mendation of the board as to a quantity of land beyond the 305 acres actually confirmed to Smith, Brown would have had a complete indefeasible right to his 360 acres; but here is the knot of the question. The very same act of Congress, which in one section confirms Brown's claim, in another confirms Smith's. Not only so, but it acts upon the recommendation of the commissioners as to the whole quantity of land claimed by Smith's assignee. Had there been land enough in the tracts designated, and Brown made his location so as not to interfere with the fulfilment of this provision of the act under which he held, I think that Smith's assignees would have had a right to a patent for the whole extent of their claim; but the difficulty arises in the executing the intention of Congress. The fund designated by the commissioners, in the act of 1828, fails; Brown makes a location near the first tract of Smith, and the residue of the land is not enough to satisfy the residue of the claim of Smith's assignee. There is, therefore, a conflict of claims arising under the different provisions of the act of 1828. If Brown takes his share, or any part of it, Smith's assignee cannot have the whole of what the commissioners have recommended to Congress to grant, and what Congress did grant him under the words of the first section of the act of 1828. Still, I am of opinion that the best construction of the act is to give-first, Smith's assignee 305 acres; second, Brown 360 acres; and the residue to Smith's assignee. I ground my construction on these reasons: 1. The whole act must be read together, and executed in all its parts, or as nearly so as possible. There is no reason on the face of the law why Smith's whole claim should be satisfied and Brown's entirely excluded. 2. The confirmation of Congress relates to, and is limited by, the confirmation of the commissioners. The latter was a distinct recognition of Brown's right and authority to him to locate anywhere, but upon a part of the land as to which the claim of Smith had been actually confirmed by them. This, as we have seen, was only to 305 acres. Congress, therefore, must be taken to have ratified the confirmation in the same terms. 3. Though the confirmation by Congress of Smith's claim to the residue, unconfirmed by the commissioners, though recommended by them for confirmation by Congress, was in the same statute which confirmed Brown's; yet there was in the order of thought, and even in the order of time, a precedence in the effect given to the latter. Brown's was actually confirmed by the commissioners; it was their act, complete and executed, though it was not to go into practical effect without the sanction of Congress; but, once given, that sanction related back to the act sanctioned; the confirmation became valid, ab initio, as the judgment of the commissioners. Not so as to the residue of Smith's claim. The commissioners declined acting on it at all. They declared it not within their jurisdiction; they gave no judgment on it, but only recommended to Congress to consider it favorably. Congress did so; but this was the act of Congress. So far as the commissioners were concerned, this was all executory. The date of the act of Congress was the date of the claim confirmed by the act; there was not a moment's relation back. Therefore, though the act of 1828 confirmed uno flatu the claim of Brown to this residuary claim of Smith, the dates in the law, of the effect it produced, were very different. The retroactive operation gave precedence to Brown. Omnis rati habitio 1etro trahitur. But their approval of the recommendation in the other case was, as I have said, no ratification of what others had done, but an original act of Congress itself. Finally, Lord Coke's rule is, that statutes are to be construed as wills are. Now, in the construction of wills, it is a settled principle that, if two parts of the instrument are totally inconsistent, and cannot possibly be reconciled, the latter shall prevail. (5 Vesey, 243; 6 Vesey, 102.) At any rate, and even if my previous reasonings fail, this rule will stand Brown instead. The clause providing for his claim is the subsequent one of the two; but I rely on the previous grounds. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. WALTER FORWARD, H. S. LEGARE. Secretary of the Treasury. PATENTS FOR CHOCTAW RESERVES. The reservations under the Choctaw treaty, of "sections," refer to quantity; but that is to be taken and patented in reference to the established system of our land surveys, in parallelograms of fixed extent and uniform character. The claimant in this case is entitled to 640 acres, but cannot take it by smaller subdivisions, at his will and pleasure; he must be made to conform to the land laws. SIR: By the letter which you did me the honor to write to me on the 27th instant, in reference to the case of Samuel Long, a reservee under the Choctaw treaty of 1830, you ask my opinion on the point-"whether the terms of the treaty, in speaking of sections, refer to quantity; or whether a tract laid off as a section is to be patented without reference to its actual contents?" I am of opinion that the treaty means a certain quantity; but