The case is remitted to the Common Pleas Division, with direction to arrest the judgment. Doran & Flanagan, for plaintiff. Edward W. Blodgett and Thomas P. Corcoran, for defend ant. ANNIE R. ATWOOD vs. WILLIAM L. ARNOLD et al. PROVIDENCE-FEBRUARY 21, 1902. PRESENT: Stiness, C. J., Tillinghast and Rogers, JJ. (1) Dower. Inchoate Right. Although an inchoate right of dower is not an estate but only a right of action, still it is in the nature of a lien upon real estate and is treated as an incumbrance to be protected. (2) Dower. Mortgages. Assignment to Third Parties. Complainant had an inchoate right of dower in an undivided half of certain real estate owned by respondent A. Two mortgages on the estate were held by C., but had been transferred to her in part by funds advanced by A. and they were under his control. One of the mortgages had been made by complainant's husband, before her marriage; and the second after her marriage, in which she released dower. Her husband conveyed his half part of the property to A., but complainant did not join in the deed. Complainant brings her bill to redeem the mortgages and have them assigned to her under Gen. Laws cap. 207, § 7, to protect her contingent right of dower. A. objected on the ground that the mortgages were necessary to protect his interest and title:Held, that complainant was entitled to redeem, as A. stood in the place of the mortgagor, and under the statute the requisition of an incumbrancer should prevail over that of a mortgagor. BILL IN EQUITY to compel the assignment of certain mortgages under Gen. Laws cap. 207, § 7. Heard on bill and answer. Relief granted. STINESS, C. J. The complainant has an inchoate right of dower in an undivided half of the Apponaug hotel estate, owned by the respondent Arnold. Two mortgages on the estate are held by Nellie J. Charlton, but, as the answer admits, they were transferred to her in part by funds advanced by Arnold, and they are under his control. One of these (1) (2) mortgages was made by the complainant's husband, before her marriage; and the second after her marriage, in which she released dower. Her husband conveyed his half part of the property to Arnold, but in this deed the complainant did not join. She brings this bill to redeem the mortgages, and to have them assigned to her under Gen. Laws cap. 207, § 7, in order to protect her contingent right of dower; for, if the respondents should sell under the mortgages, the complainant would thereby lose her right in the property. The question raised is whether she has a right to redeem. ent Arnold objects to redemption by the complainant, upon the ground that the mortgages are necessary to protect his interest and title, and hence that his equity is stronger than that of the complainant. The respond Although an inchoate right of dower is not an estate but only a right of action, still it is in the nature of a lien upon real estate and is treated as an incumbrance to be protected. Davis v. Wetherell, 13 Allen, 60; Gatewood v. Gatewood, 75 Va. 407; Campbell v. Ellwanger, 88 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (81 Hun.) 259; Frisbee v. Frisbee, 86 Me. 444; Vaughan v. Dowden, 126 Ind. 406; Smith v. Hall, 30 Atl. Rep. 409. A right to redeem being established, Gen. Laws cap. 207, $7, provides for an assignment of the mortgage in lieu of a subrogation in equity. The only question raised in this case is the balancing of equities. The respondent Arnold admits that he has in part paid for the mortgages upon his own property, and that he has the control of them. He does not show how it is necessary to have them outstanding in order to protect his interests. Manifestly the complainant, in case of sale, would lose her right of dower. But Arnold replies that his interest is also liable to be sold under the mortgages. He, however, as owner of the property, can fully protect himself by payment of the mortgages, and he is the proper one to do this; while it would be unreasonable to require a payment and discharge by one who has so small an interest as the complainant. The owner may claim that in paying the mortgage he extinguishes complainant's release, and thereby enlarges her right to dower in the whole estate instead of dower in the equity of redemption. As that question is not now before us, it is enough to say that if these mortgages are to be treated as a part of the consideration paid for the estate, and so, to that extent, exempt from dower by reason of the release, the equity remains and can be applied when dower is claimed. If no such equity exists in favor of the owner, a payment does not harm him. We are therefore unable to see any prevailing equity in favor of the owner. But if he had it we do not see how it could avail, because he stands in the place of the mortgagor; and the statute provides that the requisition of an incumbrancer shall prevail over that of a mortgagor. One is not taken to be an incumbrancer upon his own property. We think the complainant is entitled to redeem. Doran & Flanagan, for complainant. FREDERICK BAUMLER VS. NARRAGANSETT BREWING