trees of a useful class, and cannot possibly be held to apply to those of a large size only.

The object of this prohibitory legislation is undoubtedly to prevent stripping the public lands of their growth of forests regard less of the present size and character of the individual trees, and the term used is intended to apply generally for that purpose; and if it is found that live trees of such a character or sort as might be of use or value in any kind of manufacture, or the construction of any useful articles, were cut, the charges in that respect, namely, the character of the timber, has been sufficiently proven. It matters not to what purposes the timber may have been applied after being cut, if converted to the use of the party accused. Selling it for fire-wood or burning it into charcoal would be no defense or excuse for cutting and removing; nor can it be evidence of the worthlessness of the timber cut sufficient to justify it. It must be found that the lands upon which the timber, if any, was cut were lands of the United States, sufficiently described and identified to satisfy you upon that point. It need not have been reserved or purchased for the sake of timber. A homestead entry, although it gives the party entering certain rights of occupation, does not so convey title or divest the United States of property in it as to change its character in this respect; and it is immaterial, therefore, whether the land had been entered for homestead by a third party or not. It is not claimed, nor does it appear, that the defendants herein had any interest, by homestead or otherwise.

Jury found verdict of guilty.

Vide U. S. v. Briggs, 9 How. 351; U. S. v. Redy, 5 McLean, 358; U. S. v. Shuler, 6 McLean, 28; U. S. v. Cook, 19 Wall. 592; Forsythe v. U. S. 9 How. 577; Paine v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 14 FED. REP. 407; The Timber Cases, 11 FED. REP. 81; U. S. v. Smith, 11 FED. REP. 487; U. S. v. Mills, 9 Fed. REP. 684.

BIERBACH V. GOODYEAR RUBBER COMPANY.

(Circuit Court, E. D. Wisconsin. October Term, 1882.)

1. NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL INJURIES-COLLISION ON HIGHWAY.

Where teams have a right in the ordinary course of business to follow each other, turn about, pass and repass, that degree of care and caution must be exercised by parties using such highway, when in proximity to each other, to avoid doing each other injury, which would reasonably be expected of an ordinarilyprudent person in the surrounding circumstances.

2. SAME CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

Negligence is not to be imputed to a driver of a team from the mere fact of a collision; it is a fact to be proved as any other fact in the case; and, even where defendant was guilty of negligence, yet if there was a want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, which as a proximate cause concurred with defendant's negligence in causing the accident, plaintiff cannot recover in an action for damages for personal injuries caused by a collision between vehicles on a highway.

3. SAME-CHOICE OF MEANS TO AVOID COLLISION.

Where a person exercising ordinary prudence and skill as driver of a vehicle up to the moment when danger of collision was imminent, and in the presence of such danger is compelled to choose what course of action he should take to avoid the danger, and did so in good faith, the mere fact that the result afterwards may show that his choice of a way to avoid the collision was not the best course, cannot be imputed to him as negligence. 4. SAME-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

In an action for damages for personal injuries caused by a collision on a highway, where negligence only is imputed to the defendant's driver, and it is not claimed that the collision was caused by any intentional, malicious, or willful act, exemplary damages cannot be allowed. The damages which plaintiff may recover are such as will compensate him for the loss and injury sustained. 5. SAME-PROSPECTIVE DAMAGES.

Where plaintiff is entitled to damages for injuries sustained from the collision, he may recover prospective compensatory damages, or such as it is proved will directly result in the future from the injury complained of, in addition to past and present damages.

R. N. Austin and Geo. B. Goodwin, for plaintiff.

E. P. Smith and Jas. G. Jenkins, for defendant.

DYER, D. J., (charging jury.) The plaintiff in this action claims that in July, 1880, while he was riding in a wagon which was being drawn by a horse driven by his servant on one of the streets of this city, an employe of the defendant so carelessly and negligently drove a horse which was drawing a wagon belonging to the defendant that the two vehicles came in collision; that the plaintiff's wagon was overturned, and that he was thrown violently to the ground and seriously injured; and this action is brought to recover damages for the injuries claimed to have been thus received.

The undisputed testimony shows that the plaintiff, in company with his servant, left his place of business on Second street and drove to Grand avenue; that they turned east on Grand avenue and proceeded on their way until they reached a point about midway in the block, and near the Plankinton House, where they attempted to turn. about and return to the plaintiff's place of business. It appears that the defendant's horse and wagon were in their rear, and were also going east on the same street, and that as the plaintiff's horse and wagon were turning about, the collision occurred. These are general

facts not questioned, but concerning the precise positions of the two vehicles just before and at the time of the collision, and as to the manner in which the horses of the respective parties were driven and managed, and as to other circumstances bearing upon the occurrence, there is conflict in the testimony.

