« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
the water, they should find this issue for the defendant. It is an undis. puted fact that the water flowing through the sewer along Eighteenth street from Walnut to Main, and down Main street, carries off a part of the surface drainage which formerly flowed across Main street, at or near the place of the location of the culvert. But it is contended that by virtue of the improvements along Eighteenth and Main streets an additional amount of water is discharged into this sewer, and that such additional water increased the flow of water into plaintiff's lot, and injury resulted therefrom. Regarding this additional flow of water, if such has been shown to exist, you are instructed that plaintiff has a right to recover such damage as has been done by it to his lot. It is the damage done by the water which may have been added by virtue of the sewer spoken of, and not for the whole water; in other words, if the sewer gathered other than surface water, and damages were done on account of such increase of water, plaintiff may recover such damages.
We now come to the injury which is claimed to have resulted from the discharge of nauseating and filthy water and deposits, affecting the rental value of the premises. Regarding this you are instructed that the City of Kansas, in the progress of constructing its sewerage, is not responsible for the bad smells of a sewer in course of its construction, unless kept open an unreasonable length of time. The reasonableness of the time is to be judged of by the circumstances testified to. If you shall find from the testimony that the sewer testified to was left an unreasonable time in the condition it was, and in consequence of the bad smells thereby created the plaintiff could not rent his house at what it was really worth, you will allow him the difference between the real rental value and the rent he received, and this for the length of time the sewer was left open and plaintiff sustained damages in consequence thereof. As to the washing away of the soil of plaintiff's lot you are instructed that if you shall find from the testimony that an increase of flowing water was caused by the sewer run into the culvert, and that such increase of water contributed to the washing away of the soil of plaintiff's lot, you will allow him such damages on that account as will compensate him for the restoration of the lot to the condition it would have been in had such additional flow of water not takon place.
In your verdict, if you find for the plaintiff, you will find the damages sustained on account of rental value and on account of damages to the lot separately, and then state the whole of the damages allowed. If you find the issues for the defendant, you will so state.
NAT. BANK OF CHESTER Co. v. COM'RS OF CHESTER Co. and others.
(Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. October 2, 1882.)
1. CONSTITUTION LAW_STATUTE-SUBJECT EXPRESSED IN TITLE-REPUBLICATION
OF ORIGINAL ACT IN AMENDMENT_TAXATION-NATIONAL BANK.
By section 17 of act of June 7, 1879, entitled "An act to provide revenue by taxation," the Pennsylvania legislature enacted that where any banks elected to pay a tax of six-tenths of 1 per cent. on the value of the shares, the shares, capital, and profits of the bank should be exempt from other taxation. By act of January 10, 1881, entitled "A supplement to an act entitled 'An act to provide revenue by taxation, approved June 7, 1879,'" the portion of the seventeenth section of that act containing the above provisions was re-enacted, with the exception that the exemption from taxation was confined to “so much of the capital and profits of such bank as shall not be invested in real estate.” The whole section was not re-enacted, and there were some immaterial verbal alterations in the part which was set out. Held, that the act of January 10, 1881, did not violate the constitutional provision that no bill should contain more than one subject, which should be clearly expressed in the title. Held, further, that it did not violate a constitutional provision that no law should be amended by reference to the title only, but so much thereof as was amended should be re-enacted and
published at length. 2. SAME-REPUGNANCY IN STATUTE.
It appeared that at the time of the passage of the act of 1881 the only national bank property taxable for local purposes was its real estate. Held, that this did not render the act void for repugnancy.
PER BRADLEY, J. To declare an act of assembly repugnant the repugnancy must appear upon its face, and must be in conflict with the main intent and ob. ject of the enactment.
Motion for injunction upon a bill in equity by the National Bank of Chester county, against the commissioners of Chester county, Pennsylvania, setting forth
(1) That the plaintiff is an association for carrying on ine business or banking, duly incorporated under 'he national bank act of June 3, 1864.
