Though they failed in the attempt to extend their political power, they enlarged the sphere of their knowledge; and they acquired information that might be of great use in the case of their ever engaging in another expedition, with or without the consent of the Porte, to Egypt. Bonaparte, the author and conductor of the expedition to Egypt, on a retrospect of its progress, vicissitudes, and termination, consoled the French nation with the reflection, that "the army of the East had left, in Egypt, an immortal memory, which would, perhaps, one day revive there the arts and institutions of society. And that history, at least, would not pass over in silence all that

the French had done to introduce into that BOOK V.

1801.

country the arts and improvements of Europe. It is a remarkable circumstance, that, by the CHAP. V. surrender of Alexandria, the French frigate, La Justice, fell into the hands of the English, and was by them ceded to the Turks. The capture of this completed the total annihilation of the fleet of Admiral Brueys. Of the four sail which escaped, under Admiral Gantheaume, on the morning of August 2, the Genereux, Guillaume Tell, and La Diane frigate, had already been captured at different periods by the English; La Justice had alone, till this period, escaped the defeat in Aboukir Bay.

WHILE the possession of Egypt was uncertain, the establishment of a French colony there was Bonaparte's chief design: it was the grand pivot on which the aggrandisement of France, and his own glory and fame were to turn. Around this favorite project, other collateral objects were arranged. To harass, distract, and exhaust the financial resources of England, by menaces of invasion, was, of itself, a wise measure of war: but it derived an additional interest and importance, in the eyes of the chief consul, as it might afford an opportunity, while the English fleets should be detained on their coasts, of slipping out a fleet, with succours to the French army in Egypt. While all was in movement on the side of the land, and camps were formed near the sea-coast, ships were equipped and victualled in the principal ports, and gun-boats, and other light vessels of war, were constructed and drawn, from time to time, to places of rendezvous on the British channel.

The plan of a descent on Britain in flatbottomed boats, from Boulogne, was first proposed by the famous Lally, in 1744. It was for a moment adopted by the French ministry, but quickly abandoned, as impracticable. There had not arisen any circumstances in the British army, or in the character of the British nation, and certainly not in the navy, that presented greater facilities of invasion, in the course of the last fifty years, than could be hoped for at any former period. Nor was the first consul of France so devoid of prudence, or desperate in fortune, as to

hazard so extravagant and frantic a project. At the same time, therefore, that the necessity of vigilance, and preparation for defence was allowed on all hands, the most reflecting and judicious part of the British nation were fully persuaded that no descent of any consequence would be attempted, unless it should be invited by too great carelessness or contempt of the enemy. The policy of Bonaparte was two-fold: to divide and distract, and to exhaust the resources of the British government; and, at the same time, to occupy and keep in exercise a very numerous army. This army he could not, in prudence or with safety, either to the republic, as it was still called, or to himself, permit to languish in absolute idleness, or to indulge the restless genius of Frenchmen, in listening to various schemes of

endless innovation.

The state of the continent was still critical and unsettled. The indemnities of Germany were yet to be fixed; the clamours of discontented states, and the intrigues of cabinets to be overawed. It was natural, therefore, in these circumstances, that France should station her disposable troops along the frontier, in a sort of activity, and in the expectation of services, in order to prevent idleness, cabal, remissness, and desertion.

But, while it was ridiculously asserted, and as ridiculously believed by many, that France had, in the month of August, from 60 to 80,000 men assembled in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk, 30,000 near Calais and Boulogne, 30,000 in

1801.

BOOK V. Flanders and Holland, and 60 or 70,000 more in the neighbourhood of Rochford and Brest, all CHAP. VI. her preparations were, in reality, but slight, and utterly inadequate to the object which she professed to have in contemplation. There was little danger of an attack from an enemy, whom even light ships of war every where insulted on their own coasts, who were every where attacked, and almost constantly with success, by British squadrons, and individual ships of inferior force, and the amount of whose progress towards invasion was little more than to smuggle a few gunboats along their own coasts, when they had the good fortune to escape being captured in the main seas, by regaining the ports from whence they came. The vessels were frequently drawn along shore by horses.

