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first stationed troops on the border. It was this success which led to the use of typhoid vaccine in the European armieswith amazing success.

The Administration should carry these reforms further. The soldiers returning from the Spanish War received what were believed to be sound physical examinations. The great majority came back to private life armed with certificates of sound health. The Government made these examinations for the purpose of protecting itself against fraudulent claims for disability pensions. The precaution has not had quite that result, largely owing, perhaps, to the fact that the examinations were not thoroughly made. We should learn our lesson and give every returning soldier from the Mexican border a physical examination of the most modern kind. The Government should have records showing precisely his physical condition, both for the protection of the militiaman himself and as a protection against improper pension claims.

WHAT MAKES US GROW OLD?

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WHAT is the real cause of senility and decay? Bacterial toxins generated in the intestines, say some; overwork, overwrought nerves, nervous excitement, constant worries-other causes like these are urged. An examination into longevity recently made by the London Lancet rather disposes of the idea that an energetic life in itself leads to early death.

The Lancet writer has studied our

American Presidents, assuming that they may be taken as types of men who have lived strenuous lives, full of excitement and hard work. Most of them lived to a good old age. Here are their ages: 67, 90, 83, 85, 73, 80, 78, 79, 68, 71, 53, 65, 74, 64, 77, 56, 66, 63, 70, 49, 56, 71, 67, 71, 58. Three it is true, died comparatively young; Lincoln, at 56, Garfield at 49, and McKinley at 58-but these men were assassinated. With these exceptions, the only Presidents who died under sixty were Polk, at 53, and Arthur, at 56. The average age of Presidents is 70-the Biblical three-score-andten. John Adams, dying at 90, Jefferson at 83, Madison at 85, and John Quincy Adams at 80, to say nothing of their ripe

successors, clearly indicate that politics in itself does not lead to premature decay. The fact that, in 127 years, only two Presidents, except those assassinated, have died in office-the first Harrison and the second Taylor-is a record that sets at defiance the law of probabilities.

Hard work in itself is clearly the normal state and seldom kills.

A BEAUTIFUL INCIDENT OF THE WAR

BOY from Hallowell, Me., a mere lad who had not attained his

majority-was Captain Frank E. Goodrich of the Royal Flying Corps, whose death in action on the Somme front was announced by the British War Office on September 15th. Wounded at St. Julien, the British air service and in six months and incapacitated as a soldier, he entered earned two promotions and the Military Cross. Just a month before he died he wrote a letter to his mother from which the following paragraph is taken:

You wanted to know how Immelmann [the most famous of the German aviators] was finally brought down. He tried his old game of diving on one of our machines while it was being engaged by several others. Unfortunately for Immelmann another of our machines was behind, watching for just such a move. Before he could get away he was shot down and killed. We were sorry to learn that he had been killed for we had hoped to bring him down alive on our side and make him prisoner, for we all admired his ability as a pilot and no doubt he was as chivalrous as a Hun can be. I had the honor to drop wreath for him from the members of our squadron. We subcribed for it, attached a card inscribed, "To Lieut. Immelmann, a brave and able opponent, from the R. F. C.," and I took it over one afternoon and dropped it by parachute on one of the airdromes. They shelled me all the way over and back but did no damage. It was acknowledged later in the German papers. Several other squadrons also dropped wreaths.

The incident is a reminder that the German who brought down Adolphe Pegoud, the great French aviator, in September, 1915, similarly bedecked the grave of his adversary; and it is a fine evidence that war still often arouses the nobler emotions of chivalry and compassion.

THE KIND OF BONDS THE BRITISH BUY

Every month the WORLD'S WORK publishes in this part of the magazine an article on experiences with investments and lessons to be drawn therefrom.

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FEW years ago, a London firm of investment bankers undertook the task of ascertaining the precise requirements of the English investing public. For this purpose it prepared a question-andanswer paper which it sent out to several thousands of its correspondents, representing investors of every kind.

The questions were four in number, calculated to reveal as clearly as possible the aims and tastes of each investor who should take the pains to answer them. The first question had regard to the safety of principal; the second to the rate of income; the third to the possibility or probability of increase in value; and the fourth to the different classes of securities.

A large majority of the people to whom these questions were addressed furnished replies which were tabulated by the bankers, and afterward summarized in one of the English financial magazines as follows:

(1) The question of capital safety was of primary importance.

(2) They were satisfied with only a moderate rate of income, provided their capital was safe. (3) Practically none were willing to incur the slightest risk, however likely their capital

was to increase in value.

(4) They had no particular preference for any particular class of investment, or country. There were, of course, those who objected on religious grounds or through personal prejudice to certain stocks [this word in England often means "bonds"] but this was entirely unconnected with the actual question of invest

For example, some people objected to investments connected with the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, places of amusement, and so on.

(5) There were some, but quite an insignificant number, who regarded investment as a short cut to fortune.

The returns showed also that in a surprisingly large number of cases securities

yielding above 4 per cent. were regarded as unsafe, and would not, for that reason, be entertained.

