though afterwards released on their parole, they were placed under a guard of soldiers, and threatened to be sent to Verdun. These acts of violence brought less profit to the French than they did harm to the Hamburghers. The trade of Hamburgh was annihilated, while the amount of English property and manufactures confiscated was inconsiderable. Before the armed force sent to Cuxhaven to stop the English vessels at the mouth of the river, arrived at that place, the merchantmen, apprised of their danger, had made their escape. The seizure of Hamburgh had been long foreseen, and though the French minister in that city persisted to the last in his declarations that its neutrality would be respected, little credit had been given to his assurances. The fate of Leipzig had been a warning to the merchants of Hamburgh. No exertious had been spared by the factors and commercial agents of the English, in disposing of their goods, and winding up their concerns before the arrival of Mortier and his army; so that, after all, the most valuable prize from this expedition proved to be the corn found in the magazines of Hamburgh, great quantities of which were sent to Berlin, where apprehensions of famine began to be entertained.

This new system of warfare, the French emperor, intoxicated with success, promulgated at Berlin on the 20th of November, in a decree interdicting all commerce and correspondence, direct or indirect, between the British dominions and the countries subject to his control. By this decree the British islands were declared to be in a state of blockade; all subjects of England found in countries occupied by French troops were declared prisoners of war, and all English property was declared lawful prize; all letters addressed to Englishmen, or written in the English language, were ordered to be stopped; all. commerce in English produce and manufactures was prohibited; and all vessels touching at England, or any English colony, were excluded from every harbour under the control of France. The pretext for these infringements of the law and practice of civilized nations was founded, partly, on the extension given by England to the right of blockade, and partly on the difference in the laws of war by sea and by land. By land the property of an enemy is not considered lawful prize, unless it belongs to the hostile state. By sea the property of unarmed, peaceable merchants is liable to capture and confiscation. By land no one is considered a prisoner of war who is not taken with arms in his hands. By sea the crews of merchantmen are considered prisoners of war equally with the crews of armed vessels. For these reasons the French emperor declared, that the regulations of the decree, which he now promulgated, "should be regarded as a fundamental

law of the French empire, till England recognized BOOK VII. the law of war to be one and the same by sea and by land, and in no case applicable to private pro- CHAP. IV. perty or to individuals not bearing arms; and till she consented to restrict the right of blockade to fortified places actually invested by a sufficient force."

Those parts of the decree which prohibited all commerce in English produce or manufactures, filled the commercial cities of the continent with dismay, as a measure fatal to their prosperity. Deputations were sent to Bonaparte from Hamburgh, and from Nantes, Bourdeaux, and other cities of France, to solicit, upon this head, some relaxation of a decree, not less injurious to his own subjects than to the English. But bis answers were stern and uncomplying. When told by the merchants of Hamburgh, that "these measures would involve them in universal bankruptcy, and banish commerce from the continent," his reply was "so much the better; the bankruptcies in England will be more numerous, and you will be less able to trade with her. England must be humbled, though the fourth century should be revived, commerce extinguished, and no interchange of commodities left but by barter." But notwithstanding these alarming appearances, this decree soon became perfectly harmless and inoperative. Some slight and temporary embarrassments in commerce were experienced from it at first; but, in a short time, though formally extended to Holland and other countries under the control of France, its existence was only known by the bribes given to generals of division and custom-house officers for omitting to enforce it, and by the occasional confiscation of some unfortunate vessel which had neglected that necessary precaution.

Immediately after the battle of Auerstadt, the King of Prussia had applied to Bonaparte for an armistice, and though his request of a cessation of hostilities was refused, he was encouraged to send a

plenipotentiary to the French head-quarters to nogociate peace. Lucchesini was accordingly dispatched thither without delay, and arriving there on the 22d of October, Duroc was named on the part of the French emperor to negociate with him. At first the Prussian minister was amused with hopes of concluding a peace on the terms which he was authorized to offer; but as the situation of his sovereign became every day more desperate, by the capture of his armies and surrender of his fortified places, the demands of the French rose in proportion; and, at length, the Emperor Napoleon explicitly declared, November 10, that he would never quit Berlin, nor evacuate Poland, till Moldavia and Wallachia were yielded by the Russians in complete sovereignty to the Porte, and till a general peace was concluded on the basis of the restitution of all the