After the battle of Maringo had led to a negociation with Austria, and preliminaries of peace were signed on the part of that power, though afterwards disavowed by the Count St. Julien, a grand camp began to be formed at Amiens, in September, 1800. It was occupied by detachments from what was called the chosen army, commanded by General Murat, and was strengthened, from time to time, by additional numbers. A camp was also formed between Bruges and Ostend; another between Gravelines and Dunkirk; and a third at Boulogne: which was destined, as it was generally understood, to be the principal point from which the French, like the Romans, under Julius Cæsar, were to pass over into Britain. These three camps, by the month of July, 1801, were occupied by a great number of troops, among whom were many emigrant Irishmen; as there also were in camps formed at Brest, St. Maloes, and on the coast of Normandy. The building of ships, and other preparations for an immense naval armament, were carried on with great activity, all along the Dutch and Flemish coasts, as well as those of France. Rumours were industriously circulated, and by almost all the French, and by many of the English, credited, that a corps of 25,000 men, all chosen troops, under the command of General Hedouville, convoyed by thirty French and Spanish ships of the line, and a proportionable number of frigates, would sail from Brest; that a second corps of 12,000 men, under the command of General Humbert, and escorted by five ships of the line, and a frigate, would sail from the harbours of Normandy; and a third corps, consisting of 20,000, under the convoy of one ship of the line, eight frigates, and a great number of smaller ships of war, from the harbours of Flauders and Piccardy. This is the most moderate computation of the force that was destined by the French government for the invasion of England, or of Ireland. Other statements raised it to twice that number of men. All was in motion, from

the mouth of the Scheldt to the mouth of the Garonne. The islands of Jersey and Guernsey were threatened with immediate invasion from St. Maloes, Granville, and Cherburg. Besides the armament at Brest, destined, as was supposed, to make a descent on the west of England, or, more probably, on Ireland, there was a fleet of eight or nine vessels, under the command of Admiral Gantheaume, ready to sail on some unknown expedition; and another, of five ships of the line, under Admiral La Touche. The combined fleets of France and Spain, that lay in the harbour of Brest, ready, according to every appearance, to sail, amounted, so early as January, to fifty-two sail of the line.

Bonaparte, in order to combine his preparations at land with his preparations by sea, and to restore and improve the navy, had lately divided the whole extent of the sea-coasts of France into six maritime prefectures; namely, those of Brest, Toulon, L'Orient, Rochfort, Havre, and Antwerp. Not only ships, but gun-boats, and flat-bottomed boats, were equipped under the direction of the prefects, along the whole line of the coast. Redoubts were thrown up, and furnaces prepared for the heating of balls, in the places supposed to be most liable to attacks by the English. Telegraphs were erected for communication among the different prefectures, with one another, and with Paris. Proclamations were issued, from time to time, by the prefects, calculated to animate the courage and the hopes of the French seamen. If any little advantage was gained, by accident or by superiority of numbers, over any of the British ships, it was magnified into an important victory, and a signal instance of naval prowess. The British isles, and all the wealth of their commercial towns, were pointed out as the modern Carthage, whose spoils were to reward the enterprise and valour of the modern Ro

mans.

The British government and nation beheld these hostile preparations and threats without dismay, though not without a degree of anxiety as well as indignation. From Caithness to the Land's End, all glowed with ardour to meet the enemy on the theatre of either land or sea. The French had acquired the greatest glory, throughout the whole course of the present war, by their martial achievements on the continent. Their title to fame and renown was just, and not to be disputed. Yet all their exploits were found insufficient to overcome the inveterate and salutary prejudice, that one Englishman is fully a match for two Frenchmen. Not only the soldiers, but many of the officers, and even some of the commanders of the militia regiments, professed a firm persuasion of that maxim; not at any popular meetings, but in their social and convivial parties. with one another.

Orders were given, early in 1801, by the British ministry, to construct, as soon as possible, a number of gun-boats for the protection of the English coasts, particularly at the entrances into ports and the mouths of navigable rivers. Application was made, with success, by government, to the directors of the East-India company, for the use of such ships as were not taken up, for the commerce of India, for the current year, to be employed in different ways and for different purposes. The town of Liverpool solicited and obtained permission, from the legislature, to provide various means for their own defence: and this noble example was followed in other parts of the kingdom.

