1896. S. 684; Harding v. Harding, L. R. 13 Eq. 493. And in Judgment. Dryden v. Frost, 3 M. & C. 670, Lord Cottenham held it TAYLOR, C.J. Was assignable even by parol. It is only to interests in land that the Rules in question apply, so I do not see that they can be invoked in a case like the present. But the plaintiffs are not without remedy, as they can, I fancy, by garnishing proceedings, raise any of the questions they seek to raise here. The appeal should be dismissed, with costs to Burton. Appeal dismissed with costs. Statement. MASSEY-HARRIS Co. v. MCLAREN. Before DUBUC, KILLAM and BAIN, JJ. Appeal from County Court-Jurisdiction—Amount in question. In deciding whether an appeal from a County Court decision under section 315 of the County Courts Act, as re-enacted by 59 Vic., c. 3, s. 2, should be taken to a single Judge, or to the Full Court, it is not the amount claimed by the plaintiff which has to be looked at, but it is necessary to consider what is the amount which the party appealing seeks to relieve himself from, or to recover by his appeal. The defendant appealed to the Full Court from a verdict against him for $39.10 and relied on the fact that the plaintiffs' claim was for a sum exceeding fifty dollars. Held, following Macfarlane v. Leclaire, 15 Moo. P. C. 181, and Allan v. Pratt, 13 A. C. 780, that the appeal should be struck out with costs. ARGUED 1st December, 1896. DECIDED: 2nd December, 1896. APPEAL from a County Court. Plaintiffs sued to recover the sum of $55.43. Except as to one dollar the claim was practically undisputed, but defendant set up a counterclaim 1896. for a like sum for breach of warranty and was allowed an Statement. amount which reduced the plaintiffs' claim to $39.10, for which the plaintiffs obtained judgment. Defendant entered an appeal to the Full Court to have the damages allowed npon his counterclaim increased, but when the appeal came on for argument it was objected that less than fifty dollars. was in question and that there was no jurisdiction in the Court to hear the same. W. A. Macdonald, Q. C., for plaintiffs. There is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear the appeal: County Courts Act, 1896, s. 2. Plaintiffs sued for $55.43, defendant counterclaimed for the same amount; judgment was given for plaintiffs for $39.10. "The amount in question" does not exceed the sum of fifty dollars, and the appeal should have been to a single Judge, not to the Court in banc. A. D. Cameron for defendant. KILLAM, J-By the section substituted for section 315 of the County Courts Act, R.S.M. c. 33, by 59 Vic., c. 3, s. 2, (M. 1896), "In case any person directly affected by any order, decision or judgment of a Judge, or verdict of a jury, in any action, suit, matter or proceeding in any County Court in which the amount in question is twenty dollars or more, is dissatisfied with such order, decision or judgment of a Judge or verdict of a jury, he shall be entitled to an appeal to a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench, where the amount in question does not exceed the sum of fifty dollars, and to the Court of Queen's Bench in banc when the amount in question ceeds the sum of fifty dollars." ex It was at one time held by the Supreme Court of Canada that, to ascertain whether the sum or value of the matter in dispute amounted to $2,000, so as to give a defendant a right of appeal from the Courts of the Province of Quebec, 1896. it was the amount claimed by the plaintiff, and not that aJudgment. warded against the defendant, which was to be looked at: KILLAM, J. Joyce v. Hart, 1 S.C.R. 321; Levi v. Reed, 6 S.C.R. 482; Ayotte v. Boucher, 9 S.C.R. 460. These decisions appear, however, to have been over-ruled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Allan v. Pratt, 13 A. C. 780, followed by the Supreme Court in Monette v. Lefebvre, 16 S.C.R. 387. These original decisions of the Supreme Court were under the Act 38 Vic., c. 11, s. 17, (D. 1875), by which no appeal was to be allowed from any "judgment rendered in the Province of Quebec in any case wherein the sum or value of the matter in dispute" should not amount to $2000, which is practically equivalent to the first portion of section 315 of our County Courts Act as amended. The principle laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Macfarlane v. Leclaire, 15 Moo. P. C. 181, is thus directly made applicable, that "the correct course is to look at the judgment as it affects the interests of the parties who are prejudiced by it, and who seek to relieve themselves from it by an appeal." The amount adjudged against the defendant is only $39.10, and he seeks by his appeal only to relieve himself from that amount by a further deduction, and it is that amount only that he can now claim to be in question. His appeal, then, should have been to a single Judge and not to the Court in banc, and the defendant's present appeal must be struck out with costs. BAIN, J.-I think that the appeal of the defendant should have been taken to a single Judge and not to the Full Court, and it should be struck out with costs. In deciding whether, under the statute, the appeal of the defendant should be to the Full Court or to a single Judge, the measure of value must be taken to be the amount of the judgment which has been recovered by the plaintiff and against which the appeal is brought. The judgment as it 1896. affects the defendant, is the question that is in appeal: Macfarlane v. Leclaire, 15 Moo. P. C. 181; Allan v. Pratt, 13 Judgment. A. C. 780. BAIN, J. DUBUC, J., Concurred. Appeal struck out. [A cross appeal had also been entered by plaintiffs, but on delivery of the above judgment counsel asked leave to withdraw same and it was struck out with costs.-ED.] CROTHERS v. MONTEITH. Before TAYLOR, C.J., DUBUC and KILLAM, JJ. Liquor License Act, R.S.M., c. 90, s. 35—Cancellation of License— The plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants, ARGUED: 5th December, 1896. 1896. IN September, 1894, the plaintiff obtained a hotel license Statement. under The Liquor License Act, R.S.M., c. 90, and this ex pired on the 31st of May following. In May, 1895, having complied with the requirements of the Act, the plaintiff's license was renewed for one year, and it was in 1896 again renewed until 31st May, 1897. In April, 1896, and before the last license was granted, a petition was presented under section 35 of the Act against the then existing license, but upon this no action was taken. After the granting of the last license another petition under section 35 was presented, and the License Commissioners gave the plaintiff notice that they would meet on the 16th of July, 1896, to consider it. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a statement of claim, alleging that on account of the vagueness and uncertainty of the latter portion of section 35, there were no means by which a license could be cancelled after it was granted; claiming a declaration to that effect; a declaration that the Commissioners had no power to cancel the license on any grounds set up in the petition; and praying that they be restrained from cancelling or pretending to cancel his license. A motion for an injunction to restrain the Commissioners was refused by Bain J., and from the order then made the plaintiff appealed to the Full Court. F. C. Wade for plaintiff. The petition presented in April, 1896, protesting against the issue of a license to plaintiff was not acted on by the Commissioners. Such a petition can be presented only once in the calendar year. The Commissioners having rejected one petition could not consider another until a year had expired. The Act says, "once in every year." It says nothing of a license year. The presentation of the petition will cancel the license, but what means are there of ascertaining whether the persons who have signed it are the nearest householders or not? There is a certificate of a commissioner for taking affidavits annexed to the petition, but there is no provision for making that evidence. The statute does not say to whom the petition is to be presented: Sharp v. Wakefield, [1891], A. |