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the other matters discussed are entirely within the discretion of the Postmaster-General, while acting in good faith for the benefit of the public service, payment may be made to the West End Street Railway Company as a mail messenger from the appropriation for mail-messenger service, notwithstanding the fact that there already exists in the city of Boston a contract for Regulation wagon mail messenger, transfer, and mail station service."
In this connection I have to call your attention to an apparent inconsistency in the payment of the regulation wagon mail messenger, transfer, and mail station service” from the appropriation for inland transportation by star routes, for that service evidently is a service covered by the provisions of the act of March 3, 1887, and the expense thereof should properly be chargeable to the appropriation for mail-messenger service. It appears, however, that the appropriations for mail-messenger service are not and never have been sufficiently large to authorize the payment therefrom of the “Regulation wagon mail messenger, transfer, and mail station service," and that such service was paid from the appropriation for inland transportation prior to the passage of the act of 1887, and that all of said facts have been repeatedly brought to the attention of Congress by the Postmaster-General in his annual reports. Under such circumstances payment of the “regulation wagon mail messenger, transfer, and mail station service” from the appropriation for inland transportation by star routes seems to be authorized, but it is respectfully suggested that for uni. formity of accounting and for other manifest reasons it would be advisable to have the attention of Congress called to the matter, with a request that in the future appropriations be made for mail-messenger service, including regulation wagon mail messenger, transfer, and mail station service,” so as to make all the service provided for and authorized by the act of March 3, 1887, payable from the same appropriation. Respectfully, yours,
R. B. BOWLER,
Comptroller. The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
VOUCHERS RECEIPTED BY ATTORNEYS OR
Section 3477, Revised Statutes, does not prohibit disbursing officer from
accepting the receipt of an agent or attorney of an individual, firm, or corporation, and receiving credit for a voucher so receipted, provided it appears thereon that the check issued in payment was made payable to the order of the individual, firm, or corporation.
December 12, 1895. SIR: I am in receipt of yours inclosing bill in favor of Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, receipted in the following manner: “Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, by J. R. Buckelew, attorney.” You ask whether you are anthorized to make payment under such a receipt.
For the reasons stated in my letter to the Secretary of War of December 27, 1894 (1 Comp. Dec., 142), payment to persons holding powers of attorney not executed in the manner required by section 3477, Revised Statutes, should not be made because of the provisions of said section. That section, however, relates only to receiving payment" under powers of attorney and has nothing to do with the manner in which vouchers should be receipted. Accordingly it has been the uniform practice of the accounting officers to allow credit in the settlement of a disbursing officer's account for vouchers receipted by agents or attorneys of the persons entitled to receive payment on the vouchers, provided payment is made by the disbursing officer's check on the Treasurer or one of the assistant treasurers of the United States drawn to the order of the person entitled to receive the money, for payment of such check can not be made except upon the personal indorsement of the payee or upon the indorsement of an attorney appointed by him in the manner required by section 3477, Revised Statutes. Therefore, if payment of the present voucher is made by your check as disbursing officer, drawn upon the Treasurer of the United States and made payable to the order of Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, and that payment bas been made in this manner is shown by your indorsement upon the voucher, credit for the amount of the voucher will be allowed in the settlement of your account. Whether Mr. Buckelew is the attorney of Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, so as to entitle him to receive from you the check, is not within my knowledge, the only power of attorney on file in this office in favor of Mr. Buckelew being one from Clark Seamans. You will no doubt satisfy yourself of this fact before delivering to Mr. Buckelew your check in payment of the voucher, that being a matter which the accounting officers will not investigate, presuming that the check has been delivered to the right party, as payment can only be made on the check to the person entitled to receive the money. Respectfully, yours,
R. B. BOWLER,
Comptroller. Col. John M. WILSON,
Corps of Engineers, United States Army.
IN RE APPEAL OF JOHN B. DONOVAN, UNITED
STATES MARSHAL, DISTRICT OF MAINE.