As the hostile preparations of the enemy increased, the activity of the British government, and the zeal of the people, were increased in proportion. In the end of July, a circular letter was issued from the office of the secretary of state for the home department, to the lord-lieutenants of counties; communicating intelligence which had been received, "That the naval and military preparations which had been for some time past carried on, in the ports and on the coasts of France and Holland, had of late been pursued to a great extent, and with increased activity; and that these preparations being apparently directed to the object of making an attack on some part of the United Kingdom, his majesty considered it as of the utmost importance, that the most effectual steps should be taken without loss of time, for employing, to the best advantage, that part of his military force, which the voluntary zeal and spirit of his subjects had placed in his hands, for the public security. The lords-lieutenant were requested by the secretary, in the name of his majesty, to signify to the commanders of the several corps of volunteer cavalry and infantry within their respective counties, his majesty's earnest wish that all corps of that description might be kept in a state of the utmost readiness for such immediate service as might be conformable to their respective engagements, and as the exigencies of affairs might require. And it was par ticularly recommended, that, under the present circumstances, the respective corps of volunteer cavalry and infantry should assemble, for the purpose of performing their military exercises, as frequently as their necessary avocations would admit."

This recommendation and request was obeyed, throughout every part of the united kingdom, with the utmost alacrity. Field-days and reviews were to be seen at every town, and almost in every parish. The whole country assumed a military air, and an attitude of defiance. The volunteers were ready either to march to any place where any body of the enemy should land or attempt a landing, or to take upon themselves the

duty of the garrisons, if it should be thought BOOK V. necessary to withdraw the regulars. As it was understood that the Dutch fleet, under Admiral CHAP. VI. De Winter, was ready to put to sea, and that the flotilla at Dunkirk, reinforced from time to time 1801. by detachments of troops from Amiens and Calais, and other parts of the coast, was ready to act at the same time that the flotilla at Boulogne was in a like state of forwardness, the lord-lieutenant of the counties of Suffolk and Essex, as well as the lieutenants of Kent and Sussex, directed inventories to be sent to them of the horses, wag gons, and other articles in the counties. A number of posting and hand-bills were printed, by order of government, to be distributed, in case of necessity, among the people, calling upon them to take up arms, and to employ other means calculated to embarrass and obstruct the progress of the enemy in case of actual invasion."

Towards the end of July, when the preparations of the enemy were so forward as to menace an actual attempt, strong piquet guards were mounted all along the coast, and orders issued for all the volunteers of the southern districts to be alert, and in a state of preparation to march, on immediate notice. Four complete parks of ar tillery, forming a hollow square, were so arranged, at Woolwich, as to be able to set off, at a moment's warning, to any part of the country. The horses were harnessed in the centre, and the drivers and engineers slept on the spot. In the rear of the guns, which were in general 9 and 12 pounders, were the chevaux-de-frize, and ammunitionwaggons.

Örders were given for re-embodying the sup plementary militia, disbanded at Christmas, 1799, and their joining their respective regiments. Instructions were given out respecting the state in which the troops were required to move at a moment's warning. moment's warning. "Being properly provided with country carriages, ammunition, and provisions, and leaving all incumbrances behind them, they were to march, as much as possible, together, in the small brigades of contiguous regiments into which they should be divided, agree ably to the particular routes and orders that would be immediately forwarded from head-quarters,, on the certainty of the enemy's appearance. Such brigades were to have each an appointed commander, or otherwise to be commanded by the eldest officer in rank for the time. In the first hurry of assembling the troops, on the landing. of an enemy, it might not be possible, in all cases, to prescribe positive routes, and to prevent crossing, crowding, and interfering in the march of so many bodies, moving from different places, and tending to the same point. The prudence and the arrangement of the senior officers, must: therefore, in the best manner, obviate such unavoidable difficulties. When the troops marched

