basis that the disputed charges were at the time acknowledged by the La Crosse bank.

Sutor was formerly connected with the City National Bank of Chicago. He went to La Crosse and became the cashier of the First National Bank of that place, and remained in that position some time; and the result was that he obtained the control of that bank and subsequently became president. There may have been some circumstances which enabled the president of the City National Bank, who held that position up to January, 1874, to know that Mr. Sutor was not a man of very large means, and that he would not have resources enough of his own to obtain control of that bank; but admitting that to be so, the question is whether there were facts known to authorize the officers of the bank here to conclude that at the time these various transactions took place, which are the subject of controversy, there was a fraud practiced upon the bank of La Crosse by Mr. Sutor. Fraud is not to be presumed. It must be proved. It is sufficient, of course, if it is proved by circumstances, which are sometimes the most satisfactory evidence to establish fraud.

Mr. Sutor owed the bank here for a loan that had been made. He had executed his note for the amount, ($7,000,) and when he became president of the bank at La Crosse he gave instructions to the bank here to charge the sum of $2,000 to the La Crosse bank, and it was done; and he stated at the same time that he gave these instructions that the balance of the amount which he personally owed, which, I take it for granted, referred to the note for $7,000 which he had given, would soon be paid, and accordingly instructions were subsequently given to charge to the La Crosse bank the $5,000 which was still due upon the note, and it was so charged. Besides this, which constitutes the main controversy in the case, it seems that a transaction took place between Mr. Sutor and Mr. Miner, the cashier of the City Bank, by which the former purchased of the latter some real estate in Chicago or its vicinity, upon which Mr. Miner owed a balance evidenced by note, and this note Mr. Sutor had agreed to pay. That accordingly was taken up when it became due by Mr. Sutor in the same way, namely, by instructions to charge the amount to the La Crosse National Bank. If that were all there was in these transactions, it might be contended with some plausibility on the part of the plaintiff that it was not liable for the charges that were made by the City National Bank. But that is not all. Accounts were made out from time to time and transmitted to the La Crosse National Bank, in which were included the charges which are the subject of

controversy, and made against the La Crosse bank by the City National Bank, and entered as payment pro tanto on the amount due from the Chicago bank to the La Crosse bank for deposits made, by the latter from time to time. The receipt of these accounts was acknowledged by the La Crosse bank as they were forwarded, and it was then stated that the accounts conformed to the books of the La Crosse bank, although it turned out that, in fact, they did not so conform, which fact, however, was unknown to the Chicago bank. One of the notes, it seems, was transmitted to Mr. Sutor-the note which he was to pay for Miner. There is no evidence what became of the other note, but the facts prove the existence of the note given by Sutor to the bank here, and its payment in the way stated, viz., in consequence of instructions from the president of the La Crosse

bank.

In relation to the checks given in Chicago by Mr. Sutor as president of the bank, it is true that the general business of an officer of a national bank is to be transacted at its regular place of business. At the same time we know that, in the course of business between banks, occasionally officers of banks do give orders and instructions away from the place of business of the bank. And if they are within the general scope and authority conferred upon the officers, they may be binding upon the bank. But all accounts of this kind were included in those transmitted to the La Crosse National Bank. What security can there be in the business relations between banks if accounts of this kind are not considered conclusive and binding upon the respective banks, unless, indeed, there is a mistake, or it can be shown that there has been a fraud practiced upon the bank against which the charges are made, and that fraud known to the other bank or its officers? Unless that can be done, there would be. no safety in the transactions of banks with each other, One bank would never know what to do on instructions given, or a charge made. Here is an "individual" account which one bank has against a particular person. Another bank with which it is transacting business, and with which it has an account, instructs that bank to charge this individual indebtedness to it. The charge is made and the account rendered showing it is done, and the bank which makes the charge knows nothing of any wrong being done, or of any mistake, or of any fraud being practiced by the officers of the bank. That being so, it must foreclose the bank, or else banks must cease doing business with each other. And it ought to be so. Where a bank, established under an act of congress, or any other way, elects its own offi

cers, the men who are interested in the bank-the stockholders, the depositors-ought to be bound by the authorized acts of the officers, or those which appear to be authorized, whether they are or not, and by the general mercantile usage of banks. So that, in any view that I can take of this case, it seems to me that the plaintiff cannot maintain its action; that it must be concluded by the course of the business which has been done. Non constat but that, admitting all that is claimed on the part of the plaintiff, Mr. Sutor may have presumptively made some arrangement justifying his action with his own bank. The natural presumption that would arise in the minds of the officers of the city bank was that Mr. Sutor had made some transactions with the La Crosse bank by which he was authorized to act, and by which the La Crosse bank had assumed the individual debt which Sutor owed to the City National Bank. If the defendant insists, the court must certify to the balance due from the La Crosse bank to the city bank, because I hold that these items of account which are the subject of controversy constitute a valid charge against the La Crosse National Bank.

This is a controversy between the creditors of two insolvent banks, and I think the loss occasioned by the wrong of the officers of the La Crosse bank should fall on the creditors of that bank, rather than on those of the Chicago bank.

In re WALL.

