rials and miscellaneous expenses, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and this being a modification of the practice heretofore existing in this matter, this decision is submitted for your consideration and the voucher suspended until your decision is rendered."

The history of the use of appropriations for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing has been carefully inquired into, and as a result it appears that from the early days of the Bureau it has been the practice to pay for many things used by that Bureau from the appropriations therefor, which, if used in other bureaus of the Treasury Department, would have been usually paid from the appropriations for the contingent expenses of the Treasury Department. Among these items have been coal, horses, and wagons.

In the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act of July 11, 1888 (25 Stat., 271), the appropriation for the contingent expenses of the Treasury Department reads as follows:

"For contingent expenses of the Treasury Department, including all buildings under control of the Treasury in Washington, District of Columbia, namely: For stationery, for purchase of horses and wagons,"

The same language has been included in all subsequent appropriation acts, including that for the present fiscal year. Prior to the act of July 11, 1888, the words "including all buildings under control of the Treasury in Washington, District of Columbia," were not included in making the appropriations for the contingent expenses of the Treasury Department. The inclusion of these words seems to have indicated an intention upon the part of Congress to make the appropriation thereafter cover all the buildings in Washington under the Treasury Department, and, therefore, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. The words are too plain to be open to construction. In practice, however, no attention seems to have ever been paid to them. Apparently they were overlooked.

It is claimed that the clause in the sundry civil appropriation act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 379), which provides: "That no part of the appropriation herein for engraving and printing shall be held to be contingent expenses under sections 240 and 3683 of the Revised Statutes," may change the matter. It is not seen, however, how this language can in any way affect the question. Section 240 is as follows:

"No account for contingent expenses at any of the bureaus

of the Department of the Treasury shall be allowed, except on the certificate of the superintendent of the Treasury buildings that such expenses are necessary and proper, and that the prices paid are just and reasonable; and the superinten dent shall keep a full, just, and accurate account in detail of all amounts expended under the head of contingent expenses for the several bureaus of the Department of the Treasury."

The statement that that section shall not apply to the appropriations for miscellaneous expenses of the Bureau of Engrav ing and Printing rather implies that the miscellaneous expenses authorized to be paid from the appropriation for the Bureau were those other than the contingent expenses of the Treasury Department provided for by the appropriation "Contingent expenses, Treasury Department," which, as stated, includes "all buildings under control of the Treasury in Washington." The construction placed by the Auditor upon the appropriation "Materials and miscellaneous expenses, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 1896," is, for these reasons, affirmed. R. B. BOWLER,

Comptroller.

FEES OF JURORS IN SUITS TO CONDEMN LANDS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The regular appropriation for fees of jurors in United States courts is not available for the payment of jurors in suits to condemn land for public improvements in the District of Columbia, such proceedings being governed by special statutes, and the fees of jurors therein are payable from the appropriation for the work for which the land sought to be condemned is to be used.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY,

November 27, 1895.

SIR: I am in receipt of yours of the 26th, asking whether the regular annual appropriation "Fees of jurors, United States courts, 1896," is available for paying the juries of condemnation for their services in accordance with sections 10 and 14 of "An act to provide a permanent system of highways in that part of the District of Columbia lying outside of cities," approved March 2, 1893 (27 Stat., 532).

Section 10 of said act provides for a special jury of seven persons, and section 14 provides that

"Each of said jurors shall receive a compensation of five dollars per day for his services during the time he shall be actually engaged in such service."

Section 3 of the sundry civil appropriation act of August 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 412), provided a special method of condemnation for property required for the enlargement of the Government Printing Office, provided for by section 2 of said act. The last clause of said section 3 is as follows:

"And hereafter, in all cases of the taking of property in the District of Columbia for public use, whether herein, heretofore, or hereafter authorized, the foregoing provisions, as it respects the application by the proper officer to the supreme court of the District of Columbia and the proceedings therein shall be as in the foregoing provisions declared."

