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Mott v. Mott.

Westchester, where they lived until 1887, when they went to St. Augustine, Florida.

Mrs. Mott continued in Hackensack, occupying sometimes part of her own house and renting the balance, and at other times occupying rooms and renting her house. Her grandson, Charles Ackerman, lived with her, as did her granddaughter, Ella Russell, a part of the time, until she left Hackensack for a year or so, when, having been married to Dr. Russell, she returned to that place. It was arranged, in the year 1887, that the old lady should go to Florida to visit her daughter, on which trip her grandson, Charles Ackerman, was to be her escort. It was delayed at first, as he says, by the fact that he was not able to leave his business, and it appears by the evidence that afterwards Mrs. Mott's husband was seriously ill at his daughter's, Mrs. Van Scivens, in Connecticut, and the old lady, desiring to arrange some matters before his death, went to her stepdaughter's, and remained with her husband until his death, which occurred in the fall of that year. She returned, after her husband's death, to Hackensack, and continued to reside there until the latter part of May or June, 1888, when she went to visit her son, Damon, who lived in Connecticut, prior to going to Florida, which she had again determined to do.

In the summer of 1888 she was the owner of a tract of twelve acres of land in Connecticut, the value of which is not stated; a house and lot in Hackensack, in this state, worth $1,500; certain household effects; an indebtedness of her son, Damon, of $450, secured by a chattel mortgage; a note of Albert C. Bogert for $82 or $100; a note of her son-in-law Ackerman of $19 or $20; a claim against her granddaughter, Mrs. Ella Russell, of $100, and one against her grandson, Charles Ackerman, of over $125; a deposit in the savings bank of $214 and some cents.

It is claimed by her son, the defendant, Damon Mott, that his mother, in the summer of 1888, made over the whole of her property to him, by which she cancelled his indebtedness to her and invested him with the ownership of all her personal property and rights in action and the title to her real estate.

Mott v. Mott.

Deeds from her to him of the real estate in Connecticut and New Jersey, dated respectively August 6th and August 10th, 1888, were executed and placed upon the record.

This suit is brought in the name of Ann E. Mott by William E. Skinner, her guardian, to set aside the deed of the property in Hackensack, on the ground that the defendant fraudulently obtained title to said lands from his mother "by procuring in some way her signature to said paper writing purporting to be a deed of conveyance to him of said lands," at a time when she was unable, by reason of mental derangement, unsoundness and imbecility, to comprehend what she was doing, and when what she did had made no impression whatever upon her mind, or at some other time or by some means induced her to convey said lands and premises to him, at a time when her mind was deranged or unsound, or weak, or under an undue influence exercised or exerted by him.

The answer of the defendant denies the grounds stated, as to his mother's mental capacity or weakness or that he fraudulently obtained title to the lands mentioned, and insists that his mother was competent to convey, and that the transfer was made to the defendant for a good and valuable consideration, he agreeing to provide her a home and support her during her life, and for her protection to make a will in her behalf.

It is insisted that the complainant must establish that, at the time of the execution of the deed, she was either mentally inoompetent or acted under what is technically known as undue influence exerted over her by the defendant.

It is undeniable that relief cannot be granted on proof of facts outside the case made by the pleadings. But while it is true that the bill should contain averments of the rights of the complainant alleged to be attacked, and of the injury thereto inflicted or threatened by the defendant, sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and sustain the relief asked, it is not always necessary that such injury be characterized by technical terms-the acts of the defendant detailed with particularity, or proved to the extent specified. With reference to such acts, if there is in the bill substantial averment, or the recital of facts

Mott v. Mott.

which disclose to the defendant generally the grounds of complaint, it will be sufficient, on final hearing on pleadings and proofs, in a case when the facts cannot be within the knowledge of the acting party, if the grounds of relief are substantially involved in the statements of the bill and are sustained by the evidence. Outcault v. Disborough, 2 Gr. Ch. 214; Mutual Life v. Sturges, 6 Stew. Eq. 328, 337; Goherty v. Bennett, 10 Stew. Eq. 87; Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. 537, 571; Brice v. Brice, 5 Barb. 533, 541; Deatly's Heirs v. Murphy, 3 Marsh. (A. K.) 472, 474.

The general charge in the bill is that the defendant fraudulently procured this deed from his mother. It is charged to have been effected either while she was non compos or at some time or by some means when her mind was deranged or unsound. or weak, or by undue influence exerted by him over her.

