services, in excess of the amount approved by the Commissioner and Secretary for such services," it clearly is within the power of Indians to make contracts which shall be paid by themselves, and not out of moneys due from the United States to them. If, therefore, the contract is made with an attorney for his services but the contract does not authorize or direct payment thereof from moneys held for such Indians by the United States, I see nothing in the provisions of section 2104, Revised Statutes, which requires or even authorizes such payment. In this connection attention is invited to the language of Mr. Justice Shiras in the case of In re Sanborn (148 U. S., 222, 227), which, although obiter, indicates somewhat the construction which should be placed upon said section. He said: "But such enactments, intended to protect the Indians from improvident and unconscionable contracts, by no means create a legal obligation on the part of the United States to see that the Indians perform their part of such contracts." I therefore conclude that there is no authority for the United States to use funds held in trust for the Chickasaw Nation except in pursuance of treaty and law or upon the written request of the nation; and as the treaty and law do not authorize the payment of Mr. Paine's claim in the manner proposed, and there is no request from the Indians for its pay. ment out of their trust funds, the action of the Auditor in refusing to make such payment is affirmed. R. B. BOWLER, JURISDICTION OF THE COMPTROLLER TO RENDER DECISION AS TO THE PAYMENT OF ACCOUNTS APPROVED BY THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Under the act of March 2, 1895, making the approval of the temporary Committee on Accounts, House of Representatives, “conclusive upon all the Departments and auditing officers of the Government," the Comptroller has no jurisdiction to render a decision upon any question involved in the payment of accounts which have been so approved. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, July 16, 1895. SIR: I am in receipt of yours of the 11th instant, inclosing sundry vouchers approved by the temporary Committee on Accounts, to be paid from the apppopriation for contingent expenses (miscellaneous items) found in the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 764). The first paragraph of said act reads: "That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, in full compensation for the service of the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninetysix, for the objects hereinafter expressed, namely." You state that the services rendered and articles furnished by the vouchers in question were rendered or furnished during the fiscal year 1895, and therefore ask whether you are authorized to pay the same from the appropriation for the fiscal year 1896. The same act provided for the appointment of a temporary Committee on Accounts, and provided further that "All payments made out of the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers approved by said temporary Committee on Accounts shall be deemed, held, and taken, and are hereby declared to be, conclusive upon all the Departments and auditing officers of the Government." (28 Stat., 768.) I am clearly of the opinion that Congress intended by the provision above quoted to place upon said committee the final responsibility of approving all payments to be made from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives and to make their action conclusive. As any payment made under the approval of the committee is by the very terms of the statute made conclusive upon the auditing officers of the Government, I find myself without jurisdiction to answer your question. The papers are therefore returned. Respectfully, yours, Hon. JAMES KERR, Clerk House of Representatives. R. B. BOWLER, IN RE APPEAL OF OLIVER E. BRANCH, UNITED A United States district attorney, for examinations before commissioners A United States district attorney is not entitled to a docket fee, under section 824, Revised Statutes, in cases in which no indictments are found. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, July 17, 1895. Mr. Oliver E. Branch, United States attorney for the district of New Hampshire, appeals from the settlement by the Auditor of his account for the six months ending December 31, 1894, and seeks a revision of the same by the Comptroller. He complains of two items: 1. A disallowance of more than one per diem for attendance before commisioners upon the same day in more than one case. The action of the Auditor in disallowing this claim is affirmed for the reasons given in Bowler's First Comp. Dec., 182. 