Waterbury with the militia and State troops of Connecticut, was to march on the East Chester road, there to be joined by Sheldon's cavalry for the purpose of scouring Throg's Neck. Sheldon's infantry was to join the Duke de Lauzun and scour Morrisania, being covered by Scammell's light infantry, who were "to advance through the fields, waylay the roads, stop all communication and prevent intelligence from getting to the enemy." At Valentine's Hill the left column of the Americans and the right of the French effected a junction. The whole army, Parsons' Division in the lead, arrived at Kingsbridge about daylight, and formed on the heights back of Fort Independence, extending towards DeLancey's Mills; while the Legion of Lauzun and Waterbury's Corps proceeded to scour Morrisania and Throg's Neck, but with little effect as most of the Refugees had fled. A few, however, were caught and some horses brought off. The enemy were completely surprised. After spending the 22d and 23d in making a careful and thorough reconnaisance, the army marched back about six o'clock by the same routes, but in the reverse order, and reached the camp at Philipsburgh about midnight.

ners.

Westchester County, during the Revolutionary War, was infested with marauding bands known as Cow-Boys and SkinThe former were cattle thieves and made up of Refugees and Tories, and the latter, so called from their taking everything they could find, professed to be on the American side; but the two sets had a good understanding with each other and plundered patriots and loyalists with equal impartiality. To repress these bands was not easy, for the guerrilla of to-day became the peaceable farmer of to-morrow, but Parsons believed their depredations could be stopped, and on the 28th wrote Washington to that effect, suggesting measures to accomplish it.

CAMP, July 28, 1781.

SIR. From the intelligence I have received from the country and my own observation, I am convinced that the inhabitants in the rear of the Army are intimately connected with the Refugees who are on the roads in our rear, and at many times form part of the robbers who are constantly distressing the inhabitants and rendering it dangerous to pass the roads. I would, therefore, propose as a further security, that no persons under the description of volunteers be per

mitted to assemble in arms in the rear of the Camp, unless they are put under the command of such officers as shall be appointed by your Excellency, accountable to you, and that where there is reason to believe any of the inhabitants harbor or give intelligence to the Refugees, they shall be removed. A further regulation appears to be necessary to prevent plundering the inhabitants in our rear, and I know of none better than to order all plunder taken to be delivered to the Commissary or Quartermaster General, whether taken by the regular troops or volunteers on pain of imprisonment. I am &c.,

To General Washington.

SAML. H. PARSONS.

The inhabitants along the Sound lived in constant fear of attacks from the enemy and were continually urging that regular troops be stationed there for their defense. August tenth, Abraham Davenport wrote from Stamford, a place as much exposed as any on the border, asking Washington to detach some part of his Army as a guard, a request he would hardly have made had he understood the situation and the impossibility of granting it at this most critical period:

STAMFORD, August 10, 1781.

SIR. Your Excellency has undoubtedly been informed of the exposed situation of this part of the country and of the frequent incursions of the enemy. Several inhabitants have been killed and wounded, and nearly sixty within a short time carried into confinement and robbed of their property, and unless some protection is afforded, those who are of ability and inclination will retire into the country, and others will make their peace. The ardor of the people, (which is to be lamented,) has abated in consequence of their distresses, so that very little opposition is to be expected from them. If it be consistent with the general good for your Excellency to detach some part of the Army as Guards upon this representation, I have no doubt it will be done. General Parsons will inform your Excellency of the designs of the enemy against this Town and can give you any other information you desire. I am with esteem, Your Excellency's

To General Washington.

most obed't. Serv't., ABR'M. DAVENPORT.

