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could lessen her speed when she encountered a fog; and, in a place near the coast, much frequented by vessels, it was her duty to do so. Sailing vessels were condemned for going too fast in the following cases: The Juliet Erskine, 6 Notes Cas. Adm. & Ecc. 633; The Virgil, 2 Wm. Rob. 201; The Pepperell, Swab. 12.

Lowndes, in his treatise on the Admiralty Law of Collisions, says, at page 73, after speaking of steamers: "The same principles are, of course, applicable to sailing vessels." He cites two of the foregoing cases, and The Girolamo, 3 Hagg. 169.

The sailing rules, which were identical in the chief maritime countries, required steam-ships to go at a moderate speed in a fog, and said nothing about sailing vessels, which may have led their owners to suppose that they were relieved from this obligation. But this law was not intended to change the rules of seamanship, excepting where the statute differed from or added to those rules; and we find by the dicta in certain cases in the supreme court that in places like this channel off Cape Cod sailing ships should not carry a "press of sail," which means that they shall go at a moderate speed; for the amount of sail which would be a "press" must depend upon the amount of wind, and the consequent rate of progress. See The Morning Light, 2 Wall. 550; The Colorado, 91 U. S. 962. The revised sailing rules of 1879, in England, provide, (article 13 :) "Every ship, whether a sailing ship or a steam-ship, shall, in a fog, mist, or falling snow, go at a moderate speed." 4 Prob. Div. 247. This article puts sailing ships on the same footing as steam-ships, on the open ocean as well as in channels and frequented places. We hold that a steamer is bound, in all places, to go at moderate speed in a fog, and that a sailing vessel is bound to do so in such a place as this. The neglect to show a torch, and the act of crossing the bows of the steamer, are excused by the libelants on the ground of want of time, and the suddenness of the emergency. The lights of the steam-ship were much larger and higher than those of the bark, and could be seen sooner from the bark than her lights could be seen from the steamer. We are not sure that there was not time to show a torch, as required by Rev. St. § 4234. There is some reason to believe that the lookout did not report the light as a mast-head light, as he should have done, and that the mate was not at first aware that the vessel was a steamer. There was time for the bark to cross the bows of the steamer, and it can hardly be that this could take less time than the simple lighting of a torch, if one were ready. Supposing, however, that the sailing vessel cannot be blamed, it is

necessary, in order to a recovery, that some fault should be attached to the steamer. Two faults are found with her by the libelants:

1. That there was only one lookout forward. Cases are cited in which it is said to be usual for large ocean steamers to have two lookouts. Chamberlain v. Ward, 21 How. 548; The Colorado, 91 U. /S. 692. But these declarations constitute no part of the matter in judgment in those cases. The maritime law has not declared that one man forward may not be enough; and in this case, where, besides such a man, there were two persons on watch in the pilot-house, we hold that the lookout was sufficient.

2. The rate of speed. The phrase so often quoted from the decision in The Batavia, 9 Moore, P. C. 286, that the rate of speed in every case should be so moderate as to enable a steamer to do what the law requires her to do, cannot be taken literally. A fog may be so dense that a collision will take place when neither party is in fault. Some persons have understood that in such a state of the weather the steamer must lie to or anchor; and it was so argued in this case; and such is the necessary result of a literal interpretation of the dicta in some cases. It may be that a ship of any kind will be responsible for moving from one dock to another, or for beginning a voyage, in a dense fog, (see The Borussia, Swab. 94; The Girolamo, 3 Hagg. 169;) and so if the vessel had arrived at a usual anchorage and persisted in going further; but the fog in this case came on after the bark had left Vineyard Haven, and after the steamer had left Boston, and it is as certain that they were not required to lie to or anchor, as that "a moderate speed" does not mean no speed at all.

The Colorado, 1 Brown, Adm. 393, (91 U..S. 692,) is relied on by the libelants. There the sailing vessel had diminished her speed when the weather became thick from five or six knots to four; the steamer had but three men on deck, and the lookout was obliged to run to the wheel, though after he had reported the light; the speed of the propeller is found by Mr. Justice Clifford to have been five or six knots. A careful study of that case has shown us that the sailing vessel had taken every precaution possible, and that the propeller was condemned for the whole of her conduct taken together, rather than for any definite single fault.

