right to require for the maintenance of their vital interests, and especially of their liberty. The inquiry then naturally presents itself whether the establishment of a national government will afford more effectual and adequate securities.

§ 509. The fact has been already adverted to that when the Constitution was before the people for adoption, it was generally represented by its opponents that its obvious tendency to a consolidation of the powers of government would subvert the State sovereignties, and thus prove dangerous to the liberties of the people. This indeed was a topic dwelt on with peculiar emphasis; and it produced so general an alarm and terror that it came very nigh accomplishing the rejection of the Constitution.2 And yet the reasoning by which it was supported was so vague and unsatisfactory, and the reasoning on the other side was so cogent and just, that it seems difficult to conceive how, at that time or at any later time (for it has often been resorted to for the same purpose), the suggestion could have had any substantial influence upon the public opinion.

§ 510. Let us glance at a few considerations (some of which have been already hinted at) which are calculated to suppress all alarm upon this subject. this subject. In the first place, the government of the United States is one of limited powers, leaving all residuary general powers in the State governments, or in the people thereof. The jurisdiction of the general government is confined to a few enumerated objects which concern the common welfare of all the States. The State governments have a full superintendence and control over the immense mass of local interests of their respective States, which connect themselves with the feelings, the affections, the municipal institutions, and the internal arrangements of the whole population. They possess, too, the immediate administration of justice in all cases, civil and criminal, which concern the property, personal rights, and peaceful pursuits of their own citizens. They must of course possess a large share of influence; and, being independent of each other, will have many opportunities to interpose checks, as well as to combine a common resistance to any undue exercise of power by the general government, independent of direct force. 4

8

1 Elliot's Debates, 278, 296, 297, 332, 333; 2 Elliot's Debates, 47, 96, 136; 3 Elliot's Debates, 243, 257, 294; The Federalist, Nos. 39, 45, 17, 81.

2 The Federalist, No. 17.

8 Id. Nos. 14, 15.

4 Id. No. 45.

§ 511. In the next place, the State governments are, by the very theory of the Constitution, essential constituent parts of the general government. They can exist without the latter, but the latter cannot exist without them. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all; and the Senate is exclusively and absolutely under the choice of the State legislatures. The Representatives are chosen by the people of the States. So that the executive and legislative branches of the national government depend upon, and emanate from the States. Everywhere the State sovereignties are represented; and the national sovereignty, as such, has no representation.1 How is it possible under such circumstances, that the national government can be dangerous to the liberties of the people, unless the States, and the people of the States, conspire together for their overthrow? If there should be such a conspiracy, is not this more justly to be deemed an act of the States through their own agents, and by their own choice, rather than a corrupt usurpation by the general government?

§ 512. Besides, the perpetual organization of the State governments, in all their departments, executive, legislative, and judicial; their natural tendency to co-operate in cases of threatened danger to their common liberties; the perpetually recurring right of the elective franchise, at short intervals, must present the most formidable barriers against any deliberate usurpation, which does not arise from the hearty co-operation of the people of the States. And when such a general co-operation for usurpation shall exist, it is obvious that neither the general nor the State governments can interpose any permanent protection. Each must submit to that public will which created and may destroy them.

§ 513. Another not unimportant consideration is, that the powers of the general government will be, and indeed must be, principally employed upon external objects, such as war, peace, negotiations with foreign powers, and foreign commerce. In its internal operations it can touch but few objects, except to introduce regulations beneficial to the commerce, intercourse, and other relations between the States, and to lay taxes for the common good. The powers of the States, on the other hand, extend

1 The Federalist, No. 45.

to all objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives and liberties and property of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The operations of the general government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. Independent of all other considerations, the fact that the States possess a concurrent power of taxation, and an exclusive power to regulate the descent, devise, and distribution of estates (a power the most formidable to despotism, and the most indispensable in its right exercise to republicanism), will forever give them an influence which will be as commanding as, with reference to the safety of the Union, they could deliberately desire.2

§ 514. Indeed, the constant apprehension of some of the most sincere patriots, who by their wisdom have graced our country, has been of an opposite character. They have believed that the States would, in the event, prove too formidable for the Union; that the tendency would be to anarchy in the members, and not to tyranny in the head. Whether their fears, in this respect, were not of those of men whose judgments were misled by extreme solicitude for the welfare of their country, or whether they but too well read the fate of our own in the history of other republics, time, the great expounder of such problems, can alone determine. The reasoning on this subject, which has been with so much profoundness and ability advanced by the Federalist,