(Circuit Court, S. D. Florida. March, 1882.1

1. ATTORNEY AT LAW-DISBARRING.

An attorney may be disbarred for participation in an unlawful, tumultuous, and riotous gathering, and advising, encouraging thereto, and taking from the jail therewith and hanging a prisoner, although no complaint under oath has been filed against him; and he would be liable for the offense charged against him by indictment in the state court, though no such indictment has as yet been fonnd. 2. SAME.

An attorney is an officer of the court, admitted to practice under its rules. amenable to it, and liable to have such relations sundered upon satisfactory evidence of dishonest professional conduct, habits of general immorality, or any such single act of crime or vice as may show him unfitted for the trusts and confidence reposed in him as such attorney.

3. SAME-NOTICE OF CHARGES.

While an attorney is entitled to notice of the charges preferred against him, and an opportunity to answer before being disbarred, such notice is sufficient if it clearly intimates the misconduct with which he is charged.

LOCKE, D. J. It has been charged that the defendant, J. B. Wall, an attorney of this court, did, with an unlawful, tumultous, and riotous gathering, he advising and encouraging thereto, take from the jail of this county and hang a man, to the court known only as John. To this charge he has filed an answer, demurring to the action of the court because-First, no complaint under oath has been filed; and, secondly, because he has been charged with an indictable offense, of which this court has no jurisdiction before indictment and conviction; and denying that he counseled, advised, encouraged, or incited an unlawful, tumultuous, and riotous gathering or mob to take one John from the jail and cause his death by hanging. The offense in which Mr. Wall is charged to have participated came to the personal knowledge of the court. As the judge was leaving the court-house for dinner, a prisoner was brought into the yard in custody of officers. Upon his return in the afternoon the dead body of the same person hung in a tree directly in front of the court-house door. No legal execution had taken place. The evidence shows that a person, whose name has not appeared, was taken from the jail, and, in the immedate vicinity of the court-house, hung to the limb of a tree; that said J. B. Wall was present, went with several others to the sheriff's house, returned thence to the jail, where they took therefrom the prisoner; that he walked in immediate proximity to him in going to the tree, so along beside him that the witness thinks he had hold of him, and was then lost to sight in the crowd until after the man was hanged.

This is an action to determine the right of an attorney to retain his position as an officer of this court, and as such is instituted by it for its own protection, and the preservation of its integrity through the characters of its officers, and does not require the intervention of a third party by affidavit or otherwise.

No court is bound to await the complaint of a third party before investigating any matter touching misconduct of its officers, when information considered sufficient is received, and the circumstances demand its interposition. Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 540.

An attorney is an officer of the court admitted to practice under its rules, amenable to it, and liable to have such relations sundered. upon satisfactory evidence of dishonest professional conduct, habits of general immorality, or any such single act of crime or vice as may show him unfitted for the trusts and confidence reposed in him as such. Percy's Case, 36 N. Y. 651; Hawk. P. C. 212; Bryant's Case, 24 N. H. 155; Ex parte Brownsal, 2 Cowper, 829; 12 Geo. I. c. 29; 4 Henry IV. c. 18; Case of Austin, 5 Rawle, 204; McLaughlin v. Dist.

Court, 5 Watts & S. 272; Dickens' Case, 67 Pa. St. 169; Mill's Case, 1 Mich. 392; Potter's Case, H. 26 G. 3 K. B. He has a right to an opportunity to appear and answer in his own behalf before a final judgment against him; but any notice, rule, or summons does not require the technical nicety in its allegations, nor the exactness of proof, of a criminal proceeding. Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140; Leigh's Case, 1 Munf. 481.

It is sufficient if the grounds are so set out as to give him knowledge of the matter with which he is charged, so that he may not be misled, and the true facts ascertained upon such investigation may be considered and decided upon. Randall v. Brigham, supra. It is true that the English courts have in some instances declined to take summary action against attorneys for indictable offenses unless conviction has first been had, but such practice seems to have been considered as within the discretion of the court at the time and not as a rule. Lord Denman remarks, in 3 Nev. & P. 389: "Would not an indictment for perjury lie upon these facts? We are not in the habit of interfering in such a case, unless there is something amounting to an admission on the part of the attorney which would render the interposition of a jury unnecessary." Also, in 5 Barn. & Ald. 1088, he remarks: "It is not usual to grant the rule if an indictable offense is charged." Yet, notwithstanding a conviction, the question of guilt or innocence seems to have been deemed within the discretion of the court, as in Dowl. P. C. 110, although verdict had been found against the defendant, the judges still considered there might have been some doubt and refused the rule; and in King v. Southerton, 6 East, 127, nothwithstanding the defense was urged that the defendant had been convicted of an offense not cognizable by law, Lord Ellenborough remarked that "enough appeared to satisfy the court that the defendant was an improper person to remain an attorney."

While such may have been the practice in the courts of England, it has not been accepted by American courts; Anon. N. J. Law, 163, being the only case found when judgment has been refused on that ground. On the contrary, in Re Hirst & Ingersoll, 9 Phila. 216, although the court, in the motion to disbar, say that "the offense charged-subornation of perjury and conspiracy against justice-is within reach of an indictment," they make the rule absolute dismissing one party and suspending the other during the existence of the court.