2. A disallowance of certain docket fees in cases in which no indictments were found. Mr. Branch claims the fee provided in section 824, Revised Statutes, "in cases at law when the cause is discontinued, five dollars," under the authority of Stanton v. United States (37 Fed. Rep., 252). It is true that in that case such a fee was allowed, but in United States v. Van Duzee (140 U. S., 169), a substantially similar claim made by a clerk for the fee provided by section 828, "for making dockets and indexing, taxing costs, and other services in a cause which is dismissed or discontinued, or where judgment or decree is made or rendered without issue, one dollar," was not allowed. The Supreme Court held that where no indictment was ever filed there was no "cause" within the meaning of the law, and therefore that the clerk was not entitled to the fee provided by section 828. No distinction can be drawn between the docket fee provided for a clerk in section 828 and that provided for an attorney in section 824. Under the authority of United States v. Van Duzee no docket fee can be allowed, and the action of the Auditor in disallowing the same is affirmed. R. B. BOWLER, Comptroller. CLAIM OF INTERNAL-REVENUE GAUGER FOR COM- Under the provisions of section 3156 of the Revised Statutes, requiring TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, July 17, 1895. SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, inclosing an account of Edwin L. Ross, as gauger, internalrevenue service, first district of California, for services in September, October, November, and December, 1894. You ask whether you are authorized to pay said account in view of the fact that his bond as gauger is dated March 9, 1895. It appears, however, that Mr. Ross did, September 28, 1894, execute a bond as gauger with good sureties and delivered it to the collector of that district. The collector approved the bond, certified that the sureties were good, and forwarded it by mail to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, but the records show that it was not received by the latter officer. Subsequently the bond of March 9, 1895, above referred to, was executed. Mr. Ross performed all the duties of his office during the period named and the only question presented is whether it was necessary, to entitle him to payment, that his bond should be approved by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Section 3156 of the Revised Statutes requires that every gauger shall give bond, with one or more sureties, satisfactory to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and, by the regula tions such bond must be given and the oath of office taken before the gauger can be assigned to duty. In the present case the bond was given, but was never approved by the Commissioner. I am clearly of the opinion that the bond given by Mr. Ross was of no effect, so far as investing him with the office is concerned, because it lacked the approval necessary to its completion. Therefore he was, at most, a de facto officer, and it is well-established law that such an officer can not recover com. pensation. In the case of United States v. Le Baron (19 How., 73, 77) it was held: "Our opinion is, therefore, that this bond speaks only from the time when it reached the Postmaster-General, and was accepted by him; that until that time it was only an offer or proposal of an obligation, which became complete and effectual by acceptance; and that, unlike the case of a collector's bond, which is not a condition precedent to his taking office, and which may be intended to have a retrospective operation, the bond of a postmaster, given on his appointment, can not be intended to relate back to any earlier date than the time of its acceptance, because it is only after its acceptance that there can be any such holding of the office as the bond was meant to apply to." It has been frequently held, as it was in the case just cited, that where there are certain acts to be done by the appointee, as, for instance, the giving of bond, those acts are conditions precedent to the complete investiture of the office. Under section 3156, Revised Statutes, requiring a bond satisfactory to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it is clear that an officer who has executed a bond and forwarded it to the Commissioner is not thereby invested with the office aud entitled to compensation. You are, therefore, not authorized to pay Mr. Ross for his services as gauger prior to the date of the approval of his bond by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The gauger having, in this case, performed the duties of his office and rendered valuable service to the Government with the assent of the Department, has an equitable claim for his compensation. Such a claim can, however, be paid only through appropriate action by Congress. Respectfully, yours, The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. R. B. BOWLER, Comptroller. PRINTING OF MANUAL FOR ARMY COOKS. The provision in the act of February 12, 1895, for a new edition of the Manual for Army Cooks requires that the expense of printing the same must be paid from the appropriation therein, and not from the appropriations for printing for the War Department, and the issue of such manual is, by section 89 of the act of January 12, 1895, limited to 1,000 copies. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, July 19, 1895. SIR: I am in receipt, by reference, of a letter from the Com missary-General of Subsistence, calling attention to the appropriation in the Army appropriation act of February 12, 1895 (28 Stat., 658), under the head of subsistence of the Army, for "a new edition of the Manual for Army Cooks." My decision is asked whether the printing of said new edition of the manual may be paid for from said appropriation or whether the same must be paid from the regular appropriation for printing and |