This composite picture of the mind of the British investor of, say, ten years ago, is especially interesting now. For it goes far to explain how it happened that, as part collateral for the $250,000,000 twoyear 5 per cent. loan negotiated in this country a little while ago, the British Government was able to offer such an extraordinary array of American stocks and bonds.

The statistics of these American securities, representing one third of the total collateral pledged for the loan, are instructive. There are more than five hundred separate issues, having an aggregate market value of $100,000,000. The bonds number 442, of which 323 are railroad issues, 84 public utility, 27 industrial and miscellaneous, and 8 municipalthe latter those of New York City. The stocks number 61, of which 37 are railroad issues, 20 industrial, and 4 public utility.

common

The list of stocks is, fortunately, not too long to be included here as illustrating the shrewd discrimination of the kind of investors who have been taught by long experience how to minimize the risks that are inherent in corporation shares as a class. It comprises Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe preferred, Atlantic Coast Line common, Baltimore & Ohio and preferred, Chicago & North Western common and preferred, Chicago, Milwau-. kee & St. Paul common and preferred, Cleveland & Pittsburg guaranteed stock, Detroit, Hillsdale & South Western, Erie & Pittsburg, Erie Railroad first preferred, Great Northern preferred, Illinois Central, Illinois Central Leased Lines stock, Lehigh Valley, Louisville & Nashville, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie common and preferred and Leased Lines stock, Manhattan Railway, Mobile & Birming

ham preferred, Morris & Essex common, New York Central, Norfolk & Western common and preferred, Northern Pacific, Pennsylvania Railroad, Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & Chicago original and special guaranteed stock, Reading first and second preferred, St. Louis Bridge first preferred, Southern Pacific, Tunnel Railroad of St. Louis, Union Pacific common and preferred, American Locomotive preferred, American Car & Foundry preferred, American Sugar Refining common and preferred, American Cotton Oil common, American Tobacco preferred, American Smelters Securities preferred B, Baldwin Locomotive preferred, Cluett, Peabody & Company preferred, Central Leather preferred, Deere & Company preferred, Eastman Kodak preferred, International Harvester Corporation preferred, Ingersoll Rand preferred, Lehigh Coal & Navigation, Liggett & Myers preferred, P. Lorillard & Company preferred, Montgomery, Ward & Company preferred, United Fruit, Western Union Telegraph, Cities Service preferred, Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power of Baltimore common and preferred, and Consolidated Gas of New York.

This list is less noteworthy for the inclusion of the single essentially speculative issue of Erie shares than for the predominance of preferred and guaranteed issues of widely recognized investment merit, many of them in the railroad class so well established that they yield consistently under 5 per cent.

But the perseverance of the British investor is best exemplified by the list of railroad bonds. It is possible in this article, on account of the large number of items in the list, to refer only in a general way to some of its more striking aspects. Among these is that of the faithfulness with which the old investment principle of "keeping close to the rails" was adhered to in the choice of the bonds. They are, for the most part, first mortgage and divisional issues-the real "underlying" kind of which the roads themselves have few left to supply the present-day investment market. Their variety, moreover, in respect to the lines they cover is amazing. Nor do the lists of industrial and public

utility bonds hypothecated show any less discriminating tastes on the part of their individual owners in these departments of the American investment market. It would, indeed, be necessary to make precious few eliminations from either of these two lists to enable one to say: "These bonds are as fairly representative of the select investments of their class as any that might be named."

Thus have the extremities of the British Government, in providing means to meet the financial obligations it has been piling up in this country since the outbreak of the war, furnished an interesting and important lesson for the American investor.

The average buyer of securities finds himself confronted with one or more of three fundamental questions: What are the best to hold? What are the best for profit? What are the best for emergency?

It is to the last of these questions in particular that a study of the collateral back of the $250,000,000 British loan supplies an illuminating answer. These securities were discovered in the private strong boxes of that great middle class of British investors who are accustomed to buy with the intention of leaving their holdings undisturbed from one generation to another, but always with an eye to the unexpected and with a keen sense of appreciation of the fact that there is no single "best security" for one to depend upon. They were picked with painstaking care for their usefulness in meeting a supreme financial emergency, and "mobilized" by the British Treasury through the levy of a special income tax upon such of their holders as should refuse to sell or lend them to the Government.

If, as has been frequently suggested, Great Britain, so long the world's greatest creditor nation, did not escape the pangs of humiliation in facing the necessity of pawning its privately owned investments to get financial aid abroad, it must, nevertheless, have experienced some compensating sense of pride in exposing a list of assets of such admirable quality.

There are few investors of any class who could not profit by taking the pains to acquaint themselves with the individualities of these securities.

SHALL WE ADOPT UNIVERSAL

MILITARY SERVICE?

WHAT SORT OF NAVY AND ARMY DO WE NEED?