(2) That, under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of said state is exempt from local taxation, and is subject to a state tax of four mills on every dollar of the value thereof, annually, and the shares of state and national banks are taxed at the same rate.
(3) That the act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, approved June 7, 1879, entitled "An act to provide revenue by taxation,” in section 17 thereof, provides as follows:
* In case any bank or savings institution, incorporated by this state, or any national bank, elect to collect annually from the shareholders thereof a tax of six-tenths of 1 per centum upon the par value of all the shares of said bank or savings institution, and pay the same in the state treasury on or before the twentieth day of June in every year, the shares, *Reported by Frank P. Prichard, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.
capital, and profits of such bank shall be exempt from all other taxation under the laws of this commonwealth.'
(4) That the supreme court of Pennsylvania decided that, in the case of national banks paying the increased state tax, the exemption secured thereby extends to all local taxation whatever upon the real estate of such bank,
(5) That, shortly after the said decision of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, viz., January 10, 1881, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a certain other act, entitled “A supplement to an act entitled 'An act to provide rev. enue by taxation,' approved the seventh day of June, 1879,” the third section of which provides as follows:
“Sec. 3. In case any bank or savings institution, incorporated by this state or the United States, shall elect to collect annually from the shareholders thereof a tax of six-tenths of 1 per centum upon the par value of all the shares of said bank or savings institution, and pay the same into the state treasury on or before the first day of March in each year, the shares and so much of the capital and profits of such bank as shall not be invested in real estate, shall be exempt from all other taxation under the laws of this commonwealth."
(6) That, in February, 1882, the plaintiff paid to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for the year 1882, the sum of $1,350, being a tax of six mills upon the par value of all of the shares of the plaintiff's bank.
(7) That the plaintiff owns certain real estate in West Chester, Pennsylvania, on which the defendants have levied local taxes for the year 1882; that the third section of the act of June 10, 1881, is inoperative and void, for the following reasons: First, because the title to said act is in conflict with article 3, § 3, of the constitution of Pennsylvanią, which provides: “Sec. 3, No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title.” Second, because the third section of said act is in conflict with article 3, § 6, of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides as follows: “Sec. 6. No law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to the title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length,” in this: that said third section materially amends the provisions of section 17 of the act of June 7, 1879, (to which it is a supplement,) and fails to re-enact and publish at length so much of said act of June 7, 1879, as is thereby amended. Third, because said third section of the act of June 10, 1881, in so far as it attempts to make the real estate of national banks taxable for local purposes, is inoperative and void for repugnancy, in this: Under the act of congress of June 3, 1864, known as “The National Bank Act,” only the shares and real estate of national banks are taxable under the state laws. The shares are not taxable at any higher rate than “moneyed capital of indi. viduals.” Moneyed capital of individuals is in Pennsylvania exempt from local taxation, and was so exempt prior to the passage of the said acts of June 7, 1879, and June 10, 1881. At the time of the passage of the act of June 10, 1881, the only national bank property taxable for local purposes was its real estate. The saving clause of the third section of the act of June 10, 1881, excepted from the operation of said act the only property to which the exemption therein given could extend, to-wit, the real estate of national banks. Said exception or saving clause in the said third section of the said act of June 10, 1881, is thus void and inoperative, as being repugnant to the purview of said act.
The bill prayed for an injunction against the defendants from levying taxes for 1882 upon the plaintiff's real estate.
James W. M. Newlin, Wm. B. Waddell, and J. M. Gazzam, for plaintiff.
Samuel D. Ramsey and Thomas S. Butler, for county commissioners.
BRADLEY, Justice, (orally.) We have no doubt that the act of assembly of June 10, 1881, is constitutional. The title clearly expresses the purposes of the act; and the old law, as amended, is re-enacted at length in the supplemental act. Nor is the act repugnant. To declare an act of assembly repugnant, the repugnancy must appear upon its face, and must be in conflict with the main intent and object of the enactment. The bill is dismissed.
