plausibility for attempts to form monopolies. It is at this point that the arguments in favor of trusts possess most weight. Yet, with all the strength that the movement towards combination has acquired, competition has always vexed the would-be monopolist, and is especially active at the present moment. As this is written, one trust is already confronted by fourteen independent companies, while another rival enterprise with a capital of $1,000,000 is in process of formation. Another combination owning 290 mills was, in October, confronted by independent companies operating 74 mills; and in December a new concern with a capital of $5,000,000 was formed. Almost every day brings word of the appearance of new competitors for various trusts, and the New York Journal of Commerce says that the revival of competition may be considered a general movement. Some of the independent enterprises may have been started with the purpose of selling out to the trusts; but, if combinations have the superior efficiency that is claimed for them, they are under no obligation to purchase, and the investors in rival concerns would be taking inconceivable risks if competition were really useless. Trusts purchase rival concerns because competition from such companies is dangerous, and not hopeless; and the revival of independent enterprise is a reason for believing that the business world has not accepted the theory that a combination possesses material advantages over separate companies of a large size. Experience may yet demonstrate that the attempt to "regulate" industry by consolidated enterprise is the surest method of producing over-investment and depression.1 If one concedes that competition is attended with real evils, he is admitting nothing that economists have not known for a long time; and, if it is denied that combination is a good, or even possible, remedy for the ills from which we occasionally suffer, all hope of escape does not disappear. The growth of fixed capital has undoubtedly introduced into industry a disturbing element, productive sometimes of fluctuating prices and excessive investments of capital in certain directions. The situa1 On the inevitable persistence of competition, even under a general attempt to establish monopolies, see Clark in Economic Studies, I, 13. tion can be improved by the repeal of unwise laws that intensify whatever unhealthful tendencies competition may have; and, beyond that, relief can be found in measures that will raise business management to a higher plane. The moral and legal responsibility of our captains of industry must be made commensurate with the enormous powers that they wield; and the same moral restraints to which, in the last analysis, even believers in combination appeal,1 would prove a solvent of the very ills which monopoly is supposed to remedy. Then sound judgment can be fostered by the further development of industrial statistics; and, finally, the substitution of a moderate policy in the place of monopoly-hunger would be more helpful than all else. It may be found, in the long run, that a willingness to allow one's neighbors to live not only possesses more solid advantages than the "economies of combination," but is the only basis upon which private ownership and control of industry can continue. As corporate enterprises in America grow older, each company may cease to be dominated by a few men; and the management may come to represent the average opinion of the stockholders. Such conditions would probably favor the development of a "live and let live" policy. In any event, it will prove easier to impress upon independent business firms. the saving grace of moderation than to persuade the monopolist to exercise his powers in a wise and benevolent manner. Good despots there have been, undoubtedly; but we have had no experience with human nature that goes to prove that autocratic control is generally safer in industry than in politics. HARVARD UNIVERSITY. CHARLES J. BULLOCK. 1 See Hadley, 120; Andrews, in International Journal of Ethics, IV, 334. 2 Note Marshall's comparison of English and American corporation methods, Some Aspects of Competition, 14. Suggestions for Anti-Trust, 280; for MASSACHUSETTS. Public Control in, 121; Anti-Stock- MICHIGAN SALT ASSOCIATION, I. And Large-Scale Production, 446; and NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY. See Northern Securities Company, 324. OCEAN FREIGHT RATES. Fluctuations, 114. OVER-CAPITALIZATION. See also Capital- ization. Evils of, xxiii, 125. And Monopoly, 452. Historical growth of, x; Michigan PRICE, xxv. Of Salt, 14; of Corn and Whiskey, 34, PROFITS. Salt Manufacture, 16; Whiskey Trust, International Mercantile Marine Com- Issue of, in England, 418; of United In Massachusetts, 389; in Germany, RAILROAD CONSOLIDATION, 375. In Massachusetts, xiii. Treatment of, in Germany, 409. SHERMAN ACT. See Anti-Trust Law. |