Cls. R., 459, and 118 U. S., 62), the suit was brought by the administrator of the original claimant, whose demand accrued prior to April 13, 1861, in favor of said Hart, who had been dis loyal. This case was transmitted by the Secretary of War to the Court of Claims under section 1063, Revised Statutes, and the judgment of said court was that it was without jurisdiction over the case, for the reason stated in the syllabus (16 C. Cls. R., 460): "Where a claim is transmitted, which the officer transmitting it is by law forbidden to pay, the court does not acquire jurisdiction and can not determine it upon its merits." In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court approved the reasons and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims (118) U. S., 62). The case now under consideration is in all essential respects similar to that of Hart v. United States, and it must be and is now held that section 3480, Revised Statutes, forbids the pay. ment of the claim to any person. The action of the Auditor in disallowing the claim is affirmed. EDW. A. BOWERS, Assistant Comptroller. EXPENSE OF REMOVING WRECKS. Section 4 of the act of June 14, 1880, authorizing the Secretary of War in the manner therein provided to remove wrecks and making a permanent appropriation for the expense thereof, does not authorize the reimbursement of private parties who remove such wrecks on their own account. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, March 16, 1896. SIR: I am in receipt of your reference of March 11, 1896, requesting a decision upon the question "whether reimbursement may be made by the United States to the Pittsburg Coal Exchange for the removal of the wreck herein referred to from the allotment of $200 made by the Secretary of War from the indefinite appropriation of June 14, 1880, for removal of wrecks." The wreck referred to is that of a coal barge in the channel of the Monongahela River near the Smithfield Street Bridge in the Pittsburg Harbor, the matter having been submitted to you by Maj. R. L. Hoxie, the engineer in charge. The act of June 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 197), relates to this subject, and provides that there shall be at least thirty days' notice by publication or personally to the parties owning the sunken vessel, and "the provisions of this act shall apply to all such wrecks whether removed under this act or any other act of Congress." Under this I am clearly of the opinion that the persons advancing the funds for the removal of this wreck can not be reimbursed for the same. There is no authority of law for the acceptance of such volunteer services and reimbursement therefor; and in the face of the above statutory provisions, I know of no way to authorize the reimbursement of this seemingly very proper expenditure. Respectfully, yours, The CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, United States Army. EDW. A. BOWERS, Assistant Comptroller. IN RE ACCOUNT OF WILLIAM E. S. FALES, UNITED STATES MARSHAL AT AMOY, CHINA, FOR SALARY WHILE ABSENT FROM HIS POST. The leave of absence of a marshal of a consular court is not limited by the law restricting the leave of consular officers, and he is entitled to salary so long as he continues in office. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, March 18, 1896. The Auditor for the State and other Departments, in settling the account of W. E. S. Fales, late marshal of the consular court at Amoy, rendered the following decision: 6 "Mr. Fales's account is for salary as consular marshal from October 19, 1893, to January 11, 1894. The account is indorsed by W. W. Rockhill, Third Assistant Secretary of State, as follows: Approved for the period from 1st to 11th January, 1894, and disapproved from October 19 to December 31, 1893, the salary for the last-named period having been paid out of appropriation under the control of this Department to the acting marshal at Amoy.' And in a communication at a subsequent date, replying to my request for information, Mr. Rockhill says the reason given in the indorsement is regarded as sufficient to warrant a disallowance, otherwise the Government is paying two officers for performing the same duty.' "During the period in question Mr. Fales was at home on a leave of absence granted by the Department of State, but the time disapproved by the Department of State was in excess of sixty days in the year 1893. Sixty days is the limit of leave of absence with pay allowed to consular officers by section 1742, Revised Statutes, which provides: "No diplomatic or consular officer shall receive salary for the time during which he may be absent from his post, by leave or otherwise, beyond the term of sixty days in one year.' * "This provision, however, can not apply to Mr. Fales, a consular marshal, as marshal is not included in the term 'consular officer' when it occurs in the title to which section 1742 belongs, as appears by section 1674, Revised Statutes. There is no law or regulation which makes the approval of the Department of State a prerequisite to entitle a consular marshal to receive his salary, but of course the disapproval of that Department puts the Auditor on his guard and has caused me to carefully examine the question involved in Mr. Fales's account before allowing it. I find no special law or regulation which can apply to Mr. Fales's case, but it is governed entirely by the laws which apply to officers of the United States in general. It would seem to be in accordance with public policy that the performance of duty by an officer should be a prerequisite to his receiving compensation upon