient amount of the contribution fund to meet them.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
September 15, 1849.

SIR: The question submitted by you to this office as to the authority to allow "certain payments made to persons in public employment at rates exceeding the compensation fixed by law," I have considered.

These payments were made to volunteers during the Mexican war by virtue of the following order of Major General Scott, dated headquarters of the army, Jalapa, May 3, 1847:

"The volunteers whose term of service has nearly expired, and who had reported themselves to Captain B Allen, assistant quartermaster, for employment in the quartermaster's department, will be borne on the rolls. of their respective companies as on furlough during the period of their employment; and the quartermasters are authorized to pay them the rate of compensation allowed to citizens engaged in the like service, less their current pay

The objection to these disbursements is, that they are supposed to be prohibited by the 2d section of the act of the 23d August, 1842, which provides "that no officer in any branch of the public service, or any other person whose salary, pay, or emoluments is or are fixed by law or regulations, shall receive any additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever, for the disbursement of public money, or for any other service or duty whatsoever, unless the same shall be authorized by law, and the appropriation therefor explicitly set forth that it is for such additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation." (5 Stat. at Large, 510.) The meaning of this section, considered by itself, is perfectly plain. A practice had grown up in the government of allowing extra compensation for real or pretended extra services rendered by its officers and agents, inconsistent with the power and duty of Congress in relation to the appropriation of the public money. They therefore inhibited all such compensation, except where the law authorized it, and an appropriation was in terms made to meet it. The design was to keep the whole subject, where it should be, under legislative control. Upon the occurrence, however, of the Mexican war, as far as the forces of the United States were concerned who were engaged in it, a state of things occurred which seemed to call for a more extended executive discretion, and to render a modification of the act of 1842 necessary. The army had been engaged in the enemy's country, and directed to exact military contributions. Assistance, beyond its own means in labor and service, extra to that which its particular duty involved, was not to be, or had not been, obtained. The officers had been exclusively thrown upon their own resources for all the wants of the service. To make these effectual, they had used the contribution fund; and this was clearly known to Congress when they passed the act of the 3d March, 1849. (Session acts, p. 125.) By the first section of that act, the prior law was modified in this-that it sanctioned payments made out of the fund for "objects not usually embraced among those for which appropriations are made from that branch. of the service to which the officer belongs," when the Secretary of War shall certify that the amount expended was properly disbursed, and for the public service; and in case of an officer of the navy, on a like certificate of the Secretary of the Navy." This was to substitute the heads of these two departments for Congress, as far as these expenditures were concerned. The latter evidently deemed it a proper subject for executive discretion, and so made it. They dispensed with the necessity of legislative designation of the objects of expenditure; and this because, from the condition and location of the army, it had been impossible to anticipate and provide for all that might be needed. This provision simply did