See Second Nat. Bank v. Caldwell, 13 FED. REP. 429, and note.
(Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. October 24, 1882.) 1. Customs DUTIES–MANUFACTURE OF MARBLE-PROFESSIONAL PRODUCTIONS OF
A STATUARY—SECTION 2504, Rev. St.
The “professional productions of a statuary or of a sculptor” include all the artistic work of a professional statuary or sculptor produced in the exercise of his profession, whether the creations of the artist or copies of the creations of
others. 2. SAME_RATES OF DUTIES.
Such importations are liable to a duty of 10 per centum ad valorem, and are not to be classed with “all manufactures of marble, not otherwise provided
for,” which are liable to a duty of 50 per centum ad valorem. Motion for Judgment upon Special Verdict. The jury found the following special verdict:
That during the years 1879 and 1880 the plaintiffs were partners, trading as Viti Brothers, and the defendant was, during said time, collector of customs for the port of Philadelphia; that between the thirteenth day of No
*Reported by Albert B. Guilbert, of the Philadelphia bar.
vember and the twentieth day of December, A. D. 1879, the plaintiffs imported into the port of Philadelphia six boxes containing statuary: One marked No. 1076, containing statues, two boys; one marked No. 1074, containing an angel sitting in the attitude of writing; one marked No. 1077, containing an angel standing in the attitude of praying; one marked No. 1078, containing a statue representing summer; one marked No. 1079, containing a statue representing autumn; one marked No. 1080, containing a statue representing winter.
3. That the statues of the two boys were taken out and sculptured from antique original models, and that the author of those models is unknown.
4. That the statues of the two angels were taken out and sculptured from original models made by the sculptor Achille de Cori, a pensioner of the government at Rome; that he is a professional sculptor, and as such enjoys a good reputation, and is known in Carrara as a professional sculptor, and won at the Royal Academy of Fine Arts of Carrara the prize of a government pension at Rome.
5. That the said three statues, representing summer, autumn, and winter, were taken out and sculptured from original models designed and executed by Carlo Nicoli, an honorary member of the Academy of Fine Arts at Carrara; that he studied sculpture in the Academy of Fine Arts there, and then in Florence and Rome; that he enjoys the best reputation as a professional sculptor, and is recognized in Carrara as a professional sculptor; that he obtained the prize of the government pension at Rome; that for his professional merits in sculpture he was decorated by the government of Spain; and that in open competition he won the prize of three years' government pension in the Academy of Fine Arts at Carrara, and is also an honorary member of the Academy of Fine Arts at Madrid, Spain, and Urbino, Italy, and obtained several prizes at the artistic exhibitions of Florence, Parma, and Madrid.
6. That all the said statues contained in the said six cases were executed in the studio of Pietro Salada, by Giovani Padula and Alessandre Gemignani professional sculptors, under the direction of the said Pietro Salada, and that the said Pietro Salada has been a professional sculptor in Carrara for the last 34 years.
7. That with the exception of the “Two Boys," which were executed from, antique originals, the other statues were sculptured for the first time from the originals expressly executed by the said De Cori and Nicoli, and were the first productions from said models.
8. That the cost of the “ Two Boys was 300 lire each, or 600 lire; and of the two angels 690 lire each; and of the three seasons 480 lire each.
9. That defendant, as said collector, exacted from said plaintiffs thereon duties as follows: 50 per cent. ad valorem; which duties were paid by the plaintiffs on the dates mentioned in the bill of particulars, to-wit, March 24, 1880.
10. That on February 8 and February 9, 1880, the plaintiffs made due pro test against the exaction of said duties, claiming that said marble statuary was dutiable at 10 per cent. ad valorem.
11. That plaintiffs made due appeal to the secretary of the treasury from said decision of said collector, who, on March 18, 1880, affirmed the said decis