§ 523. And the Federalist has with equal point and brevity remarked, that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may be justly pronounced the very definition of tyranny."1

§ 524. The general reasoning by which the maxim is supported, independently of the just weight of the authority in its favor, seems entirely satisfactory. What is of far more value than any mere reasoning, experience has demonstrated it to be founded in a just view of the nature of government, and the safety and liberty of the people. And it is no small commendation of the Constitution of the United States, that instead of adopting a new theory, it has placed this practical truth as the basis of its organization. It has placed the legislative, executive, and judicial powers in different hands. It has, as we shall the state, the judicial and every other power is accountable to that; and it cannot be doubted that the persons who possess the sovereign authority of government will be tenacious of the laws which they themselves prescribe, and sufficiently jealous of the assumption of dispensing judicial and legislative power by any others." Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 8.

1 The Federalist, No. 47; Id. No. 22. See also Gov. Randolph's Letter, 4 Elliot's Deb. 133; Woodeson's Elem. of Jurisp. 53, 56. Mr. Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia (Jefferson's Notes, p. 195), has expressed the same truth with peculiar fervor and force. Speaking of the constitution of government of his own State, he says, “All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of a despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. An elective despotism is not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits without being effectually checked and restrained by the others." Yet Virginia lived voluntarily under this constitution more than fifty years (see 2 Pitkin's Hist. 298, 299, 300); and, notwithstanding this solemn warning by her own favorite statesman, in the recent revision of her old constitution and the formation of a new one, she has not in this respect changed the powers of the government. The legislature still remains with all its great powers.

No person, however, has examined this whole subject more profoundly and with more illustrations from history and political philosophy, than Mr. John Adams, in his celebrated Defence of the American Constitutions. It deserves a thorough perusal by every statesman.

Milton was an open advocate for concentrating all powers, legislative and executive, in one body; and his opinions, as well as those of some other men of a philosophical cast, are sufficiently wild and extravagant to put us upon our guard against too much reliance on mere authority. See 1 Adams's Def. of Amer. Const. 365 to 371.

presently see, made their term of office and their organization different; and, for objects of permanent and paramount importance, has given to the judicial department a tenure of office dur- | ing good behavior, while it has limited each of the others to a term of years.

§ 525. But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, and maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The true meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a free constitution. This has been shown with great clearness and accuracy by the authors of the Federalist. It was obviously the view taken of the subject by Montesquieu and Blackstone in their commentaries; for they were each speaking with approbation of a constitution of government, which embraced this division of powers in a general view; but which, at the same time, established an occasional mixture of each with the others, and a mutual dependency of each upon the others. The slightest examination of the British constitution will at once convince us that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally distinct and separate from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative department; for Parliament consists of the king, lords, and commons; and no law can be passed except by the assent of the king. Indeed, he possesses certain prerogatives, such as, for instance, that of making foreign treaties, by which he can, to a limited extent, impart to them a legislative force and operation. He also possesses the sole appointing power to the judicial department, though the judges, when once appointed, are not subject to his will, or power of removal. The House of Lords also constitutes not only a vital and independent branch of the legislature, but is also a great constitutional council of the executive magistrate, and is, in the last resort, the highest appellate judicial tribunal. Again, the other branch of

1 The Federalist, No. 42.

the legislature, the Commons, possess, in some sort, a portion of the executive and judicial power, in exercising the power of accusation by impeachment; and in this case, as also in the trial of peers, the House of Lords sits as a grand court of trials for public offences. The powers of the judiciary department are, indeed, more narrowly confined to their own proper sphere. Yet still the judges occasionally assist in the deliberations of the House of Lords by giving their opinions upon matters of law referred to them for advice; and thus they may, in some sort, be deemed assessors to the lords in their legislative, as well as judicial capacity.1