then that quantity is to be taken in reference to the estab lished system of our land surveys, in parallelograms of fixed extent and uniform character. The claimant is entitled to 640 acres; but he shall not take it by smaller subdivisions, at his will and pleasure; he shall conform to those of the land law. In conformity to the second clause of the supplement to the treaty in question, the section and a half of land is to be taken in subordination to the great system of surveys, so as to include the residence and improvements of the reservee. I have read the statement and argument you sent me, and, in the main, concur in them. Neither Mr. Taney nor Mr. Butler has countenanced the idea that the general expression, a "section of land," in that treaty, means more than a section of 640 acres. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, PENSIONS TO WIDOWS OF OFFICERS UNDER THE ACT OF 1833. The widows of officers who were dead at the passage of the act of 1832, but who, if alive, would have received pensions under it, are not entitled to the benefit of the act of 1838. Mr. Butler's opinion on the same subject commented on-its correctness doubted. SIR: I have had the honor to receive and to consider your observations of the 30th instant, on the construction heretofore put upon the words of the act of July 7, 1838, in relation to pensions to be paid to the widows of officers who have died, and who, but they were dead at the time of the passing of the act of 1832, would have received their pension under this latter act. Considering it as res integra, I should say that the case of a widow whose husband actually received his annuity under that act, is not within the provisions of the statute of 1838. Besides that, the words do not embrace the case; and, besides the difficulty-insuperable, it appears to me-in the way of a widow drawing pay from the 4th March, 1836, when her husband happens to have survived that epoch, the 4th section of the act of 1832 provides expressly for the case of an officer dying "during the period intervening between the semi annual payments directed to be made." The provision is, "that the proportionate amount of pay which shall accrue between the last preceding semi-annual payment and the death of such person, shall be paid to his widow." The act of 1832, therefore, contemplates the case of a husband entitled under it, and gives the widow all he would have received, and no more. The act of 1536 took up a case not within that of 1832. It provides for a certain description of wife who was totally excluded from all benefit under that act by the death of her husband. The act of 1838 goes a little further. It extends to another description of wives; but it still contemplates them as having been so situated as not to profit by the act of 1832, and it gives to them what their husbands, if alive, would have taken. I do not see how language can be plainer. But Mr. Butler's opinion having settled the practice under the act of 1836, it is, perhaps, too late to change your practice in regard to it. The act of 1838 differs from the last mentioned statute in the important feature above referred to. The widow is to begin to draw her pension from March, 1836. Now, if her husband were then alive, it is clear she could not be entitled to an additional allowance in her own right. I hold that to be fatal to the application of Mr. Butler's reasoning to the last act. With respect to this act, therefore, you are free to take the course you shall judge fittest. I should have rejoiced to be able to adopt a construction favorable to the claims of the widows of these brave men. But the law which gives, disposes; and I am bound to interpret it as I find it. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. JOHN C. SPENCER, H. S. LEGARE. Secretary of War. CONTRACT WITH A MEMBER OF CONGRESS. A partnership, of which a member of Congress is a member, cannot, under the act of 1808, enter into a contract with the government; but, if he withdraw from it, the contract may be concluded with the other partners. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY General, June 1, 1842. SIR: I have had the honor to receive from the Commissioners of the Navy a letter of 24th ultimo, in which they state to me that they have ac cepted an offer from Messrs. Andrew Gregg & Co., to supply a quantity of chain cable iron, and propose entering into contract with them. Of this firm, however, the honorable James Irvine, of the House of Representatives, is a copartner. He has so informed the commissioners, and expressed the opinion, in which the commissioners concur, that he cannot, consistently with existing law, take any interest, direct or indirect, in the proposed contract. And then proceeds to say, that he has executed an instrument, therewith transmitted, relinquishing all interest in the contract; and the question upon which the commissioners would respectfully request your opinion is whether this instrument be such a relinquishment, in law, as would exonerate Mr. Irvine, and justify them in concluding the contract." Although the law authorizes the Attorney General to give official opinions only on the call of the President, or