Granting that a steamer should go as slowly as is reasonably possible, we think that this steamer did not exceed that rate. We are of opinion that the collision was caused by the acts and neglects of those who were navigating the bark, and that if they were excusable, which we do not think they were, the collision was without fault by

either party. This is the judgment of Mr. Justice Harlan and the circuit judge, and is to be entered as of a time before Mr. Justice Gray was assigned to this circuit.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

Receiver-Appointment-Railroad Mortgage.

HAMMOCK V. FARMERS' LOAN & T. Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1881. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Illinois. The decision of the United States supreme court was rendered on April 24, 1882. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court affirming the decree appealed from.

In Illinois, a judge has no authority to appoint a receiver of a railroad corporation in vacation; such authority is to be exercised by the court while in session. Punctuation is no part of a statute. Courts, in construing statutes or deeds, should read them with such stops as will give effect to the whole. We are not prepared to hold that the power of a judge in vacation to exercise the important judicial function of appointing a receiver of a corporation, charged with public functions, was conferred by the introduction of a comma in the revised statute of a state, where the established doctrine is that no judicial functions can be exercised by a judge in vacation except where expressly or especially authorized by statutes. Where the circuit court of the United States had lawfully acquired possession of property prior to any action in reference to it by the state court, the former had the right to retain possession, for all the purposes of the suit, for foreclosure of the mortgage thereon. The provisions of the statutes of Illinois giving the right to redeem as well lands or tenements sold under execution, as mortgaged lands sold under decrees of courts of equity, has no application to the real estate of a railroad corporation which, with its franchises and personal property, is mortgaged as an entirety, to secure the payment of money borrowed for railroad purposes. Its property, real and personal, and its franchises, should be sold as an entirety, and without right of redemption in the mortgageor, or in judgment creditors, as to the real estate. A railroad mortgage security, so far as the personalty of the corporation is concerned, is not embraced in the statutes of Illinois relating to chattel mortgages.

J. K. Edsall, for appellants.

R. E. Williams, for appellee.

Cases cited in the opinion: Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612; Blair v. Reading, 99 Ill. 609; Devine v. People, 100 Ill. 290; Keith v. Kellogg, 97 Ill. 147; Doe v. Martin, 4 Term Rep. 65; Price v. Price, 10 Ohio St. 316; Cushing v. Worrick, 9 Gray, 385; Gyger's Estate, 65 Pa. St. 311; Hamilton v. The R. B. Hamilton, 16 Ohio St. 432; Brine v. Insurance Co. 96 U. S. 627; Gue v. Tidewater Can. Co. 24 How. 262.

County Bonds-Validity of.

RALLS COUNTY v. DOUGLASS, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1881. Error to the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri. The decision of the supreme court of the United States was rendered on March 6, 1882. Mr. Chief Justice Waite declared the opinion of the court affirming the decree of the circuit court.

County bonds issued in Missouri by a de facto court, sealed with the seal of the court, and signed by the de facto president, cannot be impeached in the hands of an innocent holder by showing that the acting president was not de jure one of the justices of the court. It cannot be shown as a defense to bonds issued by counties in Missouri, in payment of subscriptions to the capital stock of a company, and in the hands of innocent holders, that the company to whose stock the subscription was made was not organized within the time limited by its charter. Bonds issued by counties in Missouri during the years 1870 and 1871, in payment of subscriptions to the stock of railroad companies, without a vote of the people, are valid, if the subscription was made under authority of charters granted in 1857, which did not require such a vote to be taken. Such bonds and coupons issued in those years were admissible in evidence, in an action against the county for the recovery of the amount due thereon, without being stamped as obligations for the payment of money, under the provisions of the internal revenue law. It was not necessary to prove the order of the county court authorizing the president of the court to countersign the bonds, where there was no plea or answer sworn to, denying their execution. Where there was no averment in the petition to that effect, testimony was admissible to prove that plaintiff was a bona fide holder and owner..