The peculiar features of this suit are not to be overlooked.. It is not by a party sui juris, but in behalf of one who at the time of filing the bill must be taken to be non compos. It is brought by her legal guardian, who has not, and cannot have, knowledge of the peculiar and special phase of frand adopted. The bill charges that the complainant was in an enfeebled state of mind, either totally or partially imbecile. These are, however, but specifications of her mental condition. The charge is the fraudulent procuring of this deed. That is specifically presented to the defendant as the act attacked which requires his defence. No surprise can be alleged by him; he is thoroughly advised that his conduct in procuring this deed from his mother at the time and in the manner he did is brought in question and charged to be fraudulent. To require particularity of charge in such a case would be a denial of justice and offering a premium to frauds carried out in secret.

The inquisition in July, 1889, found Mrs. Mott of unsound mind, incapable of the government of herself or her estate, from January, 1888, a time anterior to the conveyance attacked. The inquisition, however, simply makes a prima facie case, and is not conclusive, against the defendant, even as to the point of time. when it was taken. Hunt v. Hunt, 2 Beas. 161; Yauger v.

Mott v. Mott.

Skinner, 1 McCart. 389; Hill v. Day, 7 Stew. Eq. 150; Runk v. Morgan, 3 Dick. Ch. Rep. 415.

Whatever mental infirmity Mrs. Mott evidenced prior to the visit made by her to the defendant in 1888, and which will be considered in detail on another branch of the case, it cannot, in the light of the testimony of Judge Donohue and Dr. Eldridge, and the other witnesses as to her mental condition, at and about the time of the execution of the deed, be said that she did not possess sufficient mind to understand, in a reasonable manner, the nature and effect of the act she was engaged in, which is the test in such cases if unmixed with fraud. Hill v. Day, 7 Stew. Eq. 150; Earle v. Norfolk &c. Co., 9 Stew. Eq. 188; affirmed, 10 Stew. Eq. 315: Eaton v. Eaton, 8 Vr. 109. The complainant's attack on this conveyance solely on the ground of lunacy must

fail.

Conveyances by an aged parent to a child, in consideration of the agreement by the latter to support and provide for the former, are upheld if the transaction appears to have been free from fraud and the evidence does not show that confidence has been reposed by the infirm in the stronger, but does show that the parties dealt "at arm's length." Collins v. Collins, 18 Stew. Eq.

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Another principle, however, is to be applied when confidence has been reasonably reposed between the parties which may have

been abused.

In Low v. Holmes, Dru. t. Nap. 290 (at p. 320), the lord chancellor says: "It is not the duty of this court, and it may not be within its province, to rectify in all cases the various inequalities of contracting parties, or to undo the advantage which may be gained by the strong or sagacious over the weak and improvident, but in every relation which induces confidence and involves dependence it is the bounden duty of this court to see that such confidence is not abused."

In Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y. 268 (at p. 272), Gridley, J., says: "A court of equity interposes its benign jurisdiction to set aside instruments executed between persons standing in the relation of parent and child, guardian and ward, physician and patient,

Mott v. Mott.

solicitor and client, and various other relations in which one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the conduct and interest of another. In some cases undue influence will be inferred from the nature of the transaction alone, in others from the nature of the transaction and the exercise of occasional and habitual influence."

In Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91-99, Hand, J., says: "It may be stated as universally true that fraud vitiates all contracts, but as a general thing it is not presumed but must be proved by the party seeking to relieve himself from an obligation on that ground. Whenever, however, the relations between the contracting parties appear to be of such a character as to render it. certain that they do not deal on terms of equality, but that either on the one side from superior knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from overmastering influence, or on the other from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage in a transaction is rendered probable, there the burden is shifted, the transaction is presumed void, and it is incumbent upon the stronger party to show affirmatively that no deception was practiced, no undue influence was used, and that all was fair, open, voluntary and well understood."

The principle applies, and the rule of evidence is enforced in all transactions between persons occupying relations, whether legal, natural or conventional in their origin, in which confidence is naturally inspired, is presumed, or in fact reasonably exists.

"It is that great rule of the court that he who bargains in a matter of advantage with a person placing confidence in him, is bound to show that a reasonable use has been made of that confidence-a rule applying to trustees, attorneys, or anyone else." Lord Eldon, in Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266, 278. "The principle applicable to the more familiar relations of this character have been long settled by many well-known decisions, but the courts have always been careful not to fetter this useful condition by defending the exact limits of its exercise." Lord Chelmsford, in Tate v. Williamson, L. R. (2 Ch. App.) 55, 61. "The jurisdiction is founded on the principle of correcting abuses of confidence, and I shall have no hesitation in saying it

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