BOOK V. in corps, and encamped, they would be the more easily provided for: but when it was necessary CHAP. VI. that they should be cantoned, or hurried on, they would be under a necessity of putting up with 1801. the most crowded and slightest accommodation; and a rigorous discipline must prevent them from requiring more than the country and circumstances could allow. On the routes where troops were to march sufficient bread might certainly be provided, in the large towns, on a short notice. Should this not be the case, commanding officers were, themselves, to obviate the difficulty in the best general mode they could, and not to permit individuals to trespass or commit outrages. Whether the troops should be cantoned, or encamped, a commissary was to attend each brigade, to regulate, and provide for the march, and to whom every necessary assistance was to be given. If there should be no commissary or assistant quartermaster, and the pressure should be such, that provision of straw, forage, or bread, must be had on the spot, the commanding-officer was to appoint one or more intelligent officers to act as commissaries, and assistant quarter-masters for the time, who should go forward with proper assistance, call upon the magistrate or magistrates of the neighbourhood, and, representing the necessity of the case, as the only means of preserving property, and the regularity of the troops, induce them to take such immediate measures, and give such orders, as would, on the spot, produce the necessary supplies: for all which the commanding-officers of each regiment would give full and distinct acknowledgments (signed also by the commissary or assistant quarter-master) in writing, specifying in words the quantities of each article received, the number of persons and horses thereby provided for, and for what time. Registers of every receipt, so granted, were to be kept by commanding-officers, as necessary checks if called on. And the receipts themselves were to be afterwards collected, and discharged by the commissary-general, at the fair rates of the country. The troops were to encamp on the commons, wherever there were such. Otherwise, they were ordered to encamp on such grass-fields as should be most convenient for their march, and to which they could do the least damage. But, if unavoidable damage should be done, the commanding officer of the encamping corps was to grant a certificate of the nature and amount."

Thus, in the inland arrangements, the government united the safety of the public with justice

to individuals.

On the sea-coast, all along the channel, from the Nore to Falmouth, a system of night signals was employed to announce any approach of danger. Frigates and gun-boats were stationed at proper places near the British shore. The return of the Baltic fleet, while it added to the

amount of England's disposable naval force, inspired, if possible, into her seamen and marines, still higher sentiments of courage, honor, and glory. Such was the immensity of Britain's navy, that her fleets, squadrons, and cruisers, blocked up the enemy in their principal ports, and watched their flotillas of gun-boats, while they endeavoured, with various success, to skulk close to the shore, from one place to another, and annoyed, and quashed their trade in every quarter of the world. A chain of English vessels of war stretched along the whole extent of the French coast on the channel, generally about two or three miles from land. Frigates were stationed behind the promontories, for intercepting any vessels that should venture to put to sea, not knowing their danger. Sometimes the English frigates, and other lighter vessels, would dash in, and cut out the enemy's ships from their creeks and harbours. The Dutch fleet, and the preparations in the adjacent ports of the enemy, were watched, and held in check by squadrons under the command of the admirals Dickson and Greaves. That under Dickson, who had the chief command of both, amounted to twelve sail of the line, besides frigates. That under Greaves, to five or six sail of the line, besides other vessels. The harbour of Toulon was watched, and the neighbouring coasts scoured by Sir John Borlase Warren. Admiral Cornwallis, with fourteen sail of three-deckers, and one 80 gun-ship, besides frigates, and other armed vessels, cruised off Brest. A squadron of eight sail of seventy-fours, and two of eighty-four, besides frigates, cutters, and gun-boats, under Rear-admiral Sir James Saumarez, blockaded Cadiz.

So great, at this time, the summer of 1801, was the immense strength of the navy of Eng land, that she had a fleet in the Indian ocean; a fleet in the Red Sea; a fleet at the mouth of the Nile; two fleets in or near the Mediterranean; a small fleet in the Baltic; a fleet in the West Indies; detached cruisers and convoy-ships in every direction; and a channel fleet: while a flotilla of vessels of different descriptions, under the command of Lord Nelson, who was invested with the supreme command of maritime affairs from the Land's End to Yarmouth, guarded the British shores, and struck terror into those of France.

Such was, in general, the disposition of Britain's fleets in the months of February, March, April, May, June, and July; though, on so variable an element, and amidst such complicated and shifting scenes, they underwent, of course, many variations, which shall be noticed in our chapter devoted to naval history.