The ground upon which the contention of the plaintiff necessarily proceeds is that the collision was occasioned by the negligence of the defendant's driver. As he was the defendant's agent, of course any negligence on his part was the defendant's negligence. So, too, the plaintiff was chargeable with any negligence on the part of his driver in the management of his horse and vehicle. The collision occurred on a public thoroughfare, where teams have a right, in the course of business, to follow each other, turn about, pass and repass. Upon both of the parties there was devolved the duty of exercising reasonable care to avoid doing each other injury. It was the duty of the defendant's servant to observe with ordinary care and diligence the movements of the vehicle in advance of him, as it was the duty of the plaintiff, in turning his horse and wagon about at that place, to observe with the same kind of care and watchfulness the presence. and movements of any vehicle in proximity to his. Ordinary care and caution, as mentioned in these instructions, mean that degree of care and caution which would reasonably be expected of an ordinarily prudent person in the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the alleged injury.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that the defendant's servant was guilty of negligence, and that this was the cause of the collision and injury. The burden of proof, therefore, is upon the plaintiff to prove the alleged negligence. Negligence is not to be imputed to the defendant's driver from the mere fact of the collision. The negligence or want of care must be proven, as any other fact in the case, and is not to be presumed.

The first question, then, is, was there negligence on the part of the defendant's servant? that is, was there, on his part, a want of such care and caution as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the circumstances which existed immediately preceding and at the time of the collision? And this question of alleged negligence or want of ordinary care must be determined by you in the light of the evidence. If you find that the collision was not occasioned by the fault or negligence of the defendant's driver, that, of course, will be the end of the case, for in that event the defendant will be entitled to your verdict. But if you find that the defendant's driver was negli

gent, then you will have to go a step further, and inquire whether the plaintiff's driver was or was not guilty of negligence, which proximately contributed to the accident; that is, was there on his part a want of ordinary care, which thus contributed to the injury. For, even though the defendant was guilty of negligence upon the occasion in question, yet if there was a want of ordinary care, however slight, on the part of the plaintiff which, as a proximate cause concurred with the defendant's negligence in causing the accident, the plaintiff cannot recover. And by proximate cause, or negligence which proximately contributed to the accident, is meant negligence occurring at the time of the event-negligence having immediate or present relation to the accident.

Now, gentlemen, the facts of this case you must determine upon the evidence. As I have indicated, the first question for your consideration is, was the defendant guilty of negligence which occasioned the alleged injury?

It is claimed by the plaintiff that the defendant's driver, before a collision was imminent, was inattentive to the movements of the vehicle in advance of him; that he drove on at the speed at which he had been going and made no effort to turn his horse to the right, or towards the curb, until a collision was unavoidable; that there was ample space between the plaintiff's wagon and the right margin of the street to pass, and that no effort to pass was made, until it was too late to do so without bringing the two wagons in contact.

On the part of the defendant it is insisted that the defendant's horse and wagon were proceeding at a moderate rate of speed, from 10 to 15 feet behind the vehicle of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff gave no indications that he intended to turn about, until the speed of the plaintiff's horse was suddenly stopped and the effort to turn was made; that the defendant's driver at once reined his horse to the right so as to pass the plaintiff's wagon; that the collision was occasioned by the management and movements of the plaintiff's horse and wagon; and that the defendant's driver exercised throughout the ordinary care which any reasonably prudent man would have exercised in such circumstances.

It is especially insisted by the defendant's counsel that no negligence is imputable to the defendant on account of anything that occurred prior to the moment when the plaintiff's driver began to turn his horse and wagon about, and that when, in consequence of that act, an emergency arose requiring instant action, the defendant's servant took such measures in the management of his horse, and to avoid the

collision, as his best judgment prompted; and if he then erred in judgment such error is not to be imputed to him as negligence. Upon that point the court instructs you that if it be true that there was no want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant's driver in driving his horse and vehicle up to the moment when the danger of a collision was imminent, and if, in the presence of such danger, the defendant's servant, exercising at the time ordinary prudence and skill, was compelled immediately to choose what course of action he would then take to avoid the danger, and did so in good faith, the mere fact that the result afterwards may have shown that his choice of a way of avoiding the collision was not the best, cannot properly be imputed to him as negligence. In other words, a mere error of judgment in such circumstances would not be negligence. I do not understand this to be disputed on the part of the plaintiff, but it is claimed that the defendant's servant was guilty of negligence in driving his horse, before any emergency arose requiring instant exercise of judgment and action, and that the emergency was brought about or created by such negligence, and hence that the defendant cannot be absolved from liability on the ground of error of judgment on the part of its driver.

Of course, if there was want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant's servant before the danger of a collision was imminent, and at a time when, by the exercise of such care, the collision could have been avoided, and the want of such care created or helped to create the emergency which afterwards arose, then the defendant could not be relieved of responsibility for its servant's original fault by the exercise of his best judgment in endeavoring to escape from the emergency after it was upon him. And you will notice that the proposition previously stated, that an error of judgment would not be imputable as negligence, is based on the assumption that, before danger was imminent, the defendant's servant was guilty of no negligence.

Now, taking up this question of the alleged negligence of the defendant's driver, you will consider it in the light of all the facts elicited by the testimony. If the alleged negligence is not proved, then, as I have said, there can be no recovery. If, on the contrary, you find that the defendant's driver was negligent, you will then proceed to inquire whether there was any want of care on the part of the plaintiff's driver which contributed proximately to the injury.

Upon this branch of the case it is claimed by the defendant that the plaintiff's driver, without giving any previous warning, suddenly