serve evidence that an adequate price was paid, and that the transaction was in all respects fair, and such as a competent and independent adviser of the client would have approved of. Where these obligations are neglected, the suit of the client must be brought within twenty years, but an unexplained delay of less than that period may under the circumstances be a bar. Where nineteen years had elapsed, and the delay was accounted for, the heirs of the client were held entitled to relief. Oakes v. Smith, 17 Chy. 660; Champion v. Rigney, 1 R. & M. 539; Geo. Cooper, 204; Goddard v. Carlisle, 9 Pri. 180.

(9). Where the person claiming such land or rent, or the person through whom he claims, has become entitled, by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued when such forfeiture was incurred or such condition broken. C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 2 (5).

the last clause in section As the next sub-section

This was originally taken from 3 of 3 & 4 Will. IV. cap. 27, s. 2. has reference to the same subject of forfeiture, we refer the reader to notes on sub-section 10.

(10). Where any right to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover any land or rent, by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition, has first accrued in respect of any estate or interest in reversion or remainder, and the land or rent has not been recovered by virtue of such right, the right to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action to recover such land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued in respect of such estate or interest at the time when the same became an estate or interest in possession, as if no such forfeiture or breach of condition had happened. C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 4.

This sub-section is taken from section 4 of 3 & 4 Will. IV. cap. 27. Before that Statute it was held that though a remainder man expectant on an estate for life or years, to whom a right to bring an ejectment is given by the forfeiture of the tenant for life or years, may take immediate advantage of a forfeiture, yet he is not bound to do so; therefore, if he pursues his remedy within his time, after

the remainder attached, it will be sufficient. Nor can the Statute of Limitations be insisted on against him, for not coming within twenty years after his title accrued by the forfeiture. 1 Ves., Sen. 278; see Doe d. Allen v. Blakeway, 5 C. & P. 563.

Formerly it was held in Ireland, that where a landlord or those through whom he claims have received no rent for upwards of twenty years, under an existing lease containing an express clause of re-entry for the non-payment, he is barred, by the 2nd section of 3 & 4 Will. IV. cap. 27, from recovering either the land or the rent, the case falling expressly within that section. Doe d. Marmion v. Bingham, 3 I. L. R. 456. But this decision has been overruled. Cosbie v. Sugrue, 9 I. L. R. 17; Parke v. McCloughlin, 1 Ir. C. L. R. 186; Spratt v. Sherlock, 3 Ir. C. L. R. 69. It has been suggested that under such a clause in England, a fresh right to re-enter accrues every time a fresh default in payment of rent is made. Darb. & Bos. Stat. Lim. 251; Doe v. Bliss, 4 Taunt. 725; Macher v. Foundling Hospital, 1 Ves. & B. 191.

Thus A., tenant for years under a lease with a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent; B., tenant for life, at the expiration of A.'s tenancy: the right shall be deemed to have first accrued to B. at the end of A.'s term of years, although A. might not have paid the rent in the meantime.

It was held that a condition of re-entry, on breach of covenants in a lease, could only operate during the continuance of the lease; when that was determined the proviso was gone, and the reversioner having never been in possession by right of re-entry for the condition broken, could not take advantage of it, and that the lessee who had sown the land was entitled to emblements. Johns v. Whitley, 3 Wills. 127.

As to notice of condition: where a party is really ignorant of the existence of an instrument in which the condition is contained, and where he would have a good title if there

were no such instrument, a neglect of the terms of the condition will not subject him to a loss of the estate; and the party entitled to avail himself of the condition must take care to make it known to the person who was to comply with it. Frances' case, 8 Rep. 89 b; Shep. T. 148; Mallon v. Fitzgerald, 3 Mod. 28; Skin. 125; Doe d. Kenrick v. Lord W. Beauclerck, 11 East. 657. An heir at law to whom a devise is made upon condition, is not liable to lose his estate by a breach of the condition, unless he has notice of the devise which contains it; and the onus of proving that the notice has been given lies upon the party entitled to the benefit of the breach of the condition. Doe d. Taylor v. Crish, 1 P. & D. 37; 8 Ad. & Ell. 779; 2 Jur. 943.

Particular case with regard to forfeiture of an agreement to purchase land for the purpose of boring for oil. Marcus v. Smith, 17 C. P. 416; also McCord v. Harper, 26 C. P. 96; Cameron v. Barnhart, 14 Chy. 661.