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BOOK VII. Spanish, French, and Dutch colonies and possessions taken by Great Britain during the war. CHAP. IV. With this declaration all hopes of peace vanished, instead of which an armistice was now proposed by the French, and after much fruitless negociation concluded by Lucchesini, November 16, on terms so disadvantageous to his master, as well as impossible for him to execute, that reduced as his circumstances were, he refused, on the 22d, to ratify it. To justify him in this determination it is sufficient to mention, that he was made to purchase by this convention a suspension of military operations, without any hope of peace, and with a reservation to France of a right to renew hostilities after ten days notice, by surrendering Dantzig, Graudenz, Colberg, Breslau, or, in one word, almost all the fortified places in his possession, besides engaging, what he could not perform, to prevent the entrance of the Russian troops into his dominions. Desperate as was the chance of war, it was better than submission to such conditions.

While this negociation was going on, the French were prosecuting the war with unremitted activity. Two corps of their army crossed the Oder early in November; the one under the command of Marshal Davoust entered Posen on the 10th; and the other, consisting of the troops of Wirtemberg and Bavaria, with Jerome Bonaparte at their head, undertook the conquest of Silesia, where victory seemed easy and sure, as there was no army to contend with, and the fortified places were destitute of the means of defence. But the panic, which had delivered up so many Prussian fortresses without resistance, had begun to subside. Great Glogaw, the capital of lower Silesia, though invested on the 8th, and defended by a garrison of only 2,500 men, held out till the 29th; and Breslau, though bombarded for more than three weeks, did not surrender till the 5th of January, 1807. Repeated sallies were made by the garrison, and the besiegers were repulsed with loss in an attempt to storm some of the works. Nothing could exceed the gallantry and firmness of the inhabitants during the bombardment, though the town was set on fire in different places, and many persons were killed, and many houses and churches destroyed. An attempt was made to raise the siege by the Prince of Anhalt Pless; but his army, drawn from the garrisons in Upper Silesia, after being repeatedly defeated, was at length dispersed. This disaster extinguishing all hopes of relief, Breslau surrendered by capituIation.

As the attempts of the French emperor to excite insurrection in Poland were attended with little effect, and failed ultimately of success, it will be unnecessary to enter at length into the measures taken by his emissaries for that purpose, or to make extracts of their speeches and procla

mations. Dombrowski, a Polish exile in the French service, was the chief actor in this scene, and even the celebrated Kosciusko was brought again upon the stage. Some little sensation was produced in South Prussia, where the French armies were in force, and where the nobles were discontented with the Prussian government, for interfering with their privileges, and abridging their ancient authority over their serfs. But even in this part of the country, none of the great nobles joined the French, or showed a disposition to profit by their flattering offers of raising Poland again to her former rank among nations, and avenging her of her now humbled oppressors. In Russian Poland all classes were reconciled to their chains, and the nobles in particular, delighted with the splendour and consideration they enjoyed at Petersburg, had lost all recollection of the republic of Poland and liberum veto of their ancestors, as completely as those who now summoned them to freedom had forgotten the rights of man and republic one and indivisible.

The Russian troops, advancing to assist the Prussians, reached Warsaw before the French, and having taken possession of that city with a view to maintain it against the enemy, they sent forward a detachment to Lowicz, to defend the passage of the river Bzura. But this corps was attacked on the 27th of November by the advanced guard of the Grand Duke of Berg's division, and driven back with loss to Blonie. General Benningsen, who commanded the Russian army, having, in the mean time, received more accurate information of the French force marching against him, determined to abandon Warsaw and repass the Vistula with his troops, and not content with this retrograde movement, he continued his retreat beyond the Narew. The French entered Warsaw on the 28th and 29th, and applied themselves, immediately, with the greatest in dustry, to fortify the suburb of Prag on the opposite side of the river, and to re-establish the wooden bridge over the Vistula, which the Russians had burned in their retreat. The same military precautions were taken at Thorn, by Marshal Ney, and at Zakroczym by Marshal Augereau. At both places bridges were thrown over the Vistula, protected by formidable works, which at once facilitated the return of the army, and secured, if

