DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, September 4, 1913. SIR: I have the honor to reply to your letter of August 28, 1913, requesting my opinion on the following question: "Whether wood pulp shipped to the United States from Norway on through bills of lading but transshipped en route at Rotterdam would be entitled to entry free of duty under the decision of the United States Court of Customs Appeals rendered on May 12, 1913, published in T. D. 33434." I am of opinion that such wood pulp is entitled to free entry, assuming, of course, that it is the product of Norway and otherwise conforms to the conditions prescribed by section 2 of the act of July 26, 1911 (37 Stat. 11). In this I agree with the opinion of the Acting Solicitor of the Treasury, dated August 18, 1913. The point presented for consideration is whether such goods are "imported therefrom [i. e., from Norway] directly into the United States" within the meaning of the statute referred to. Certainly this importation is "direct" in the commercial sense, for there is no intervening commercial transaction. Also, it is "direct" in the transportation sense, for the goods arrive under through bill of lading, without other pause than that incident to the necessities or conveniences of transportation. And it is "direct" within the common policy of our customs and reciprocity laws, by which, having originated in Norway and having been from the first destined to this country, the goods would be considered as imported from Norway and not from Holland (United States v. Luyties, 130 Fed. 333, C. C. A. 2d C.; Millar v. Millar, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9546; Re Booth, T. D. 338; Grant v. Peaslee, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5212; Griswold v. Maxwell, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5838; Re Leerburger, T. D. 25510; Re Hermann Brothers, T. D. 22447), always with the qualification that they have not entered the commerce of the intervening country (Re La Montagne, T. D. 21565; Acker, Merrall & Condit v. United States, T. D. 31481). Even under the old "direct-trade" statutes (e. g. act Mar. 3, 1865, sec. 6, and act June 6, 1872, sec. 3) it was 83152°--VOL 30-13--15 ruled by the Secretary of the Treasury that the words "directly imported" did not require the transportation to be accomplished entirely in a single bottom (T. D. 225), though they did exclude any commercial pause in the intermediate country (T. D. 1862; Powers v. Comly, 101 U. S. 789). The closest analogy to the present case is the decision of the Court of Customs Appeals in United States v. United Cigar Stores Co., T. D. 31505 (affirming T. D. 30643). The statute there construed (sec. 5, act Aug. 5, 1909) provided that certain privileges of free entry should be granted goods of the Philippines coming by "direct shipment from the country of origin to the country of destination," and the court held that the condition was satisfied by a shipment bona fide on through bill of lading, even though there was transshipment at Hongkong. In reaching this conclusion the court said: "Direct shipment' means no more than directly imported,' and if Philippine products invoiced for the United States on a through bill of lading have been so transshipped as not to permit of their commingling en route with the commerce of any other country, the condition for direct shipment has been fulfilled according to the purpose and meaning of the statute. (T. D. 31505.)" I perceive no distinction between these authorities and the present case unless there is some peculiarity of purpose in the present act which would require the other construction, as for instance a purpose to foster steamship lines between the country of production and the United States rather than between the intermediate country and the United States. It is evident, however, that no such purpose existed. Indeed, it would hardly be applicable to traffic with Canada (which is the only traffic especially dealt with by the act), for that is conducted mainly by rail. In fact, the real purposes of Congress are well understood to have been (1) to take a step toward reciprocity, and (2) to obtain a supply of pulp wood on favorable terms. Neither of these purposes would be furthered in any degree by putting the unusual interpretation on the words "imported directly," but on the contrary they re quire the interpretation I have given, in order to permit a fair and equitable operation. It is evident that the clause was inserted as a precaution against abuse of the privilege or its use on behalf of countries other than that of production, as was the intention of the similar clause in the Philippine case (T. D. 30643, p. 554). For these reasons I am of opinion, as above stated, that a transshipment at Rotterdam, of a merely transportation character not constituting any commercial interruption in the journey, would not prevent these goods from being "imported directly" from Norway. Very respectfully, Approved: WINFRED T. DENISON, JNO. W. DAVIS, Acting Attorney General. To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. EXPORTATION OF HORSES, RIDING SADDLES, ETC., TO MEXICO. Ordinary, as distinguished from military, riding saddles, stirrups, girths, hay and other food stuffs, and horses are not munitions of war within the meaning of the amended joint resolution of March 14, 1912 (37 Stat. 630), prohibiting the export of "arms or munitions of war" to any American country in which, according to the President's proclamation, conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of such materials. Opinion of April 20, 1912 (29 Op. 394), dissented from. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant inquiring whether riding saddles, stirrups, girths, hay and other food stuffs, and horses, intended for the Mexican federal army or for other parties, are "munitions of war," within the meaning of the joint, resolution approved March 14, 1912 (37 Stat. 630), which prohibits the export of "arms or munitions of war" to any country in which, according to the President's proclamation, "conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of" such materials. In my opinion to the Secretary of War of August 11th last (30 Op. 213) it was stated that the term "munitions of war was not interchangeable with "contraband of war," but was confined to "articles manufactured and primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war." This definition would evidently exclude the articles to which you refer, as they are all plainly of a doubtful, and not primarily military, character. It is true that in treaties and in declarations of the political department of nations, from time to time, horses and their equipment have been designated as absolutely contraband. . While such public acts throw a light on the meaning of "contraband" as a matter of international law and are, indeed, binding as municipal law upon the courts of the countries whose political departments have so declared, it must not be forgotten that the question here involved is not one of international law, but of the intent of Congress, as expressed in the phrase "munitions of war" in the joint resolution. The authorities quoted in Attorney General Wickersham's opinion in 29 Op. 375 and in my opinion, supra, show that this term has always been used by responsible persons in a sense akin to "arms," and that it can not be stretched to include horses and their equipage. In addition to the authorities quoted in the two opinions just referred to I may be permitted to refer to Book III, Tit. IX, Art. 11 of the Ordonnance de la Marine of France of 1681, which directs confiscation of" les armes, poudres. boulets et autres munitions de guerre, même les chevaux et équipages qui seront transportés pour le service de nos ennemis," and of this inclusion of horses and their equipage in "contraband of war," Valin in his Commentary on the Ordonnances, as quoted in 3 Phill. (2d ed.) 448, remarks “parceque cela a beaucoup d'analogie avec les munitions de guerre." Phillimore himself evidently construes "munitions of war" in a limited sense (3 Phill. [2d ed.] 405); so does Halleck (Vol. II, 3 Eng. ed., § 20); so apparently does Oppenheim (Vol. II, §§ 392, 393), and the Naval War Code of the United States of 1901, while stating by Art. 36 that horses and mules are absolutely contraband, provides in Art. 24 as follows: "ART. 24. The term 'contraband of war' includes only articles having a belligerent destination and purpose. Such articles are classed under two general heads: "(1) Articles that are primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war, such as arms and munitions of war, military material, vessels of war, or instruments made for the immediate manufacture of munitions of war. "(2) Articles that may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances." The English rule, apart from treaties and proclamations, was that horses were not absolute contraband under international law. (Boyd's Wheaton, p. 651, Oppenheim, Vol. II, p. 424, citing Holland's Prize Law, § 62.) I am satisfied that the term "munitions of war" should not be extended beyond the plain definition expressed in my opinion of August 11. Outside of that limit you approach a debatable field where the articles are not clearly designed to "promote domestic violence," where there is a possibility of confusion in the minds of administrative officers and, perhaps, the adoption of inquisitorial methods, and where no line can logically be drawn short of practical nonintercourse with Mexico, a thing I am sure Congress did not intend. And for these reasons the particular designation of the articles, while important in determining their character as contraband, does not offer a safe guide to their character as "munitions of war," a character which, in my judgment, must be fastened upon them by the inherent nature of the articles themselves. These conclusions constrain me to dissent from the opinion of Attorney General Wickersham of April 20, 1912 (29 Op. 394), to the effect that ordinary, as distinguished from military, saddles and bridles are "munitions of war." This conclusion was probably largely based on the Declaration of London of 1909 (see 29 Op. 377, 378) defining absolute contraband and, as indicated above, I do |