§ 526. Mr. Justice Blackstone has illustrated the advantages of an occasional mixture of the legislative and executive functions in the English constitution in a striking manner. "It is highly necessary," says he, "for preserving the balance of the constitution, that the executive power should be a branch, though not the whole of the legislative. The total union of them, we have seen, would be productive of tyranny. The total disjunction of them, for the present, would, in the end, produce the same effects by causing that union, against which it seems to provide. The legislative would soon become tyrannical by making continual encroachments, and gradually assuming to itself the rights of the executive power, &c. To hinder, therefore, any such encroachments, the king is, himself, a part of the Parliament; and, as this is the reason of his being so, very properly, therefore, the share of legislation which the constitution has placed in the crown consists in the power of rejecting, rather than resolving; this being sufficient to answer the end proposed. For we may apply to the royal negative, in this instance, what Cicero observes of the negative of the Roman tribunes, that the crown has not any power of doing wrong, but merely of preventing wrong from being done. The crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in the present established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two houses." 2

§ 527. Notwithstanding the memorable terms in which this maxim of a division of powers is incorporated into the bills of rights of many of our State constitutions, the same mixture will be found provided for, and indeed required in the same solemn

1 The Federalist, No. 47; De Lolme on the English Constitution, B. 2, ch. 3. 21 Black. Comm. 154.

instruments of government. Thus, the governor of Massachusetts exercises a part of the legislative power, possessing a quali fied negative upon all laws. The house of representatives is a grand inquest for accusation; and the senate is a high court for the trial of impeachments. The governor, with the advice of the executive council, possesses the power of appointment in general; but the appointment of certain officers still belongs to the Senate and House of Representatives. On the other hand, although the judicial department is distinct from the executive and legislative in many respects, either branch may require the advice of the judges, upon solemn questions of law referred to them. The same general division, with the same occasional mixture, may be found in the constitutions of other States. And in some of them the deviations from the strict theory are quite remarkable. Thus, until the late revision, the constitution of New York constituted the governor, the chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them with the governor, a council of revision, which possessed a qualified negative upon all laws passed by the Senate and House of Representatives. And, now, the chancellor and the judges of the Supreme Court of that Stato constitute, with the Senate, a court of impeachment, and for the correction of errors. In New Jersey the governor is appointed by the legislature, and is the chancellor and ordinary, or surrogate, a member of the Supreme Court of appeals, and president, with a casting vote, of one of the branches of the legislature. In Virginia the great mass of the appointing power is vested in the legislature. Indeed, there is not a single constitution of any State in the Union, which does not practically embrace some acknowledgment of the maxim, and at the same time some admixture of powers constituting an exception to it.1 (a)

§ 528. It would not, perhaps, be thought important to have dwelt on this subject, if originally it had not been made a special objection to the Constitution of the United States, that though it professed to be founded upon a division of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, yet it was really chargeable with a departure from the doctrine by accumulating in some instances the different powers in the same hands, and 1 The Federalist, Nos. 47, 48.

(a) Many of these things are now otherwise,

by a mixture of them in others; so that it, in effect, subverted the maxim, and could not but be dangerous to the public liberty.1 The fact must be admitted, that such an occasional accumulation and mixture exist; but the conclusion, that the system is therefore dangerous to the public liberty, is wholly inadmissible. If the objection were well founded, it would apply with equal, and in some cases with far greater, force to most of our State constitutions; and thus the people would be proved their own worst enemies, by embodying in their own constitutions the means of overthrowing their liberties.

§ 529. The authors of the Federalist thought this subject a matter of vast importance, and accordingly bestowed upon it a most elaborate commentary. At the present time the objection may not be felt as possessing much practical force, since experience has demonstrated the fallacy of the suggestions on which it was founded. But, as the objection may be revived, and as a perfect separation is occasionally found supported by the opinions of ingenious minds, dazzled by theory, and extravagantly attached to the notion of simplicity in government, it may not be without use to recur to some of the reasoning by which those illustrious statesmen who formed the Constitution, while they admitted the general truth of the maxim, endeavored to prove that a rigid adherence to it in all cases would be subversive of the efficiency of the government, and result in the destruction of the public liberties. The proposition which they undertook to maintain was this, that "unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained." 2

§ 530. It is proper to premise, that it is agreed on all sides. that the powers belonging to one department ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments; and, as a corollary, that, in reference to each other, neither of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the administration of their respective powers. Power, however, is of an encroaching nature, and it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to 1 1 Amer. Museum, 536, 549, 550; Id. 553; 3 Amer. Museum, 78, 79. 2 The Federalist, No. 48. 8 Id.