law of the land, and as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be necessary for carrying into execution the authorities. with which it is proposed to vest the national government, it might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects, upon the pretence of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the national revenue; and thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State governments."1 The difficulties arising from this collision between the State and national governments might be easily avoided by a separation and distinction as to the subjects of taxation, or by other methods which might be easily devised. Thus, for instance, the general government might be intrusted with the power of external taxation, such as laying duties and imposts on goods imported, and the States remain exclusively in possession of the power of internal taxation. Or power might be given to the general governments to lay taxes exclusively upon certain specified subjects; or to lay taxes if requisitions on the States were not complied with; or, if the specified subjects failed to produce an adequate revenue, resort might be had to requisitions or even to direct taxes to supply the deficiency.8 § 936. In regard to these objections it was urged that it was impossible to rely (as the history of the government under the confederation abundantly proved) upon requisitions upon the States. Direct taxes were exceedingly unequal and difficult to 1 The Federalist, No. 31; 1 Elliot's Debates, 77, 78 to 89; Id. 91, 105, 112; Id. 293, 294 to 296; Id. 301, 302, 303; Id. 329 to 333; 2 Elliot's Debates, 52, 53, 208; 3 Elliot's Debates, 77 to 91; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 240; 2 Amer. Museum, 543, 544. 2 3 Amer. Museum, 423; 2 Elliot's Debates, 52, 53, 200, 206. See The Federalist, No. 30; 1 Elliot's Debates, 294; 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 234, 235; 1 Elliot's Debates, 294, 295; 2 Elliot's Debates, 52, 53, 111, 112; Id. 200, 206, 208. It was moved in the convention, that whenever revenue was required to be raised by direct taxation, it should be apportioned among the States, and then requisitions made upon the States to pay the amount; and in default only of their com. pliance, Congress should be authorized to pass acts directing the mode of collecting it. But this proposition was rejected by a vote of seven States against one, one State being divided. Journal of the Convention, p. 274. The Federalist, No. 30; 1 Elliot's Debates, 303, 304; Id. 325, 326, 327; 2 Elliot's Debates, 198, 199, 204. VOL. I.-44 adjust,1 and could not safely be relied on as an adequate or satisfactory source of revenue, except as a final resort when others more eligible failed. The distinction between external and internal taxation was indeed capable of being reduced to practice. But in many emergencies it might leave the national government without any adequate resources, and compel it to a course of taxation ruinous to our trade and industry and the solid interests of the country. No one of due reflection can contend that commercial imports are or could be equal to all future exigencies of the Union; and, indeed, ordinarily they may not be found equal to them. Suppose they are equal to the ordinary expenses of the Union; yet, if war should come, the civil list must be entirely overlooked, or the military left without any adequate supply.3 How is it possible that a government half supplied and half necessitous can fulfil the purposes of its institution, or can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be anything else than a succession of expedients, temporary, impotent, and disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good? Who would lend to a government incapable of pledging any permanent resources to redeem its debts? It would be the common case of needy individuals who must borrow upon onerous conditions and usury, because they cannot promise a punctilious discharge of their engagements. It would, therefore, not only not be wise, but be the extreme of folly, to stop short of adequate resources for all emergencies, and to leave the government intrusted with the care of the national defence in a state of total or partial incapacity to provide for the protection of the community against future invasions of the public peace by foreign war or domestic 1 The Federalist, No. 21; 1 Elliot's Debates, 81, 82; 2 Elliot's Debates, 105; Id. 199, 204, 236; 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 234, 235, 236; 3 Dall. R. 171, 178. 2 The Federalist, No. 41. See 1 Elliot's Debates, 303 to 306. The Federalist, Nos. 30, 34. "A government," said one of our most distinguished statesmen, Mr. Ellsworth, of Connecticut, speaking on this very subject, "which can command but half its resources, is like a man with but one arm to defend himself." Speech in Connecticut Convention, 7th January, 1788; 3 Amer. Museum, 338. 