Rochambeau, at the Wethersfield conference, had favored a southern campaign in preference to an attempt on New York,

believing it impracticable to bring the large French ships of the Line into the Harbor, and that, without the assistance of the fleet, the city could not be successfully attacked. His plan, while not wholly abandoned, had beeen, at the instance of Washington, contingently laid aside for the attempt on New York. The result of the several reconnaisances must have raised a doubt in Washington's mind as to whether anything more could be accomplished by the present expedition, for in a letter to Lafayette of July 30, he says:

I think we have effected one part of the plan of the campaign settled on at Wethersfield, that is, giving a substantial relief to the Southern States by obliging the enemy to recall a considerable part of their force from thence. Our view must now be turned towards endeavoring to expel them totally from those States, if we find ourselves incompetent to the siege of New York.

Early in August Washington began his preparations for a possible abandonment of New York for the South. Indeed, events were now rapidly creating a state of affairs which left him no alternative. "The feeble compliance of the States with his requisitions for men hitherto, and the little prospect of greater exertions in the future," forbade the hope of any material increase in his Army; three thousand Hessian troops arriving on the 11th of August had raised Clinton's force to eleven thousand men; Cornwallis, it was learned on the 15th, had marched down the Peninsula to Yorktown, and would probably weaken his force by sending reinforcements to New York, though in fact none were sent, their departure having been prevented by the arrival of the French fleet; Count de Grasse had sent word that he would reach the Chesapeake by the end of August, and Lafayette's troops had been so disposed as to prevent the enemy's escape through the Carolinas. Matters thus brought to a crisis, Washington was compelled for the time to abandon his designs on New York and turn his attention to the more promising field of operations on the Peninsula.

On the 19th of August, both armies broke camp, the Americans crossing the Hudson at King's Ferry on the next day, and the French between the 22d and 25th. Every effort was made to mislead both the Army and Clinton, as to the objective of the

march, the roads being repaired towards Kingsbridge and Staten Island and a French bakery set up at Chatham. Misleading letters were also written to fall into the enemy's hands. Marching to the head of the Elk, the troops were embarked on sailing vessels and arrived before Yorktown September 28. The place was completely invested on the 30th, and on the 19th of October, four years and two days after Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, Cornwallis surrendered to the allied forces the Posts of Yorktown and Gloucester, with about seven thousand British troops, together with his shipping and seamen. This event caused the fall of North's Ministry and virtually ended the

war.

OF

CHAPTER XXIII

HEATH COMMANDS IN THE HIGHLANDS. PARSONS TAKES CHARGE THE DEFENSE OF CONNECTICUT. PREPARES TO ATTACK LLOYD'S NECK. HEATH FAILS TO SUPPORT HIM. THE CONNECTICUT TROOPS WINTER IN THE HIGHLANDS. AS TO DISABLED OFFICERS. PARSONS' FAREWELL ADDRESS TO HIS TROOPS. RESIGNS HIS COMMISSION AS MAJOR GENERAL.

August, 1781-July, 1782

BEFORE leaving for the South, General Washington issued the following instructions to Major General Heath, whom he left in command in the Highlands:

SIR. You are to take command of all the troops remaining in this Department, consisting of the two regiments of New Hampshire, ten of Massachusetts and five of Connecticut, the Corps of Invalids, Sheldon's Legion, the Third Regiment of Artillery, together with all such State troops and militia, as are retained in service, and who would have been under my own command.

The security of West Point and the Posts in the Highlands, is to be considered the first object of your attention. The force now put under your orders, it is presumed, will be sufficient for the purpose, as well as to yield a very considerable protection and cover to the country, without hazarding the safety of the Posts in the Highlands. The protection of the northern

and western frontiers of the State of New York, as well as those parts of that and other States most contiguous and exposed to the ravages and depredations of the enemy, will claim your attention. Although your general rule of conduct will be to act on the defensive only, yet is not meant to prohibit you from striking a blow at the enemy's Posts, or detachments, should a fair opportunity present itself.

The most eligible position for your Army, in my opinion, will be on the north side of Croton River, as well for the purpose of supporting the garrison of West Point, annoying the enemy and covering the country, as for the security and repose of your troops. Waterbury's brigade, which may be posted towards the Sound,