necessary, its retreat. In addition to these measures of precaution, the fortresses of Custrin, Stettin, Spandau, Wittenberg, Erfurt, and Magdeburg were placed in the best possible state of defence, and strongly garrisoned, forming a chain of posts between the French army in Poland and the heart of Germany. And, besides compelling the confederates of the Rhine to furnish their full contingents to the army, a message was sent from Berlin to the French senate, before the departure of the emperor to Poland, desiring that the con

scripts of 1807, who by law could not be called out to serve till the following September, might be placed at his disposal on the 1st of January, 1807. This prudence and caution, worthy of an experienced general, and most suitable to the circumspect and wary character of Bonaparte, appeared to the Russians the result of fear and apprehension; and this conceit filled them with a barbarous exultation and stupid confidence in their arms. That such should have been the impression on the Russians, who know no tactics but marching straight forward to battle, and have no resource after battle but victory, does not in the least surprise us; but that the same opinion should ever have prevailed elsewhere, does indeed fill us with astonishment; we cannot, however, forget, that for a short period there were men of understanding who seriously believed, that the conqueror of Austria and Prussia was afraid of the half-civilized, half-disciplined savages of the north.

The Russian general, Benningsen, having formed a junction behind the Narew with the second division of the Russian army, under the command of Buxhoevden, and further reinforcements having arrived with Kamenskoy, who had been appointed by the court of St. Petersburgh commander-in-chief of the army, the Russians began again to advance, and fixing their head-quarters at Pultusk, threatened to drive the French over the Vistula. But while they were anticipating triumphs, and celebrating, with fire-works, at Sierock, the junction of their three armies, a small French detachment passed, in the night, over the Narew, and before 'morning had entrenched itself so strongly, that the Russians could not afterwards dislodge it. A bridge, similar to those thrown over the Vistula, was immediately constructed and fortified with works; and when this was finished, the whole French army began at once to move forward, in order to bring the united Russian and Prussian armies to a general en

gagement.

The French emperor having left Berlin on the 25th of November, and remained at Posen till the 16th of the following month receiving addresses and congratulations from the Poles, arrived at Warsaw on the 18th; and, on the 23d, put himself at the head of his army, and crossed the Narew. The French army was distributed in the following manner. The right, consisting of the divisions of Lasnes, Davoust, and the Grand Duke of Berg, and commanded by Bonaparte in person, having crossed the Narew at the abovementioned bridge, was opposed to the left flank of the Russians, who were so injudiciously drawn up by their generals as to be exposed to its attacks in this unfavorable position. To the left of this great division of the army was the corps of Augereau at Zakroczym on the Vistula, and

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at a still greater distance in the same direction BOOK VII. was the corps of Soult, which had crossed the river at Polock. The French left, consisting of CHAP. IV. the divisions of Ney, Bessieres, and the Prince of Ponte Corvo, after having advanced from Thorn to Golub, and from thence to Sierpsk, was directed to attack the Prussians under General Lestocq, and, by a rapid movement, to cut off their communication with the Russians. These orders were executed by Ney and Besseires with their accustomed promptitude and success. The chief actions were at Biezun and Soldau, in both of which the Prussians were defeated with considerable loss of men and artillery, and thereby prevented from forming a junction with the Russians. These actions took place on the 23d and 26th of December. The operations of the French right began on the night of the 23d, by an attack on the village of Czarnowo, on the Narew, where the Russians were in great force, and had erected batteries; but, after an obstinate resistance, their batteries were carried, and their troops dislodged by the French. Next day, the army under Kamenskoy was driven from its entrenchments at Nasielsk, and compelled to fall back several leagues; and the same day Augereau passed the Wkra at Kurscomb, and defeated a body of 15,000 men, who disputed with him the passage of that river. On the 25th, there was no action of consequence. The Russian columns, broken and dispersed, retired before the French in disorder, and nothing saved them from being entirely cut off, but the shortness of the days, which was favorable to their escape, and the badness of the roads, which prevented the advance of the French artillery. At this critical moment, Kamenskoy, the Russian commander-in-chief, left his army, and retired to Ostrolenka. The cause of his departure has been variously explained. His enemies gave out, that the late reverses of the army had disordered his mind, and rendered him incapable of the command. But there are some who pretend, that he was the only one of the Russian generals who was aware of their danger, and, that be left the army in disgust and despair, when he found his authority insufficient to curb the inconsiderate ardour of the younger generals, who were determined on risking another engage ment. In consequence of the departure of Kamenskoy, the command of the Russian army was divided between Benningsen and Buxhoevdep, the former at Pultusk, and the latter at Golomyn. Both were attacked by the French on the 26th, and both made an obstinate resistance. They were both, however, driven from their positions, and forced to retreat with precipitation, leaving behind them great part of their baggage and artillery. Soult had been sent forward by another road to cut off their retreat; but the horrible sloughs, the consequences of rain and thaw,

