of his authority.

Consolidated Coal Company v. Block &

Hartman Smelting Co., 53 Ill. App. 565.

In the present case it does not appear that under the laws of the Royal League the officer whose duty it is to collect dues and assessments has any authority relating to the question of forfeiture on account of entering into a prohibited occupation. On the contrary, it is expressly provided that any acts of omission or commission by the collector shall not bind the order or in any manner waive any part of the constitution or laws of the order. It is also provided that the receipt of assessments shall not be a waiver of the forfeiture. Hence, in this case, the officer who is claimed to have knowledge of the forfeiture, did not receive the same within the scope of his authority as an agent, and therefore, his knowledge cannot be imputed to the defendant.

Another essential element in the doctrine of estoppel is that the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have been misled to his prejudice by the conduct of the other party. And it has been held that where the person claiming the estoppel had equal knowledge of the facts with the person against whom the estoppel is sought to be enforced, he will not be heard to say that he was misled by the conduct of the other party, and is therefore not entitled to the benefit of the estoppel. (Authorities infra.)

Under the express provisions of the contract in this case, the officer who received the assessments from Bruley after he had gone into the saloon business had no authority to waive the forfeiture, and the contract also expressly provided that should the assessments be accepted and retained, still the forfeiture would not be waived. No one was better apprised of these facts than was Bruley, because he was conclusively presumed to know the laws of the order which were a part of his contract, and therefore knowing, as he did, that such acceptance of dues and assessments would not waive his forfeiture, it certainly cannot be claimed that he was misled.

In Kocher v. Supreme Council, Catholic Benevolent Legion 65 N. J. L. 649, 52 L. R. A. 861, after the member had dis

appeared his beneficiary continued to pay the assessments until she heard that he was dead. The supreme secretary then told her that she need not pay any further assessments until she found out whether or not he was dead, and if living, she could pay up the back assessments and restore him to good standing. The member afterwards returned, and a tender of the unpaid assessments was refused by the society, claiming that his membership was forfeited. The trial court held that the conduct of the supreme secretary was a waiver of the forfeiture. Upon appeal it was held that the secretary had no power to waive the laws of the Order, and that the forfeiture was a good defense. In its opinion, the court said: "The powers and duties of the supreme secretary as defined in the constitution and by-laws, are largely clerical, *** but he is no where clothed with power to waive or suspend any of the provisions of the constitution and laws of the Legion.

It is true that the law of agency applies to officers of corporations, and that if any officer of a corporation is allowed to exercise general authority in respect to the business of the corporation or a particular branch of it the corporation is bound by his acts in the same manner as if the authority was expressly granted. But this immunity is extended to those only dealing in good faith with such officers, and who do not know or are not bound to know the limitations of their power by the provisions of the company's charter.

In the present case the plaintiff is not in the attitude of one dealing with the corporation in good faith and without notice. Besides it is a general principle that persons entering mutual companies are presumed to know the terms of the charter and by-laws under which they are organized. Nor can the officers of such associations dispense with the terms and conditions of such charter and by-laws unless they are expressly authorized to do so. The officers of a mutual association have no power to waive by-laws relating to the substance of the contract between an individual member and his associates in their corporate capacity."

In Schimp v. Cedar Rapids Insurance Co., 124 Ill. 354, the

court said: "The waiver or estoppel relied upon, cannot prevail. It is destitute of that element which is most essential to either. It does not appear, nor is it claimed, that the assured has been mislead in any manner to her prejudice by the company accepting payment of the note."

In Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. v. Jesse, 50 Ill. App. 101, the laws of the order required that a health certificate be filed in case a member who was suspended more than 30 days sought reinstatement. Jesse was suspended more than 30 days and thereafter the subordinate lodge accepted the back assessments, and reinstated him without the health certificate. The Grand Lodge refused to accept the money and returned it to the subordinate lodge which in turn returned it to the member. The member died about one year after. Suit was brought on the certificate. The plaintiff claimed that the subordinate lodge was the agent of the grand lodge, and that its acts estopped the grand lodge, and that the member was misled by them. Of this point the court said (p. 108):

"If it be assumed that Douglass Lodge and its officers were agents of the grand lodge in all matters pertaining to the collection of assessments, it does not follow that they had authority to waive any of the laws of the grand lodge, which relate to the substance of a contract between an individual member and the grand lodge. The constitution of

the Grand Lodge provided the only method for reinstating a beneficiary certificate after it had been suspended for 30 days. The officers of the subordinate lodge could not waive these requirements.

