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horrence, and fortify the spectator in his aversion to such actions. When anger is immoderate, it cannot fail to produce the same effect.

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Final causes of the more frequent emotions and



T is a law in our nature, That we never act but

by the impulse of desire; which in other words is saying, that passion, by the desire included in it, is what determines the will. Hence in the conduct of life, it is of the utmost importance, that our passions be directed to proper objects, tend to just and rational ends, and with relation to each other be duly balanced. The beauty of contrivance, so conspicuous in the human frame, is not confined to the rational

part of our nature, but is visible over the whole. Concerning the passions in particular, however irregular, 'headstrong, and perverse, in a slight view, they may appear, I propose to show, that they are by nature modelled and tempered with admirable wisdomn, for the good of fociety as well as for private good. This subject is extenfive: but as the nature of the present undertaking will not admit a complete discussion, it Thall suffice to give a few observations in general upon the sensitive part of our nature, without regarding that strange irregularity of passion difcovered in some individuals. Such topical irre-. gularities, if I may use the term, cannot fairly be held an objection to the present theory: we are frequently, it is true, milled by inordinate passion; but we are also, and perhaps not less frequently, misled by wrong judgement.

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In order to a distinct apprehension of the present subject, it must be premised, that an agreeable cause produceth always a pleasant emotion; and a disagreeable cause, one that is painful. This is a general law of nature, which admits not a single exception : agreeableness in the cause, is indeed so essentially connected with pleasure in the emotion, its effect, that an agreeable cause cannot be better defined, than by its power of producing a pleasant emotion : and disagreeableness in the cause, has the fame necessary connection with pain in the emotion produced by it.

From this preliminary it appears, that in order to know for what end an emotion is made pleasant or painful, we must begin with inquiring for what end its cause is made agreeable or disagreeable. And with respect to inanimate objects, considered as the causes of emotions, many of them are made agreeable in order to make us happy; and it proves invincibly the benignity of the Deity, that we are placed in the midst of objects for the most part agreeable. But this is not all: the bulk of such objects, being of real

use in life, are made agreeable in order to excite our industry; witness a large tree, a well-dressed fallow, a rich field of grain, and others that may be named without end. On the other hand, it is not easy to specify a disagreeable object that is not at the same time detrimental : some things are made disagreeable, such as a rotten carcass, because they are noxious: others, a dirty marsh for example, or a barren heath, are made disagreeable in order, as above, to excite our industry. And with respect to the few things that are neither agreeable nor disagrecable, it will be made evident, that their being left indifferent is not a work of chance but of wisdom: of such I Thall have occasion to give several instances.

Because inanimate objects that are agreeable fix our attention, and draw us to them, they in that respect are termed attractive : such objects inspire pleasant emotions, which are gratified by adhering to the objects, and enjoying them. Because disagreeable objects of the same kind repel us from them, they in that respect are termed repulsive : and the painful emotions raised by such objects, are gratified by flying from them. Thus in general, with respect to things inanimate, the tendency of every pleasant emotion is to prolong the pleasure; and the tendency of every painful emotion is to end the pain.

Sensible beings considered as objects of passion, lçad into a more complex theory. A sensible being that is agreeable by its attributes, inspires


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us with a pleasant emotion accompanied with desire; and the question is, What is naturally the gratification of this desire ? Were man altogether selfish, his nature would lead him to indulge the pleasant emotion, without making any acknowledgement to the person who gives him pleafure, more than to a pure air or temperatė clime: but as man is endued with a principle of benevolence as well as of selfishness, he is prompted by his nature, to desire the good of every fenfible being that gives him pleasure; and the happiness of that being, is the gratification of his defire. The final cause of desire so directed, is illustrious: it contributes to a man's own happiness, by affording him means of gratification, beyond what felfishness can afford; and at the same time, it tends eminently to advance the happiness of others. This occasion's a beautiful coalition of felf-love with benevolence; for both are equally gratified by promoting the good of others. And this consideration, by the way, ought to silence certain minute philosophers, who, ignorant of human nature, teach a disgustful doctrine, That to serve others unless with a view to our own happiness, is weakness and folly; as if felf-love only, and not benevolence, contributed to our happiness. The hand of God is too visible in the human frame, to permit us to think seriously, that there ever can be any jarring or inconsistency among natural principles, those especially of self

love and benevolence, which regulate the bulk of our actions.

Next in order come sensible beings that are in affliction or pain. It being disagreeable to behold a person in distress, this person must raise in the spectator a painful passion; and were inan purely a selfish being, he would desire to be relieved from that pain, by turning from the object. But the principle of benevolence gives an opposite direction to his desire: it makes him desire to afford relief; and by relieving the perfon from distress, his passion is fully gratified. The painful passion thus directed, is termed sympathy; which, though painful, is yet in its nature attractive. And with respect to its final cause, we can be at no lofs: it not only tends to relieve a fellow-creature from pain, but in its gratification is greatly more pleasant than if it were repulsive.

We in the last place bring under consideration persons hateful by vice or wickedness. Imagine a wretch who has lately perpetrated some horrid crime: he is disagreeable to every spectator ; and consequently raiseth in every spectator a painful passion. What is the natural gratification of this passion? I must here again observe, that fupposing man to be entirely a selfish being, he would be prompted by his nature to relieve himself froni the pain, by averting his eye, and banishing the criminal from his thoughts. But man is not so constituted; he is composed of many principles,

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