to the confirmation or defeat of a plan or were beneficial in the administration of the estate. Section 243, 11 U. S. C. A. § 643. Under section 77B, sub. c (11), U. S. C. A. § 297, sub. c (11), the debtor had "the right to be heard on all questions,” but it was held that compensation from the estate was allowable to the attorney for the debtor only to the extent of benefits received by the estate from his services. In re Allied Owners' Corp. 2 Cir., 79 F. 2d 187, 191; In re Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 7 Cir., 100 F. 2d 588, 592. A similar limitation was applicable to attorneys for creditors and stockholders in 77B proceedings. See Strauss v. Baker Co., 5 Cir., 87 F. 2d 401, 407 and cases therein cited. * For services rendered in opposition to the modified plan the appellant was duplicating the efforts of the stockholder's committees who also opposed it. These committees represented approximately fifty per cent. of class A stockholders; there is no contention that the committees did not adequately represent the interests of all stockholders whom the plan affected. Under such circumstances we can see no reason for the debtor to take an active part in opposition to the plan and duplicate the legal services of attorneys for committees. Certainly if the debtor is to supplement the efforts of the committees at the expense of the estate, the need of such additional services should be brought to the attention of the court, and authorization to serve for compensation should be obtained in limine. The same considerations which govern as to administration when there is a trustee should govern as to opposition to a plan when stockholders are already adequately represented. We find no error in denying appellant compensation and disbursements relating to its unsuccessful opposition to and appeal from confirmation of the plan. Schnader v. Reading Hotel Corp., 3 Cir., 105 F.2d 572, 573, (117 F. (2d) at 601, 602). Considering the services of petitioners in the light of those principles, we do not agree with the statement of the petitioners that there were no unnecessary duplications of services between them and counsel for the sole stockholder of the debtor. Neither are we impressed by their claims to a purported representation of first-mortgage bondholders; especially, when the record shows that their services in that respect consisted in vigorously supporting the claims of the refunding-mortgage bondholders that the refunding mortgage's lien on substantial properties was superior to that of the first mortgage, and contending that the equity interests were entitled to participate in the reorganization at the expense of secured creditors. Assuming that the activities of petitioners were required for a proper factual presentation of the case in view of the late intervention of the debtor's sole stockholder, we fail to see the necessity for active participation of the petitioners after the district court rendered its decision affirming the finding that the equity interests were not entitled to participate in the reorganization. The relaying of information as to the progress of the reorganization in its last stages to representatives of arbitrage houses certainly should not be construed as a benefit to the estate. The record contains no intimation that any bona fide and interested party to the reorganization was unable to obtain such information from the reorganization committee or the debtor's trustee. While, as previously indicated, we recognize that the debtor is a necessary party, and as such is entitled to representation, it is our view that the only services rendered by the petitioners which can be construed as a "benefit to the estate" were limited to approximately 350 hours and did not extend beyond the decision of the district court approving the plan. The record shows clearly that the burden of representation of the equity interests after that decision has been carried by Sloss & Turner. The maximum allowance fixed by us will reflect these considerations. As all of the expenses of these petitioners occurred after the date of the decision referred to, no maximum will be fixed for them. Conclusions.-We conclude that in view of the nature and extent of the services rendered, the contributive value thereof in the final disposition of the matters at issue, and the benefit accruing to the debtor's estate, we should fix the amounts shown below, as the maximum limits of final allowances to be paid out of the debtor's estate to the petitioners and claimants as reasonable compensation for all services rendered and to be rendered and as reimbursement for all actual and reasonable expenses incurred by them, generally, between November 1, 1939, and December 31, 1944, in connection with the section 77 proceedings and plan of the debtor, such allowances to cover any office or other overhead expenses which should be provided for in connection with such services. Payments should be made to the petitioners and claimants, or their personal representatives rendering the services or incurring the ex penses, as indicated in the foregoing statements, except that, in instances where counsel or others have already been paid by their principals, in whole or in part, the amounts payable from the debtor's estate should be paid to such principals to the extend that the principals have paid their counsel and others. An appropriate order will be entered. MILLER, Commissioner, dissenting in part: While I agree that "benefit to the estate" is the basic consideration for every allowance of compensation, I do not agree with the majority that no allowance should be made to the debtor's counsel after the district court's approval of the Commission's finding that the equity of the stockholders was without value. In my opinion, the debtor is not only a proper but a necessary party throughout the reorganization proceeding and consequently must be represented by counsel. From my review of the record, I agree that the burden of representation of the equity interests during the latter period of the reorganization was carried by Sloss & Turner; that the time devoted to the proceedings includes an undetermined number of hours expended unnecessarily by the debtor's counsel; and that certain of the latter's services for which compensation is requested are not properly compensable out of the debtor's estate. Nevertheless, I do not agree that no allowance should be made for their services when it cannot be disputed that they did actively participate throughout the proceedings and were recognized as counsel for the debtor by the circuit court of appeals and the Supreme Court. I would increase the maximum fixed by the majority as compensation for the debtor's counsel to $10,000.00 and also approve an allowance for their actual and reasonable expenses. Totals..... 50,000.00 14, 190. 91 115, 750.00 36, 989. 89 $165, 750. 00 $51, 180. 80 $216, 930. 80 1 $2,819.60 reimbursed by committee. $83,000 paid by committee. 3 $6,700.58 reimbursed by committee. Grand Totals... 35,000.00 29.010.00 1, 812. 54 64, 010. 00 1, 812. 54 65.822. 54 144, 500.00 25, 254. 75 435, 449. 34 79, 770. 79 579, 949. 34 105, 025. 54 684, 974. 88 4 Reimbursed by Irving Trust Company. Allowance from inception of proceeding. Reimbursed by Reconstruction Finance Cor poration. 7,500.00 48, 925.00 4611.86 4, 173. 41 63,925.00 5,775.90 69, 700.90 29, 700.00 3, 560. 77 29, 700.00 4, 285. 79 33,985.79 1, 549. 17 FINANCE DOCKET No. 14531 WHEELING & LAKE ERIE RAILWAY COMPANY Submitted December 14, 1944. Decided February 14, 1945 Public convenience and necessity not shown to require the operation by the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Company over the tracks and bridge of the Wheeling Steel Corporation extending from Steubenville, Jefferson County, Ohio, to Follansbee, Brooke County, W. Va., under the proposed plan. Application denied. Andrew P. Martin and John A. Duncan for applicant. Russell A. Klieves and Edwin C. Jepson for intervener supporting the application. Windsor F. Cousins for intervener opposing the application. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION DIVISION 4, COMMISSIONERS PORTER, MAHAFFIE, AND MILLER BY DIVISION 4: Exceptions to the report proposed by the examiner were filed and the case was argued orally. The Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway Company on April 17, 1944, applied under section 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act for authority to extend its line of railroad by operating over the tracks and bridge of the Wheeling Steel Corporation between Steubenville, Jefferson County, Ohio, and Follansbee, Brooke County, W. Va., approximately 1.97 miles, for the sole purpose of hauling ex-lake iron ore to storage facilities of the latter concern. The Wheeling Steel Corporation intervened in support of the application and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company intervened in opposition thereto. No representations have been made by any State authority. The applicant is incorporated under the laws of Ohio and owns and operates lines of railroad within that State, which together with the line of the Lorain & West Virginia, a subsidiary, comprise the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway system. The applicant's lines consist of two main stems, which with intersecting branch lines comprise operating divisions. The Cleveland division extends southwardly from Cleveland to Zanesville a route distance of 144.19 miles, and the Toledo division extends southeasterly from Toledo to Warrenton and thence south for a few miles to Terminal Junction a point |