6 Ibid. The Federalist, No. 30. convulsions. If, indeed, we are to try the novel, not to say absurd experiment in politics, of tying up the hands of government from protective and offensive war founded upon reasons of state, we ought certainly to be able to compel foreign nations to abstain from all measures which shall injure or cripple us.1 We must be able to repress their ambition and disarm their enmity; to conquer their prejudices and destroy their rivalries and jealousies. Who is so visionary as to dream of such a moral influence in a republic over the whole world? It should never be forgotten that the chief sources of expense in every government have ever arisen from wars and rebellions, from foreign ambition and enmity, or from domestic insurrections and factions. And it may well be presumed that what has been in the past will continue to be in the future. § 937. Besides, it is manifest, that, however adequate commercial imposts might be for the ordinary expenditures of peace, the operations of war might, and indeed ordinarily would, if our adversary possessed a large naval force, greatly endanger, if they did not wholly cut off, our supplies from this source. And if this were the sole reliance of the national government, a naval warfare upon our commerce would, on this very account, be at once the most successful and the most irresistible means of subduing us, or compelling us to sue for peace. What could Great Britain or France do in a naval war, if they were compelled to rely on commerce alone as a resource for taxation to raise armies or maintain navies? What could America do, in a contest with a rival power whose navy possessed a superiority sufficient to blockade all her principal ports? And, independent of any such exigencies, the history of the world shows that nothing is more fluctuating and capricious than trado. The proudest commercial 23 Elliot's Debates, 290. 1 The Federalist, No. 34. In the recent war of 1812, 1813, between Great Britain and the United States, we had abundant proofs of the correctness of this reasoning. Notwithstanding the duties upon importations were doubled, from the naval superiority of our enemy our government were compelled to resort to direct and internal taxes, to land taxes, and excises; and, even with all these advantages, it is notorious, that the credit of the government sunk exceedingly low during the contest; and the public securities were bought and sold, under the very eyes of the administration, at a discount of nearly fifty per cent from their nominal amount. Nay, at one time it was impracticable to borrow any oney upon the government credit. This event, let it be remembered, took place after twenty years of unexampled prosperity of the country. It is a sad but solemn admonition. adjust,1 and could not safely be relied on as an adequate or satisfactory source of revenue, except as a final resort when others more eligible failed. The distinction between external and internal taxation was indeed capable of being reduced to practice. But in many emergencies it might leave the national government without any adequate resources, and compel it to a course of taxation ruinous to our trade and industry and the solid interests of the country. No one of due reflection can contend that commercial imports are or could be equal to all future exigencies of the Union; and, indeed, ordinarily they may not be found equal to them. Suppose they are equal to the ordinary expenses of the Union; yet, if war should come, the civil list must be entirely overlooked, or the military left without any adequate supply. How is it possible that a government half supplied and half necessitous can fulfil the purposes of its institution, or can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be anything else than a succession of expedients, temporary, impotent, and disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good? Who would lend to a government incapable of pledging any permanent resources to redeem its debts? It would be the common case of needy individuals who must borrow upon onerous conditions and usury, because they cannot promise a punctilious discharge of their engagements.5 It would, therefore, not only not be wise, but be the extreme of folly, to stop short of adequate resources for all emergencies, and to leave the government intrusted with the care of the national defence in a state of total or partial incapacity to provide for the protection of the community against future invasions of the public peace by foreign war or domestic 1 The Federalist, No. 21; 1 Elliot's Debates, 81, 82; 2 Elliot's Debates, 105; Id. 199, 204, 236; 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 234, 235, 236; 3 Dall. R. 171, 178. 2 The Federalist, No. 41. See 1 Elliot's Debates, 303 to 306. The Federalist, Nos. 30, 34. "A government," said one of our most distinguishe statesmen, Mr. Ellsworth, of Connecticut, speaking on this very subject, "which command but half its resources, is like a man with but one arm to defend him Speech in Connecticut Convention, 7th January, 1788; 3 Amer. Museum, 338 4 The Federalist, No. 30. 5 Ibid. 693 powers; since it be reasonably ke place.1 1 at once be seen s of self-protecports and exports ates, unless it is r of taxation reive with that of ject will demonge of the Constiwer in Congress; mpatible with the are not expressly Under such circoncurrent power al and unsurren his point are very at work, "no exhat power excluslause, or sentence, it. So far is this ve argument to the upon the States in This restriction imed, the States would ies a further admishority of the States it would be both uninnecessary because, if laying such duties im , 9 Wheat. R. 1, 199 to 202. 1 is subject has been already considretation of the Constitution; and a 2, on this very point of taxation, was sary to repeat the reasoning. See also 4, 28, 45, 49; 9 Wheaton's R. 199, 210, |