the theory that compensation is for services performed, but the courts do not appear to have taken this view of it and, upon the theory that the salary is attached to the office, have decided that one holding office is entitled to the salary belonging to it without regard to the performance of the duties belonging to it. The rule is well laid down by Chief Justice Drake, Court of Claims, in Sleigh v. United States (9 C. Cls. R., 375), as follows: "The incumbent of an office is prima facie entitled to the lawful compensation thereof so long as he holds the office, though he may be disabled by disease or bodily injury from performing its duties. If it be an office held at the will of the appointing power, and that power does not see fit to have the compensation go on while the incumbent is so disabled, the only remedy, in the absence of express law or regulation authorizing the stoppage of the compensation during the disability, is to remove the incumbent and so end his right to compensation. If the appointing power suffers him to continue in office, notwithstanding the disability, he is entitled to the compensation. The right may be cut off by law or regulation authoriz ing it; but not by the act of the appointing power without the authority of law or regulation.' "Such being the law, Mr. Fales is entitled to salary for the whole time while on leave for which his account is rendered. As this decision involves a change in the practice of settling consular marshals' accounts, this account will be suspended to await the action of the Comptroller in approving this decision, under section 8, act of July 31, 1894." The foregoing decision is approved. R. B. BOWLER, Comptroller. IN RE APPEAL OF N. A. COVARRUBIAS, UNITED STATES MARSHAL FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. A marshal arresting a prisoner under the Chinese exclusion act is not entitled to mileage for transporting him to the commissioner who issued the warrant when there was at the place of arrest an officer authorized by section 13 of the exclusion act to hear the cause, the travel not being necessarily performed within the meaning of the act of February 22, 1875. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, March 19, 1896. Mr. N. A. Covarrubias, United States marshal for the southern district of California, appeals from the settlement by the Auditor for the State and other Departments of his account under the appropriation "Fees and expenses of marshals, United States courts," for the quarter ending June 30, 1895. Among the items disallowed was mileage for transporting a defendant and deputy 127 miles, from Los Angeles to San Diego, on the ground that the defendant ought to have been taken before the nearest commissioner, who was at Los Angeles. In explanation the marshal states that the case was one against a Chinese person under the Chinese exclusion act, and that the provision in the act of August 18, 1894 (28) Stat., 416), requiring a marshal "Who may arrest a person charged with any crime or offense to take the defendant before the nearest circuit court commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial" does not apply. As the proceedings in Chinese deportation cases are not criminal and do not constitute a trial and sentence for a crime or offense (Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S., 698–730), it may be conceded that the act of August 18, 1894, does not apply. Section 7 of the act regulating fees and costs, of February 22, 1875 (18 Stat., 334), provides that no marshal "Shall become entitled to any allowance for mileage or travel not actually and necessarily performed under the provision of existing law." It follows that if the marshal could have taken the Chinese person before a commissioner at Los Angeles he is not entitled to receive mileage for traveling from Los Angeles to San Diego. Section 13 of the act to prohibit the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, of September 13, 1888 (25 Stat., 479), provides "That any Chinese person, or person of Chinese descent, found unlawfully in the United States, or its Territories, may be arrested upon a warrant issued upon a complaint, under oath, filed by any party on behalf of the United States, by any justice, judge or commissioner of any United States court, returnable before any justice, judge or commissioner of a United States court, or before any United States court, and when convicted, upon a hearing, and found and adjudged to be one not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States, such person shall be removed from the United States to the country whence he came." From a reading of this statute it is entirely clear that any of the officers therein named had authority to hear the case, notwithstanding that the warrant may have been issued by some other of the officers therein named. It follows, therefore, that the hearing might have been had before a commissioner in Los Angeles, and that there was no necessity for the travel to San Diego. Such travel must, therefore, be disallowed, and the action of the Auditor is affirmed. R. B. BOWLER, REWARD OF INFORMERS IN CUSTOMS SERVICE. Under the act of June 22, 1874, an informer is not entitled to compensation for furnishing information concerning any fraud upon the customs revenue, unless in addition to the loss of revenue there was a fraudulent intent on the part of the importer and not merely an undervaluation. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, March 19, 1896. SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of February 8 in regard to the claim of Frank Thoma for compensation as |