So far as the holding of real estate in Ohio is concerned, section 8627 of the Revised Statutes of that State expressly authorizes corporations to hold all property, real or personal, necessary to effect the objects for which they are. created. That land is necessary for a home for orphan children is a proposition which seems to need no argument or authority to support it.

The statute which requires a certificate from the Secretary of State of authority to do business in this State applies only to foreign corporations for profit. The missionary society not being such a corporation was not required to have such a certificate. Section 26 of chapter 32 of the Revised Statutes provides that foreign corporations shall be subject to the same liabilities, restrictions and duties as are imposed upon corporations of like character organized under the general laws of this State and shall have no other or greater powers, and that no foreign or domestic corporation organized for pecuniary profit shall purchase or hold real estate in this State except as provided for by the general Corporation act. Section 31 of the same chapter authorizes corporations not for pecuniary profit to purchase, hold and dispose of real and personal estate for purposes of their organization, and under this authority they may take and hold as much real estate as is necessary for such purposes. (Hossack v. Ottawa Development Ass'n, 244 Ill. 274.) It has been held that the manifest purpose of section 26 was to produce uniformity in the powers, liabilities, duties and restrictions of foreign and domestic corporations of like character, and that foreign corporations which are doing business in this State possess the same powers as corporations organized under our statute but no greater. (Stevens v. Pratt, 101 Ill. 206; Barnes v. Suddard, 117 id. 237.) So in the latter case it was held that a corporation organized to conduct a manufacturing and commercial business under the laws of a foreign State which authorized it to hold any property necessary for its purposes and such as

should be taken in payment of or as security for debts due to it, had the power to acquire real estate in this State necessary for the transaction of its business or taken in payment of or as security for debts. So a corporation organized under the laws of another State solely for educational purposes, having the capacity, under its charter and the laws of its State, to acquire, hold and convey real and personal property, may take and hold real estate in this State to the extent of its capacity in the State of its creation. Santa Clara Female Academy v. Sullivan, 116 Ill. 375.

The missionary society being incorporated in Ohio for purposes for which a corporation might lawfully be organized in Illinois, and being authorized to hold real estate in Ohio necessary to effect the object for which it is created, has the same powers as if it were incorporated in Illinois, including the capacity to hold real estate, unless this capacity is restricted by the law of the State of its organization. The appellants contend that it is so restricted by the language of section 8627 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which provides that the corporation shall have power "to acquire and hold all property, real or personal, necessary to effect the object for which it is created, and at pleasure convey it in conformity with its regulations and the laws of this State." It is argued that since lands can be conveyed only according to the law of the place of their location, the legislature of Ohio, by requiring the power to convey to be exercised in conformity with the laws of that State, has restricted the power to acquire the ownership of land to that State. The words quoted do not refer to the form of execution of conveyances but to the general supervision of the State over corporations organized under its laws, their business and their property. Deeds of real estate must be executed formally in conformity with the laws of the State where it is situated. Such conveyances must also be in conformity with the regulations of the corpora

tion and the laws of its State. Though the corporation may acquire property beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the State, it is not thereby relieved from the supervision of the State and the control of its laws in the management, control and disposition of such property. It is conformity with the law of the State in these particulars which is required of the corporation in the acquisition, holding and conveyance of its real and personal property.

It is argued that the amount of the devise and the income derived from the property are entirely insufficient to carry out the testatrix's design. This objection is not sufficient to defeat the gift. The devise is with the direction to the devisee to establish and maintain a home for orphan children. The income, after the payment of annuities which were given by other parts of the will and amounted to $300 a year during the lives of the annuitants, was to be devoted to the preservation of the property and the payment of the expenses of the orphanage. If the devisee failed to establish or maintain the orphanage there is a devise over. The devisee accepted the devise, and there is no reason to suppose that the bounty of the testatrix will not be applied to the charitable purpose to which she devoted it. Alone it could, perhaps, accomplish little, but supplemented by the means and the efforts of the missionary society to which she has entrusted it, it may be expected to aid in the charitable purpose for which it was intended. The fact that the fund may not be sufficient to provide for the needs of all the orphans in Ogle county is no reason why it should be taken from them and turned over to the appellants.

The decree of the circuit court will be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

THE CACHE RIVER DRAINAGE DISTRICT, Appellee, vs. THE CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914.

1. DRAINAGE—when property owner may file cross-petition for damages. If the petition to confirm a levee drainage assessment does not fully set out the property to be taken for which no compensation has been made and the property which, though not taken, is damaged, the owner of such property has a right to file a crosspetition for damages and to have the question of damages considered by the jury empaneled to consider the question of benefits.

2. SAME the question of damage to property taken by improvement may be raised by objections. If property of an owner in a levee district is to be actually taken by the proposed drainage improvement but no compensation has been made, and the facts do not appear in the petition to confirm the assessment, the owner may raise the question by objections in such proceeding.

3. SAME what amounts to a taking of property. If the proposed change by a levee drainage district in the channel of a creek under a railroad bridge will add burdens which are not imposed by law upon the railroad company with respect to keeping the channel open and unobstructed, then there is a taking or damaging of the company's property for public use for which compensation must be made. (People v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. 262 Ill. 492, followed.)

4. SAME when a railroad company is not required to enlarge channel without compensation. A railroad company is bound to keep the channel of a natural water-course of such size as to afford a passage for all waters which naturally flow through such channel, even though such flow is increased by the construction of drainage ditches; but this does not mean that the channel must be enlarged without compensation to the company for property taken or damaged if the natural course of the stream is reversed by artificial means.

APPEAL from the County Court of Massac county; the Hon. W. F. ELLIS, Judge, presiding.

HOMER T. DICK, and C. L. V. MULKEY, (E. H. SENEFF, of counsel,) for appellant.

COURTNEY, HELM & HELM, for appellee.

264 - 7

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Massac county confirming the verdict of a jury assessing benefits on the right of way of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company for improvements in the Cache River Drainage District.

This cause has heretofore been before this court, (255) Ill. 398,) and the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded in October, 1912, for a new trial. The material facts as to this improvement were set forth in the opinion in that case and need not be re-stated. The case was redocketed in the county court March 25, 1913, and set for hearing May 26 of the same year. On March 13, 1913, the commissioners of the Cache River Drainage District notified the appellant that in the construction of what was known as the Post creek cut-off they found it necessary to remove appellant's trestle bridge across said creek; that the ditch at that point would be forty feet wide at the bottom and ninety-eight feet wide at the grade line of appellant's right of way. The notice requested that appellant remove said trestle bridge by a specified date and reconstruct and enlarge it so as to make a clear span of ninetyeight feet, "without any piles, posts, pillars, abutments or other obstructions to the flow of water therein." Appellee filed a petition for mandamus in the circuit court of Massac county April 18, 1913, praying that said railroad. company be commanded by said writ to remove its said trestle railroad bridge across said Post creek, as it was an obstruction to the natural water-course. To this petition a demurrer was filed and after hearing sustained by the trial court. On appeal to this court the judgment of the trial court was sustained. (People v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. 262 Ill. 492.) After the judgment of the circuit court was entered sustaining the demurrer to the petition for mandamus, appellant, on leave obtained,