not a principal, the felony being complete before he interfered.1 And it may be, therefore, generally declared that a confederate is not responsible for a crime which is not a probable and natural result of the confederacy, unless such crime was committed with his assent.2 §215. In the case of murder by duelling, in strictness, all parties, as will be more fully seen, are technically principals.3 In duels And all persons present at a prize-fight, having gone all are thither for the purpose of encouraging the prize-fighters, principals. are principals in the breach of the peace.* Persons suicide are § 216. If one encourage another to commit suicide, and is present aiding him while he does so, such person is guilty of murder as a principal; and if two encourage each other to abetting murder themselves, and one does so, the other being pres- principals ent, but the latter fail in an attempt upon himself, he is in murder. principal in the murder of the first." Whether the influence of the defendant was the exclusive cause of the suicide is immaterial." All present at the time of committing the offence are principals, although only one acts, if they are confederates, and engaged in the common design of which the offence is a part. Where, however, the act is done in the absence of the party who incites it, the latter has been held in England not to be amenable to indictment as a 1 R. v. King, R. & R. C. C. 332, 1818; R. v. McMackin, R. & R. C. C. 333, 1818. Supra, ? 160. 2 See infra, 3 220, 397, 478; R. v. Murphy, 6 C. & P. 103, 1833; R. v. Franz, 2 F. & F. 580, 1860; R. v. Horsey, 3 Ibid. 287, 1862; R. v. Skeet, 4 Ibid. 931, 1864; R. v. Hawkins, 3 C. & P. 392, 1828; R. v. Tyler, 8 Ibid. 616, 1838; R. v. Price, 8 Cox C. C. 96, 1858; U. S. v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209, 1821; Com. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541, 1863; Watts v. State, 5 W. Va. 532, 1872; Manier v. State, 6 Baxt. 595, 1875; Lamb v. People, 96 Ill. 73, 1880; People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112, 1872; State v. Stalcup, 1 Ired. 30, 1840; Miller v. State, 15 Tex. App. 125, 1883; Harris v. State, Ibid. 629, 1883. See R. v. Colli son, 4 C. & P. 565, 1831; and see other cases cited infra, & 397. does not constitute complicity, see 4 R. v. Perkins, 4 C. & P. 537, 1831; R. v. Murphy, 6 C. & P. 103, 1833. Cf. R. v. Coney, cited supra, ¿ 212; infra, 22 373, 636. See more fully infra, 22 448 et seq.; R. v. Dyson, R. & R. C. C. 523, 1819; R. v. Russell, 1 Mood. C. c. 356, 1832; R. v. Allison, 8 C. & P. 418, 1838; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 165, 1872; State v. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412, 1879. 6 Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 1815; Whart. Prec. 107. 7 Green v. State, 13 Mo. 382, 1850. That a mere sympathetic cognizance See supra, ?? 206–208. principal, because he was not present; nor as an accessary before the fact at common law, because the principal cannot be convicted ;' nor as guilty of a substantive felony under 7 Geo. III. c. 64, s. 9, because that statute is to be considered as extending to those persons only who, before the statute, were liable either with or after the principal, and not to make those liable who before could never have been tried. But by subsequent statutes the English law in this respect is materially changed.3 That an attempt to commit suicide may be indictable at common law is elsewhere seen." A party who compels another to take poison, so as to produce death, is responsible for the murder as principal in the first degree." § 217. Where one assailant strikes a blow which is not fatal, and a confederate follows it up with a fatal blow, both are executing principals in the homicide. If part of a crime also be committed in one place and part in another, each person arately are concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principa s. principal. Hence if several combine to forge a document, Persons parts of crime sep 1 R. v. Fretwell, 9 Cox C. C. 152, administering of poison. Neither de1862; L. & C. 161. 2 See R. v. Leddington, 9 C. & P. 79, 1839; R. v. Russell, 1 Mood. C. C. 356, 1832. 3 See infra, ?? 448 et seq. • Supra, & 175. 