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THE INITIAL STEPS IN A SUBMARINE'S DIVE

On the right, the submarine is running along the surface; in the centre, the ballast tanks have been filled and the submarine is awash; on the left, the horizontal rudders are turned, the motors set working, and the submarine glides under the surface

practically all our armament makers and it certainly offers a fair basis for getting together. Unfortunately, Mr. Daniels has ignored these offers, being obsessed with the idea of government manufacture, an idea that cannot be immediately effective on a large scale for plants cannot be erected and placed upon a working basis. for two or three years; clearly, therefore, we shall have to depend upon our private makers. And the resources of our private makers are large and can be extended almost without limit.

Pressure is being exercised upon the

Government to speed up the building programme adopted in the bill of 1916. This stipulates that work should be started immediately upon four battleships, four battle cruisers, four scout cruisers, twenty destroyers, three submarines of 800 tons displacement, twenty-seven submarines of about 500 tons, one experimental submarine, one fuel ship, one hospital ship, one ammunition ship, and one gunboat. The Department has already let contracts for all these vessels except the four battle cruisers and three scout cruisers. These units, as well as the others provided in the

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On the right, the submarine is steered by the periscopes and kept at the correct depth by the horizontal rudders; in the centre, the boat is completely submerged and steers by compass and clock; and on the left, by letting more water into the ballast tanks, the boat rests lightly on the bottom

1916 bill, are intended to form part of a modern symmetrical navy. It is doubtful whether the present exigency, so far as rush construction is concerned, would be met best by hurrying work on this programme. The Allies already have battle fleets large enough to "contain" the German squadrons. The war, as already said, has settled down to submarine operations. Our work, so far as we have any to do, should be concentrated upon meeting this Clearly, therefore, our shipyards should be devoted to turning out, in large quantities, the type of vessel most useful for fighting submarines. We should not neglect work on larger units of the fleet, for there are other national dangers facing us than those that come from Germany, but the Department should certainly devote much attention to turning out destroyers, light and swift cruisers, and other vessels of special type which have demonstrated great usefulness in meeting precisely the present situation. The greatest lack in the American Navy, at the present moment, is destroyers and this lack we should immediately set about to remedy, even at the cost of delaying other work.

Clearly, such fighting as America may do will be upon the sea. This does not mean, however, that we should ignore the possibility of land warfare. Indeed, the War College has all its plans matured for precisely the contingency we are now facing, and, in case war is declared, the Army will be transformed on to a war basis according to these plans. The Army will have three separate tasks in mind. The first, and probably the least important, will be to hold itself in readiness to crush, at the first indication, any local disorders; the police and militia will mainly guard against any dangers of this sort, but there is a chance, though a remote one, that regular troops will be required. Perhaps the most important work will be the formation of a large force, with the regular Army as its nucleus, to form a defense against possible invasion. Here, again, the likelihood of any such use for the Army is remote. But, as a matter of general policy, the War Department will entertain the possibility that the British fleet may break down and our own give way, calamities

that would make our coast subject to invasion. Our War College, of course, has the most complete plans formed to meet any such dangers. The third use of the Army would be as a force that might be transported for field work in France. This might take the form of an expeditionary force of 50,000 or 100,000 men, such as England put in France in the early days of the war, an action we should take, if we took it at all, merely for its moral value Again, we might send a substantial force, one or two million strong, or even stronger, for real work in pushing back the German line.

All this discussion, to those familie with our standing forces, sounds rather academic. Yet it is not necessarily so. At the earliest, we could not get an Army of a million men ready within a year, but it is not impossible that we should have a year, or even a longer time, in which to do it. Nor would such a force be neces sarily unwelcome to the Allies, for, in a year or two from now, assuming that the war lasts that long, their forces might be so depleted that a large army from this side would prove highly useful. There is not the slightest question that, given time, we could raise and equip a larger army than any of the competing nations, excepting perhaps, Russia. The census shows that there are 20,000,000 men in the United States of military age, from 18 to 45. li we take the military age as from 18 to 32 we have nearly 10,000,000 and if from 18 to 23, nearly 5,000,000. Moreover, about 1,000,000 young men reach military age here every year. Thus, if we went into the business of raising armies, we should not lack men; nor, in view of our huge manufacturing plants, should we lack equipment. At present, public sentiment would probably not support sending a large conscript army to France, but, if German ruthlessness is manifested in all its logical extremes, it is not impossible that it may. Most intelligent public sentiment agrees upon one point, and that is that we should adopt at once universal military ser vice. We should not repeat the blunder: England has made in this war-whic are nearly the same blunders we made r the Civil War.