The nature of the maritime war that was, at this time, carried on close in on the French side of the channel, and the extreme absurdity of the

threatened invasion will appear from the mention of one circumstance, that when their vessels were enabled to skulk along the shore, and to escape from the British ships of war, by means of batteries on land, this was published as matter of congratulation and triumph. The following article, extracted from the French journals, was considered as a piece of great and good news. Brest, August 22d. Four chasse-marées, laden with salt, having doubled the point of Pennemarck, were chased about nine o'clock in the morning by an English frigate, which endeavoured to cut off their retreat from Audierne. The troops of artillery and infantry were at their post; already the frigate had discharged several shots on one of the chasse-marées, and had considerably damaged it. It was on the point of surrendering when the crew were loudly encouraged from the battery of Cremence to continue their voyage, with assurances that they would receive the necessary degree of protection from a battery near at hand. Encouraged by this, the vessel continued its course, and arrived in safety at the place of its destination.

"The officer commanding the battery, seeing that the three other vessels were making the shore at an intermediate point, and that the frigate had manned three boats, to defeat their design, for want of horses, caused the cannoniers to drag along the beach a field-piece three quarters of the way. But their strength failing them, they took up their muskets, and, conjointly with the infantry, flew to the place where the vessels were aground. But the enemy had previously reached the place, and had time, in spite of a very brisk fire from the battery of Sock, to set fire to two of the chasse-marées, and to carry off the third. Two officers of the 40th, with a number of the fusileers and cannoniers precipitated themselves on board the vessels. In the face of 150 shots from the frigate, which was at anchor opposite to them, they succeeded in extinguishing the fire on board one of them, and brought her safe into the port of Audierne. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on the activity and zeal of the officers, fusileers, and cannoniers."

Thus the French and English were busily employed in keeping each other on the alert. A mighty force was collected on either side of the channel. More and more troops were continually drawing to the French coast. Reinforcements, on the other hand, were daily sent to the British, so that, by the beginning of August, the sea was covered in a manner with their ships of war along the whole extent of the coast, from which the enemy might attempt to execute their threats of invasion. But a system of mere defence was not considered as worthy of the British nation. Even menaces of invasion were not to pass with impunity. It would have been mad

ness to have attempted an invasion of France; BOOK V. but there were different points on the coasts of France, Flanders, and Holland, where deep CHAP. VI. wounds might be given; and where the painful and tedious preparations of the enemy might be 1801. disconcerted in a moment.

To turn the tide of war from defensive to offensive, was deemed a not less wise than magnanimous conduct. The nature of war merely defensive was dispiriting. It gave the enemy not only the choice of his time and place, but the advantage of courage and energy in his attack. It was better to hazard something in offensive war than to lower the public mind by suspense. At the very point of time, therefore, when the project of invading England appeared to be ripe for execution, it was determined that Lord Nelson, with a flotilla of gun-boats and other armed vessels, backed by some ships of the line, should carry the terrors of war home to the doors of France. A fitter agent for this purpose could not have been chosen than Lord Nelson. His very name was a tower of strength and every thing possible to be done was to be expected from the skill as well as galiantry of his conduct.

While the armament to be directed by Lord Nelson was drawing together at Sheerness and the Nore, and of which further mention shall be made in our naval history, a stop was put to all intercourse between England and the opposite coasts. Orders were sent by government not to suffer any persons whatever to land from France, Flanders, or Holland.

The French, instead of making attacks on England, were wholly employed in preparations for defence against the dreaded attacks of the English armament. At Boulogne, Dunkirk, Dieppe, Havre, Cherbourg, and other places, where the English might direct their attacks, land-forces were collected from the neighbouring quarters; batteries were constructed, and furnaces erected for heating red-hot shot; all which had fires in them ready for service. The French were every where on their coasts; they kept on the alert, and felt that anxiety and alarm which unavoidably arise in the most courageous breasts from ignorance of the particular point to be attacked by a brave and enterprising commander.

The war between France and Britain assumed now an, aspect extremely interesting to every individual of the French and British nations. In former wars, and in the preceding part of the present, hostilities were carried on in distant colonies. In Italy, Germany, or other parts of the continent, the nations seemed now to come to close quarters with each other. The contest bore somewhat of the character of the struggles between the French and English in the days of the Henrys and Edwards. The French encampments, on the coast of Picardy, were seen