COMPANY. PROVIDENCE-FEBRUARY 21, 1902. PRESENT: Stiness, C. J., Tillinghast and Rogers, JJ. (1) Negligence. Master and Servant. Assumed Risks. In an action for negligence against a master by a servant the declara- TRESPASS ON THE CASE for negligence. Heard on demur 23 611 23 611 26 127 (1) rer to amended declaration. case, 23 R. I. 430. Demurrer sustained. See same PER CURIAM. We fail to see any material difference in principle, between the allegations in the amended declaration and those which were contained in the original declaration. If it was necessary for the plaintiff "to assume a cramped position and to worm in" to the space underneath the vats, as now alleged, this fact must necessarily have been known to him as he entered. If the space was irregular, and there were blocks or supports which made it difficult for him to get in, or to move around after getting in, his senses must have given him due warning thereof; and hence he cannot complain that he had no means of knowledge of the smallness and irregularity of the space. He alleges that he felt and knew as he worked that it was exceedingly difficult to move his body along the different projecting blocks." Feeling and knowing the difficulty in which he was thus placed, however, he continued in his work until he finally became unable to extricate himself without injury. In view of these facts, we fail to see that it can be reasonably said that he did not fully and intelligently assume the risk incident to the work. As to the allegation that the plaintiff was unable to realize the danger because his attention was taken up with his difficult work," it is enough to say that the work of scrubbing a floor can hardly be considered so absorbing as to prevent the person engaged therein from taking notice of his surroundings, and from properly looking out for his own safety. In short, it cannot be claimed that there was any emergency connected with the doing of said work. And hence the case clearly does not come within the exception upon which plaintiff's counsel relies. The demurrer is sustained, and case remitted to the Common Pleas Division, with direction to enter judgment for the defendant for its costs. John Doran and T. H. Holton, for plaintiff. W. B. Vincent, for defendant. SIDNEY R. TABER et al. vs. WILLIAM H. HALL et al. PROVIDENCE-FEBRUARY 26, 1902. PRESENT: Stiness, C. J., Tillinghast and Rogers, JJ. (1) Of Boundary Lines of Land Covered by Public Tide-Water. Plats. Estoppel. In equitable proceedings under Gen. Laws cap. 266, for the settlement of the boundary lines of lands covered by public tide-water, it appeared that all of the tide-flowed land embraced in the suit lay between upland formerly owned by Joseph Burgess and the harbor line as now established. Joseph Burgess died in 1829, and his farm was divided by commissioners appointed by the Court of Probate in 1830-1. The commissioners set off to J. P. B. lot 6; to F. W. lot 5, next south of lot 6; to D. C. lot 4, next south of lot 5; and to J. B. lot 7, next north of lot 6; respondent H. acquired title to the tide-flowed lands appertaining to lot 6, and one Benjamin Allen acquired title to lots 4, 5, and 7, and to the tide-flowed lands appertaining thereto. These lots, as marked on the partition plat, extended only to high-water mark, and they were set off by their numbers on the plat, to which reference was had for quantity and boundaries. Subsequent to the partition, J. P. B. quitclaimed to Benjamin Allen all his interest north of his north line, describing the course, "and to continue said course to the channel of Providence river, or so far as they have a right so to do." This was accepted by Benjamin Allen. Said Allen had his upland and his interests in tide-flowed land platted in 1832 and again in 1856, both of which plats extended eastward to the harbor line as then established. The north line of the J. P. B. lot on said plats, being the southern line of the Allen north section, was delineated as a straight line from the P. turnpike to the harbor line as given on the Burgess division plat, which line had been agreed on by J. P. B. and Benjamin Allen. The south line of the J. P. B. lot, being the northerly line of the southern section of the Allen land on said Allen plats, was nearly parallel with the north line of said J. P. B. lot as delineated on the Joseph Burgess partition plat on the same course to the harbor line. On said Allen plats a street named Friend street was delineated on the north side of the southern section of the Allen land, being the south line of the J. P. B. land, half of said street being taken from each proprietor. The Allen land was conveyed by mesne conveyances to the petitioners. All of the conveyances made by the petitioners' predecessors in title described their north line as bounding on land of J. P. B. while recognizing the Allen plat, and the only conveyance made by petitioners bounded on the center line of Friend street and made no mention of the J. P. B. land. Neither respondent Hall nor his predecessors ever referred to the Allen plats, nor did respondent Hall or any of his prede |