BOOK VII. retarded his march, and saved them from total destruction. According to the French accounts CHAP IV. the Russians lost, in these actions, 80 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition-waggons, 1,200 baggage-carts, and 12,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. Their own loss they admitted to

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have been 800 killed and 2,000 wounded; among the latter were six general officers, and one general of dragoons was killed. After the action of the 26th, the French army went into cantonments on the banks of the river Orzyk, and the Emperor Napoleon returned to Warsaw.

WHILE these events were passing in Poland, hostilities broke out unexpectedly between Russia and the Porte. This termination of the friendship and alliance which had subsisted between these two powers since the invasion of Egypt by Bonaparte, was brought about partly by the machinations of the French ambassador at Constantinople, and partly by the ambition and precipitate violence of the court of St. Petersburgh.

It had been lately settled by a convention between Russia and Turkey, that the hospodârs of Moldavia and Wallachia, when once appointed by the Porte, should remain in office for seven years, and should on no account be removed from their governments before the expiration of that term, without the concurrence of the Russian minister at Constantinople. That such a stipulation was derogatory from the sovereignty, claimed and exercised by the Ottoman Porte for ages in these provinces, cannot be denied. But the terms of the convention were clear and precise, and, when concluded and ratified, any contravention of its articles by one of the contracting parties, without the consent of the other, could not but be regarded as a breach of treaty, affording to the other party a just ground of complaint, and on refusal of redress, a justifiable cause of war. The convention might have been originally improvident on the part of the Turks, as being incompatible with the dignity, and inconsistent with the interests of their empire; but, when concluded, they were bound to abide by it, and had no right to abrogate or set it aside without the consent of Russia.

Affairs were in this posture, when the Ottoman government, alarmed at the progress of the French power, consented to send a special embassy to Paris, to congratulate Bonaparte on his assumption of the Imperial dignity; and contrary to its former determination, agreed to receive an ambassador from France. This concession was re

garded as an important victory by the French cabinet; and to improve the advantage it had gained, General Sebastiani was selected to be its ambassador at the Porte, as a person eminently qualified to promote its views in that quarter, by persuading Turkey to break her alliance with Russia and England, and revert to her ancient connection with France. Fully instructed in the part he was to act, no sooner had Sebastiani arrived at Constantinople, than he laid before the divan the treaty between France and Russia, recently signed at Paris by D'Oubril; and contending that an article of that treaty, which gua ranteed in general terms the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, amounted to a virtual repeal of the convention concerning the hospodars, which he knew to be disagreeable to the Turks, he succeeded in persuading the Porte to recal the reigning hospodârs, and appoint others in their place, without consulting the Russian ambassador, or regarding his formal protest against these measures. Having carried this point against the Russians, while it was still uncertain whether D'Oubril's treaty would or would not be ratified by the court of St. Petersburgh, the French negociator proceeded next, as soon as he understood the ratification of that treaty had been withheld, to present a note to the Ottoman government, Sept. 6, in which he demanded that the passage of the Bosphorus should be shut against all Russian ships of war, as well as against every other vessel of that nation, bringing troops, ammunition, or provisions; though he knew, that by a treaty between Russia and the Porte, that passage was open to the vessels of the former, without exception or limitation. If these and other demands in his note, urged with equal insolence and contempt of good faith and of the obligations of treaties, were instantly complied with, he assured the Turks of the friendship and

protection of his master, the great Napoleon; but if not immediately acceded to, he threatened them with instant war, and announced the presence of a formidable French army in Dalmatía, ready to punish or defend them, according to the party they espoused.