When, in order to properly serve a writ, the marshal is obliged to make a
copy, he is entitled to the fee of 10 cents a folio provided by section
December 14, 1895. Mr. John B. Donovan, the marshal for the district of Maine, appeals from the settlement by the Auditor for the State and other Departments of his account for the quarter ending March 31, 1895. Among the disallowances made by the Auditor were certain charges connected with the service of four writs of attachment of real estate in York County. In each case the marshal charged the following: Attachment of real estate in York County ........ Copy for register of deeds, York County........... Paid register of deeds for recording attachment.. Serving writ........ Copy of writ served on defendant corporation, 2,000 words, cents per folio ....... Total..................
.......... 4.60 In a memorandum on the account the marshal says:
“ The service in the above case is made in accordance with the statutes of Maine, which require a copy of the writ to be served upon a corporation by leaving an attested copy with an officer of same, which in this case was the clerk. The other charges are statutory fees governing the attachment of real estate."
Of these charges, there were allowed by the Auditor the following items: “Paid register of deeds for recording attachment, 10 cents; serving writ, $2," the other items being dis. allowed “ because these charges are under the fee bill of the State of Maine, and as the said writs do not appear to have been in any sense a final process, but a lien, such charges by the marshal are unauthorized” under clause 6 of section 829, Revised Statutes, which provides that for serving any final process the fees of the marshal shall be the same as those allowed for similar services to sheriffs of the States, respectively. On his appeal the marshal makes further explanation as follows:
"There seems to be a misconception in this case as to the charges. The charges for four writs of attachment of real estate in York County were in accordance with law. The district attorney directed in writing upon each writ a real estate attachment. This gives me no discretion, and I should be derelict in my duty if I had failed to make them as required. Moreover the statute requires me to file with the register of deeds so much of my return on the writ as relates to the attachment. (See chapter 81, Revised Statutes of Maine, sec. 59.) The copies are for the register of deeds on separate paper, and it is essential, in order that the attachment may be valid.
"As to the charges for copies of writs served on defendant corporation, the following are the facts: These writs were brought to recover a penalty for the importation of an alien laborer under contract, and were for four different persons, and each was a separate action against the defendant corporation for the recovery of penalty by law. In brief, then, I had to make a real-estate attachment on each writ, and four copies were necessary to be served on defendant corporation, otherwise there would have been a failure of service. The whole proceeding was in accordance with the laws of Maine, and the charges were legal and authorized.”
As the attachment was not a final process, the disallowance made by the Auditor of the fees allowable to a sheriff in the State of Maine for making au attachment was correct. Paragraph 11 of section 829, Revised Statutes, provides a fee " for copies of writs or papers furnished at the request of any party, 10 cents a folio." As the district attorney instructed the marshal to make a real-estate attachment in each case, and as in order to do so it was necessary to have copies of the writs of attachment made, and as the copies were not furnished to the marshal by the district attorney, a request that the marshal make the necessary copies must be implied from the direction
of the district attorney to the marshal to make a real-estate attachment. When a marshal makes a copy of a paper which is necessary to make a service of a writ, he is entitled to the fees therefor in the absence of an express prohibition. This seems clear from the provisions of paragraph 5 of section 829:
" For serving a writ of subpæna ou a witness, fifty cents, and no further compensation shall be allowed for any copy, summons, or notice for a witness."
In addition to the fees for serving the writ allowed by the Auditor, folio fees for copy of the writ and folio fees for copy of the return filed with the register of deeds will be allowed upon this revision.
R. B. BOWLER,
PAY OF NAVY OFFICER DURING TEMPORARY
An officer of the Navy is entitled, while temporarily receiving treatment
in a hospital, to the pay attached to the duty to which he has been regularly assigned.
December 14, 1895. SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of December 4, 1895, in reference to the case of Lieut. Commander G.W. Tyler, United States Navy, “whose account is borne on the rolls of this station as on duty at the Library, War Records, Navy Department, and who was admitted into the naval hospital in this city for treatment on October 18, 1895, per hospital notice of that date.” You request “to be informed how long I am authorized to credit his account as on other duty,' there being no orders detaching him from duty or notice of discharge from the hospital received.”
In reply I have to state that the length of time which an officer may remain in hospital and continue to draw the rate of pay authorized by his previous orders must be determwed by his orders.
Three different cases may arise under the law and regulations: First, where the officer's incapacity for duty is determined by a board of medical survey, and he is formally detached; second, where the officer is granted temporary sick leave pur