H. A. Cunningham, for plaintiff in error.

John H. Overall, for defendant in error.

Cases cited in the opinion: State v. Douglass, 50 Mo. 596; Harbaugh v. Winsor, 38 Mo. 327; Bank of Missouri v. Merchants' Bank, 10 Mo. 130; Kayser v. Trustees, 16 Mo. 90; Smith v. Clark Co. 54 Mo. 81; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Macon Co. v. Shores, 97 U. S. 277; State v. Macon Co. Ct. 41 Mo. 453; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Justices, 47 Mo. 349; State v. County Court, 51 Mo. 531; State v. Greene Co. 54 Mo: 550; Callaway Co. v. Foster, 93 U. S. 570; Scotland Co. v. Thomas, 94 U. S. 688; Henry Co. v. Nicolay, 95 U. S. 624; Cass Co. v. Gillett, 100 U. S. 592; State v. Garroutte, 67 Mo. 455; State v. Dallas Co. Ct. 72 Mo. 330; Douglass v. Pike Co. 101 U. S. 687.

Commerce Bridging Navigable Waters.

NEWPORT & CINCINNATI BRIDGE Co. v. UNITED STATES, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1881. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. This case was decided in the supreme court of the United States in April, 1882. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court affirming the decree of the circuit court; Miller, Field, and Bradley, JJ., dissenting.

The paramount power of regulating bridges that affect the navigation of the navigable waters of the United States is in congress. It comes from the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states. The

withdrawal by congress of its assent to the maintenance of a bridge, when properly made, is equivalent to a positive enactment that from the time of such withdrawal the further maintenance of the bridge shall be unlawful, notwithstanding the legislation of the several states upon the subject. If modifications are directed, assent is in legal effect withdrawn unless the · required changes are made. Where congress licensed the erection of a bridge over a navigable stream, and in express terms reserved to itself the power to revoke the franchise or require alterations in case experience proved that the structure which was to be erected substantially and materially interfered with navigation, it may withdraw its assent, or direct such modification or alterations in the structure in its own discretion, and the United States will not be liable for the expenses incurred in making such modifications or alterations. William M. Ramsey, for appellant.

S. F. Phelps, Solicitor General, for the United States.

Cases cited in opinion: As to the power of congress over bridges, Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 252; The Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How. 421; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 729; The Clinton Bridge Case, 10 Wall. 462; Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 569; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 464; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U. S. 387.

City Bonds in Aid of Manufacturing Company.

CITY OF OTTAWA v. NATIONAL BANK, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1881. The decision in this case was rendered by the supreme court of the United States on April 24, 1882. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court affirming the judgment of the circuit court.

Where a city council had power, the voters consenting, to issue negotiable securities for certain municipal purposes, if the purchaser, under some circumstances, would have been bound to take notice of the provisions of the ordinances whose titles were recited in the bonds, he was relieved from any responsibility or duty in that regard by reason of the representation upon the face of the bonds that the ordinances provided for a loan for municipal purposes. Such a representation by the municipal authorities of the city would estop the city, as against bona fide holders for value, to say that the bonds were not issued for legitimate or proper municipal or corporate purposes. By the decisions of the supreme court of Illinois, municipal bonds, payable to bearer or to some named person or bearer, were excepted from the rule that notes payable to a person or bearer could not be transferred or assigned by delivery only, so as to authorize the holder to sue in his own

name.

C. B. Lawrence, for plaintiff in error.
G. S. Eldredge, for defendant in error.

Cases cited in the opinion: Roberts v. Bolles, 101 U. S. 120; Hilborn v. Artus, 4 Ill. 344; Roosa v. Crist, 17 Ill. 450; Garvin v. Wiswell, 83 Ill. 217; Turner v. Railroad Co. 95 Ill. 143; Wall v. Monroe Co. 103 U. S. 77; Johnson v. Stark Co. 24 Ill. 75; Brush v. Reeves, 3 Johns. 439; Dean v. Hall, 17 Wend. 214; Cox v. United States, 6 Pet. 200; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 77; Bell v.

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