following sections of the Act, | plaintiff's claim was for damages although they declined after- by fire occasioned by the use of wards to submit the award to the the defendant's steam thresher, County Court Judge for confirma- but the jury found that the detion. fendant was not guilty of negligence.

In an action by the plaintiff for a mandamus to compel the defendants to complete the arbitration proceedings, and pay the amount of the award,

Held, on demurrer, that the defendants could not rely upon such slight differences between the notice actually given and the notice provided for by the statute; that such differences were mere irregularities which were waived by defendants taking subsequent proceedings, and that defendants were also estopped from relying npon such mistakes in the notice prepared and served by them.

Held, also, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege in his declaration that a by-law had been passed by the defendants authorizing the notice of arbitration in question: Harpel v. Portland, 17 U. C. R. 445, followed.

The count of the declaration

Held, that where a person uses fire in his field in a customary way for the purposes of agriculture, or other industrial purposes, he is not liable for damages arising from the escape of the fire to other lands, unless the escape is due to his negligence ; and that the plaintiff could not recover. Owens v. Burgess. 75 See NEGLIGENCE.

FORECLOSURE.

See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 1.

FORMS, DEVIATION FROM.
See BILLS OF Sale, 1.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

setting up a money demand by 1. Queen's Bench Act, 1895, virtue of the award was held bad, Rules 803 to 807 Bona fide because the award had not been purchaser-Garnishment-Land, confirmed by the County Court interest in Vendor's lien.]Judge. Scott v. The City of Win- Plaintiffs moved under Rules 803 nipeg ...84 to 807 of the Queen's Bench Act,

FAILURE OF CONSIDERA-
TION.

1895, for an order for the sale of a parcel of land alleged to have been purchased by defendant in his wife's name for the purpose of delaying, hindering or defrauding the plaintiffs, as judgment creditors of defendant; but it was shown on the return of the motion that the wife had entered Damages-Negligence.]-The into an agreement for the sale of

See MISREPRESENTATION.

FIRE.

the land to a bona fide purchaser | tlement. This settlement was who had paid a part of his pur- executed just prior to the marchase money and entered into riage of the parties in 1893, and possession. provided that the husband would The plaintiffs then served a forthwith after the celebration of notice of motion on the purchas- the marriage grant and convey er, calling upon him to appear to his wife all the personal and and state the nature of his claim, real property and life insurance and either maintain or relinquish which he owned, and that he the same.

Held, that both motions must be dismissed, as the purchaser could not be called upon to defend himself in such a proceeding, and neither the husband nor the wife after the sale had any interest in the land, within the meaning of the Rules, which could be ascertained and sold thereunder, and the plaintiffs' only remedy under the circumstances would be under the garnishing provisions of The Queen's Bench Act.

would further transfer to her within one year other furniture to be selected by her to the value of $1,500 in all, and would within five years convey to her further real estate to the value of $5,000 and increase his life insurance in her favor to make a total of $10,000, and would keep and maintain the same and would pay all taxes, and would keep the real and personal property insured and bear and sustain all expenses of the common domicile.

A vendor's lien is not an inThe husband was indebted at terest in land: Parke v. Riley, 3 the time for the furniture in quesE. & A. 215; Perry on Trusts, tion, and also to other creditors, section 238; Overton on Liens, and the evidence in this and section 612. It is only a remedy other respects showed in the for a debt, and is neither a right opinion of the Court that the setof property, an estate in lands, tlement was entirely voluntary nor a charge on the land. Bank and without consideration, and of Montreal v. Condon......366 was not stipulated for by the claimant as a condition of the

2. Husband and wife - Bill of marriage, but was made with sale-Ante-nuptial settlement.]-the intention of putting all his Appeal from a County Court in property then owned and practian interpleader issue. The plain- cally all his after-acquired proptiff having recovered a judgment erty beyond the reach of his against the husband of the de- creditors. fendant in the issue for the price of certain furniture sold to him issued an execution under which the furniture was seized. The defendant claimed the goods as her property under a bill of sale made by her husband to her in pursuance of an ante-nuptial set

It appeared, also, that nothing had been done to carry out the covenants in the marriage settlement for nearly two years until the execution of the bill of sale, which the husband gave to his wife two days after the service of the writ in the action against

..577

Fleming, 1 A. & E. 40; Sharpley | and Doll on the other, and as to v. Louth and East Coast R'y Co., the whole subject of the sale, and 2 Ch. D. 663, and Morrison v. for this no case had been made. The Universal Marine Ins. Co., Doll v. Howard......... L.R. 8 Ex. 197, that the defendant had waived his right to rescind the contract for misrepresentation and that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for the amount of the note and interest. Held, also, per Killam, J.

