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tract (No. 3) sold nominally to Church; but the whole transaction touching the real estate was not closed until the execution of the conveyances by the defendant to Moyer, and by the latter to the bankrupt on March 11, 1878, presumptively at the same time when the warrant to confess judgment was delivered to the defendant. The case, then, is this : At the conclusion of the real estate transaction, the bankrupt, by means of the defendant's deeds for the tracts knocked down to Moyer, completes his title to Alexander Penny's real estate, and simultaneously gives his warrant of attorney to confess judgment in favor of the defendant,-a judgment which unquestionably was available as a security to such of the unpaid legatees of Alexander Penny as are named in the defendant's written agreement already quoted at large. The assignee in bankruptcy succeeds to this real estate, converts it into money, and proposes to hold on to the proceeds, and yet asks the court to strike down the judgment. If there is any equity in this demand I confess it is not apparent

to me.

But, furthermore, I think the defendant takes an impregnable position when he claims that he was invested with the equitable right of subrogation to the assured lien which the legatees have acquired against the real estate of the bankrupt by the filing and docketing in the court of common pleas of the transcript from the orphans' court, and shows that the confessed judgment in the main represents and secures the same debt. Why may it not well stand as a valid cumulative security to the defendant, as claimed by him? Clearly, in so far as it is a mere cumulative security, the confessed judgment contravenes no provision of the bankrupt law, for it takes nothing from the creditors, and impairs not the value of the bankrupt's estate. Sawyer v. Turpin, 91 U. S. 114; Stewart v. Platt, 101 U. S. 731.

But the defendant's right of subrogation is stoutly denied, and the plaintiff produces authorities to show that, as between principal and debtor jointly liable, there can be no subrogation. Mehaffy v. Share, 2 Pen. & W. 361; Griener's Appeal, 2 Watts, 414; Singizer's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 524. But Watson's Appeal, 90 Pa. St. 426, proves that the above proposition is not universally true. There it was held that joint obligors in bonds secured by mortgage are entitled, as against each other, to subrogation. And in Lidderdale v. Robinson, 12 Wheat. 594, it was decided that the principle of substitution is not confined to cases arising between surety and principal, but applies as between CO-sureties. Hence, one of two joint sureties, having paid the whole debt, has been permitted to enter judgment on their obligation in the

inter se.

name of the creditor, and have execution therein against his co-sureties for his proportion. Wright v. Grover & Baker S. M. Co. 82 Pa. St. 80.

Charles Penny and John A. Gundy, however, did not stand simply in the relation of joint debtors. Doubtless they had become jointly liable to the legatees for the entire balance of $9,097.02, but as between themselves they were jointly liable. Their account upon its face showed that of this balance but $2,493.82 had actually come into Gundy's hands, and that Charles Penny was personally answerable for $6,603.19. These sums were the measure of their liability

Of the balance due the legatees, Charles Penny, in good conscience, was bound to pay the last-mentioned sum, and to indemnify Gundy from liability therefor. Unquestionably, as between the executors, Penny was under a superior obligation to pay that amount. Why, then, was not Gundy entitled to subrogation in respect to the lien entered in the common pleas upon the certificate from the orphans' court? It is true, he did not stand strictly in the relation of a surety to Penny, but for the purposes of a subrogation he had the equitable right of a surety. Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. St. 325.

“The familiar doctrine of subrogation,” says Mr. Justice Strong, in McCormick's Adm'r v. Irwin, 35 Pa. St. 117, "is that when one has been compelled to pay a debt which ought to have been paid by another, he is entitled to a cession of all the remedies which the creditor possessed against that other. To the creditor both may have been equally liable; but if, as between themselves, there is a superior obligation resting on one to pay the debt, the other, after paying it, may use the creditor's security to obtain reimbursement." It was therefore held in Scott's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 173, that a partner who goes out of a partnership, and for a valuable consideration is indemnified by his partners against all debts of the firm, is entitled to subrogation to a judgment obtained against the firm and paid by him, for which, under the agreement of indemnity, he was not liable as between himself and partners.

The assignee, whose position is simply that of the bankrupt himself, has no countervailing equities to defeat the defendant's right of subrogation. The legatees have either been paid or are secured, and they do not gainsay the defendant's equitable right. I do not see that he has done anything to mislead other creditors, or of which they have any just reason to complain. Nor can laches fairly be imputed to him. It was, indeed, urged at the argument that he had not fully complied with the terms of his agreement of March 11,

1878. But to this suggestion there are several answers. Nothing of the kind is alleged in the bill, and the evidence was not directed to the inquiry whether the defendant was thus in default, and the facts in this regard are not sufficiently clear. But if in default, it is not shown that the bankrupt or his estate has sustained any injury thereby; and, finally, the appropriate remedy for such injury is an action at law.

Upon the whole I have reached the conclusion that the substantial justice of the case is with the defendant, and that the plaintiff has failed to establish any ground for equitable relief. This court, sitting in bankruptcy, will, of course, see to it that the defendant makes no inequitable use of his cumulative securities.

Let a decree be drawn dismissing the plaintiff's bill, with costs, to be paid out of the bankrupt's estate.

ROGERS V. MARSHALL and others.