Some doubt was raised whether this clause did not impliedly repeal the method authorized by law for the condemnation of property for the District of Columbia, including that required for highways, roads, and bridges. Apparently to remove that doubt the following clause was enacted as part of the act making appropriations for the District of Columbia of August 7, 1894 (28 Stat., 251):

"That section three of the act approved August thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled 'An act making appro priations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and for other purposes,' shall not be construed to apply to the condemnation of land for public highways nor to repeal chapter eleven of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia in regard to public highways, roads, and bridges."

From this legislation it appears entirely clear that the provisions of Chapter XI of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia apply to the condemnation proceedings required by the act of March 2, 1893, above cited, except where the provisions of said special act may conflict therewith. Section 265, Revised Statutes, District of Columbia, being a part of Chapter XI thereof, provides for the costs of a second jury of condemnation when such second jury is required, and further provides "all expenses up to the second jury shall be paid by the District," and section 266 provides a table of fees, including jurors' fees in such cases. I am informed that it has been the uniform practice to pay all the expenses of such condemnations from the special appropriations for the highways, roads, or bridges for which the property condemned under the provisions of these sections was used, and such practice seems to have been clearly proper

if not specifically required by the provisions of said section 265. The regular annual appropriation for "Fees of jurors," although applicable to jurors in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, in my opinion, was intended for the payment of the regular juries of the United States courts and not of such special juries as the jury provided for in the act of March 2, 1893, and the practice has been to limit that appropriation to regular juries, and to provide for the payment of special condemnation juries in cases in which the United States are a party either from the appropriations for the work for which the property sought to be condemned was to be used or from the appropriation: "Miscellaneous expenses, United States courts." The appropriation "Miscellaneous expenses, United States courts," is not available in the present case because section 265, Revised Statutes, District of Columbia, provides that the expenses in condemnation proceedings for highways for the District shall be paid by the District; therefore, in District cases the expense would necessarily be chargeable to the appropriation for the particular work.

For the reasons above given my reply to your question is that the appropriation "Fees of jurors, United States courts, 1896," is not available for paying the juries of condemnation in cases arising under the act of March 2, 1893, "to provide a permanent system of highways in that part of the District of Columbia lying outside of cities."

Respectfully, yours,

Mr. ALBERT A. WILSON,

R. B. BOWLER,
Comptroller.

Marshal of the District of Columbia, Washington.

IN RE APPEAL OF B. PICKMAN MANN, DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE BOARD OF CHILDREN'S GUARDIANS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The expenses incurred by an officer in furnishing the bond required by law of all disbursing officers of the Government is not a proper charge against the Government, even though the officer serves without compensation.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY,

November 27, 1895.

Mr. B. Pickman Mann, disbursing officer of the Board of Children's Guardians, District of Columbia, appeals from the

settlement by the Auditor of his account for the quarter ending June 30, 1895. In the settlement of said account the Auditor disallowed the following item:

"Voucher 554; Fidelity and Deposit Company; payment of premium on bond of treasurer [disbursing officer] disallowed as an improper charge against the appropriation.”

Mr. Mann claims that this item is a legitimate charge against the appropriation for the Board of Children's Guardians, because the regulations of the Treasury Department require that a disbursing officer shall file a bond before he will be advanced any funds to disburse, and that as disbursing officer he is not entitled to any compensation for services rendered by him.

Mr. Mann is mistaken in stating that the bond is required by the regulations of the Treasury Department. Such bond is specifically required by law of all disbursing officers, except officers of the Army and Navy, by the provisions of section 3614, Revised Statutes. It therefore became necessary for Mr. Mann to give a bond before becoming fully invested with the office of disbursing officer. That which is required of a person to become invested with an office must be done at his own expense unless specific provision is made by law for payment by the Government. This seems clear from the language of Mr. Justice Brown in United States v. Van Duzee (140 U. S., 171):

"But the expense of taking the oaths and executing the proper bonds is not so chargeable, since it is the duty of persons receiving appointments from the Government to prepare and tender to the proper officer the oaths and bonds required by law; in other words, to qualify themselves for the office."

The fact that a disbursing officer receives no compensation can not affect the question, for if he does not desire the office he need not accept it.

The action of the Auditor in disallowing this item is affirmed. R. B. BOWLER, Comptroller.