A woman after a second marriage cannot, without her husband's consent, release her right to dower in lands of her first husband. Howard v. Wilson, 10 Q. B. 186; affirmed in McGill v. Squire, 13 Q. B. 550; vide Williams v. The Commissioners of the Cobourg Town Trust, 23 Q. B. 330.

Forfeiture of dower by adultery. Under the Statute of 13 Ed. I. ch. 34, and Westminster II., the question of bar of dower by adultery first arose in our courts in Graham v. Law, 6 C. P. 310, where it was held that a wife abandoned by her husband, and subsequently guilty of adultery, did not bar her dower. This was overruled in the cases of Woolsey v. Finch, 20 C. P. 132; Neff v. Thompson, 20 C. P. 211; where the court, following the decision in England of Woodward v. Dowse, 10 C. B. N. S. 722, decided that "it is the voluntary living apart in adultery that deprives a wife of dower, whether leaving the husband's roof was sua sponte or in consequence of his violence, or whether he abandoned her without provision."

(11). Where the estate or interest claimed is an estate or interest in reversion or remainder, or other future estate or interest, and no person has obtained the possession or receipt of the profits of such land, or the receipt of such rent, in respect of such estate or interest, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which such estate or interest became an estate or interest in possession. C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 2. (4).

This sub-section is taken from the 4th branch of section 3 of 3 & 4 Will. IV. cap. 27. The words "or other future estate or interest," will comprehend all executory devises. James v. Salter, 3 Bing N. C. 554; Doe d. Johnson v. Liversedge, 11 M. & W. 517.

In 1788, estates were settled by marriage settlement to the use of the wife for life, with remainder to her issue in tail, with remainder to the settlor, whose heiress at law she was in fee. In 1818, by deeds to which the husband and wife, and their only son R. G., were parties, and by a recovery suffered in pursuance thereof, the estates were limited to the use of the husband for life, remainder to the wife for life, remainder to R. G. the son for life, remainder to his issue in tail, remainder to J. F. his sister for life, with other remainders over. The husband died in 1819, the wife in 1822, and R. G. in 1828; it was held that inasmuch as the estate of J. F. was carved out of the estate by R. G., she had the same period for bringing ejectment in respect of any estates comprized in the above deeds, as he would have had, if he had continued alive, viz., twenty years from the year 1822, when his remainder came into possession. The effect of the deed of 1818, and of recovery, was to bar all remainders over, and to create new estates out of his estate tail. Doe d. Curzon v. Edmonds, 6 M. & W. 295; vide also Darb. & Bos. Stat. Lim. 236–242; also Doe d. Davey v. Oxhenham, 7 M. & W. 131; Grant v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113; Doe d. Newman v. Godsill, 5 Jur. 170; 4 Q. B. 603, n.

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In Jumpsen v. Pitchers, 13 Sim. 327, a husband and wife, seised in fee in right of the wife, conveyed to a purchaser by a conveyance not operative to bind her, it was held that the right of the wife came within the 4th branch of sec. 3 (the present sub-section Ontario Statute), and that she herself, if she should survive her husband, and if not, her heir, could recover the land notwithstanding the purchaser may have been in possession for forty years.

(12). A right to make an entry or a distress, or to bring an action or a suit, to recover any land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued, in respect of an estate or interest in reversion or remainder, or other future estate or interest, at the time at which the same became an estate or interest in possession, by the determination of any estate or estates in respect of which such land has been held or the profits thereof or such rent have been received, notwithstanding that the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom he claims, has, at any time previously to the creation of the estate or estates which have determined, been in the possession or receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent, 38 Vic. cap. 16, s. 2.

6. If the person last entitled to any particular estate on which any future estate or interest was expectant has not been in the possession or receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent, at the time when his interest determined, no such entry or distress shall be made, and no such action or suit shall be brought, by any person becoming entitled in possession to a future estate or interest, but within ten years next after the time when the right to make an entry or distress, or to bring an action or suit for the recovery of such land or rent, first accrued to the person whose interest has so determined, or within five years next after the time when the estate of the person becoming entitled in possession has become vested in possession, whichever of those two periods is the longer. 38 Vic. cap. 16 s. 3.

Sub-sections 1 & 2 of section 6 are taken from the English Statute 37 & 38 Vic. cap. 57, being the latter part of sec. 2 of that Act.

Our Canadian Statute has divided the section into two parts, and has added sub-sec. 3, which was taken from C. S. U. C. cap. 88, s. 48. Mr. Charley thus speaks of the

enactment: