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circuit courts of the United States by the act of March 3, 1875. The complainant has no case if the article 258 of the Louisiana constitution of 1879 has the force and effect that its terms import. The defendant, the St. Tammany Water-works Company, has no defense to the complainant's case unless article 258 of the Louisiana Constitution has the force and effect of repealing the exclusive features of complainant's charter. Said article undoubtedly has such force and effect, except in so far as it is in violation of the tenth section of article 1 of the constitution of the United States. Thus a question is at once raised as to the construction, force, and effect of an article of the federal constitution, and such question seems to be decisive of the issue between the parties.

The following propositions are declared by the supreme court to be now too firmly established to admit of or to require further discussion:

“That a case in law or equity consists of the right of one party as well as of the other, and may properly be said to arise under the constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either. That cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege or claim or protection or defense of the party in whole or in part by whom they are asserted. That except in the cases of which this court is given by the constitution original jurisdiction, the judicial power of the United States is to be exercised in its original or appellate form, or both, as the wisdom of congress may direct. That it is not sufficient to exclude the judicial power of the United States from a particular case that it involves questions which do not at all depend on the constitution or laws of the United States; but when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is within the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.” Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 141.

It would seem, then, that the court has jurisdiction and will be called on to proceed with this case-to determine all issues of law and fact that may

be raised therein. Ought an injunction to issue pending such determination? The showing made is to the effect that the proceedings of the defendants are very injurious to the complainant in depreciating its stock and bonds, and directly lowering, if not ruin. ing, its credit, in hindering and obstructing complainant in carrying on and carrying out the extensive works and improvements it is charged with by the legislature of the state. Whether this is being done rightfully or wrongfully is the real issue in the case. The

prima facie showing is against its being rightfully done, and therefore there is a prima facie showing for the issuance of an injunction.

The learned counsel who have appeared for the St. Tammany Water-works Company have very ably and learnedly urged that the question of supplying the inhabitants of a great city with water was one arising under, and under the control of, the police power, and therefore could not be the subject of a contract within the protection of the federal constitution. This proposition may be taken for granted, so far as this case is concerned at this time, and yet not affect the matter before the court. There is no suggestion in this record that the police power of the state has been directed against the complainant, or that any portion of it has been delegated to the St. Tammany Water-works Company. So far as this record shows, or the court is advised, the last exercise of the police power of the state in relation to the supplying of water to the inhabitants of the city of New Orleans was when the sovereign in the state clothed the complainant with the powers, privileges, rights, and duties it is now asking the court to protect. Certainly it cannot be pretended that the last clause of article 258 of the state constitution has delegated anything in the way of inaugurating and maintaining public waterworks in the city of New Orleans to the defendants.

In the Slaughter-house Case, decided at the November term of this court in 1881, reported in 9 Fed. REP. 743,-a case identical in prin. ciple with this,—there had been a delegation of power to regulate slaughter-houses, etc., to the city authorities, (see article 248 of the Louisiana constitution of 1879,) and the city authorities had acted in the premises. In that case the same authorities (Beer Co. v. Mass. 97 U. S. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, Id. 677; Stone v. Miss. 101 U. S. 814) as are cited here were examined, and their inapplicability shown, and both the circuit judge and district judge, in separate opinions, decided in favor of the jurisdiction and of granting an injunction.

I am still disposed to adhere to that decision, and I regard the case under consideration as equally strong on the question of jurisdiction and much stronger on the facts. And here I desire to remark that there seems to me to be a great misapprehension as to the force and effect and proper exercise of the police power of a state. Its power and far-reaching effect may perhaps not be measured by general rules and definitions, and each case as it arises may have to be determined on its own particular facts and circumstances.

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It seems, however, to be clear to me that regulations pertaining to the public health, manners, and morals come within its jurisdiction, and that, therefore, whenever any business, occupation, rights, franchises, or privileges become obnoxious to the public health, manners, or morals, they may be regulated even to suppression, individual rights being compelled to give way for the benefit of the whole body politic.

It seems equally clear to me that when, in the exercise of the police power, private property, or private or vested rights, must be taken for public use in order to carry out, or allow to be carried out, improvements and regulations, or to carry on business or occupations, or schemes of public works, looking to the amelioration and benefit of the public health, manners, or morals, such private property or private rights of property must be entitled to the protection given by the constitution of the United States declaring, “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation,” (see U. S. Const. Fifth Amend.,) and by articles 155 and 156 of the constitution of Louisiana, declaring

Art. 155. “No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be passed, nor vested rights be divested, unless for purposes of public utility, and for adequate compensation previously made."

Art. 156. “Private property shall not be taken nor damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.”

All property of corporations or individuals is owned subject to the proper exercise of the police power. If my lot of ground is needed for a public hospital or jail, no doubt I am entitled to compensation before it can be taken from me. If my vested rights are needed to supply the city of New Orleans with pure water, must I not likewise be compensated ?

The arguments usually addressed to the courts in cases like the one under consideration are generally based on the assumption that the sovereign, in exercising the police power of the state, is absolutely unfettered with regard to all the rights of individuals and all the rights of property. I am not prepared to take this advanced ground, und therefore, having jurisdiction, I feel compelled to enjoin the St. Tammany Water-works Company from further proceedings necessarily resulting in the confiscation or appropriation without compensation of the vested rights of the New Orleans Water-works Company:

So far as the city of New Orleans is concerned, although the city attorney has entered an appearance for her, no steps have been taken in her behalf as against complainant, and a decree pro confesso has been entered. Although from the showing made by complainant it would seem probable that some members of the city council are disposed to act with the St. Tammany Water-works Company in depreciating the stock and bonds of complainant, and in hindering the performance of the works and duties devolving on complainant, yet it hardly seems probable that such adverse action can be secured from the city government. Considering the very large interest the city owns directly in the stock and property of the New Orleans Waterworks Company, and particularly in view of the fact that as the city of New Orleans is the vendor and warrantor of the property, rights, and privileges she transferred to the water-works company, and was and is the chief beneficiary in the financial schemes provided by the legislature by which she was relieved of an oppressive bonded debt, any successful adverse action on her part would subject her, in equity and good conscience, to the payment of every dollar of the original "water-works bonded debt," and perhaps also to the payment of all the bonds and paid stock of the water-works company.

It would thus seem that in this controversy both individual interest and good faith would control the city's action. At all events, the restraint by injunction of the legislative action of a corporation is of doubtful propriety, and I am indisposed to grant such order; particularly so when complainant will lose no substantial advantage thereby, as an injunction can readily issue as soon as legislation takes any form susceptible of execution. That any rights of the defendant the St. Tammany Water-works Company may be saved, the complainant will give adequate security,

Let an injunction issue as prayed for against the St. Tammany Water-works Company, on complainant's giving bond in the sum of $20,000, with good and solvent security, conditioned to repay all damages resulting to the defendants from the issuance of said injunction, should it be hereafter determined in this court, or on appeal, that said injunction was wrongfully or improvidently issued.,

JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT Court. For the judicial power to extend to a violation of the constitution, it must be a case in law or in equity.(a) It is the final arbiter of constitutional construction, and may receive from the legislature the power to construe every constitutional law.(b) The act must be clearly subversive of the constitution,(c)--a clear violation,(d)--and the objec

(a) Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264. See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 133.

(6) Van Horne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304 ; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cuhens v. Virginia, 6

Whent. 264 ; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 526; S.
C. 3 Wis. 1; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247,

(c) Turner v. Athans, 6 Neb. 51.

(a) Central C. R.Co. v. Twenty-third St. R. Co. 54 How. Pr. 162; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178.

tion must not be doubtful.(e) It extends over statutes, whether passed by a state legislature or by congress, which are claimed to be in contravention of the constitution of the United States. (f) So the circuit court has jurisdiction of a suit arising under a state law violating the obligations of a contract;(9) but not to statutes claimed to be void under a state constitution.(h)

VESTED RIGHTS. A right is vested when it has already become a title, legal or equitable,(i) and the legislature has no power to divest titles(j) or legal or equitable rights previously vested,(k) nor to vest them in another. (1) Even if rights have grown up under a law of somewhat ambiguous meaning, the legislature cannot interfere with them;(m) but a statute is not objectionable because it purports to operate on prior, contingent, or qualified rights.(n) So, if an act of the legislature is within the legislative power, it is not a valid objection to it that it divests vested rights. Such an act is not within the constitutional prohibition, however repugnant it may be to the principles of sound legislation.(0) If a right be impaired by a subsequent statute, the law is void;(P) but the repeal of a statute before a party has taken all the steps neceasary to give him a right under it, does not impair the right.(q) A corporation may be private, and yet the charter may contain provisions of a purely public character.(r) An act which impairs the charter by enlarging the powers of the state over the body corporate, or by abridging the franchise, or by altering the charter, is void.(s) The legislature may make a failure to comply with police regulatious a ground for forfeiture of a charter, (t) and the provisions of its charter cannot exempt it or its officers from regulations made in the exercise of police powers of a state;(u) but it cannot subject a corporation to forfeiture of its franchise for any cause not sufficient when such corporation was created.(o)

POLICE POWERS OF STATE. The police powers comprehend all those general laws of internal regulation necessary to secure peace, good order, health, and the comfort of society.(w) It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, morals, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property in the state.(x) Congress cannot legislate on the internal police of a state;(y) the power of the state over police regulations being supreme.(z)

(e) U. 8. v. Jackson, 8 Sawy. 62; People v. Brinkerhoff, 68 N. Y. 259.

Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 399; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 625.

(g) State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Wood, 222

(n) Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 399.
(i) Richardson v. Aiken, 87 III. 138.
(j) Helm v. Webster, 85 III. 113.

(k) Bunn v. Morrison, 5 Ark. 217 ; Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 489.

(1) Koenig v. Omaha, etc., R. Co. 3 Neb. 383.
(m) McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213.
(n) Clarke v. McCreary, 40 Miss. 317.
(0) Lane v. Nelson, 79 Pa. St. 407.

(p) Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 ; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Von Hoffnan v. Quincy, 4 Wall, 535.

(@) Van Horne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304 ; Mobile R. Co. v. State, 29 Ala, 573; Brinstield v. Carter,

2 Ga. 143; Wise v. Rogers, 24 Gratt. 169; Hunts. man v. Randolph, 5 Hayw. 263; State v. Gray, 4 Wis. 330.

() Regents v. Williams, 9 Gill, & J. 365.

(8) Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Houst. 506; Commercial Bank v. State, 14 Miss. 439.

() State v.S. P. R. Co. 24 Tex. 80.
(u) Cummings v. Spannhorst, 5 Mo. Ct. Ap. 21
(v) State v. Tombeck bee Bank, 2 Stew. 30.

(2) Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279; Philadel. phia, eto., R. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Houst. 506; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25.

(1) Mann v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 147 ; Toledo, etc., Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 III. 37 ; Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279; Davis v. Central R. Co. 17 Ga, 323.

(y) Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203; U. 8. v. De Witt, 9 Wall. 41; Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 56).

(z) Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 62; Barte. meyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 138.

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