5 Thus in a case tried in 1872 in Ohio (where suicide is not a crime, there being in that State no common law crimes), the evidence was that the defendant, Blackburn, gave to the deceased, Mary Jane Lowell, poison, to be taken by her; and there was evidence tending to show that the defendant, by threats of violence or otherwise, forced her to swallow the poison, or forced it down her throat. There was also evidence of a mutual agreement between the parties to commit suicide. The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, under the Ohio statute making killing by administering poison murder. This was sustained in the Supreme Court. "To force poison down one's throat," said Welch, J., "or to compel him by threats of violence to swallow it, is an ception nor breach of confidence is a necessary ingredient in the act. It matters not whether the poison be put into the hand or into the stomach of the party whose life is to be destroyed by it." Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 1872. In a reserved case before the English judges, the evidence showed that the prisoner procured certain drugs and gave them to his wife, with intent that she should take them in order to procure abortion. She took them in his absence and died from their effects. On an indictment against him for manslaughter, it was objected that he was only an accessary before the fact, and that in law there cannot be an accessary before the fact to manslaughter. It was held that a conviction for manslaughter was proper. R. v. Gaylor, 7 Cox C. C. 253; Dears. & B. C. C. 288, 1856; People v. Weber, 5 W. Coast R. (Cal.) 290, 1885. Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33, 1881. R. v. Kelly, 2 C. & K. 379, 1847. See R. v. Lockett, 7 C. & P. 300, 1836; and each executes, by himself, a distinct part of the forgery, and they are not together when the instrument is completed, they are nevertheless all guilty as principals.' And if A. counsel B. to make the paper, C. to engrave the paper, D. to fill up the names of a forged note, and they do so, each without knowing that the others are employed for that purpose, B., C., and D. may be indicted for forgery, and A. as an accessary; for if several make distinct parts of a forged instrument, each is a principal, though he do not know by whom the other parts are executed, and though it is finished by one alone in the absence of the others.3 Persons outside keeping watch are principals. § 218. It has been already seen that actual immediate presence at the injury is not necessary; (1) when the defendant acts through an irresponsible agent (e. g., through a lunatic or infant); and (2) when he acts through a material agent, such as poison, which does not require the of presence a guilty director to make it effective. Nor is it necessary that the party should be actually present, an ear or eye-witness of the transaction, in order to make him principal in the second degree; he is, in construction of law, present aiding and abetting, if, with the intention of giving assistance, he be near enough to afford it should the occasion arise. Thus, if he be outside of an inclosure, watching, to prevent surprise, or for the purpose of keeping guard, while his confederates are inside committing the felony, such constructive presence is sufficient to make him a principal in the second degree." R. v. Gogerly, R. & R. C. C. 343, 1818; R. v. Owen, 1 Mood. C. C. 96, 1826; R. v. Vanderstein, 10 Cox C. C. 177, 1865; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496, 1829; Com. v. Lucas, 2 Allen, 170, 1861; Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213, 1870; Stephens v. State, (Ohio) 18 Rep. 181, 1884; State v. Hardin, 2 Dev. & Bat. 407, 1837; State v. Coleman, 5 Porter, 32, 1837; State v. Town, Wright's Ohio R. 75, 1831; Breese v. State, 12 Ohio St. 146, 1861; Tate v. State, 6 Blackf. 110, 1842; Doan v. State, 26 Ind. 495, 1866; State v. Squaires, 2 Nev. 226, 1865; Selvidge v. State, 30 Tex. 60, 1867; Truitt v. State, 8 Tex. App. 148, 1880; Thomas v. State, 43 Ark. 149, 1884. No matter how wide may be the separation of the confederates, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony, and all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is direct connection between the actor and the crime. Turning out a wild beast with intent to do mischief, so that thereupon death ensues, involves, as we have seen, the guilt of a principal; and the same grade of guilt is imputable to him who, intending to kill, sets a spring-gun, or explosive machine,3 no matter how far he may be from the place where the hurt is inflicted. Hence, as will presently be more fully seen, a confederate who aids in the commission of a robbery by a signal on a distant hill, notifying the approach of the parties to be attacked, is a principal in the robbery. A person, however, is not constructively present at an overt act of treason, unless he be aiding and abetting at the fact, or ready to do so, if necessary.5 An abettor must be near