THE GRAVE BUT INEVITABLE CONCLUSION THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST ABANDON ITS TRADITIONAL POLICY OF ISOLATION AND BUILD AN EFFECTIVE DEMO

T

CRATIC ARMY AND A POWERFUL NAVY TO INSURE ITSELF

AGAINST INVASION AND TO DO ITS DUTY IN THE WORLD

BY

CHARLES W. ELIOT

(PRESIDENT EMERITUS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

HERE is endless talk in these days about "preparedness." Both political parties and both candidates for the Presidency advocate a larger Navy and a larger Army. On preparedness and Americanism the Republican platform uses the braver words; but the Democratic Party has voted-with more or less reluctancethe largest appropriations for the Navy and Army that have ever been voted, and also made the most earnest attempt ever made to convert the state militias into a national force. As to the defunct Progressive Party and its leaders, it shouted louder than either of the others for warlike preparation, and, indeed, appeared to advocate war against piteous little Mexico; but its principal doctrines related to social and industrial improvements at home, and it has had no chance to put those doctrines into practice through legislation. Under these political conditions at home and in the present fearful state of Europe, it is important that the American people, and particularly the public men who undertake to lead the people, should consider, first, for what uses the United States needs a navy and an army; and secondly, the sort of navy and army which the United States should prepare.

To undertake the maintenance of a great modern navy and a great modern army, always prepared for immediate action, involves the abandonment of a deeply rooted American policy-the ancient reliance for safety on the physical isolation of the

The

country between two great oceans. maintenance of a larger navy will not require much new legislation, or much change of customs; but the maintenance of a great land force which can be mobilized in a few days-all ready for service in the field— will require much new legislation, great new expenditures, and many changes in the habits and customs of the people. The policy of maintaining only a small professional army, and even that imperfectly equipped, will have to be abandoned.

Why should the American people make this formidable change in their national habits and their international policy? First, because the industrial and commercial interests of the Nation have completely changed since the Civil War, and can no longer be preserved and promoted in isolation. The country cannot keep its existing machinery running, or sell its surplus foods and raw materials, unless the foreign markets are open to it, and are freely developed. The United States, having become an industrial and commercial World Power, needs to have all the seas and oceans of the world open for its foreign trade in times of peace, and so far as is practicable in times of war also open for both its imports and its exports of foods, drinks, drugs, raw materials, and manufactured articles.

So long as the British navy ruled the seas, freedom for American trade with all nations was secure in peaceful times, and with Great Britain and her allies in war times; but the war has demonstrated that

Great Britain can no longer secure the freedom of the seas for herself and other nations without assistance. During the present war the combined navies of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia have not succeeded in maintaining an effectual blockade of all German, Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish ports, or in preventing the destruction of an immense tonnage of merchantmen belonging to the Entente Allies, with their cargoes. Although many German and Austrian submarines have been destroyed, and a few short lines of transportation by water have been made safe against submarines, it cannot be said to-day that adequate means of defending commercial vessels and fishermen against destruction by hostile submarines have been discovered, or that the full power of the submarine to destroy enemies' property, or to maintain some foreign commerce in spite of a blockade, has as yet been developed and exhibited. The world still has much to learn about the functions of the submarine. Hence it follows that the task of keeping the oceans safe for the commerce of the free, manufacturing nations to which foreign commerce is indispensable is one in which the United States may reasonably be expected to take its fair part. It is not doing so now. If the United States expects to share the benefits of the resistance the Entente Allies are making to the domination of seas and lands by Germany, should it not also prepare to share the terrible sacrifices that resistance costs?

AMERICA NO LONGER PHYSICALLY ISOLATED

Secondly, steam and electricity have done away with the physical isolation of the United States. The oceans are not barriers, but highways which invite the passage of fleets, pacific or hostile. The security of America can no longer be trusted to the width of the Atlantic and the Pacific.

If any one says that the risk of an invasion of the United States by a strong naval and military Power is very small, particularly within twenty years of the close of the present terrifying and exhausting war, the answer is that, since the war in Europe has demonstrated how horrible a catastrophe an invasion would

be, the American people may wisely insure themselves against even a small risk of invasion. The only available insurance is a Navy powerful in every respect, and an Army in reserve visibly strong in numbers and visibly prepared for immediate service.

IF WE HAD UNIVERSAL SERVICE

If the principle of universal military service should be accepted and acted on in the United States, several important consequences would immediately follow:

The country would always have on call a trained force for all the duties and services which the Regular Army now performs, and this force could be increased by telegraph and telephone to any desired extent up to the limit of the reserves. Within ten years these reserves would be formidable in number. It would probably be desirable to maintain a special force for a service of two years in the Philippines, the Panama Zone, and other outlying regions; but this force should consist of young men who volunteered for that special service after they had received the universal training at home, or the better part of it. It would no longer be necessary to maintain any state militia; provided the governors were authorized to call on the national War Department for any troops. they might need for local service. But if any state preferred to do so, it might maintain a local volunteer force made up of young men who had already served their first period (sixty to ninety days) in the national army.

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3. The Nation would be always prepared for defensive combat with any military Power which might assail it for purposes of conquest or ransom; and, being prepared, would probably be safe from such attempts.

4. In case of rebellion or outbreak of any sort within the country itself, a national force could be promptly put into the field to subdue it.

5. All the able-bodied young men in the country would receive a training in the hard work of a soldier which would be of some service to them in any industry in which they might afterward engage. They would have become accustomed to a discipline under which many men coöperate

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