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FINANCIAL COÖPERATION AND AID-COMBATING THE SUBMARINE-MILITARY PREPAREDNESS CONTROL AND REGULATION OF SHIPPING AND RAILROADS ORGANIZATION

OF PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALS-DANGER OF HARMING RATHER THAN

HELPING THE ALLIES-LABOR-MAXIMUM

FOOD PRICES

THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES TO THE UNITED STATES

F WE are to have war with Germany the obvious way for us to conduct it is the way which will most quickly and effectively gain our object, whether that object be the ending of the Prussian military idea or merely the ending of the particular symptom of that idea which chiefly affects us-the U-boat warfare.

The quickest and most effective way for us to fight Germany is to do certain definite things to make the Allies' war on Germany more effective.

First and foremost is our financial cooperation with England and France. In the two and a half years of the war the United States has changed from a debtor to a creditor nation. Where formerly out of every dollar made in this country a little interest had to be sent to Europe to pay for the money Europe had lent us, now we have not only paid back the debt but we in our turn receive interest from Europe. When the war began, as a nation we probably owed Europe 4 or 5 billion dollars, or $400 to $500 a head for each person in the country. Five per cent. on 5 billion dollars is 250 million dollars a year. Something like that is what we have been paying to Europe every year in interest.

Dur

ing the war we have paid off most of our 5 billion debt and have lent the Allies 4 or 5 billion. It is this money which they have spent here and which accounts for our phenomenal prosperity.

This foreign trade prosperity is almost universal in this country, notwithstanding the general idea that it consists chiefly of steel and iron products-munitions. Between 1913 and 1916, the exports of wheat, flour, oats, meat, and dairy products increased more than did the exports of iron and steel products. But curiously enough, although this prosperity is all over

the country, it is chiefly financed through one firm-J. P. Morgan & Company.

The national banking system under the Federal Reserve Board has held aloof from any participation in the lending of money or credit to the Allies for them to spend here to increase our prosperity. Our foreign markets, therefore, have been limited to the gold the Allies could send us and the Allied securities which Morgan & Company could sell. But if we wished to do all in our power to insure Germany's defeat, the United States Government could put the stamp of its approval on the credit of England and France and they would be assured of plenty of credit here with which to purchase everything that they can want from us. As far as our prosperity is dependent upon foreign purchases, it would be increased rather than diminished by our helping the Allies.

To put our financial resources behind those of the Allies for the conduct of the war would immediately relieve them of their worst financial problem-that of keeping a proper gold supply at home.

The second definite thing which we can do is to take over the work of the Allied navies on this side of the water. Great Britain and France have had to keep in the Western Atlantic a large number of lesser war vessels to combat raiders, to search for submarines, to see that the interned German merchant ships do not escape, and to keep up a general patrol. This has been no simple task, for many are the breaches of neutrality that the Germans have attempted both here in the United States and to the south of the United States. This piece of work can be taken over by our Navy. Also, if the German submarines succeed in making raids on this side of the ocean, our Navy can undertake to convoy our

merchant ships until they reach the area which the Allies will patrol on their side of the Atlantic. This one move-the use of our Navy for patrol work-will be of infinite use to the Allies, for it will free all their lighter war vessels which are now in Western waters to prosecute the antisubmarine war more vigorously around England and in the Mediterranean. The Allies now need no further ships to augment their grand fleet, but the increase in size and cruising range of submarines has enlarged the area necessary for patrol work, and these light cruisers may be taken away from here and used in European waters to great advantage.

Not that the Allies fear the ability of the Germans to get any decisive result by their renewal of ruthless submarine warfare. The Germans have tried their utmost, despite their protestations in their answer to our Sussex note, to torpedo the two largest ships still in the merchant service between New York and England, the Baltic and the Adriatic, and for a year they failed. The chances of their getting such boats under the new conditions are not much greater than they have been before. As an English captain said: "Seventy-five per cent. of this great threat is pure bluff, and the other twenty-five per cent. will rapidly diminish into futility.' And that is probably true. For once all merchantmen are allowed to arm themselves the submarine war becomes much less effective. So far, the chief obstacle to the arming of merchant vessels has been the attitude of the United States: that ships armed in any way except defensively would be considered vessels of war and could not trade with our ports. With this restriction removed the defense against submarines will be much easier.

SUBMARINE DEFENSE

The German submarine now has little or no love for the armed tramp or steamer. It is not as simple as is generally supposed to sink a ship without rising to the surface. A submarine can carry only a limited number of torpedoes, whereas it can carry enough ammunition to sink many ships. Before now the Germans felt fairly sure when they met a ship from the United

States that it was unarmed or only armed with guns on the stern. Under these con ditions the submarine had a more equal chance of sinking the ship if it resisted. To torpedo a ship a submarine must come fairly close and must show its periscope, which at a short distance is plainly visible and is not an impossible target.

There is no question but that along the Atlantic seaboard the Germans could establish submarine stations. There are thousands of small inlets and islands almost inaccessible which would make excellent points of refuge for the U-boats. One of the first moves that the United States should do is to establish a complete force -perhaps civilian-volunteer-to patrol from the Rio Grande to Maine to seek out any such places and destroy them. We have more than a thousand motor boats already enrolled in our naval reserve and the makers of such speed launches could be organized to turn their output to increasing this fleet to aid in this work. To stop absolutely the submarine warfare is the first and main piece of work for our naval and military authorities to take up. And the work of the fleet will be to a large extent nullified if we do not see to it that no submarine can use some spots in the Western Hemisphere as bases.

The United States, therefore, can very materially aid the Allies by eliminating submarine bases, by taking over the patrol on this side of the Atlantic, It has already taken off the restriction against armed ships entering our ports. In these three ways the United States can help minimize the loss of tonnage by submarine war.

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM

We can also in two ways add greatly to the world's tonnage. In the first place we can take over, repair, and commission the great German merchant fleet which now lies in American harbors. There are ninety-one of these ships with a gros tonnage of 594,696 tons. This is more than a quarter of all the Allied and neutra tonnage destroyed in 1916—which amounts to just more than two million tons. It is difficult to tell how quickly these German ships could be gotten into service because not only have they deteriorated from lack

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CONSTRUCTION AND DESTRUCTION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING IN 1916

The table shows the total number of ships and their tonnage constructed in the Allied and neutral countries during 1916, and the number destroyed during the same period. Of the British ships, 176 were either trawlers or fishing smacks of less than 600 tons. On the other hand, one half of the American ships built, comprising about one fifth of the tonnage, is of such a nature that it is unavailable for merchant service. Fifty of the ships totalling about 40,000 tons built in America were for foreign customers.

During 1916, the net reduction of the neutral and Allied tonnage was 278,304 tons, whereas the number of ships increased 1162. The total Allied and neutral tonnage last year amounted to about 42,000,000 tons. In 1916 the Germans lessened it by less than two thirds of one per cent. England's loss in tonnage over and above the amount built in 1916 was 415,210 tons. Against this loss can be credited 700,000 tons of enemy shipping seized on German ships chartered from Portugal, which makes a clear gain in tonnage

of care but they have been to some extent purposely damaged by the German crews. Certain orders had been given to the commanders of interned German ships to do some definite act on January 31st. Just what move was contemplated is not known, for the Government got wind of it and closed the ports and inspected all the ships. In Charleston, S. C., harbor, however, one zealous German captain sank his ship, and in New York harbor the Germans threw overboard much machinery and destroyed many papers and did other damage.

But whatever the damage turns out to be it can certainly be fairly rapidly made

for Great Britain. In 1915, the U-Boat warfare did not destroy as much British tonnage as was built in the British Empire.

The United States has under construction, to be commissioned in 1917, 357 ships totalling 1,250,722 tons. Unquestionably the Allied nations are increasing their output. To this we can add the 91 German ships interned in the United States, nearly 600,000 tons. To overcome this enormous increase in shipping, the Germans must multiply their submarine destructiveness by many times their previous efforts.

It is not a question of how many ships the Germans sink but what kind of ships and in what business these ships are employed; the sinking of trawlers and hospital ships does not directly hurt the Allied food supply.

It is a race between the submarine blockade and starvation in Germany, with the odds against the submarine

good. These ships would take the place of three or four months' losses at the rate at which the submarine war was conducted last year, or one to two months' losses if the German U-boat warfare averages double its former toll.

In the meanwhile the ship production of the United States is the greatest in the history of the country and the majority of the building is for the ocean and not the lake trade.

During the past year American shipyards have turned out 560,239 tons of shipping. With only the same amount of building during the next year and with the addition of the interned German fleet

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