ance. § 219. But persons not actually assisting are not principals at common law. Thus, where Brighton uttered a forged note at Portsmouth, the plan was concerted between him and two others, to whom he was to return, when he passed enough to give assist- the note, and divide the proceeds. The three had before been concerned in uttering another forged note; but at the time this note was being uttered in Portsmouth, the other two stayed at Gosport. The jury found all three guilty, but on a case reserved, the judges were clear that as the other two were not present, nor sufficiently near to assist, they could not be deemed principals, and therefore, they were recommended for a pardon. Going toward the place where a felony is to be committed, in order to 1 Supra, 209-213; R. v. Standley, R. & R. C. C. 305, 1818. But the crime must be the result of a prearranged plan. Roney v. State, 76 Ga. 731, 1886; Jordan v. State, 81 Ala. 20, 1887; Quinn v. State, (Tex.) 20 S. W. Rep. 1108, 1893; State v. Whitson, (N. C.) 16 S. E Rep. 332, 1892; White v. People, 139 Ill. 143, 1891. 5 United States v. Burr, 4 Cranch, 492, 1808; infra, ? 224. 6 Taylor v. State, 9 Tex. App. 100, 1880. One within 150 yards aiding and abetting can be convicted as a principal. State v. Chastain, 104 N. C. 900, 1890; and see State v. Praeter, 26 S. C. 198, 1887. 7 R. v. Soares, Atkinson & Brigh ton, 2 East P. C. 974, 1802; R. & R. 2 Fost. 349; 1 Hale, 514. C. C. 25; and see R. v. Stewart and See supra, ?? 161, 166; infra, 507. others, Ibid. 363, 1818; R. v. BadState v. Hamilton, 13 Nev. 386, cock and others, Ibid. 249, 1817; R. v. 1878, cited infra, 220; see Scales v. Manners, 7 C. & P. 801, 1837. Infra, State, 7 Tex. App. 361, 1880. 8 710. assist in carrying off the property, and assisting accordingly will not make a man a principal, if he were at such a distance at the time of the felonious taking as not to be able to assist in it. And although an act be committed in pursuance of a previous concerted plan between the parties, those who are not present, or so near as to be able to afford aid and assistance at the time when the offence is committed, are not principals in cases where the felony is immediately executed by responsible agents, but are accessaries before the fact. Presence, however, during the whole of the transaction, is not necessary; for as we have already seen, if several combine to forge an instrument, and each execute by himself a distinct part of the forgery, and they are not together when the instrument is completed, they are, nevertheless, all guilty as principals.3 And presence is not to be determined by mere contiguity of space. A man who, on a mountain-top at a distance of thirty miles, assists a highway robber, by a signal, in making an attack, is a principal in the robbery.* § 220. All those who assemble themselves together, with an wrongful are charge able with incidental felony. intent to commit a wrongful act, the execution whereof Persons makes probable in the nature of things a crime not spe- confedercifically designed, but incidental to that which was the ating for object of the confederacy, are responsible for such inci- purpose dental crime. Thus, if several persons come armed to a house with intent to commit an affray or a personal outrage (such affray or outrage having bloodshed as a probable incident), and a homicide ensues while the assailants are engaged in such illegal proceedings, then even those who may not actually participate in any overt act of outrage will be principals in the homicide. And where persons combine to stand by one 1 R.. Kelly, R. & R. 421, 1820. 1 R. v. Soares, R. & R. 25, 1802; R. r. Davis, Ibid. 113, 1810; R. v. Elsee, Ibid. 142, 1813; R. v. Badcock, Ibid. 249, 1817; R. v. Manners, 7 C. & P. 801, 1837. • State v. & P. 437, 1837; R. v. McNaughton, 14 Cox C. C. 576, 1879; Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511, 1853; Carrington v. People, 6 Parker C. R. 336, 1860; State v. Johnson, 7 Oreg. 210, 1879; Peden v. State, 61 Miss. 268, 1875; Allen v. State, 12 Lea, 424, 1883; W. S. v. Boyd, 45 Fed. Rep. 851, 1890; Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99, 1884. Infra, 1536. 6 Dalt. J. c. 161; 1 Hale, 439; R. v. Bingley, R. & R. 446, 1820. See 2 East P. C. 768. See supra, 217. Hamilton, 13 Nev. 386, 1878. Infra, 280. As giving a still larger meaning to "abet," see State v. Stanley, 48 Iowa, 221, 1878. Supra, & 214; Fost. 351, 352; 2 State, 61 Miss. 268, 1875; State v. 29, s. 9; R. v. Howell, 9 C. Barrett, 40 Minn. 17, 1889. Hawk. c. Hawk. b. 2, c. 29, s. 8; Simmons v. State, 61 Miss. 244, 1875; Peden v. |