(Circuit Court, D. Colorado. 1882.)

1. ATTORNEY AND. CLIENT-PURCHASE OF PROPERTY IN LITIGATION.

An attorney at law cannot purchase from his client the subject-matter of litigation in which he is employed and acting, if, as a part of his negotiations for the purchase, he advises his client as to the probable outcome of the litiga

tion, and its effect upon the value of the property he is seeking to purchase. 2. PLEADING--ALLEGATIONS—TO BE PROVED.

In cases where the answer neither admits nor denies some of the material

allegations of the bill, they must be proved upon the final hearing. 3. REHEARING-APPLICATION, WHEN DENIED.

An application for a rehearing, upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence, where the affidavits filed in support of the motion show that the newlydiscovered evidence is merely cumulative, will be denied.

Luther S. Dixon and W. B. Felker, for complainant.

John F. Dillon, J. B. Henderson, Geo. W. Kretzinger, and N. A. Cowdrey, for respondents.

McCRARY, C. J. This important case has been exhaustively reargued by eminent counsel upon a petition for rehearing, based (1) upon the record as it stood at the former hearing, and (2) upon alleged newly-discovered evidence. The questions raised, some of them now for the first time, have been carefully considered, and the conclusions reached are as follows;

1. On the former hearing it was held, as will be seen by the opinion then announced, that an attorney at law cannot purchase from his client the subject-matter of litigation in which he is employed and acting, if, as a part of his negotiations for the purchase, he advises his client as to the probable outcome of the litigation, and its effect upon the value of the property he is seeking to purchase. Counsel for respondents, both upon the former hearing and upon the reargument, have insisted that such is not the law, and that if under such circumstances the attorney can show that he gave honest and sound advice concerning the pending litigation, and otherwise discharged the duties imposed upon him by fully disclosing all his knowledge of the value, etc., the sale is valid. There are certainly some respectable authorities holding that a purchase by an attorney from his client of the subject matter of the litigation pendente lite is void not only for champerty, but also on grounds of public policy. West v. Raymond, 21 Ind. 305; 4 Kent, Comm. (10th Ed.) 530; Simpson v. Lamb, 17 Com. B. 306; Hall v. Hallett, 1 Cox. 134; Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 120. I will assume, however, (without deciding,) that the rule is the other way, and that an attorney may purchase from his client the subject-matter of the suit in which he is employed and acting, provided before the negotiations are opened the relation of attorney and client is ended, or at least for the time being suspended, and the client placed in a position to deal with the attorney upon terms of perfect equality. It may be conceded that such is the rule, and still the doctrine heretofore announced in this case may be perfectly sound.

According to all the authorities, it is, at all events, clear that in order to uphold such a transaction the client must be placed in a position such as to enable him to deal with the attorney at arm's length, and upon terms of perfect equality. The relation of attorney and client must be, so far as the transaction of purchase and sale is concerned, dissolved and ended. In that transaction the attorney cannot act as such. If it becomes necessary or desirable for the client to be advised as to the nature of the pending litigation, and the danger to his title to be apprehended therefrom, as a means of determining the question of selling or of fixing the price, the attorney must decline to give him advice upon those points, and the client must employ other counsel, or act upon his own judgment. There is a plain and necessary distinction between the right of the attorney under such circumstances to give the client information touching the value of the property in the market, and his right to advise him upon

the legal questions involved in the pending litigation. As to the former he and his client may be equally well advised, and when they are so advised they may stand on an equality and at arm's length; but as to the latter this is not so. The questions of law presented by a litigation in which the attorney has been employed are matters within his peculiar knowledge; he deals with them as an expert; they are frequently questions of a technical, and always a professional, character. They are often questions which go to the very root and marrow of the inquiry which the seller must make in determining the price at which he will sell. This is well illustrated by the present case, since it appears that Marshall, the attorney, was defending for the complainant and others certain suits involving the validity of her title, and which, if decided adversely to her, would have destroyed every vestige of her property in the mine. It follows, therefore, that to decide the question whether these suits were well grounded, or whether there was danger of a decision therein adverse to complainant, was to decide upon the question of the value of complainant's interest. To allow Marshall to advise her or her agent upon this question was to enable him to influence materially the fixing of the value of the property while negotiating for its purchase. The law will not permit an attorney to deal with his client in this way. Such dealing is manifestly against the policy of the law—as much so as a purchase by a guardian from his ward, or that of a trustee froin his cestui que trust. Such transactions are not held to be void upon the ground of intentional fraud, or proven bad faith, but because the relations of the parties are such that the one may make use of his position of power and influence over the other, or of his superior knowledge derived while in the employment of the other, to take an unfair advantage of him. The law, upon grounds of high public policy, seeks to destroy the temptation to abuse such opportuni i 's, and therefore does not inquire whether the transaction was fraudulent or not. In such a case the attorney, by continuing to advise the client about the pending litigation, while at the same time negotiat. ing for the purchase of the property in controversy in such litigation, confounds his position as attorney with that of purchaser, and, however honest he may be, the purchase is not permitted in any case.

“The general interests of justice requiring it to be destroyed in every instance, and no court is equal to the examination and ascertainment of the truth in much the greater number of cases.Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow.

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