MISTAKE.

See CONTRACT, 1.

MORTGAGE.

1. The evidence before the Court standing by itself might Landlord and tenant-Attornseem to warrant the granting of ment clause Distress for inrelief to the defendant on the terest-Distress Act, R.Š.M., c. ground that W. F. Doll had 46, s, 2.]-A mortgage of lands fraudulently obtained a larger contained a special attornment sum for the shares conveyed to clause whereby the mortgagor the defendant than he was entitl-became tenant of the lands to the ed to, and that the plaintiff was defendants at a yearly rental only the holder in trust for him, equal to the interest on the and on the ground of failure of amount of the loan to be paid at consideration for a definite por- the times appointed for the paytion of the $6,000 of notes, fol- ments of interest. This mortgage lowing Beck v. Kantorowicz, 3 was not executed by the mortK & J. 242; but, as no case for gagee. relief on that ground had been set up in the statement of defence or at the trial, it would not be proper to give effect to it now, or to allow any amendment of the pleadings at this stage, as the plaintiff might have made her case stronger at the trial if she had been called upon to do so.

2. The evidence showed that the sale impeached by defendant was a sale of the shares en bloc to three parties for a single consideration and, following Morrison v. Earls, 5O. R. 434, that the purchase could not be avoided by the defendant alone as to some of the shares, but if rescinded at all it must be so as between all of the purchasers on the one side

Held, that the relationship of landlord and tenant was validly created between the parties, and that on default of any payment of interest the mortgagee might distrain for a year's rent under the attornment clause, and take any goods upon the premises, whether belonging to the mortgagor or not, and make a valid sale of same.

Held, also, that section 2 of the Distress Act, R.S.M., c. 46, has no reference to the right of mortgagees to distrain for rent under a tenancy validly created, but only to the right to distrain for interest as such provided for in the ordinary distress clause in the short form of mortgages set

verdict for defendant should the Queen's Bench Act, 1895, to stand. Colquhoun v. Seagram,339 set aside the attaching order.

illegal, the illegality must appear, their licenses could issue, and on the face of the by-law, and left it in his power to decide who no evidence should be received should have a license and who to show how it came to be should not, was also ultra vires passed, or that there were as an illegal delegation of irregularities or failures to com- authority which the council itself ply with statutes in and about should exercise. Re Elliott and the introduction and passing of The City of Winnipeg......358 the by-law. The provisions of the Act requiring a petition 4. By-laws-Dairy inspection signed by three fourths of the Quashing by-law- Ultra vires.] occupiers of shops of the same -The City of Winnipeg having kind prior to the passing of the in assumed exercise of the powby-law, that the by-law should ers conferred by the Municipal be passed within one month from Act, s. 599, as amended by 57 the receipt of the petition, and Vic., c. 20, s. 17, 58 & 59 Vic., that the by-law should be c. 32, s. 16, and 59 Vic., c. 15, published before the date on s. 16, passed a by-law for the which it was to take effect, are licensing, inspecting and regudirectory and not imperative. lating of dairies and vendors of Re Cloutier.... ..220 milk and for preventing the sale ducts until compliance with reguor use of milk or other food prolations, an application was made to quash it under section 385 of the Municipal Act.

3. By-laws Quashing by-law -Dairy inspection-Ultra vires.] The City of Winnipeg, relying

on sections 593 and 607 of the Municipal Act and section 17 of 57 Vic., c. 20, passed a by-law for inspecting and regulating dairies and licensing vendors of milk.

Held, that a provision requiring the owners of all dairies whose milk was sold in the City to submit to an inspection and to take out a license whether their dairies were in the City or not, was ultra vires and illegal so far as it applied to the owners of dairies who did not sell their milk in the City, but to other persons, who might or might not sell it there.

Held, also, that section 3 of the by-law which required applicants for licenses to satisfy the health officer of the City before

Held, following Dillon on Municipal Corporations, s. 91, and Merritt v. Toronto, 22 A.R. 205, that all such by-laws should be construed strictly, and that any ambiguity or doubt as to the extent of the powers conferred on municipalities to make by-laws is to be determined in favor of the general public as against the grantee of the power, especially where such by-laws affect the rights of liberty or property of a citizen, and that the by-law in question should be quashed because some of its provisions were unreasonable, and others the Act. ceeded the powers conferred by

ex

The following are the provis