"It appears in evidence that Charles Jesse had about a year before been recorder of Douglass Lodge and knew in fact, as well as being bound to know, the rules and laws of the society.

"We see no ground for holding that the appellant is estopped from denying its liability because of the conduct of the officers of the subordinate lodge in reinstating Jesse without the certificate of good health."

Royal Highlanders v. Scoville, 66 Neb. 213, 92 N. W. 206, was a suit on a benefit certificate which provided for payment

on condition that the member comply with all the laws, edicts, etc. One of the laws provided that in case of suspension reinstatement might be had if the member was in good health and not engaged in any prohibited occupation. The member was suspended and subsequently took sick. A few hours before her death, the beneficiary, acting as the agent of the member. paid the arrearages, but said nothing about the condition of the member's health. The society refused to pay the claim, and when sued, set up the forfeiture to which the plaintiff replied that the acceptance of the assessments was a waiver. The court held that there was no waiver, and in its opinion said: "It is insisted, however, by the plaintiffs, that the acceptance of the assessment by Mr. Glover was a waiver of the condition of good health. We cannot agree with this contention. The members of a mutual benefit association are conclusively presumed to know its rules and regulations, and the assured therefore must have known that her good health was a condition precedent to her right to reinstatement. She was not acting, therefore, in good faith to the lodge in tendering the payment of her dues in view of the condition of her health."

In Phoenix Insurance Company v. Maxon, supra. it is said: "Where the assured is notified of the limitation of the authority of the agent, the former cannot rely upon the statements of the latter in excess of his authority."

Boyce v. Royal Circle, 99 Mo. App. 349, 73 S. W. 300, was a case of forfeiture for non-payment of dues and a waiver was claimed because the local secretary thereafter received the dues contrary to the provisions of the laws of the order. The court in its opinion said: "At the close of the defendant's evidence the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiffs for the full amount of the certificate, apparently on the assumption that the local secretary of the Cabool Circle by accepting payments of Henderson's monthly dues for May, June, July and August, waived his default, restored him to membership, and reinstated his certificate of insurance in full force and effect."

"That is a view of the law which we cannot accept. The spontaneous action of local secretaries of this and kindred societies in accepting dues from suspended members contrary to the constitution or by-laws, whether the acceptance be due to ignorance or complaisance, does not, ipso facto, reinstate the insurance, and cannot have that result unless the settled rules of laws governing contractual obligations are set aside as to contracts of fraternal insurance."

The court then holds that if the supreme officers tolerated the acceptance of dues with knowledge of the facts, that there might be a waiver.

Continuing, the court said:

"These contracts for fraternal

insurance must be treated like other contracts.

Provisions for forfeitures should be strictly construed but not abrogated."

In Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489, it is said: "A person who enters an association must acquaint himself with its laws, for they contribute to the admeasurement of his rights, his duties and his liabilities.

It is not one by-law or some by-laws of which the member must take notice, for he must take notice of all which affect his rights or interests."

The next point to be considered is whether or not Bruley's course of action was affected by reason of the acceptance of these dues by the collector. This is also a necessary element in an estoppel. How can it be said that Bruley was led to believe that the order had intended to waive his forfeiture by accepting his assessments, when as far as he knew, neither the order nor its agent was aware that he had forfeited his insurHow could he expect that they would do anything else but accept his assessments until he knew that they were aware of his forfeiture? He made no effort to apprise the officers of his forfeiture nor to inquire what the attitude of the order would be. His course of action may have been influenced by two different intentions, as contended by learned counsel for defendant.

ance.

First, it may have been his intention to conceal the fact