The Porte, instead of resenting these insolent proposals in the manner they deserved, whether governed by the intrigues, or terrified by the threats of Sebastiana, shewed a disposition to comply with his desires, and communicated the note received from him to the English and Russian ambassadors at Constantinople, in order to obtain their advice in this critical juncture of its affairs. Both these ministers, as was to be expected, remonstrated in the strongest terms against the wavering, undecided policy, which had lately directed its councils; but their representations made little impression on its government, till the Russian ambassador, Italinski, threatened to leave Constantinople, and began, September the 29th, to make preparations for his departure. Alarmed at the threats of the Russian minister, as they had been formerly dismayed by the menaces of Sebastiani, the Turks yielded a second time to their fears, reversed their late orders, restored the deposed hospodârs, in the manner required by Italinski, and acceded in fact to all his demands, October the 15th.

All cause of war between Russia and Turkey seemed now removed, when suddenly a Russian army, under General Michelson, entered Moldavia, November the 23d, and took possession of Chotzim, Bender, and Jassi.

When the news of this invasion reached Constantinople, that city was filled with indignation and surprise. The cry for war was loud and universal, especially among the janizaries and ulemas, whose religious fanaticisin and general hatred of Europeans were inflamed by the perfidy of the faithless Muscovites, the objects alike of their superstitious dread and deep-rooted aversion. But, so unwilling was the Turkish government to engage in hostilities with Russia, that notwithstanding this ardour on the part of the people, more than thirty days were suffered to elapse before war was determined upon and declared. A Russian brig, which attempted to pass through the streights of Constantinople, brought matters at last to a crisis. This vessel was stopped by the Turkish batteries, December the 25th, and the dispatches which it bore for the Russian minister, explanatory of Michelson's invasion, were thrown overboard and lost. This event determined Italinski to leave Constantinople without delay. He accordingly embarked in the Canopus, an English seventy-four, which had been for some time at anchor in sight of the Turkish capital, and contrary to the old but barbarous custom of the Ottomans, he was suffered

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to depart without molestation, December the 29th. BOOK VII. Next day a rescript from the grand seignior to the grand vizier was published, containing a CHAP. V. formal declaration of war against Russia. Great preparations were made by sea and land for carrying on hostilities with vigour. Paswan Oglou, Pacha of Widin, formerly pursued as a rebel, but now invested with legitimate authority in the revolted province, which he had successfully maintained against his sovereign, and Mustapha Bayracter, Ayan of Ruschuk, had been already commissioned to repel the infidels by force, and to oppose the further progress of their invasion. The Pachas of Romelia were ordered to advance towards the Danube to support them; and an army was assembled in Asia, at the head of which it was announced that the grand vizier would take the field in spring, bearing the sacred standard of the empire. The naval armaments of the Ottomans, as far as their means would allow, oorresponded with their military preparations. Their fleet was got in readiness and manned with the best sailors that could be procured; and to prevent any hostile designs upon their capital, orders were given to put the castles of the Dardanelles in the best possible state of defence.

In the mean time the Russians, under Michelson, after having completed the conquest of Moldavia, entered Wallachia, and having defeated a body of troops, which the Ayan of Ruschuck had sent to oppose them, they took possession without resistance of Bucharest, December the 27th, the capital of that province, and from thence sent detachments in all directions. At the close of the year they were masters of the three provinces of Moldavia, Bessarabia, and Wallachia; and threatened to cross the Danube, and join the revolted Servians under Czerni George; who after gaining repeated victories over the Turks, and nearly driving them from Servia, were at this time employed in the siege of Belgrade.

The invasion of Moldavia by the Russians, besides other bad consequences to the allies, excited the jealousy and ill-humour of Austria, and produced in her cabinet a temporary alienation from their cause. The system of Austria during the present campaign had been that of a cautious and prudent neutrality. When war between France and Prussia became inevitable, she assembled a formidable army on the frontiers of Bohemia, but declared at the same time to the belligerent powers, that she had no other intention in taking this step, than to maintain inviolate the integrity of her territories. While the fortune of the war was uncertain, those assurances appeared to both parties satisfactory, and no one presumed to find fault with her conduct, or doubt the sincerity of her professions. But, when the Prussians were driven across the Oder, an imperious message was delivered at Vienna, in the