1 The Federalist, No. 45.

8 Id. Nos. 17, 45, 46, 31.

2 Id. No. 31.

4 M. Turgot appears to have been strongly impressed with the difficulty of maintaining a national government under such circumstances. In his letter to Dr. Price he says: "In the general union of the States I do not observe a coalition, a fusion of all the parts to form one homogeneous body. It is only a jumble of communities too discordant, and which contains a constant tendency to separation, owing to the diversity in their laws, customs, and opinions, to the inequality of their present strength, but still more to the inequality of their advances to greater strength. It is only a copy of the Dutch republic, with this difference, that the Dutch republic had nothing to fear, as the American republic has, from the future possible increase of any one of the provinces. All this edifice has been hitherto supported upon the erroneous foundation of the most ancient and vulgar policy; upon the prejudice that nations and states, as such, may have an interest distinct from the interest which individuals have to be free, and defend their property against the attacks of robbers and conquerors," &c. Similar views seem to have occupied the mind of a distinguished American gentleman, who published a pamphlet in 1788 (edit. Worcester), entitled "Thoughts upon the Political Situation of the United States of America," &c., p. 37, &c.

will, in the mean time, deserve the attention of every considerate man in America.1

§ 515. Hitherto our experience has demonstrated the entire safety of the States, under the benign operations of the Constitution. Each of the States has grown in power, in vigor of operation, in commanding influence, in wealth, revenue, population, commerce, agriculture, and general efficiency. No man will venture to affirm, that their power, relative to that of the Union, has been diminished, although our population has in the intermediate period passed from three to more than twelve millions. No man will pretend to say, that the affection for the State governments has been sensibly diminished by the operations of the general government. If the latter has become more deeply an object of regard and reverence, of attachment and pride, it is because it is felt to be the parental guardian of our public and private rights, and the natural ally of all the State governments, in the administration of justice, and the promotion of the general prosperity. It is beloved, not for its power, but for its beneficence; not because it commands, but because it protects; not because it controls, but because it sustains the common interests, and the common liberties, and the common rights of the people.

§ 516. That there have been measures adopted by the general government which have not met with universal approbation, must be admitted. But was not this difference of opinion to be expected? Docs it not exist in relation to the acts of the State governments? Must it not exist in every government, formed and directed by human beings of different talents, characters, passions, virtues, motives, and intelligence? That some of the measures of the general government have been deemed usurpations by some of the States is also true. But it is equally true, that those measures were deemed constitutional by a majority of the States, and as such received the most hearty concurrence of the State authorities. It is also true that some measures whose constitutionality has been doubted or denied by some States have, at other times, upon re-examination, been approved of by the same States. Not a single measure has ever induced three-quarters of the States to adopt any amendment to the Constitution founded upon the notion of usurpation. Wherever an

1 The Federalist, Nos. 45, 46, 31.

2 If there be any exception, it is the decision as to the suability of the States. But VOL. I.. - 25

amendment has taken place it has been to clear a real doubt, or obviate an inconvenience established by our experience. And this very power of amendment, at the command of the States themselves, forms the great balance-wheel of our system, and enables us silently and quietly to redress all irregularities, and to put down all practical oppressions. And what is not a little remarkable in the history of the government, is that two measures, which stand confessedly upon the extreme limits of constitutional authority, and carry the doctrine of constructive power to the last verge, have been brought forward by those who were the opponents of the Constitution, or the known advocates for its most restricted construction. In each case, however, they received the decided support of a great majority of all the States of the Union; and the constitutionality of them is now universally acquiesced in, if not universally affirmed. We allude to the unlimited embargo, passed in 1807, and the purchase and admission of Louisiana into the Union, under the treaty with France in 1803. That any act has ever been done by the general government, which even a majority of the States in the Union have deemed a clear and gross usurpation, may be safely denied. On the other hand, it is certain that many powers positively belonging to the general government have never yet been put into full operation. So that the influence of State opinions and State jealousies and State policy may be clearly traced throughout the even this deserves not the name of usurpation, for the case falls clearly within the words of the Constitution.

1 4 Elliot's Debates, 257. President Jefferson himself, under whose administration both these measures were passed, which were, in the highest sense, his own measures, was deliberately of opinion that an amendment of the Constitution was necessary to authorize the general government to admit Louisiana into the Union. Yet he ratified the very treaty which secured this right; and confirmed the laws which gave it effect. 4 Jefferson's Corresp. 1, 2, 3. A more particular consideration of these subjects will naturally arise in some future discussions. (a)

(a) See Cocke's Constitutional History, pp. 209, 234. This author, alluding to this acquisition, and to Mr. Jefferson's opinion upon the power to make it, has not failed to remark the readiness of every party in power to exercise greater authority than they were willing to concede that the government possessed when in the hands of their opponents; and it might thence be argued that the tendency to a

constant accretion of federal authority was to be expected, if not inevitable. Using the terms "Federal" and "Republican" in their original sense, as applied to those who were respectively for a liberal and a strict construction of the powers of govern. ment, it might, by modifying a little Mr. Jefferson's famous aphorism, be said, “Out of power, we are all Republicans; in power, we are all Federalists." C.