the heads of departments, I am willing to consider the Commissioners of the Navy as standing towards this office quasi in the relation of one of the latter. I proceed, therefore, to state my opinion upon the case presented to me by their letter. There are two views of it-1st. The political, embracing questions of expediency, propriety, &c., with which I have officially nothing to do; 2d. The strictly legal: to these I confine myself. The act of 1808 is a singularly strict, searching, and comprehensive enactment, and one of my distinguished predecessors (Mr. Wirt) thought it ought to be so construed as to make it as remedial and efficacious as possible. Yet it is a highly penal law; and, besides, is in derogation of common right: on both accounts, therefore, if not to be interpreted strictly, at least not to be extended by any latitude of inference and construction. The object of the statute is only to prevent jobbing between members of the legislature and the Executive, for the pecuniary advantage of the former. The words are expressly to that effect; and the exceptions of corporations show that there are even some direct, though minor interests, which are not meant to be embraced by the prohibitory clauses. The interest to disqualify a member from taking, or an officer from offering, a contract, must, in my opinion, be an immediate (however indirect) personal inte rest in its benefits. That he may ultimately profit by the contract—e. g., as heir, devisee, &c.- is not enough. Neither is it enough that his nearest friends or relatives may profit by it. The case before me is, however, one of the most intimate of all personal relations-a partnership-which produces, for all purposes of profit and responsibility within the scope of its constitution, a perfect legal unity; and the unity is confined to the agreed objects of the association, as between the partners, at least. Their will, with regard to each other, is its law. To third parties, their responsibility is governed by other principles; as to each other, it is an affair of contract. They may, therefore, modify at pleasure the law they give to their union; and if their spe cial agreement derogate from the common law of such associations, modus et conventio vincunt legem. I think, therefore, that the papers sent me, accompanied with a written acceptance and stipulation, under seal, to the same effect, by the two other partners, will save, in strict law, the statute of 1808. The possible ultimate benefit to the partnership is too remote and contingent an interest to avoid the contract or incur a penalty. Further than this, I will not venture to go. But then the contract will not be with the same partnership. It will be a special contract with the two other partners, authorized by Mr. Irvine, to use the common fund for their private purposes. He will be to them in the nature of a friend, by endorser, lending his name and capital. The contract will be with Messrs. Andrew Gregg & Moses Thompson, or Messrs Andrew Gregg & Moses Thompson, in this case using the firm of &c., &c. They could not, therefore, plead in abatement, if he were not joined as a defendant in an action against them; or, if they did, the papers in question, sealed both by them and by him, would be an estoppel. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. A P. UPSHUR, H. S. LEGARE. Secretary of the Navy. LIGHT-HOUSE SURVEYS. Secretary of the Treasury may institute survey of light-house establishment under appropriation in the act of May 16, 1842. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, June 4, 1842. SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d instant, submitting for my consideration and opinion "the question as to the powers vested in the Secretary of the Treasury to institute a survey of the lighthouse establishment under the appropriation act of the 16th ultimo, which contains the following provision: For expenses in examining and reporting the condition of all the light-houses annually, $4,000." All the acts for the collection of the revenue must be read together, as in pari materiâ, and composing a complete system. The general laws of the session of 1789, passed just after the formation of the government, are all more or less fundamental, and serve as legisla tive expositions of the different provisions of the constitution to which they respectively relate. The act of August 7, 1789, for the establishment and support of light-houses, expressly assigns to the head of the Treasury Department the power and the duty of building, rebuilding, and keeping in good repair all light houses, &c. Clearly, under this act, the expenditure of an appropriation for examining and reporting annually the condition of light-houses-i. e. of looking into them with a view of keeping them in good repair-would be incidental to the general charge imposed by that statute upon the head of the Treasury Department. But none of the subsequent acts on the subject make any change in the system; on the contrary, they uniformly re enact, in particular cases, the general provision just referred to of the act of 1789. That the Treas ury Department has confided the function of superintendence of light |